On terrorist strategy in domestic conflictsm

Abstract

This thesis contains three papers on the economic study of domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism is the most prevalent form of terrorism, yet, when compared to transnational terrorism, is understudied in the literature. This thesis makes two game theoretic and one econometric contribution to this literature. Chapter 3 presents a model of how a revolutionary terrorist interacts with both governments and members of society. This model shows that societies adverse to violence can incentivise reductions in terrorism but can also induce escalations of violence and lax government responses. Chapter 4 contributes to the signalling literature, by painting a revolutionary terrorist that has both political and militant wings. The leadership of this organisation favours one wing over the other and attempts to signal this preference to its rivals. This model shows that terrorist organisations are more likely to signal their true type to adversaries who have access to similar levels of resources. Finally, Chapter 5 uses duration modelling to test the interaction of rival terrorist organisations operating during The Troubles in Northern Ireland in the late-20th century, showing that both the main Republican and Loyalist players deviated from their local and temporal strategies to interact with each other.