Bodily perception of our hands, feet, and whole body
Abstract
This thesis examines differences in sensing, imagining and feelings towards our hands,
feet, and whole body in healthy participants, via three online experimental studies. The
first chapter describes the theoretical background used to develop this thesis,
encompassing the most up-to-date theories on body representation that form the basis of
our knowledge on the topic.
The second chapter (sensing) describes a study exploring whether spontaneous sensations
(SPS), in other words, sensations we feel without external stimulation, differ between our
hands, feet and whole body. This study also explores whether visual attention influences
the experience of SPS. One hundred and seventy-five individuals completed an SPS task
measuring the general tendency to experience SPS (SPSTrait) and the experience of SPS
in a precise moment (SPSState), along with an endogenous visual attention task. The results
show that the SPS experience differs between the precise moment and the general
tendency, and across our body districts. My findings show that we tend to experience
SPS, in general, more strongly in our whole body than our feet (SPSTrait), while our in-the-moment attention to SPS (SPSState) is the same across the body districts. This
experience does not depend on visual attention differences.
The study described in the third chapter (imagining) explores whether the representation
of the body in action, measured via motor imagery, differs between our hands, feet, and
whole body depending on the levels of awareness required by the task administered. Sixty
participants completed a series of Implicit Association Tests (a more implicit motor
imagery task), a Mental Motor Chronometry task (a more explicit motor imagery task),
and a visual imagery questionnaire. All tasks targeted the representation of hands, feet
and whole body. The results show that when the task requires less awareness to be solved,
in other words, it is more implicit, there are no differences between hands, feet and whole
body. While differences can be found when more awareness of our own body
representation and related processes is required, with a stronger motor imagery for the
hands than the whole body. This finding is not due to visual imagery differences, as
demonstrated by the results of the visual imagery questionnaire I administered.
The study described in the fourth chapter (feelings towards our body) adopts a similar
approach to the previous one, but this time I focused on emotional body representations,
measured via body image. I explored whether these representations differ in our hands,
feet, and whole body, considering more implicit and explicit levels of awareness. Sixty-seven participants completed a series of Implicit Association Tests (a more implicit body
image task) and a Body Image Satisfaction Visual Analogue Scale (a more explicit body
image task) for hands, feet and whole body. The results show no differences in the more
implicit level of awareness in hands, feet and whole body, while differences are apparent
at a more explicit level of awareness, with higher scores for body image satisfaction for
the hands than the whole body and marginally significant lower scores for feet than hands.
In the fifth and final chapter, a general discussion of the findings, their novelty and the
impact on applications of body representation is presented. Overall, my studies show that
the mental representations of our hands, feet and whole body are different. Hands appear
to have a more pronounced effect on our body representation at a more explicit level of
awareness and at imagining and feelings towards our body representational levels. This
suggests the possibility of a separate and different representation for hands, depending on
the level of awareness (more explicit) and representation (imagining/feelings towards our
body)