On terrorist strategy in domestic conflictsm
Abstract
This thesis contains three papers on the economic study of domestic terrorism.
Domestic terrorism is the most prevalent form of terrorism, yet, when compared to
transnational terrorism, is understudied in the literature. This thesis makes two game
theoretic and one econometric contribution to this literature. Chapter 3 presents a model
of how a revolutionary terrorist interacts with both governments and members of
society. This model shows that societies adverse to violence can incentivise reductions
in terrorism but can also induce escalations of violence and lax government responses.
Chapter 4 contributes to the signalling literature, by painting a revolutionary terrorist
that has both political and militant wings. The leadership of this organisation favours
one wing over the other and attempts to signal this preference to its rivals. This model
shows that terrorist organisations are more likely to signal their true type to adversaries
who have access to similar levels of resources. Finally, Chapter 5 uses duration
modelling to test the interaction of rival terrorist organisations operating during The
Troubles in Northern Ireland in the late-20th century, showing that both the main
Republican and Loyalist players deviated from their local and temporal strategies to
interact with each other.