A Critical Institutionalist Analysis of Youth Participation in Jordan’s Spatial Planning

The case of Amman 2025

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh
School of Energy, Geoscience, Infrastructure and Society

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Abstract

By 2050, it is estimated that 84% of the population in the Global South will be living in urban areas. As a country of the Global South, Jordan has experienced dramatic growth of urban areas over the past decades. Cities in Jordan contain 83% of the population, of which, it is estimated, 24% are in the age group 15–24. Youth input, effort and experience in the planning process are recognised by academic research and international aid donors as a significant element in catalysing positive social and economic change and ensuring sustainable development across the Global South. Consequently, this research aims to investigate whether young groups’ vision and aspirations for, and perspectives on the city of Amman were translated into strategies or projects in urban policy. In doing so, it aims to explore the wide range of institutional challenges and opportunities that either hinder or encourage youth participation in policymaking.

To achieve this aim, this study followed the inductive–deductive cycle of knowledge. This research starts with a critical literature review of theories in planning, governance, youth participation and spatial planning in Jordan. Healey’s systemic institutional design for collaborative planning was employed to critically analyse the planning system (hard infrastructure) and planning practice (soft infrastructure) within the chosen case study of Amman 2025. Amman 2025 is a significant and unique strategic spatial planning project in Jordan designed to encourage public participation in the policymaking process regarding urban development in Amman. New primary data were collected through extensive qualitative research in the form of semi-structured interviews and focus groups to cover the period from the start of Amman 2025, in 2006, to the conducting of data collection in 2015. With the research objectives in mind, a thematic analysis was conducted to identify salient themes in order to address the research aims.

The findings of this study show that youth participation in Jordan is neither inherent in the legal, political and administrative framework of the planning system nor in the embedded institutional settings within the planning practice of Jordan. Most importantly, cultural imperialism in Jordan weakens young people’s chances of being considered for any decision-making roles relevant to planning activities. Enhancing youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan requires the institutional capacity of urban governance to be built up to enable a more collaborative planning practice, in addition to applying principles of good governance in the planning system.
Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the many people and institutions who contributed to this research. In particular, the author would like to thank his mum, Swsan Mashal, and his dad, Freih Zeadat. Also, the author would like to thank his aunts Hila and Helda Zeadat for their continuous support.

Also, the author acknowledges the support of both his supervisors, Dr Chris McWilliams and Dr Ryan Woolrych, for their cooperation and help and for providing the author with assistance during the course of this research.
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<td>Ai</td>
<td>Amman Institute for Urban Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJYC</td>
<td>All Jordan Youth Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency, United States</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Corridor Intensification Strategy</td>
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<td>CPU</td>
<td>Comprehensive Planning Unit</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>CSBE</td>
<td>Center for the Study of the Built Environment</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>civil society organisations</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>corporate social responsibility</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan University</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of Statistics</td>
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<td>EGIS</td>
<td>School of Energy, Geoscience, Infrastructure and Society (at Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh)</td>
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<td>FBOs</td>
<td>faith-based organisations</td>
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<td>GACDP</td>
<td>Greater Amman Comprehensive Development Plan</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Greater Amman Municipality</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>geographical information systems</td>
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<td>GoJ</td>
<td>Government of Jordan</td>
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<td>HCY</td>
<td>Higher Council for Youth</td>
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<td>HDMU</td>
<td>high-density, mixed-use development</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>HRD Strategy</td>
<td>Human Resources Development Strategy</td>
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<td>information and communication technologies</td>
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<td>Interim Growth Strategy</td>
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<td>University of Jordan</td>
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<td>LDU</td>
<td>Local Development Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBO</td>
<td>management-by-objectives</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MGS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Growth Strategy</td>
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<td>Ministry of Youth</td>
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<td>National Youth Strategy</td>
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<td>OSP</td>
<td>Outlying Settlements Policy</td>
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<td>RHC</td>
<td>Royal Hashemite Court</td>
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<td>RINGOs</td>
<td>royal non-government organisations</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Developement</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Chapter 1: Research overview
1.1 Youth participation in spatial planning

It is meaningful to present the concept of youth participation in spatial planning at the beginning of this thesis. Presenting the literature on youth participation in spatial planning will aid the reader to understand the overarching context of the study and the literature that significantly informed the research aims and objectives.

Sustainable urban interventions require physical planning (i.e., land-use planning) to be integrated with other public policy sectors in decision-making (Kidd, 2007). Traditionally, spatial planning has encouraged the integration of three strands of thought: economic planning; physical development (i.e., buildings and spaces); and public administration and policy analysis (Healey, 2006a, p.10). In this regard, spatial planning has been perceived as a field of public policy (Healey, 2006a, p.73) that embraces a multitude of activities and processes “to guide the location of development and physical infrastructure. It consists of a set of governance practices for developing and implementing strategies, plans, policies and projects, and for regulating the location, timing and form of development” (Healey et al., 1998, p.4).

As a field of public policy and practice, spatial planning has been viewed as an aggregation of formal organisations and informal relationships undertaken in a social context, rather than a merely techno-corporatist process of design, analysis and management of the public realm (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010). According to Tewdwr-Jones (2012, p.1), spatial planning ought to be a ‘multivocal’ strategy, owned by all stakeholders who have interest in the land and what happens to it. Public participation in shaping and making public policy (implicitly, in spatial planning) is an integral part of a democratic society and of achieving principles of good governance (Simão, 2008, p.ii; Yaghi, 2008; Riggio, 2002). The concept of participation is grounded in democratic theory (Percy-Smith, 2010; Connelly, 2009; Simão, 2008, p.45; Lane, 2005), where it has been understood as a philosophical framework through which to understand the relationship between individuals and their societies as a whole (Oyedemi, 2015; Bohnet et al., 2010). For Arnstein (1969), participation is when the underprivileged have an impact on decisions affecting their lives (Sakil, 2017; Wilks and Rudner, 2013). Participation is identified by the Scottish Government to be a prerequisite to achieving genuine sustainable development, in which a wide range of actors from the market and the community, along with the state, work collaboratively.

... [G]iving people a genuine opportunity to have a say on a development plan or proposal which affects them; listening to what they say and reaching a decision in an open and transparent way taking account of all views expressed.

These arguments share a common understanding in which people are engaged in institutions and the formation of decisions that affect them (Yoldaş, 2015; Churchman, 2003). In this regard, youth participation is understood as a mechanism that involves young people expressing their interests and fulfilling their potential at the institutional and community levels (Derr, 2015; Richards-Schuster and Pritzker, 2015; Chawla and Driskell, 2006; Frank, 2006). Youth participation is concerned with the power of young people to shape the institutions and decisions that affect their lives as a group (Heinrich and Million, 2016; Cushing, 2015; Checkoway, 2011; Checkoway et al., 2005; Checkoway, 1998). Most definitions of youth participation in urban development are enshrined in the literature on human rights (Wood, 2015; Hinton, 2008) – for instance, the right to shape the city and in so doing shape the institutional and planning frameworks that govern city development (Wilks and Rudner, 2013; Woolrych and Sixsmith, 2013; Bohnet et al., 2010; Simpson, 1997).

Head (2011) stated that rights, efficiency and development are the three main rationales underpinning youth participation. The concept of youth participation gained momentum in practice after the widespread ratification of two main global agreements (Richards-Schuster and Pritzker, 2015; Severcan, 2015; Percy-Smith, 2010; Hinton, 2008). The first was the endorsement of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in Istanbul in 1996, and the World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond (1995) (Wood, 2015; Phaswana, 2008, p.23). The CRC outlined a framework setting the basic requirements for strengthening youth participation in civic engagement (Richards-Schuster and Pritzker, 2015; Head, 2011; Hinton, 2008; Chawla and Driskell, 2006; Simpson, 1997). Both conventions
emphasised that youth are fully fledged persons and have the right to actively engage in any political processes and decisions that affect their lives (Checkoway, 2011; Percy-Smith, 2010; Hinton, 2008).

Theories of youth participation began with Roger Hart’s ‘ladder’ of forms of participatory engagement (Hart, 1997, 1992). Hart (1992) believed that youth participation is a critical “standard against which democracies should be measured”. Hart (1992) also described youth participation as “the process of sharing decisions which affect [youth] life and the life of the community in which one lives” (p.5). Hart developed his ‘ladder of youth participation’ following the classification of different types of participation suggested in Arnstein’s (1969) oft-cited ‘ladder of participation’ (Wilks and Rudner, 2013; Checkoway, 2011). Hart outlined an eight-point typology through which youth participation could be categorised and evaluated (Head, 2011) (see appendix 1). The model depicts non-participation and tokenistic form of engagement on the bottom rung of the ladder, participation in the middle, and youth power and leadership at the top (Head, 2011; Phaswana, 2008, p.27). In this research, Hart’s model was used as a meaningful conceptual framework that provides a clear conceptualisation of tokenistic youth participation within the Jordanian context as related to the Amman 2025 decision-making process.

Thomas (2006) distinguished between two forms of youth participation: ‘individual' and 'collective' participation (Phaswana, 2008, p.23). In accordance with these definitions, this research focuses mainly on the collective agency of youth to ensure greater youth input in Jordanian spatial planning. For Bandura (2006), collective agency refers to youth communities when they “pool their knowledge, skills, and resources, and act in concert to shape their future” (p.165).1 Healey (2006a, p.84) used the term ‘political capital’; this is accrued where youth, or other social groups, can act collectively on specific issues that have an influence on their future.

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1 In accordance with Thomas (2006), Bandura (2006) distinguishes between three modes of agency: individual, proxy and collective. The first category, individual agency, is when people rely on their influence to achieve the outcomes they desire. Proxy agency is when people resort to others who possess the knowledge, resources and means to attain the outcomes they desire. However, the things people seek are only achievable if they work interdependently. Interrelationship is referred to as collective agency. Bandura (2006) believed that human beings practise the three forms of agency on a daily basis no matter what cultural context they belong to.
1.1.1 The importance of youth participation in spatial planning

In an increasingly urban world, youth provide both a tremendous challenge and a great opportunity to benefit from this demographic dividend (Ai, 2010). The literature on youth participation has entailed various personal and social benefits of youth participation in planning (Heinrich and Million, 2016). Youth participation in the developing world has been utilised as a vehicle to enhance the well-being and development of youth (Sakil, 2017; Yoldaş, 2015; Frank, 2006). When youth are engaged in collaborative decision-making exercises, participation can have direct and powerful personal effects for young participants (Cushing, 2015; Wilks and Rudner, 2013; Checkoway, 2011). It provides youth with civic competences and substantive knowledge, enhancing skills and building confidence (Yoldaş, 2015; Barbosa et al., 2014). Further, young people learn to debate, think critically and tackle issues collaboratively within other social groups (Churchman, 2010; Matthew, 2003, cited in Phaswana, 2008, p.33). These self-development attributes are vital to youth in relation to future career prospects, college access or other opportunities to develop social status (Collins et al., 2016; Wilks and Rudner, 2013).

At the societal level, youth participation has the potential to promote social learning and broaden civic entrepreneurship and is thus likely to enhance democracy (Checkoway, 2011, 1998, 1994; Head, 2011). The generic outcomes reported are similar to other forms of participation, such as enhancing citizenship or delivering an equal distribution of development benefits among all classes within a society. Other planning scholars have posited that planning, delivery and evaluation of services will be more efficient and effective if young people’s perspectives are engaged (Cavet and Sloper, 2004).

According to Collins and colleagues (2016) and Kudva and Driskell (2009), youth have the potential to promote the positive growth and development of their communities. Thus, the perception of youth in this research can be positioned within the ‘youth as resource’ perspective (Roth and Brooks-Gunn, 2003), with the underlying assumption that young people are capable of bringing a unique contribution to their society and the communities in which they live (Yoldaş, 2015; Percy-Smith, 2010; Frank, 2006; Churchman, 2003). Involving youth in planning decisions in the communities in which they live has been recognised as essential to delivering the outcomes of sustainable
urban products (Wilks and Rudner, 2013; Bohnet et al., 2010; Kudva and Driskell, 2009). Therefore, many international development agencies recognise the importance of youth in the prosperity of the cities of the Global South. Youth engagement projects, whether for consensus building or the fulfilment of certain funding requirements, enrich the quality of the final products (Richards-Schuster and Pritzker, 2015; Barbosa et al., 2014; Bohnet et al., 2010).

1.2 Research problem

Youth are the future of any society. In the Global South, youth make up the vast majority of the urban population (Cheney, 2013). Nevertheless, young people’s voices are often not heard in urban development planning (Osborne et al., 2017; Sakil, 2017; Wood, 2016, p.1; Cushing, 2015; Derr, 2015; Kudva and Driskell, 2009). Moreover, limited research has focused on young people living in the Global South in comparison to their counterparts in the Global North (Philipps, 2018). With high rates of population growth, Jordan is faced with unprecedented challenges in managing the country’s land and urban development (Tewfik and Amr, 2014). The issue of rapid and haphazard horizontal urban expansion has become a challenge for urban planners in Amman and other major cities in Jordan (see appendix 2-2) (Alnsour, 2016; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Bagaeen, 2006a). The geopolitical instability that has destabilised the Middle East has had a significant impact on the growth and development of the main Jordanian cities (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011; Potter et al., 2009). Jordan has been a relatively secure destination for refugees who have fled their homes in hope of a prosperous future (Al Nammari, 2013; Ababsa, 2010). In this regard, public

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2 The terms Global South/North are widely used in the development literature, and they have been used interchangeably with other, similar terms such as East/West, and developing and developed countries (Shawash, 2011, p.23). For the purposes of this research, the term Global North is used to refer to wealthy states with high socio-economic profiles according to World Bank indicators. Mainly, countries of the North have a long, well-established history of being researched in academia. Although this terminology is used widely in the development and governance literature, it has been criticised for its problematic and naive division between poor, ‘backward’ states (Global South) and wealthy, modern states (Global North) (Drakakis-Smith, 2000, pp.4–6, cited in Weber, 2007, p.1).

3 According to the Department of Statistics (DoS, Jordan), Jordan’s population grew by 87% during the period 2006–2016. Its population in 2004 was 5.1 million, increasing by 4.4 million to reach 9.5 million in 2015 (Jordan Times, 22/02/2016).

4 Refugees have travelled to Jordan following many incidents of political instability in the Middle East. This political instability includes the Arab–Israeli conflicts in 1984, the Civil War in Lebanon in 1975, the First Gulf War in 1991, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ripple effect of the so-called Arab Spring in Syria, Egypt and Libya. As a result, Jordan is weighed down by an exploding urban population spurred by refugees from these countries.
participation in policymaking is deemed critical in ensuring fairness and justice in
development, and in promoting legitimacy and mutual understanding throughout the
decision-making process (Callahan, 2007). Therefore, public participation in the public
realm is significant in addressing the major challenges facing Jordan and its people.

Commensurate with a postmodern⁵ view of spatial planning, this study believes that
young Jordanians should influence decisions that may affect their well-being. The
weakness of youth participation in Jordan is concerning. This research argues that
marginalising youth from the planning process is inimical to the sustainable
development and stability of Jordan and the region. Many planning researchers in
Jordan have depicted Jordan’s urban governance⁶ as centrally controlled and highly
bureaucratic (Al Rabady et al., 2014; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012). The deficiencies of
development plans, regarding a lack of public and youth input, negatively affect the
progress and welfare of Jordanian youth. This study aims to explore the issue of youth
marginalisation in Jordan and recommends ways to promote their involvement in the
planning process.

1.3 Research importance
Young people comprise a significant portion of Jordanian communities.⁷ Planning has
a significant impact on youth since they will experience the consequences of the

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⁵ Both modernism and postmodernism are interrelated methods of philosophical thought that have an
impact on the fields of architecture, art, urban design, urban planning, etc. (Goodchild, 1990). In terms
of urban planning, modernists believe that scientific methodologies provide the necessary rationality and
logic to address urban issues and promote quality of life (Allmendinger, 2017, p.169). However,
postmodernist urban planners question the capability of instrumental rationality (i.e., large-scale, utopian
and technical urban plans), delivered through bureaucratic government structures, to ensure social equity
and satisfy the variety of interests in city plans (Goodchild, 1990; Beauregard, 1989). Postmodernism is
“concerned with a critical deconstruction of tradition [...] In short, it seeks [...] to explore rather than
conceal social and political affiliation” (Dear, 1986, p.373). This implies that postmodernism does not
reject modernism, yet it responds to critiques and issues in modernism such as totalitarianism as favoured
by synoptic comprehensive planning and economic concentration (Goodchild, 1990). Postmodernism
emphasises the importance of diversity, and the possibility of building consensus among diverse
interests. However, the translation of postmodern social theory to planning has met with much criticism.
Critics believe that postmodernism is turning planning into fictitious enterprise fraught with difficulty
(Allmendinger, 2017, p.180). A further discussion on paradigm shifts in planning and criticism of the
postmodern approach to planning are provided in chapter two, in section 2.2 and subsection 2.3.3
respectively.

⁶ Following the sociological perspective on institutionalist analysis, this research views urban governance
as the management of the common affairs of political communities in a locality. Thus, it transcends the
boundaries of formal institutions of government to include the wider relational webs of economic and
social factors (Healey, 2006a, p.290).

⁷ Nearly 70% of Jordan’s population are under the age of 30 (see table A2-1, appendix 2-1).
decisions the longest (Frank, 2006). Nevertheless, Jordanian youth\textsuperscript{8} have to date only acquired a modest representation in both the political milieu and the formal planning process (Droz-Vincent, 2011; Jarrah, 2009). This research is important as it draws attention to youth in Jordan and the importance of their involvement in a country experiencing a critical economic and political situation (Sakil, 2017; Wilks and Rudner, 2013; Ali and Al Nsairat, 2009; Kudva and Driskell, 2009).

Youth, a key asset of the Jordanian community, can contribute to its power to promote sustainable development. Economically, Jordan is a country of the Global South with mostly arid desert land and extremely limited natural resources, surrounded by politically unstable countries (Nazzal, 2005, p.3). These hurdles are major challenges to economic development in Jordan. In order to ensure sustainable development, the Government of Jordan (GoJ) launched a series of initiatives and projects to invest in human resources. Following the directives of King Abdullah II presented in the Seventh Discussion Paper, the GoJ launched the Human Resources Development Strategy 2016–2025 (HRD Strategy) (NCHRD, 2016). The vision is to establish talent-driven prosperity. The HRD Strategy aims to channel more investment into Jordanian development, with particular attention to Jordanian youth as vital to Jordan’s long-term stability (Day, 2017). This study is commensurate with the aims and goals of the HRD strategy, because it focuses on and draws attention to the importance of investing in Jordanian youth. This research considers that Jordan’s significant numbers of young people are an opportunity: a long-term investment for Jordan. As discussed in subsection 1.1.1, above, youth engagement projects bring benefits to the individual development of young people as well as their communities at large.

Politically, this research is timely in the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011. Observers see that the deteriorating regional situation following the Arab Spring has profoundly altered the political landscape in Jordan (Köprülü, 2014). Jordan was not hermetically sealed against the social unrest in the region (Coskun, 2013). The Arab Spring has mobilised Jordanian youth to organise, ask and protest for a better and more prosperous future and to be present in policymaking (Beck and Hüser, 2015; Köprülü, 2014).

\textsuperscript{8} The age range chosen for youth to be invited to participate in the research is 18 to 25 years. This age category comprises those who have completed their schooling and are politically and legally eligible to be involved in public politics. Members of this group are more susceptible to livelihood and unemployment challenges after finishing mandatory schooling in Jordan (Górak-Sosnowska, 2010).
Politically motivated youth movements have persuaded the government to democratise and strengthen the public sphere and to cede more power to civil society (Shawash, 2011, p.21). Democratisation in Jordan requires politicians and policymakers in Jordan to create institutional space to encourage youth, the largest population group in Jordanian society, to participate in the public realm.

Practically, this research is significant in helping policymakers craft future government policy on urban development that allows greater youth input into spatial plans as a field in public policy. Chapter seven includes a set of recommendations that planning institutions could employ to address challenges to youth participation in Jordanian spatial planning.

1.4 Research rationale

There is a growing body of research on public participation in spatial planning and urban development (Brabham, 2009; Lane, 2005; Keung, 1990, p.34). Nevertheless, the theoretical underpinnings of youth participation are still underdeveloped (Richards-Schuster and Pritzker, 2015; Wood, 2015; Wilks and Rudner, 2013; Hinton, 2008; Frank, 2006; Cavet and Sloper, 2004), particularly regarding youth in the Global South (Philipps, 2018; Phaswana, 2008, p.17). Accordingly, this study aims to enhance our understanding of the challenges of institutional design to safeguard long-term youth involvement in development planning in Jordan.

In terms of contributions to knowledge, this study provides an opportunity to produce original material and data that can support future research on issues of urban development in Amman and, generally, spatial planning in Jordan. This study brings together ideas, research methods and theories from different areas of research in development governance, youth empowerment and agency, and development institutions,9 including social science, architecture, urban planning and geography. Working in the context of a developing country is a challenging task (Shawash, 2011, p.23). There is insufficient material for academic research on urban development planning in Jordan (Khirfan and Momani, 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Bagaeen,

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9 Institutions, in this context, are understood as the “norms of behaviours and routines of practice embedded in particular histories and geographies” (Healey, 2006a, p.324).
In terms of theoretical impact, this research is unique as it analyses youth participation in Jordan from the ‘neo-institutionalist’ perspective away from common political economy approaches, which is followed by international aid donors (i.e., United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)) to design community empowerment policies in the Global South (Hasan, 2012).Political economy approaches analyse youth participation using a normative concept of power (i.e., the analysis of zero-sum power) that fails to fully understand how social or cultural forces have an impact on youth participation in urban development decision-making (Hasan, 2012, p.241). Analysing youth participation from the perspective of institutionalist approaches provides a comprehensive analysis of the given urban development context (see subsection 2.4.1, chapter two). It also provides suggestions for future researchers interested in strengthening and institutionalising youth participation rights in urban development planning.

In terms of practical impact, this research aims to assist donor agencies, policy advisors and planners working in Jordan to promote youth involvement in spatial planning. This study identifies strategies suitable for achieving greater youth participation in the public realm of Jordan (chapter seven). Its recommendations offer opportunities for policy and practice in the city of Amman that are compatible with the institutional context of Jordan.

1.5 Research motivation

The main motivation for conducting this study lies in the researcher’s genuine desire to enhance the social well-being of youth in Jordan. As an urban planner, the author has an ethical commitment to enabling all segments of Jordanian society to have a ‘voice’ in planning. In this work, the researcher stands as an advocate of an inclusionary perspective on spatial planning in Jordan: a spatial planning attentive to social justice, qualities of place and sustainability. This inclusionary vision was inspired by the view

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10 See France and Threadgold, 2016; Côté, 2014.
11 The term ‘qualities of place’ within an urban region refers not only to assets, but also to the relational capacity of an urban region – an urban governance that is inclusive, just and sustainable, not merely a set of architectural aesthetics or a ‘utopian’ image of a city (Healey, 1999).
of Herbert Gans, who argued that planners have a moral responsibility to improve the lives of the disadvantaged (Healey, 2006a, p.25).

In addition to the above-mentioned inspiration, this interest has been developed throughout the researcher’s life experience. The challenges the researcher encountered when he lived in Amman led him to investigate the roots of youth marginalisation in the public realm. Despite the high numbers of youth in the population of Jordan, recognition of them in the development agenda is still insufficient (Ismayilova et al., 2013; Shirazi, 2012). In terms of urban development, the researcher believes that youth have the right to exercise participation at all levels of development, from the municipal level to the drawing up of national policies (Wood, 2015; Percy-Smith, 2010; Hinton, 2008; Churchman, 2003).

1.6 Scope of the study

This section presents the scope of the study regarding time, place, institutions and people. Firstly, although the research is placed under the rubric of public participation in urban development, the research focuses on youth aged 18–24. This research aims to generate a unique understanding of youth experiences of participation in urban development planning. It aims to do so by examining the case of Amman 2025. Therefore, the views represented in this study are confined to those who participated in this research and do not represent all youth in Jordan.

The second delimitation of this study is the selection of Amman as the geographical location for the case study. This research has used the administrative area under the jurisdiction of the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM). The case study’s geographical boundary encompasses all rural and urban areas under the jurisdiction of GAM.

12 The researcher lived in Amman for 25 years before travelling to pursue his studies in the UK. Amman was where the author was born, grew up and received his preparatory, tertiary and undergraduate education. Being from Amman has helped the author to define the scope of this research and provided a better understanding of cultural dimensions within the Jordanian context, and thus a better understanding of the perceptions of interviewees.

13 In the researcher’s experience, challenges included, but were not limited to, the following: a lack of integrated transportation networks, increasing rates of unemployment, and lack of access to physical and social infrastructure through which youth can fill their leisure time.

14 This research adopted the UN age category of 15–24. However, the primary group of participants targeted in this research is that of youth between the ages of 18 and 24 years. The research claims no philosophical stance in adopting this age group. Instead, it aims to eliminate the methodological challenges and avert the ethical dilemmas involved in engaging underage groups in data collection. The Jordanian constitution (Act 61 of 2003) states that the legal age of majority in the country is 18 years old.
third delimitation is the time period covered for this research. This research focuses on examining youth participation in Amman 2025 for the nine years from 2006, when it began, until 2015, the end of the data collection period. The fourth delimitation in this study relates to the public and private institutions targeted in this research. The majority of focus group participants (23 out of 27) came from the All Jordan Youth Commission (AJYC), while the other four participants were from the University of Jordan (JU). Participants in semi-structured interviews were selected according to their involvement in Amman 2025 or their professional experience in Amman’s urban development. They were found in international aid agencies such as the UNDP, UN-Habitat in Jordan, or private engineering consultancy firms such as Consolidated Consultants or Dar Al Handaseh. With regard to city officials, these were nominated or approached through a snowball sampling technique. They mainly work in GAM, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MoMA), the Ministry of Interior (MoI) or the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) or are former employees of the Amman Institute for Urban Development (Ai).

1.7 Research objectives and key questions
This study seeks to critically analyse youth participation in the chosen case study of Amman 2025 and suggest more effective methods of youth engagement and empowerment policies. Critical institutionalist analysis of youth participation is achieved through analysing the form and quality of urban governance in terms of soft and hard infrastructure; they are distinguished as the planning system and practices, respectively (see subsection 2.4.1, chapter two). Accordingly, this study adopts a qualitative approach to examine the institutional context of Amman 2025, and to design context-based recommendations for an institutionalised process of youth engagement in urban development in Jordan.

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15 Consolidated Consultants is a consultancy firm based in Amman that provides a comprehensive range of integrated services in the fields of design, management and specialised studies. In addition, Dar Al Handaseh is a privately owned international professional services firm with a branch in Amman. The firm provides a comprehensive range of engineering services along with planning, design and project management of facilities, installations and structures.

16 The snowballing sampling techniques used in this research are discussed in detail in subsection 3.7.2, chapter three.

17 Further details regarding Amman 2025 are presented in section 5.5, chapter five and appendix 8.
Specifically, it will address the following conceptual research question:\(^{18}\)

*By placing greater emphasis on systemic institutional design, in what ways can youth participation enhance the quality of spatial planning in Jordan?*

This aim is underpinned by a set of objectives and research questions, which will allow for the building of theory, knowledge and practice within the area of youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan.

**Objective 1:**

To theoretically examine the concept of systemic institutional design and its significance in investigating youth participation in spatial planning.

The following questions will be addressed to meet this objective:

A. In what ways do successive planning models conceive youth participation in urban development?

B. How does the institutionalist approach provide deep understanding of spatial planning systems and embedded practice in specific context?

C. What are the planning systems and practices (institutional design) presented in the literature?

**Objective 2:**

To critically explore the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman regarding youth participation in decision-making.

The following questions will be addressed to meet this objective:

A. What is the current structure of spatial planning in Amman 2025 regarding the key actor(s) and relationships, and who assumes responsibility for planning decisions?

B. To what extent, and in what ways, were youth incorporated in the strategy-making process of Amman 2025, from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015?

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\(^{18}\) The research question is the explicit instrument that helps the researcher to fulfil the aim of the study. It directs the researcher to define the area to be investigated, creates boundaries for the literature search, and guides the analytical framework of the study (Bryman, 2012, p.11).
C. To what extent have the planning system (hard infrastructure) and the practices (soft infrastructure) followed in Amman 2025 been improved to ensure greater youth participation in policymaking?

D. What are the opportunities or challenges within the institutional context of spatial planning that enable or hinder the promotion of sustainable youth participation in Jordan?

Objective 3:

To identify context-based recommendations for effective youth participation to enhance the quality of spatial planning in Jordan.

The following questions will be addressed to meet this objective:

A. Is the collaborative planning and institutionalist approach a realistic agenda for introduction in Jordan?
B. What strategies should be designed to promote Jordanian youth participation in spatial planning?

1.8 Methodological framework

The research development process followed the inductive–deductive cycle of science. The research started by adopting a rational approach to framing the research problem and the research’s objectives after conducting the literature review. Spatial planning in Jordan was examined, and the issue of weak youth participation was identified as a research problem. After determining the research scope, a critical review of prominent planning models was carried out to identify the most appropriate theoretical model to address the research question. The institutionalist and collaborative planning approach was found to be convenient and to fit the research purpose – that is, to address the research problem and answer the research questions (see section 1.7, above). Deploying the most relevant contemporary planning approach was vital to revealing the impediments that hinder institutions in developing inclusive and participatory planning governance in Jordan.

Two main tools were used to collect evidence from the case study research: semi-structured interviews and focus groups. 28 participants from the main spheres of the
state, the market and civil society involving prominent researchers in Jordan’s urban planning were interviewed. Semi-structured questions were designed to provide full answers to understand the institutional context of urban development in Jordan. In addition, four focus groups involving 27 young male and female participants were undertaken. An in-depth understanding of the general perception of youth with respect to their participation in the public realm – Amman in general, and urban development specifically – was attained. Focus groups were also used to gather information from young people regarding their concerns, priorities and recommendations with respect to Amman’s urban development (see appendix 9-4).

Following the inductive–deductive approach, thematic analysis was used to analyse the data generated from semi-structured interviews and focus groups (see figure 3-2, chapter three). Nilsen (2005) identified the deductive top-down approach that applies existing theoretical themes to raw data. On the other hand, the inductive approach was identified as a bottom-up approach that generates themes grounded in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

1.9 Analytical framework

This study considers spatial planning as a subset of governance and a field of public policy (Hasan and McWilliams, 2015; Hasan, 2012, p.4; Healey, 2006a, p.7). This research joins other academic works in emphasising the importance of the institutionalist context: going beyond the mere analysis of power in society to examine issues of public participation in spatial planning (Weber, 2007; Healey et al., 2002). The institutionalist analysis framework adopted for this research made it possible to highlight actors and examine their strategies, their visions and their perceptions of urban governance (ibid.).

Healey’s institutionalist approach and collaborative planning theoretical framework is drawn from Antony Giddens’s conception of structuration theory and Jürgen Habermas’s (1984) communicative action theory (Healey, 2006a, p.57). In her conceptual framework, Healey pays more attention to the impact of the institutional

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19 A schedule of all interviews, with dates and venues, is provided in appendix 10-1.

20 Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) used the hybrid process of inductive and deductive reasoning to demonstrate rigour in thematic analysis.

21 See further information regarding research analysis in section 3.9, chapter three.
context, including its impact on collaborative planning (Healey, 1999). In addition, the institutionalist approach has been chosen for its consistency with the epistemological and ontological approach adopted in conducting this research. In this context, the interpretivist approach considers planning to be a field in public policy and a style of governance where formal government and social relations are entangled to form the governance context (Healey, 2006a, p.256). More particularly, this research adopted the systemic institutional design for the following key advantages it offers:

- The institutional analytical approach takes into account the micro-social level of governance dynamics and investigates the complex social relationship that forms urban development (Smith and Jenkins, 2015). It expands the analysis of the urban governance context beyond the institutional ‘sites’ of the formal local government legally charged with policy responsibilities, to explore the informal institutional context through which collective action is accomplished (Smith and Jenkins, 2015; Healey, 2006a, p.199)

- The institutional analytical approach enables the investigation to highlight the spheres of key actors, their strategies and networks (intra- and inter-) and their vision of qualities of place and governance (Hasan and McWilliams, 2015)

- The institutional analytical approach provides a rich seam of ideas on practical policymaking for managing discussion among different cultural communities (Healey, 2006a, pp.49–50); the model also provides context-based practical considerations relating to mediation between those of dissenting opinions and thus the building of place-based institutional capacity (Healey, 2006a, p.84)

- The institutional analytical approach focuses on the quality of governance processes rather than on material outcomes of spatial plans (Healey et al., 2002, p.6).

### 1.10 Developing a theoretical model

This research argues that youth priorities have often not been sufficiently acknowledged or incorporated into the design and application of the Jordanian planning system. Most of the policy recommendations on youth empowerment strategies implemented in Jordan are designed based on studies conducted in the Global North (Górak-Sosnowska, 2010). These empowerment strategies are transmitted to the Jordanian
context through international aid agencies such as the UN, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UNDP: “Work within the planning academic and professional spheres tends to concentrate on normative issues of how planning ought to operate in society rather than situating these theories within the ‘real’ world of practice” (Bagaecen, 2011, p.358). Kasim and colleagues (2014) underscored this argument and stated that there is no one-size-fits-all policy for youth empowerment and engagement. Public participation policies implemented in the Global West are shaped by their analogous political, economic and social structures (Hasan, 2012, p.2). Transferring public participation theoretical models to the Global South (i.e., Jordan) requires particular attention to the different institutional contexts to ensure their validity and applicability (Weber, 2007; Kothari, 2002, cited in Hasan, 2012, p.3). Otherwise, youth participation policies will fail to capture the nuances of the Jordanian context and national differences. Nevertheless, limited academic research has been conducted that explores the real reasons behind youth exclusion from development, resulting in the absence of recommendations compatible with the context of Jordan.

The main importance of this study comes from its theoretical contribution. This study seeks to examine an in-depth case study on strategic spatial planning in Jordan (i.e., Amman 2025) and to build on the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach to provide a useful analytical tool for the understanding of the urban development context in Amman (see objective 1, presented in section 1.7). This research argues that integrating the cultural context into the institutional design will enhance the usefulness and applicability of this framework in Jordan. Therefore, the model was developed by integrating a new theoretical construct regarding the cultural context22 as a key dimension in systemic institutional design in planning practice for sustainable youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan.

1.11 The layout of the thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters, each of which significantly contributes to the answers to the research questions. Chapter one provides an overview of the research. The overview includes presentation of the research problem, explanation of its reasoning, the chosen approach, the research questions and relevant concepts. To

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22 In this study, the term cultural context refers to the set of values and beliefs linked to a particular society.
answer the research questions, **chapter two** presents the literature review that inspired the research undertaken: a critical review of relevant publications in development governance, civil society and youth participation and development institutions. Chapter two also explores the usefulness and applicability of various planning models and prominent theories in urban politics to address research objectives. Critical explanation of philosophical approaches helps to establish the theoretical framework used to examine the planning practice and system in Amman 2025. **Chapter three** describes how this research was conducted. The first section describes the main philosophies in social science and research paradigms. Chapter three includes the measures to ensure research reliability and validity, and information on data analysis methods, ethical considerations and limitations that affected the research process. **Chapter four** presents an overview of the political and socio-economic context of Jordan with an institutional overview of the urban development context in Jordan. **Chapter five** illustrates the local urban development decision-making context in Amman. A key research contribution in this chapter is a description of the local urban development context of Amman 2025. **Chapter six** provides a critical analysis of the youth participation process taking place in relation to Amman 2025. **Chapter seven** builds on the findings presented in chapter six to suggest recommendations to enhance the institutional design of Amman’s urban governance for greater youth participation in urban development in Jordan. **Chapter eight** concludes the thesis and briefly presents key findings, recommendations and future research opportunities in relation to youth participation in spatial planning.
Chapter 2: Setting the theoretical framework for institutional analysis
2.1 Introduction

This chapter starts by critically discussing the most prominent theoretical frameworks in the planning field. Studying the most recent planning models is vital in choosing the most appropriate theoretical approach to address the research issue (Farzaneh, 2011, p.13). Consequently, and in accordance with the research aims and objectives, an institutionalist and collaborative planning approach is adopted for this research. In this theoretical realm, the communicative rationality of Habermas provides a rich seam of ideas and techniques by which to acknowledge the range of interests by creating space for negotiation and debate to encourage different social groups to reconstitute the public realm (Healey, 2006a, pp.49–50; Innes and Booher, 2004; Jenkins and Smith, 2001b).

Section 2.3 outlines the most influential theories in urban politics. These include elite theory, pluralist theory, Marxist theory, regulation theory and urban regime theory. The section highlights key concepts for each theoretical proposition and the reasons for excluding them. Also, section 2.3 outlines the neo-institutionalist turn in urban politics and why it has been chosen as the analytical approach to this study. The neo-institutionalist approach “recognises that different groups within society may have very different value systems, each of which has its validity” (Jenkins and Smith, 2001a, p.489). Most importantly for this research, it focuses on institutional design so that there is a greater capacity for public conversations and debates to deal with disputes and discussion among different groups (Healey, 2006a, p.50).

This research has benefited from linkages between the institutionalist development in urban analysis and communicative planning theory (Healey, 2006a; Vigar et al., 2000, pp.43–51; Healey, 1999). The institutionalist and collaborative planning approach would lead to greater improvement of spatial planning in Amman in order to achieve sustainable urban products (Emerson et al., 2012; Polk, 2011; Healey, 1999). The model is applied to understand urban regional dynamics and to undertake analysis of collective action in Amman 2025 regarding how youth take part in decision-making. Therefore, the theoretical underpinnings of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach are discussed. These are communicative rationality and structuration theory. The chapter concludes by presenting the analytical framework used to design institutional mechanisms for collaborative planning through which youth communities, along with other political communities in Amman, can collectively address urban issues and suggest solutions. The institutionalist and collaborative planning approach was
developed by Healey, drawing on neo-institutionalism, in combination with the communicative approach to planning theory developed by Jürgen Habermas (1984), and Giddens’s structuration theory (1984).

### 2.2 Analytical models of planning

This section examines the key theoretical models in the planning field. Understanding these models is essential in choosing the most suitable planning model to address the research objectives and its related research questions. This section involves the discussion of the six planning models:

- rational comprehensive
- advocacy planning
- equity planning
- radical planning
- liberalistic planning
- collaborative planning.

Schoenwandt (2016, p.3) believed that these six planning models are the most prominent models and the ones that have dominated the discussion of planning theory and literature in the past four decades. These planning models depict the movement in the planner’s role from the ultimate domination of the planning process towards more multi-stakeholder engagement in decision-making. In addition, these planning models are a reflection of the socio-political ideological shift characterised by modernism and postmodernism (Allmendinger, 2017, p.168; Alexander, 2000). These movements have had impacts on the fields of architecture, art, social science (e.g., feminism) and urban planning (Mura, 2012; Harvey, 1989b). In planning, modernism embraces the notion of totalitarianism, while, in contrast, postmodernism is a stark rejection of synoptic and comprehensive urban plans (Goodchild, 1990). To put it simply, modernism relies on a scientific approach to city planning (e.g., Le Corbusier’s standard measure for building and urban design (Healey, 2006a, p.99)), while postmodernism is directed more towards public participation and environmental awareness (Filion, 1996).

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23 It is worth noting that the following discussion will not address the technical models of planning prominent in the arenas of traffic and landscape planning, etc. It will focus on aspects of planning policies, the decision-making process, and political and ideological underpinnings. Also, it reviews key actors and their institutional power and the main cultural values embedded in this body of thought.
The rational comprehensive planning model

Charles Lindblom and Andres Faludi were the first to establish the principles of the rational comprehensive model (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.4; Hostovsky, 2006; Faludi, 1973, p.8, cited in Yiftachel and Huxley, 2000, p.908). The deployment of this model came about in response to the repercussions of the Second World War. Lindblom put forward a technical and scientific approach to addressing the aftermath of the six-year war. Scientific rationalism aimed to improve the quality of life of the majority of citizens of the West following the devastating experience of the war and the economic depression that preceded it (Healey, 2006a, p.9).

For Mayerson and Banfield (1955, p.314), rational decision-making is a multi-step process that a planner follows to achieve logically sound and efficient decisions. In their book Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, Mayerson and Banfield (1955, p.314) identified a series of essential steps in applying a rational comprehensive planning framework (Campbell and Fainstein, 2003, p.57; Hostovsky, 2006; Stiftel, 2000):

- analysing the situation: the decision-maker collects and examines groups of data and facts available within the conditions of the situation
- setting objectives and goals
- considering all courses of action (alternatives) available to him/her to achieve these aims
- foreseeing how the total situation would look given the deployment of each alternative
- undertaking comparative evaluation, then selecting the options based on the perceived consequences s/he sees as valued and significant
- creating of systems for implementing the chosen alternative
- monitoring effects, plans and policies, and conducting amendments accordingly.

According to this model, the rational planner is a technocratic expert who relies on the ‘objectivity’ of ‘professional expertise’ to discover the needs and interests of the ‘public’ (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.5). Rational planners are trained and qualified professionals in the fields of planning, social science and architecture who work under the guidance of local government policies and frameworks (Davidoff, 1965).
When professional legitimacy overrides public agreement, it leads to social discontent for those who are affected by the plans (Sandercock, 1998, p.32). Rational planning has been heavily criticised for its extremely technical, apolitical and ahistorical approach in dealing with public issues (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.6). Instrumental rationality is commonly referred to as a top-down structure with a rigid pattern where decisions are formed by central governments and implemented by the local administration (Albrechts, 2004). It is characterised as an authoritative, highly bureaucratic and undemocratic mode of governance. Under rational planning theory, the planning agency is conceived of as a formal organisation with clear boundaries between itself and the community affected by planning (Boyer, 1986, p.186).

Rational planners and designers adopted this utopian vision to enhance the physical image of the Global North cities (i.e., slum clearance) (Werlin, 1999; Krumholz, 1982; Davidoff, 1965). Proponents of this model put faith in the ability of science and technology to identify and tackle issues within the public arena (Farzaneh, 2011, p.14; Alexander, 2007, 2000; Healey, 2003, 1999; Stiftel, 2000; Innes, 1996). Following the ‘project of modernity’, rational planners view the public as an undifferentiated, homogenous group, resulting in ill-defined and interdependent understandings of social problems (Schoenwandt, 2016; Hostovsky, 2006; Harvey, 1989b, p.12).

This research argues that the essence of contemporary urban governance lies in communicative participatory activity (Faehnle and Tyrväinen, 2013; Healey, 2003, 1998a; Innes, 1995). Accordingly, this study investigates the extent to which the Jordanian town planning system acknowledges and engages with youth communities and how far youth input is recognised in the decision-making process. The epistemology of the rational comprehensive model has not led to youth participation in the Jordanian public realm (Teney and Hanquinet, 2012). In fact, the rational model highly resembles the current planning system in Jordan (Al Nammari, 2013; Alnsour and Meaton, 2012; Haddaden, 2009). The model is anti-democratic in nature and lacks comprehensiveness and inclusion of different social classes and affected parties (Boyer, 1986, p.186). The planning system in Jordan is top-down and highly bureaucratic, following a rigid pattern of procedures (i.e., budget allocation, development policies, administrative decisions, etc.) (Al Nammari, 2013; Alnsour and Meaton, 2012; Haddaden, 2009). The absence of authentic public input tends to lead to different forms and shapes of oppression and exploitation (Hooper, 1992). Weak public participation
has resulted in the failure of the GoJ to meet the needs of the public, giving rise to social discontent (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Jarrah, 2009).

The researcher in the present study joins with other local researchers in Jordan to criticise the rational comprehensive planning ideology followed by Jordan’s planning authorities (Alnsour, 2016; Haddad and Fakhoury, 2016; Al Nammari, 2014, 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Daher, 2005). Therefore, the study dismisses the ability of this model to achieve better-quality spatial planning in Amman. The rational comprehensive model is apolitical in nature and is a direct cause of the unsustainable city development plans in Jordan. The mechanism adopted in the rational comprehensive planning model is not capable of meeting comprehensive public interest (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.8). The model gives the ultimate power to the state – as an autonomous actor – to manage and administer the public realm. Rationalist policy analysis undermines the value of local communities’ input, leaving them marginalised and passive stakeholders in the development process. According to utilitarianist epistemology, the public interest is seen to be confined to those individuals affected by any political action (Campbell and Marshall, 2002; Boyer, 1986, p.186). The purely physical-economic approach to addressing urban challenges in Amman 2025 has resulted in residents, shopkeepers and small business owners mobilising against the proposed plan (M.Y., interview, 30/06/2015). In contrast, communicative planning theory advises planners to be attentive to people’s lives, an approach that has not been considered in rational comprehensive planning models (Healey, 1999).

The advocacy planning model

By the early 1960s, the rational planning model had lost ground (Stiftel, 2000; Innes, 1995). Lindblom’s critique of rational planning was robust and gained wide circulation in the planning literature (Thomas, 2008; Stiftel, 2000; Checkoway, 1994). The advocacy planning model, suggested by Davidoff in 1965, was the first alternative to the rational planning model (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.7).

Davidoff was motivated and personally moved by large-scale socially inattentive urban renewal schemes, which manifested in slum clearance and dispersal of underprivileged communities (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.7; Stiftel, 2000; Werlin, 1999; Peattie, 1986). In his two leading studies, ‘A choice theory of planning’ (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962) and ‘Advocacy and pluralism in planning’ (Davidoff, 1965), Davidoff formed the basis for
empirical research into a new school of thought in planning (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.8; Checkoway, 1994). The vital argument in both publications concerns standing with poor communities as a reaction to the destruction and removal of their slums in American cities (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.8; Stiftel, 2000; Peattie, 1986).

Davidoff’s two publications initiated a radical departure from the extant planning literature (Thomas, 2008; Krumholz, 1994; Heskin, 1980). For Davidoff, advocacy planners are required to publish several plans, to represent the different interests of various social groups (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.9; Davidoff, 1965). It implies a new understanding of the ‘public sphere’ as heterogeneous in the sense of there being multiple interest groups, lifestyles and experiences (Thomas, 2008). Thus, Davidoff refuted the notions of solely scientific reasoning, unitary planning, the traditional planning commission and value-neutral plans inherent in the comprehensive rational model (Allmendinger, 2017, p.167). Davidoff believed in a genuinely pluralistic democratic model where society is heterogeneous, composed of many different groups and interests. Regardless of the socio-economic status of social groups, they all have the right to define and equally participate in the development agenda and political action (Davidoff, 1965).

The advocacy planning model would not be useful in promoting spatial planning and youth participation in Jordan. Participation should not stop at providing youth with a platform to be heard but should also allow them to become engaged and empowered in the decision-making process (Checkoway, 2011). Proponents insist that listening to the voices of ‘vulnerable groups’ is vital, yet this alone does not make the planning process participatory (Checkoway, 1994). Accordingly, this would not be a useful model as it raises expectations that could not be met in the Jordanian context.

**The equity planning model**

The equity planning model and the advocacy planning model are closely related and, to some extent, share the same values of social justice in relation to ‘multi-interest pluralism planning’ (Allmendinger, 2017, p.166). In their work at Cleveland City Council, Norman Krumholz and Robert Mier were among those planners who had been influenced by the ideas of Davidoff (Zapata and Bates, 2015). Both were convinced of the significant role of planners in fighting, or at least alleviating, poverty and promoting social justice and ending racial segregation (Zapata and Bates, 2015; Checkoway,

In contrast to rational planning, under equity planning public issues get resolved in a pluralistic process of networked commitment from relevant stakeholders (Zapata and Bates, 2015). In agreement with Davidoff, Krumholz (1982) believed in the potential of planning to achieve greater social justice in cities (Thomas, 2008). In this respect, Krumholz (1982) suggested that planners should work outside the boundaries of city administration, engaging in the political arena, in community-based organisations and political parties, and special interest groups (Zapata and Bates, 2015; Stiftel, 2000).

The theory is limited in its approach to promoting the participatory and inclusionary planning that this research seeks to support in the Jordanian planning context. Equity planning treats social equity as a philanthropic act, which relies on planners’ willingness to stand with social values and the rights of the underprivileged (Zapata and Bates, 2015). In Jordan, it would seem to be difficult for the urban planning profession to join political parties and be active in defending the disadvantaged, as any political activism against the state would be prohibited by law and may come at a personal cost to planners. Since planners in Jordan hardly operate outside local councils and city administration, and due to the absence of a legal framework to regulate public participation in spatial planning, it is challenging for a planner to risk his/her career under an authoritarian state like Jordan.

**The radical planning model**

The radical model in urban planning is in clear opposition to and rejection of the state apparatus and economic interests that respond to neoliberal specifics of dominance (Tironi, 2015; Zapata and Kaza, 2015; Miraftab, 2009). It is radical because it diminishes the power of the state while granting power to the public (Miraftab, 2009; Shatkin, 2002). The growing democratic and human rights movements in the early 1960s began questioning the traditional, rigid, top-down, hegemonic pattern of decision-making in the planning field (Tironi, 2015; Beard, 2003). Theories emerged after advocacy planning targeted aspects of social transformation as well as seeking to challenge the unequal distribution of power, resources and opportunities within the planning system (Farzaneh, 2011, p.16).
The term radical planning was first introduced by Stephen Grabow and Alan Heskin (1980) in 1973 (Stiftel, 2000). In his book Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action, John Friedmann (1987) defined radical planning as the “mediation of theory and practice with the aim of social transformation and emancipation of humanity from social oppression” (p.391). Friedmann believed that planning practices could perpetuate the status quo, resist change, serve the elite24 and are overly bureaucratic and centralised. However, they still find that planning is capable of delivering a better representation of the interests of the underprivileged and preserving their identity (Shatkin, 2002).

Under radical planning theory, the critical objective of the planner is to support the disadvantaged and actively engage in processes of political action (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.15; Tironi, 2015). The intention is for planners to build strong networks with the community, to mobilise for ‘insurgent planning’ while acting outside the bureaucracy of the state (Farzaneh, 2011, p.16; Miraftab, 2009). To achieve profound structural and political reform, radical planners should work outside the boundaries of formal planning and regulatory frameworks to boost and accelerate social transformation (Sandercock, 2005; Beard, 2003).

Although this theory advocates granting greater decision-making power to local communities, it is highly unlikely to be adopted in the Jordanian context. The literature on radical planning is closer to ‘insurgent’ and inimical to methods of achieving youth empowerment. Also, there is no clear explanation of how youth or any under-represented segment in community could engage in radical movements within an authoritarian context similar to the one in Jordan (Beard, 2003). Any form of political activism or incitement against the state is considered ‘subversive’ or destabilising by the Jordanian Public Gathering Act of 2011 and the Societies Act of 2004, no.51 (Jarrah, 2009), and is thus an extremely dangerous and inappropriate way to initiate social and policy change. Moreover, abolishing the state’s role in planning would not necessarily serve and promote spatial planning quality and ensure greater youth involvement. Instead, this research joins the post-positivist voices in demanding public participation via more collaborative and equitable distribution of planning power among the three major societal forces in communities (the state, the market and civil

24 Elitism is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “advocacy of or reliance on leadership or domination of a select group” (Harding, 1995, p.35) (see section 2.3, below).

**The liberalistic model of planning**

The word ‘liberalistic’ stands for ‘laissez-faire’, which means letting things ‘go their way’ (Sager, 2012; Anas, 1992). Because it adopts “market-oriented and market-dependent approaches”, Friedmann (1992, p.83) saw the process as being intended to depoliticise the economy and minimise the sphere of the state (Chang, 2002). The neoliberal ideology implies granting the economic realm superiority in advancing economic promotion and competitive restructuring (Swyngedouw et al., 2002, p.572).

On this basis, planning is perceived as a ‘necessary evil’, to be avoided unless the mechanisms of the ‘free market’ have failed (Sager, 2012). Instead of investing resources in planning services, proponents of this model put their faith and trust in the power of contracts (i.e., individual and property rights) to maximise people’s well-being (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.17; Albrechts, 2015).

Although the principles of neoliberalism promote political inclusion through governance (Jessop, 2002; Harvey, 2007a), the model has failed to achieve redistributive equity, and inequalities are rising (Miraftab, 2009). Neoliberal policies have created socially and spatially uneven distribution of development benefits (Albrechts, 2015; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Anas, 1992). In addition to distributive injustice, the model suffers from a democratic deficit that allows irregular political inclusion within the public realm (Chang, 2002).

Local planning authorities in Jordan have resorted to the neoliberalistic planning model as a means of implementing a utopian image based on order and efficiency to replace the chaos and social problems that characterise many cities (Haddad and Fakhoury, 2016; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Tayeh, 2012, pp.96–98; Daher, 2005). Since this model lacks the capability to address inequality and achieve social justice and inclusiveness, this model is dismissed as a theoretical framework for the present research. Firstly, it contradicts the key focus of this research of achieving social equity and political decentralisation. This research seeks to promote values of social justice

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25 Drawing on Marxist political economics, society is defined in terms of the three spheres of the state, economy and civil society. These spheres are not discrete but are overlapping spheres of activity that are continually interpreted through relational dynamics as people live their lives, firms conduct their business and government agencies perform their activities. See appendix 3 for more information.
and promote youth welfare and well-being in Amman. Secondly, the principle of freedom in the liberalistic model is confined to individuals who meet specific criteria of financial means, knowledge and time (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.18).

**The collaborative planning approach**

Collaborative planning is a new paradigm of planning, where consensus building is the vehicle for mediation of conflicts between dissenting opinions and different parties (Healey, 2006b; Innes and Booher, 2003; Innes, 1996). Generally speaking, collaborative planning aims to address different social interests in a place through the interactive efforts of urban actors (Kossmann et al., 2016; Healey, 2006a, p.57, 2003, 1999). In this research, collaborative planning is understood as the capability of all levels of governance to engage a diverse mix of actors via authentic dialogue and deliberative processes to achieve a consensually accepted outcome (Faehnle and Tyrväinen, 2013; Healey, 1998a). In contrast to the singular planning approach, collaborative planning is a tool to build stronger community relations and use negotiation and the power of discourse to address issues of social equity and power imbalances (Emerson et al., 2012; Healey, 2006a, p.57).

According to collaborative planning theory, the profession of planning goes beyond mere technical drawings and blueprints. Rather, it is also about creating connections in order to exchange ideas through dialogue in a situation of equal empowerment and shared information and knowledge (Emerson et al., 2012; Polk, 2011; Bryson et al., 2006). Creating institutional arrangements that weave together formal government structures with wider economic and social relational webs enhances the quality of plans. In our knowledge-rich world, and given the increasing complexity of urban issues, innovative practices in urban governance are strongly needed (Innes and Booher, 1999; Healey, 1998a), particularly in the developing world (Harpham and Boateng, 1997). Innovative governance enables planning authorities at the local and regional levels to be agile to dynamic changes, thus enhancing coexistence among fragmented society and social groups (González and Healey, 2005). Thus, the decision-making process is not a value-laden process so much as a process of enhancing cooperation among stakeholders and agencies (Healey, 2006b; Innes and Booher, 2003).

In contrast to the politics of confrontation adopted by radical planning, the rationale of the collaborative planning is to establish and develop long-term partnership
relationships among the three key actors of the state, the market and civil society (Durose and Rummery, 2006; Healey, 2006b). Collaboration among people with different goals and opinions can create comprehensive, practical and transformative thinking in spatial plans. Moreover, and due to the high level of complexity and diversity of urban issues, communities must work collaboratively to achieve aspects of sustainable development (Polk, 2011; Googins and Rochlin, 2000).

Consequently, this study adopts the collaborative planning model as a theoretical approach to address research objectives. The collaborative planning approach is a postmodernist theoretical approach that better involves a variety of interests and competing systems of values and meanings in the planning process (Emerson et al., 2012; Connelly, 2009; Bryson et al., 2006; Googins and Rochlin, 2000). The inclusionary approach to public policy (i.e., spatial planning) suggests a shift from government to governance, from hierarchical bureaucracy to more deliberative decision-making (Durose and Rummery, 2006; Newman et al., 2004).

### 2.3 An institutionalist approach to policy analysis

Economic transformation from Fordism to post-Fordism has resulted in major changes in economic and social patterns in the Global North (Jessop, 1995). In the 1980s, the United Kingdom (UK) and continental Europe witnessed a radical shift from the ‘conventional’ agricultural community to new urban industrial patterns (Marsden, 2015). Planning theorists and practitioners became increasingly interested in studying the dynamic changes in ‘modes of production’ and their influences on social and economic structure (Vigar et al., 2000, p.44). This section outlines the major theories underpinning the study of urban politics that emerged in the period from the early 1960s to the late 1990s, marking the ‘rebirth’ of neo-institutionalism in economics and its application in urban politics. This includes elite theory, pluralism, the Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of urban politics, regime theory, regulation theory (see table 2-1, below) and, finally, the neo-institutionalist turn in urban and regional analysis (Davies and Imboscio, 2009; Judge et al., 1995).

Although these theories are presented and discussed separately, they are to some extent linked to each other (Judge et al., 1995, p.4). According to Judge and colleagues (1995, p.4), urban political theories are not static. Instead, they are in constant change and development over time, mainly in response to criticism from other theoretical
perspectives. Theories in urban politics are subject to ‘refinements’ through internal variations, omissions and modifications (ibid.). Therefore, this section focuses only on the core concepts and initial hypotheses that distinguish each theory. In addition, the discussion highlights the main criticisms of each theory and the reasons they were dismissed as an analytical approach for this research. Table 2-1, below, presents basic information on prominent theories in urban politics, including associated theorists, types of theory, and each theory’s conception of ‘power’.

**Elite theorists** believe that, whether we live in democratic or authoritarian societies, urban governments are ruled by group(s) of individuals who are able to exercise comprehensive control in complex modern societies (Pierre, 1999). Through their control over crucial resources (i.e., property, money, the legitimate use of violence, political influence and scientific knowledge (Harding, 1995, p.35)), the elite, mostly economic notables and financial leaders, play a commanding role in urban governance (Pierre, 1999). Accordingly, their decisions have a significant impact on the lives, choices and futures of the people.

Elite theory is wide and heterogeneous. It contains either a technocratic or a critical approach (Harding, 1995, p.36). A technocratic normative approach suggests that power should be concentrated with the elite, and their rule is a necessary ‘evil’ for the management of increasingly complex urbanisation. Harding (1995, p.37) describes normative elitists as optimistic. He argued that they (i.e., elites) commit themselves to ensuring civic well-being and protect societies from ‘mob rule’ by promoting democratic values. In contrast, critical elite theorists see the ‘power elite’ as undesirable as they design policies according to their preferences (ibid.). In the context of urban planning, elites influence practices in planning systems to pursue their specific land and development policy agendas. In the context of corrupt governments and perfunctory politics, interrelations between self-interested businesses and local politics are inevitable, resulting in economic interests being dominant in the development agenda.

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26 Normative theories make theoretical claims concerning how the world ought to/should be, whereas empirical theories are concerned with ‘what is’, in an attempt to explain and interpret reality (Allmendinger, 2017, p.17).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key theorists in regard to urban politics</th>
<th>Elite theory</th>
<th>Pluralism</th>
<th>Marxist theory</th>
<th>Regulation theory</th>
<th>Urban regime theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaetano Mosca, Floyd Hunter, , Wright Mills</td>
<td>Robert Dahl, Raymond Wolfinger, Nelson Polsby</td>
<td>James O'Connor, Roger Friedland, Francis Fox Piven, Robert Alford</td>
<td>Alain Lipietz, Robert Boyer, Bob Jessop</td>
<td>Clarence Stone, Susan Fainstein, Norman Fainstein</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Became influential in urban politics</td>
<td>Early 1960s</td>
<td>Mid-1960s</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>After the 1980s</td>
<td>Mid-1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory type</td>
<td>Normative or empirical theory (empirical observation and hypothesis testing)</td>
<td>Normative or empirical descriptive theory</td>
<td>Deductive explanatory theory</td>
<td>Inductive empiricism (urban political economy)</td>
<td>Inductive explanatory theory (urban political economy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nature and meaning of power</td>
<td>Power is conceptualised as concentrated in the hands of the few (i.e., economic notables)</td>
<td>Power should be dispersed among multiple interest groups</td>
<td>Power should be conceptualised ‘systematically’</td>
<td>Power resides in the formal structures and procedures in planning systems and local governments</td>
<td>Power is embedded in the relationship between different groups pursuing a shared agenda through coordination, networking, and establishing relations. Therefore, power is a matter of social production rather than social control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-1: Basic information regarding selected theoretical models in urban politics, source: Gregory et al., 2009; Vigar et al., 2000; Ward, 1996; Jones, 1995; Judge et al., 1995
Examining the urban development institutional context is of particular importance for the purpose of ensuring greater youth participation within the Jordanian context. In this regard, elite theory is dismissed for its weak powers of analysis of governance practices. Elite theorists are more concerned with the inner institutional embedding of urban government, excluding local and regional contexts and the wider national political environment. Moreover, elite theory is incompatible with the goal of clarifying the highly fragmented nature of the decision-making process embedded in most cities of the developing world (Grindle and Thomas, 1989).

**Pluralist theory** arose in response to criticisms of elite theory. Unlike normative elite theorists, advocates of the pluralist approach stress that urban politics ought to be pluralist and urban governments ought to be open and democratic (Gregory et al., 2009, p.543; Jude, 1995, p.30). They recognise the diversity and the inevitable ‘social plurality’ of large cities (Dahl, 1961, p.86). In disagreement with critical elite theorists, pluralists dismiss the ideas that democracy is a ‘sham’, urban politics ‘highly stratified’ and local power concentrated in one group (Jude et al., 1995, p.6). Rather, they believe that elections are the ultimate guarantee of democracy in our complex world and power is dispersed among several groups of interests (Schumaker, 2013). In this regard, policies should be made through collective bargaining and competition among the diverse cultural, religious, economic, racial and ethnic groups that exist in a locality (Grindle and Thomas, 1989). The free will of citizens and the division of political resources between different institutions and organisations will lead to negotiation of different interests that will ultimately achieve the common good.

Nevertheless, pluralist advocates of policy ‘bargaining’ focus on analysing formal descriptions of structures and urban government procedures. Although they take into consideration the spatial, temporal and socio-economic context, pluralists have not provided an analytical mechanism for profound understanding of the wider local and national political environment (Harding, 2009, p.30). In addition, they pay greater attention to ‘who governs’ while paying less attention to those who are systematically excluded from the political process (i.e., youth groups) and their capacity to act. The theory underestimates the influence of the powerful economic elites embedded in the ‘competitive’ decision-making process. This implies that their analytical mechanism covers only a small part of political life in socially complex systems.
Marxist theory analyses the urban world according to the significant roles played by economic and class relationships and interests, providing the key to understanding all aspects of society. Similar to normative elite theorists, Marxists draw attention to the influence of economics and class interests on urban policies. The following points summarise key aspects of the Marxist perspective (Jude et al., 1995, p.10; Pickvance, 1995, pp.264–271):

- Marxists following the instrumentalist approach view the state, and hence the local government, as an instrument of the capitalist class and therefore as driven by the interests of nationally dominant classes
- In capitalist systems, the nature of social and political relations is highly determined by the ‘modes of production’ in a society
- Modes of production under capitalism are exploitive, allowing the accumulation of capital at the expense of the working class
- Marxism, following the structural approach, views modes of production under capitalism as authoritarian and suppressive, offering ostensible public participation with no real power
- Exploitive and suppressive modes of production threaten the stability of society. They lead to class conflicts that cannot be regulated by economic institutions.

Despite its widespread appeal in understanding modes of resistance to contemporary urban capitalism, Marxist theory has failed to apply the ‘meta’ theory to the micro-level analysis field (Pickvance, 1995, p.267). The research objectives presented in section 1.7, chapter one, require the addressing of questions at the middle and micro levels, rather than mere analysis of socio-economic systems at the macrolevel.

Influenced by Marxism, regulation theory seeks to investigate the growth, crisis and transformation of capitalism in cities (Gregory et al., 2009, p.640). This theory is a branch of contemporary political-economic theory that has provided a new frame of reference for the analysis of the urban world. Regulationists, similar to Marxists, believe that economies are socially embedded. Regulationists seek to explain the growth of capital according to specific conditions in relation to the history and geography of places and social and political-economic institutions (Painter, 1995, p.283). Therefore, regulation theory pays great attention to the interrelations between the economic, the political and the sociocultural (Jessop, 1995). Regulation theory
focuses on the broad structural forces that shape the transformation of societal relations from one ‘form’ to another. In relation to urban politics, the term ‘regulation’ is much broader than a specific legal power to regulate or a regulatory framework in the planning system. It refers to the wider array of formal and informal structures that underpin the relationships between production, consumption and investment (Painter, 1995). The conception of regulation also encompasses the set of social, cultural and political institutions and their embedded norms and networks that mediate relations between the economy, civil society and the state.

Although it provides a new frame of reference for the study of urban politics, regulation theory is incapable of providing deep analysis of local governance practices (Vigar et al., 2000, p.41). Overemphasising the dimension of structuring dynamics while missing the dimension of ‘agency’ draws analytical attention away from issues such as local governance cultures and the detailed practices that accomplish political transformations (ibid.). As a result, the theory has little to say about the complexity of governance relations at the local level. The application of regulation theory in the study of urban politics has at best been sporadic, patchy and far from systematic. Although its present stage of development in urban politics, regulation theory does not provide this study with the analytical methods required to study local governance practices in Amman 2025.

Another branch of theory that has become influential in urban political economy, and which is also informed by ideas of neo-Marxism, is urban regime theory. Unlike critical elite theorists, urban regime analysts dismiss the claim that economic elites are able to exercise comprehensive control (Stoker, 1995, p.59). For urban regime theorists, tackling complex urban problems is not the purview of one state. State and non-governmental actors are interdependent, and they hold a variety of resources (e.g., time, money, knowledge, social position and access to officials (Dahl, 1961)) essential to accomplishing “difficult and non-routine goals” (Stoker, 1995, p.59). The genius of this concept originates from pluralist theory (Stone, 1993, cited in Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, p.812). Urban regime theorists do not believe that state authorities are capable of making and carry out government policies alone (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). In this context, the term ‘regime’ refers to partnerships between governmental and non-governmental alliances by which a range of policy goals are achieved. In a complex and fragmented world, different actors interact in a dynamic power relationship and
share resources to build more stable and intense relationships. Regime theory focuses on efforts to build more stable and intense relationships specifically to accomplish public purposes (Stone, 1993). The theory also focuses on how governing coalitions are constructed and sustained in order to achieve greater ‘capacity’ for successful governance (Yiftachel, 1998).

While urban regime theory is an improvement on regulation theory in terms of urban politics, two common critiques of it hinder its application in this study. Firstly, urban regime theory suffers from difficulties in its theoretical transfer (Ward, 1996). The theory draws on a rich body of case studies of cities that are principally in the USA, raising questions about its applicability to contexts with different urban planning systems (Stoker, 1996, p.60). There are great dissimilarities between the US and Jordanian governmental systems: Jordanian cities are under the control of central policy, while US cities possess more autonomy in urban matters. In this regard, regime theory focuses on studying local actors while paying little attention to the influence of central governments in local economic development. Secondly, regime theory overemphasises the role of ‘local’ players without incorporating the impacts on regimes of structuring dynamics and macroeconomic changes (Vigar et al., 2000, p.42). Therefore, it draws our attention away from how decisions in Amman 2025 have been made and the wider relations between the GoJ and Jordanians.

Since the late 1990s, theorists, policymakers and practitioners in planning (Alexander, 2005; Healey, 1999) have become increasingly interested in the interrelationships between planning and institutions. Studies of urban governance, institutional qualities and ‘community power’ have drawn attention back to neo-institutionalist theory as a promising theoretical proposition in understanding urban politics.

Generally speaking, institutions are the ‘humanly devised constraints’ that provide human communities with the structure and framework required to regulate our daily life activities (Kim, 2012; Raitio, 2012; Teitz, 2007, p.26). For Teitz (2007, p.28) and Hall and Taylor (1996), neo-institutionalism embraces three different schools of thought: historical institutionalism; rational choice institutionalism; and sociological institutionalism. The traditional historical approach in political science addresses issues of formal organisational capacity and its aim is to achieve present goals and objectives. It includes re-engineering formal institutions to fit a purpose and meet business
agendas. Rational choice in institutionalism focuses on designing agencies capable of reducing transaction costs across economies (Healey, 2006a, p.325). The sociological strand of institutionalism defines institutions as “specific practices [embedded] in a wider context of social relations that cut across the landscape of formal organizations, and ... the active processes by which individuals in social contexts construct their ways of thinking and acting” (Healey, 1999, pp.112–113).

Of these, this thesis has followed the sociological strand of institutionalism as proposed by Hall and Taylor (1996). Following a postmodern view on youth participation in spatial planning, this study dismissed the theoretical approaches that rely on the mere analysis of power to investigate participatory planning (Hasan, 2012, p.5). Generally speaking, the analytical models presented in table 2-1, above, are dismissed as they provide “little guide to the analysis and design of emerging governance processes” (Vigar et al., 2000, p.39) and limited generalisability to contexts other than their original ones (mainly in the US, the UK or France).

Within the planning field, the neo-institutionalist perspective provides a vocabulary and basis for involving different claims and interested voices relevant to a place in the planning-making process (Kim, 2012; Raitio, 2012). The approach focuses on the social constructivist and relational perspectives on governance practices (Healey, 2007, 2006a, p.321; Hall and Taylor, 1996). In this respect, the neo-institutionalist approach stresses the significance of the context, expressed in the way broader forces interact with the particular history and geographies of social context (Healey, 1999). It measures how far fundamental forces have an impact on the outcome of a political process (i.e., planning activities) (Raitio, 2012).

According to Lowndes and Sullivan (2004, p.88), neo-institutionalism offers significant insights into political behaviour. The theory parallels the work of communicative planning theory (see subsection 2.3.1, below) and provides structure-focused analysis, addressing the influence of norms and rules on political behaviour in a given setting, along with a focus on agency. Neo-institutionalist theory locates individual actors in their wider networks and explores the spectrum of governance relationships in a locality. Power, under neo-institutionalism, is not understood merely as the impacts of the powerful on the powerless (power over); in the planning field, it is also understood as the capacity of the powerless to make change and make a difference via the decision-
making process (power to) (Vigar et al., 2000, p.48). The theory exposes the informal processes that underlie formal structure, and the fine grain of the social processes that underpin policy development and delivery. By studying the informal processes, this study reveals how business people, property developers and landowners have influenced Amman 2025 (see subsection 6.2.1, chapter six). In this regard, neo-institutionalism is a radical shift from the rational technical analysis offered by rival theories (see section 2.2, above), towards the investigation of the informal dimensions of planning practices (soft infrastructure).

This strand of analysis is valuable for the purpose of this research since it brings together structuring dynamics and the world of agency as interlinked aspects of the analysis, not as alternatives (Vigar et al., 2000, p.49). According to Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, the recursive relations between structures and agency are responsible for shaping governance processes, and thus for crafting strategic spatial plans (Healey, 2006a, p.55). Most importantly for the context of this research, the approach provided the analytical mechanism to understand the impact of sociocultural forces and tribalism in Jordan on youth marginalisation in the public realm. These theoretical propositions have enabled this study to produce institutional explanations of the opportunities for and constraints on youth participation in public policymaking in Jordan. The institutionalist analysis approach takes into account the economic, cultural, social and political factors in this issue (Healey, 2003; Jenkins and Smith, 2001a, b; Healey, 1999).

Neo-institutionalism offers a theoretical basis for planners to gain vast knowledge about the embedded practices, systems, challenges and pressures that dominate and exclude youth from public policymaking and the planning agenda (Healey, 1999). According to Healey, this conception has obvious applications to spatial planning, where structuring forces affect and are affected by society. In the context of this research, this refers to the processes through which youth, along with other social groups in society, can participate in a deliberative manner to construct and shape their living environment. Neo-institutionalism goes beyond analysing the formal structures of government (hard infrastructure) to address “the powerful patterning of social relations produced by the organisation of economic production processes, or the overall manner of governance in a society” (Vigar et al., 2000, p.38). The institutionalist approach emphasises the
sensitivity of the spatial, temporal and socio-economic context and the resultant social relations through which collective action is accomplished (Vigar et al., 2000, p.49).

**Dimensions of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach**

In order to develop a theory, a deep and thorough understanding of the theoretical approach and its limitations is required (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.26; Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007). This study links institutionalist developments in urban analysis, in particular neo-institutionalism (Giddens, 1984), and communicative planning theory (Healey, 2006a, 1997; Vigar et al., 2000, p.47).

Vigar and colleagues (2000) and Healey (2006a, 1997) have developed an approach that draws on Habermas’s ideas on communicative rationality (1984) and Giddens’s structuration theory (1984). Firstly, for Healey and Habermas, social life is constructed, formed and transformed via intersubjective conversation and means of communicative efforts in society (Healey, 2003, 1999). Secondly, both models see cultural assumptions and relational processes of governance as vital in shaping and forming social and economic relations (Healey, 1999, 1998a). Thirdly, Healey and Habermas recognised that governance is transformed through communicative and interactive dimensions within deliberative processes (Bolton, 2005; Healey, 1999). Fourthly, both models recognise that powerful structures are changeable through deliberative processes. An institutionalist approach implies that power structure is not rigid: it is susceptible to changes or alterations in the flow of ongoing thought, action and interaction among different social groups (Healey, 2006a, p.53; Healey, 1999). Accordingly, the following discussion covers the key concepts of:

- communicative rationality, and
- structuration theory.

### 2.3.1 Communicative rationality

In the 1980s, John Forester and Habermas developed the concept of “communicative rationality” in stark opposition to the instrumental rationality that dominated the planning field following the Second World War (see rational comprehensive planning, section 2.2, above) (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.4; Bolton, 2005). The tendency towards the communicative approach in planning research has mainly focused on providing answers to the question “how can we make planning practice better?” (Yiftachel and Huxley, 2000). Communicative rationality is about “undistorted communication,
openness, a lack of oppression” 27 (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998, p.1978). The approach is based on principles of participatory democracy and opposition, in contrast with the idea of the free market economy (Chaskin, 2005; Allmendinger, 2002; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998). Communicative rationality has introduced a new way of perceiving planning and policymaking in the public sphere (Bolton, 2005; Healey, 2003; Innes, 1996). Planning is no longer an action for one’s self-interest or a ‘zero-sum game’ 28 in which ‘I win and you lose’ in the game of public policy (Healey, 2006b, 2003, 1999; Alexander, 2000). Under communicative rationality, planning is more interpretative and intersubjective in nature (Innes, 1996). Spatial planning, as a field in public policy, involves multiple stakeholders, with their different interests and value systems (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.12). Under communicative rationality, consensus between different ‘others’ can be reached. Different stakeholders approach consensus by being ‘open’ to each other’s opinions and suggestions (Allmendinger, 2002; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998).

Within the paradigm of communicative rationality, Habermas put forward the concept of “lifeworld”, as opposed to the concept of “systems world” embedded in scientific rationalism (Schoenwandt, 2016, p.45; Healey, 1999). By systems world, Habermas meant the bureaucratic and scientific-technical systems that make up a governance system, while “lifeworld” depicts the day-to-day lives of “worlds taken for granted, meanings and understandings of everyday living and interaction of emotions, traditions, myth, art, sexuality, religion and culture” (Dixon and Sindall, 1994, p.303, cited in Farzaneh, 2011, p.22).

The philosophy behind communicative rationality facilitates effective negotiation and social learning 29 to build authentic dialogue among political communities (Healey, 2006a, p.322; Innes and Booher, 2003, p.39). Through public conversations and debate,

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28 The term ‘zero-sum game’ is a prevalent concept in game theory, a formal study of interdependent decision-making, cooperation and conflict. A game (i.e., planning activity) is said to be zero-sum when one actor’s gain is the other actor’s loss (Gregory et al., 2009, p.267).
29 According to (Webler et al., 1995, abstract), the concept of social learning refers to “how communities of people with both diverse and common interests can reach agreement on collective action to solve a shared problem”. In this regard, social learning does not refer to ‘masking’ or eliminating suggestions put forward by the underprivileged (e.g., youth) or ignoring any case that participants cannot agree on.
new relational nexuses\(^{30}\) can be built or developed among communities coexisting in a locality (Polk, 2011; Healey, 1998a; Innes, 1996). Dialogue and conversation, in Habermas’s thinking, can form or reshape new systems of meaning, cultural referents and understandings (Healey, 1998a). Decisions are supposed to be taken following a positive discourse\(^{31}\) that assimilates various interests and priorities – not solely those of state officials and planners, but those of public groups as well (Kossmann et al., 2016; Healey, 2006b; Alexander, 2001).

The theoretical realm of the communicative approach provides a rich seam of ideas to promote collaborative practices (Healey, 2003, 1998a; Alexander, 2000). Communicative rationality provides practical solutions for the design of governance processes that promote sustainable youth engagement in spatial planning (Percy-Smith, 2010; Simpson, 1997). Also, Habermas’s theory of communicative action, with its communicative ethics (Alexander, 2000), would enable youth to have a voice in the planning process. In accordance with the communicative ethics of Habermas (1984), planners, city officials and other key actors in the planning process have an ethical commitment to enabling youth to build their level of agency in order to mobilise structural changes in the ‘taken-for-granted’ planning procedures in Amman (Checkoway, 2011; Head, 2011; Churchman, 2003).

2.3.2 **Structuration theory**

Structuration theory is an approach to social theory developed by Giddens\(^{32}\) and Pierre Bourdieu (1977) (Lippuner and Werlen, 2009). As a sociologist, Giddens examined aspects of and elements embedded in human interaction, and how those interactions create rules and structures by which agents gauge their behaviours (Whittington, 2015).

Basically, the theory of structuration focuses on the structures or systems created by small groups of people, communities or organisations, or even diplomatic relations between nations *(ibid.)*. Also, structuration theory addresses the creation and reproduction of social systems. The most prominent concept in the theory of structuration is called ‘duality of structure’ (Whittington, 2015; Macintosh and

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\(^{30}\) For Healey (2009), the term ‘relational nexuses’ refers to webs of relations that bond various social groups (i.e., people, firms, households, agencies) with different frames of reference and systems of meaning.

\(^{31}\) According to Fairclough (1995, p.135), the term discourse refers to “the language use conceived as social practice” (Bagaeen, 2011, p.360).

Scapens, 1990; Dickie-Clark, 1984). Giddens asserted that structure is created through social interactions, by which it (i.e., structure) either enables or limits future actions (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990). In this way, the theory distinguishes between the analysis of structure and of agency, without giving primacy to either. On one hand, agency (the microlevel) refers to the ability of individuals to act freely against structural constraints. According to Giddens, humans can think and act freely but are to an extent defined by structure. On the other hand, structure (the macrolevel) is an established pattern of sociological institutions implicated in a specific context. Structure is not merely an external constraint; instead, it lies in the microsocial practice and routines of daily life and the taken-for-granted flow of action (Vigar et al., 2000, p.47). Accordingly, the actions of agents are either enabled or challenged by structure (Dickie-Clark, 1984). For Giddens, the actions of humans with a great deal of agency may lead to changes in structure. Human actions and ways of thinking reflect the recursive relations between structures and agency (Whittington, 2015): “[I]ndividuals are neither fully autonomous nor automatons. Powerful forces are all around us, shaping our lives, and presenting both opportunity and constraints” (Healey, 2006a, p.49). Unlike structuralism, the institutionalist approach, following Giddens (1984, 1990), treats structures as actively constituted through social relations, in the shape of thesis, antithesis and synthesis (Englund and Gerdin, 2011).

In this research, the implication of structuration theory could be understood as relating to how wider Jordanian society perceives the notion of youth participation in the public realm from a cultural point of view (structure), and how youth, as agents, are able to challenge such social constructs and cultural norms to change modes of urban governance. Urban governance is a reflection of authoritative, allocative and ideological structuring forces (Bryson et al., 2006; Healey, 2006b, 1999, 1998a). In the context of this research, structuration theory enables the analysis of institutional embeddedness to give greater credit to the context of the study, thus enhancing the applicability of the theoretical model in Jordan (Healey, 2007; Weber, 2007).

2.3.3 Criticising the institutionalist and collaborative planning model

Criticisms of the institutionalist and collaborative planning model abound (Huxham et al., 2000). Its weaknesses mainly originate from the three main theoretical underpinnings that constitute the model: Habermas’s communicative planning (1984),
Giddens’s structuration theory (1984) and the sociological strand of neo-institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

Yiftachel and Huxley (2000) and Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) are considered to be among the main critics of communicative rationality. Their criticisms could be classified into three main areas: theory, practice and value. Yiftachel and Huxley (2000) stated that this model was based on weak theoretical ground, while Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) believed that to calling communicative rationality a theory is an exaggeration. Instead, they described it as a ‘life view’. The theoretical constructs of communicative rationality abandon the underlying material and political processes that shape cities and regions (Yiftachel and Huxley, 2000). In terms of practice, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) believed that this model only operates in idealistic or utopian societies. They asserted that the model fails to address configurations in power relations. In addition, many planning theorists have criticised Habermas’s thoughts on how far planning authorities could interpret and translate emotional relations or cultural matters into practical means and plans (Seidman, 1998; Bauman, 1997). In terms of value, the model is believed to impose values on participants, who may not concur with the particular system of ethics adopted in communicative rationality. For example, representative democracy is ‘bad’ while participatory democracy is ‘good’ (Allmendinger, 2002; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998; Jones, 1995, p.72). It also opens up questions on the future of planning as a profession. In other words, if planners are no more than facilitators in the process, what is the future of professional planning institutions and their educational programmes?

2.4 Institutional analytical frameworks

Table 2-2, below, outlines and summarises three institutional frameworks developed to analyse the institutional context of urban development governance (Hasan, 2012, pp.30–33).

The first analytical tool, developed by Healey (2006a, p.327), contains three-levels of analysis: specific episodes, governance processes and governance cultures (González and Healey, 2005). The first level investigates “a period of concentrated governance attention” (Healey, 2006a, p.327), and investigates any resultant innovative governance or creative learning outcomes (e.g., strategic planning cooperation). The second level
looks at how far these innovative approaches influence routinised approaches in the
governance process, and whether they lead to a new practice in multi-stakeholder
governance (González and Healey, 2005). The third level explores ‘cultural
assumptions’ and accepted governance behaviour in wider society. More specifically,
the third level examines “the formal and informal frameworks that shape the structure
of the given governance context” (Hasan, 2012, p. 30).

Another way to analyse urban planning governance was developed by Jenkins and
Smith (2001b, pp.19–24). The model consists of three areas of analysis. The first area
analyses the roles of key actors in a society (i.e., the state, the market and civil society)
and their spheres of relations within the planning process. The second area is an
institutionalist analysis that investigates the planning system (i.e., formal legal
frameworks) and the socially accepted framework within a specific context. The third
area analyses the interdependency between local contexts on one hand, and global
contexts or supranational unions (e.g., the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Region,
etc.) on the other. In particular, it examines how global agreements and international
agendas (e.g., Agenda 21) have an impact on local governance processes at the regional
and local levels. In a similar argument, Jenkins and Wilkinson (2002) have assessed the
impact of the global economy on the dynamics of urban development in two cities:
Maputo in Mozambique and Cape Town in South Africa. Both authors introduced a
conceptual framework to assess the institutional capacities of cities to respond to
challenges from globalisation. The first level of analysis examines the ‘institutional
ordering’ within cities in terms of the formal and informal aspects of economy, society
and governance. For Jenkins and Wilkinson (2002), analysing the institutional ordering
is critical to determine the “institutional preconditions which cities need to meet if they
are to compete effectively in the global economy” (p.34). The second level of analysis
in this framework concerns the analysis of locally constituted institutional ordering-
‘social ends’. Within the four interrelated themes (see table 2-2, below), the authors
discussed the importance of a stimulating cultural milieu as a precondition for cities to
compete successfully for international investment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Institutional analytical frameworks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Healey (2007)</td>
<td><strong>Three-level governance performance analytical framework:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                               | ➢ **Specific episodes:**  
|                               |   • actors – roles, strategies, interests  
|                               |   • arenas – institutional sites  
|                               | ➢ **Governance processes:**  
|                               |   • networks and coalitions  
|                               |   • discourses – languages, metaphors, derived from frames of reference  
|                               |   • practices  
|                               | ➢ **Governance cultures**  
|                               |   • range of accepted modes of governance  
|                               |   • range of embedded cultural values  
|                               |   • formal and informal processes of critique through which governing processes are rendered legitimate |
| Jenkins and Wilkinson (2002)  | ➢ **Institutional ordering in relation to:**  
|                               |   • economy  
|                               |   • society  
|                               |   • governance  
| Jenkins and Smith (2000b)     | ➢ **Social ends in terms of four themes:**  
|                               |   • the impact of globalisation processes on local economies  
|                               |   • demographic and socio-economic dynamics within local populations  
|                               |   • changes in established or emerging systems of urban governance or management  
|                               |   • the implications of all these for physical urban development processes  
|                               | ➢ relationships between the state, the market and civil society  
|                               | ➢ institutional structure (mental models and organisation)  
|                               | ➢ local and global context |

Table 2-2: Selected institutional analysis frameworks, source: Hasan, 2012, p.32
2.4.1 Systemic institutional design for collaborative planning

Another useful model for an institutional analysis of public participation in spatial planning has been developed by Healey (2006a, pp.284–288) in relation to systemic institutional design for collaborative urban planning (see figure 2-1, below). Institutional design is a “synthesis between analysis of the context and the problem, and invention, assembly, and adaptation of design solutions from repertoires of known exemplars” (Alexander, 2000, p.53). Under the rubric of systemic institutional design, Healey (2006a, pp.284–288) and Amin and Thrift (1995, pp.16–17) stressed that processes of collaborative strategy-making are comprised of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ infrastructure. These have been referred to as the informal and the formal regulatory frameworks, respectively, in Hasan and McWilliams (2015). Healey discussed the systemic institutional design model in her book Collaborative Planning (Healey, 2006a, pp.284–310). Bryson and colleagues (2006), Healey (2006a, pp.284–288) and Innes (1996) discussed in their publications issues of how different stakeholders, in a knowledge-rich world with increasing diversity, can manage their collective concerns about a place. In this model, systemic institutional design encourages governance mechanisms to incorporate collaborative, inclusionary consensus building to address the dilemmas of coexistence in a shared place (Harris, 2002, p.37).

![Figure 2-1: The terrain of systemic institutional design for managing coexistence in a shared place, source: Healey, 2006a, pp.284–310, drawn by the author](image-url)
The model reflects the shift in spatial planning fields from an ultimate focus on physical
development to the institutional infrastructure design of multi-partnership governance.
Accordingly, this model is meaningful in exploring and understanding the role of
barriers to youth participation in the Jordanian context.

By the 1990s, the attention paid to public policy analysis had shifted away from rational
technical analysis, towards policy development as a communicative process. Under the
institutionalist approach, urban governance analysts moved beyond the world of formal
dimensions of policy systems, to include informal ways in which interdependent
relations among the economy, civil society and the state are mediated (planning
practice). Institutionalist analysts emphasised that “policy was made as much in its
practices as in its design” (Vigar et al., 2000, p.37). For Healey (2006a, p.285, 2006b,
pp.9–11, 1998a) and Amin and Thrift (1995, pp.16–17), both soft and hard
infrastructure must complement each other for collaborative strategy-making. Soft
infrastructure systems are meaning, values, social networks, routines and cultures
developed to be as relevant as possible to the lifeworld of participants (Polk, 2011;
Healey, 2006a, p.285; Harris, 2002, p.37). In this respect, stakeholders, via dialogue
and constructive debate, explain their different points of view and get to know each
other, thus building up the institutional momentum needed to maintain or develop
social, intellectual and political capital (Smith and Jenkins, 2015; Googins and Rochlin,

Although these forms of soft infrastructure and consensus building are critical, they
cannot lead directly to effective participatory forms of urban governance (i.e., in the
context of this research, engagement of youth). However, a formal institutional
infrastructure is also needed to foster collaborative planning. Formal institutional
infrastructure is termed ‘hard’ infrastructure and is crystallised in the design of the
political, legal and administrative systems (Alexander, 2007, p.53; Healey, 2006a,
p.286). Formal rules are also significant to establish effective urban governance that
considers partnerships with youth communities. Healey’s argument was also
underscored by Professor John Dryzek (2009), Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom, John
Friedmann (1987) and Judith Innes (Healey, 2006a, p.286).
Soft infrastructure

Soft infrastructure concerns planning practices that encompass the social, intellectual and political capital in a locality (Polk, 2011; Amin and Thrift, 1995, pp.16–18; Innes et al., 1994). Planning practices differ from place to place as a result of distinguished “institutional histories, local knowledge resources and the legacies of past policies” (Vigar et al., 2000, p.55). Following the institutionalist approach, collaborative strategy-making generates sufficient consensus building and mutual learning to facilitate coordination, competence and knowledge exchange (Polk, 2011). It develops an institutional infrastructure and cultural resources that enable future issues to be discussed in a reciprocal consensus-building manner (Healey, 2003, 1999, 1998a; Innes, 1996).

In this research, the concept of ‘institutional capacity’ does not refer only to the ability of the agencies involved in urban management activity to manage planning processes (Suh, 1998). It also includes “the ability of coalitions consisting of public and private actors in governance arrangements to get involved in policy processes and decision-making processes by using specific discourses and mobilising knowledge resources and relational resources” (Van Tatenhove, 2015, p.43).

The concept of institutional capacity was primarily originated by Amin and Thrift (1995). Amin and Thrift were looking for answers on how local governance policies could reinvigorate domestic economies, health and quality of life (Healey et al., 2002). They devised the term ‘institutional richness’ or ‘institutional thickness’, referring to the quality of social relations among business firms within a particular industrial agglomeration (Healey et al., 2002; Henry and Pinch, 2001).

Innes and Booher (2004), Khakee (2002) and Amin and Thrift (1995, pp.5–19) distinguished between three forms of capital deployed in an interactive governance context: intellectual, social and political. They emphasised that building relational nexuses boosts knowledge resources (i.e., intellectual capital), sufficient trust to share and exchange knowledge and experiences (i.e., social capital) and the ability to mobilise an act (political capital) (Raitio, 2012). To put it simply, they consider that in urban governance, institutional capacity exists in three categories of capital (Farzaneh, 2011, p.42):
• social capital (relational resources), promoting youth relationships with other key actors in the planning process
• intellectual capital (knowledge resources), encompassing diverse knowledge resources, thus engaging youth input and opinions
• political capital (mobilisation capacity), ensuring that youth participation lasts beyond a particular collaborative effort (initiative).

The three tiers of soft infrastructure are discussed in more detail as follows:

**Relational resources: the building of community**

The concept of relational resources refers to expanding stakeholders’ involvement and enabling all underprivileged groups to make a difference in transforming their localities (Emerson et al., 2012; Polk, 2011; Healey, 2003, 1998a). By relationship thickness, this research was referring to the density of network linkages that can engender cooperation and solidarity among society for the participatory process (Khakee, 2002, p.57). Building institutional capacity implies strengthening relational resources among various institutional ‘sites’ or ‘arenas’ coexisting within a place, depicted as institutional thickness by Amin and Thrift (1995, p.16). Thus, different stakeholders have the opportunity to shape the driving forces affecting life chances, economic opportunities and environmental quality (Healey, 2006b; Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones, 2000).

Fafchamps (2006, p.1196) stated that “investing in social capital should be seen as complementary to investing in government capacity. The two cannot and should not be separated” (cited in El-Said and Harrigan, 2009, p.1236). In his work on social capital, Putnam (2001) defined social capital as the production of “social organisation such as social trust, networks, and norms that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (p.67). As Innes and Booher (2003) and Sommerfeldt and Taylor (2011) pointed out, collaborative decision-making and consensus-building programmes can build up capacity for trust, reciprocity and cooperation in the long run, creating a store of capital that can be drawn on in any future decision-making.

This dimension assesses the quality and examines the nature of relational nexuses between actors of the state, the market and civil society on one hand, and youth communities on the other. Institutionalists, therefore, argue that the quality of such
webs depends on levels of trust and norms embedded in the networks that link actors together (Kim, 2012; Khakee, 2002; Suh, 1998).

A key struggle for governance practices is the active involvement of a diverse range of relational webs in a locality, such as socio-spatial relations (Healey et al., 2002, p.19). As it addresses place-focused governance, this research assesses relational resources according to the deliberative partnerships developed/created in the planning arena of Amman 2025. The semi-structured interviews in this research examined intergovernmental relationships on one hand, and other market actors and civil society on the other. Questions were structured so as to reveal the thickness of relationships between those actors and young communities and to identify which areas are still in need of development.

**Knowledge resources: coordination through shared knowledge**

Innovative governance was introduced as a concept in which public policy recognises different forms of local knowledge, employs diverse knowledge and is less engaged with the bureaucratic hierarchy of the state (Healey, 2004; Amin and Thrift, 1995) “to incorporate the networks of social relations within which systems of meaning and ways of acting are constituted” (Healey, 1999, p.115). Knowledge resources involve the employment of multifaceted knowledge resources in framing issues and finding solutions (Faehnle and Tyrväinen, 2013; Schilderman and Ruskulis, 2005; Alexander, 2000, p.46). The more diverse knowledge is, the wider the intellectual base for the plans can be (Innes and Booher, 2004). Integrating a plurality of interests within a political community results in the strengthening of new relational nexuses with a new layer of cultural formation and shared systems of meaning (Polk, 2011; Innes and Booher, 2003, p.41; Habermas, 1984).

According to Polk (2011, p.188), “Knowledge resources refer to both formal and informal types of expertise and know-how” and include:

- formalised knowledge: information made explicit and associated with a semantic meaning
- tacit knowledge: the kind of knowledge that is hard to transfer by writing it down, such as skills, ideas and experience.
In his book *The Deliberative Practitioners*, Forester (1999) emphasised the diversity of experience in urban space and underscored how planners are in charge of voicing local communities’ needs via communicative action. In addition, Henri Lefebvre (1991) commented on how important it is to integrate various layers of knowledge into the planning process. In agreement with this, Edward Relph (1976) pointed out in his book *Place and Placelessness* that the identity of a place is the assimilation of the various lived experiences of its residents: “The confusion about the meaning of the notion of place appears to result because it is not just a formal concept awaiting precise definition, but is also a naïve and variable expression of geographical experiences” (Relph, 1976, p.4).

Citizens have varied lifestyles with different types of relational webs of economic activity, social life or governance (Faehnle and Tyrväinen, 2013; Raitio, 2012; Healey, 1999). Youth as a social group perceive urban development and its accompanying urban issues differently from any other segment of society. Scholars have termed these experiences ‘indigenous knowledge’ or ‘local knowledge’ (Soh and Omar, 2012; Kolawole, 2010; Schilderman and Ruskulis, 2005). Such knowledge is defined as knowledge that has developed systematically in a specific context through different experiences, empirical trials, innovation, scientific information and ongoing interaction with the surrounding environment (Soh and Omar, 2012; Kolawole, 2010).

**Mobilisation capacity: amassing the power to act**

According to collaborative planning theory, the task of spatial planning goes beyond ‘building places’ to building the institutional capacity of governance to deliver effective and durable transformations in social change (Brulle, 2010; Healey, 1998a). In addition to connecting youth to sources of power (relational resources) and knowledge (intellectual capital), youth also need sufficient mobilisation capacity to sustain their engagement beyond a single collaborative effort. For Williams (2003, p.13), mobilisation capacity is built by creating a suitable institutional base and structural shifts for collaborative decision-making. It could be understood that groups under-represented in the political system can harness any ‘cracks’ or ‘windows of opportunity’ in the ‘old’ planning practices to challenge routine ways of conducting the business of planning (Healey et al., 2002; Innes and Booher, 1999). In this research, it has been understood that the process of building mobilisation capacity is manifold. It requires
the nurturing and sponsoring of charismatic leaders among youth who can collectively bring significant changes in the public policy arena\textsuperscript{33} (Day, 2017; Bryson et al., 2006; Healey, 2007, p.68, 1998a; Healey et al., 2002, p.21; Innes et al., 1994). Youth empowerment means equipping youth with the opportunities and skills necessary to support their participation in community activities and promote positive outcomes (Roth and Brooks-Gunn, 2003).

In this context, Healey and colleagues (2002) suggested that the literature of movement mobilisation and the work of Tarrow (1998) support understanding of mobilisation capacity. For Tarrow (1998), mobilising youth is about finding “\textit{ways of coordinating contention and organizing [youth communities] to sustain mobilization ... [it depends] on their capacity to build on existing social networks and to construct more formal organizations to maintain solidarity and aggregate resources}” (p.118). In this vein, Tarrow predicts that the continuous development of online communication would significantly facilitate online recruitment and mobilisation, as well as new forms of social organisation to challenge and change established methods of spatial planning.

\textbf{Hard infrastructure}

Without a supportive formal structure, building up knowledge resources, relational resources and mobilisation capacity is not enough to sustain youth participation (Healey, 2006a, p.285). The state has to establish an incentive structure for collaborative strategy-making to become an integral part of urban development in Jordan (Innes et al., 1994). The particular organisational and legal form by which “\textit{rights are redeemed, duties defined and resources allocated and redistributed}” (Healey, 2006, p.304) has been referred to by Healey (2006a, p.73) as ‘hard infrastructure’. Hard infrastructure concerns the rules and resources of a policy system (Alexander, 2007, pp.53–55). It also includes the organisational and legal systems that comprise planning practices (see figure 2-1, above).

This study perceives hard infrastructure as the institutional support by which youth can redeem their citizenship rights; planning authorities’ duties towards young communities are defined and secured; and resources are distributed equally among social actors (Healey, 2006a, p.304, 1999).

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33} The policy arena is the place where issues of concerns are discussed (Vigar et al., 2000, p.245).}
**Political system**

This theoretical concept aims to investigate the nature of political constitutions through which the values of equality, rights and social justice are emphasised in governance. The basis for consensus building and communicative action is a democratic context (Hasan and McWilliams, 2015; Healey, 2006b; Tewdwr-Jones and Almendinger, 1998). Also, Pierre (1999) stressed that the state system is significant in shaping urban governance. In this context, governance processes are value-laden and affected by the political values of the state (Innes et al., 1994). Democratic political systems are significant in forging a path to include new players and new perceptions in policymaking (Head, 2016).

**Administrative system**

Topics related to “governance without government” have gained greater importance in the European literature (Peters and Pierre, 1998). Administrative capacity alludes to issues related to the shifting of power, which mainly resides with the state apparatus and its planning institutions, towards other actors in the market and civil society, enabling more participatory action planning (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Grindle, 1996, p.6, cited in Jenkins and Smith, 2001a, p.490). Administratively, Rondinelli and Nellis (1986, p.5), ascribed decentralisation in urban governance to

> the transfer of responsibility for planning, management [...] to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, [...] or non-governmental private or voluntary organizations. (cited in Al Rabady et al., 2014, p.253)

The rational-bureaucratic approach to planning and implementation is considered to be among the main obstacles to the realisation of participatory planning (Chaskin, 2005; Zakus and Lysack, 1998; Innes et al., 1994). To be both effective and long-lasting, community planning has to be supported by an inclusionary administrative system of urban governance (Smith and Jenkins, 2015; Zakus and Lysack, 1998; Innes et al., 1994). Many scholars assert that bureaucratic top-down administration is anathema to public participation in the public realm (Fox-Rogers and Murphy, 2016; Zakus and Lysack, 1998; Innes et al., 1994). The rational model of governance relies heavily on the professionalisation of decision-making (i.e., involving expert knowledge systems) to manage the public sphere (Alexander, 2000).
Legal systems

The main concern of the focus of planning regulations is to set up a formalised structure of citizenship rights (Hasan and McWilliams, 2015), according to which young communities have the power to demand to be involved in planning decisions. Following Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration, planning regulations on land-use planning, for instance, are considered as a ‘formal’ structure. Structure is a powerful force, presenting both opportunities and constraints (Healey, 2006a, p.303; Alexander, 2001). Formal structures “seem to have the quality of engineering and managerial techniques, abstracted from the flow of social relations through which we make our lives” (Healey, 2006a, p.45). Planning regulations manifest power in society through the set of values and modes of thought embedded in legal frameworks (ibid.). Therefore, planning regulations could be considered a ‘structured oppression’ tool used by the powerful against the underprivileged.

Regardless, Marxist political economists argue that such powerful forces are never obsolete. Through our relational webs, we continually reaffirm them, modify them and transform them in the flow of daily life (Healey, 2006a, p.60). In addition, Habermas (1984), through his communication theory, argued that the tools and mechanisms of regulation are formed and transformed through good arguments. Through our relational webs, we can develop shared systems of meaning through which policy priorities change and power bases shift (Healey, 2006, p.66; Healey et al., 2002).

2.5 Writing young people into planning theory

Planning is of critical importance to young people’s lives (Checkoway, 2011; Churchman, 2010; Hinton, 2008; Checkoway et al., 2005). For Schoenwandt (2016), the significance of planning theories lies in providing a framework “to [analyse], compare, develop, and apply scientific theories and methods that can support the planning process in practice” (p.19). Nevertheless, planning scholars have paid little attention to youth exclusion in planning theory, and to what a contemporary planning perspective could bring to studies of young people and their welfare (Gillespie, 2013). This study aims to investigate how far young groups in Jordan are involved in the spatial planning process, and to explore the wide range of institutional challenges and opportunities that either hinder or encourage youth participation in urban policymaking.
Following the theoretical review presented in section 2.2 and section 2.3, above, and in accordance with the research’s epistemological and ontological stance, the research has determined the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach to be the most convenient theoretical model presented in the literature to investigate youth participation in Jordan’s spatial planning. This section extends the earlier discussion on the review of the theoretical underpinnings of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach, and explores how its key features and characteristics are meaningful, in theory and in practice, in addressing youth participation in Jordan’s spatial planning.

Spatial planning is a struggle between a comprehensive rationalist ideology of governance in a techno-corporatist form and a collaborative planning approach to decision-making and consensus building (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010; Lauwers and Vanderstede, 2005; Albrechts et al., 2003). In this research, spatial planning has been explored as a ‘cognitive style’ of urban governance, rather than the mere application of scientific inquiry and technological invention to urban management (Healey, 2006a, p.245). This research perceives spatial planning as a style of governance involving communicative work among heterogeneous social groups (e.g., different age groups) via ‘authentic’ dialogue and deliberative processes to achieve a consensually accepted outcome (Innes and Booher, 2000, cited in Raitio, 2012, p.309). According to a postmodern view of spatial planning, this thesis argues that young Jordanians should influence decisions that may affect their wellbeing. In contrast to the instrumental rationality of policy analysis, collaborative planning perceives young groups as a distinct social group with exclusive interests, perspectives and experiences that are different from those of any other political communities in a society (Derr, 2015; Head, 2011; Churchman, 2010; Hinton, 2008). Following the review of planning models in section 2.2, above, the dogma of collaborative planning entails a democratic pluralist mode of governance, in which young people’s ways of thinking and means of expressing claims are respected, accepted and integrated in urban policy (Heinrich and Million, 2016; Severcan, 2014; Head, 2011; Hart, 2008). Deliberative planning, as a key dimension of collaborative planning, requires key actors in a society to adopt an inclusionary and discursive style of governance, within which young people’s forms of knowing and reasoning, and their distinctive values, are enmeshed with other social
groups’ systems of meaning and frames of reference in urban policymaking (Yoldas, 2015; Head, 2011; Churchman, 2010; Simpson, 1997).

Cultural norms and adults’ perceptions of young people have significantly shaped urban planning (Gillespie, 2013). Understanding cultural conceptions and the complex webs of social relations in Jordanian society is of critical importance in unveiling the institutional challenges and opportunities that either hinder or encourage youth participation in urban policymaking (Frank, 2006; Ginwright and James, 2003; Camino and Zeldin, 2002). According to Bourdieu (1977), culture is a vital factor in shaping ways of valuing, acting and thinking in a society. This includes the modes of thought, systems of meaning and frames of reference through which our behaviours, interests and decisions are formed (ibid.). A critical institutionalist analysis of the governance context in Jordan provides a deep understanding of the social processes through which issues about a place are framed, and the political processes (i.e., processes of governance) through which society manages its public realm (Alexander, 2001). Neo-institutionalism, as discussed in section 2.3, above, enables the inquirer to investigate and better understand the social relations by which people live their daily life and how businesses conduct their work (Alexander, 2007, 2001; Healey, 1999). The sociological trajectory of neo-institutionalism extends its analytical power beyond merely investigating the formal institutions legally in charge of planning decision-making (Vigar et al., 2000, p.48). It also explores the powerful patterning of social relations produced by the overall manner of urban governance. This clarifies how urban conflicts and the ‘dilemmas of coexistence’ in the 21st century are sorted out according to the power of big corporatist interests (Healey, 2006a, p.201) or the interests of powerful politicians and social gatekeepers at the expense of young groups’ welfare. Accordingly, institutionalist analysis enables the researcher to examine the fine grain of planning practices, entering the ‘black box’ of social relations to unveil the power structure embedded in our thinking and explore the barriers inhibiting the realisation of sustainable youth participation (e.g., sociocultural forces).

To sum up, the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach is a postmodernist theoretical approach that better involves a variety of youth interests and competing systems of values and meanings in the planning process (Emerson et al., 2012; Connelly, 2009; Bryson et al., 2006; Googins and Rochlin, 2000). It involves a deliberative reshaping of frames of reference, shifting the system of meaning and
challenging the cultural conceptions by which young people and their issues are negotiated and integrated in future plans. Youth empowerment requires mutually balanced roles and sharing of power among the relevant actors: the state, the market and civil society. Their roles are different but equally important for youth participation. Under the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach, each of a society’s actors needs to have a certain capacity to collaboratively take responsibility for a greater engagement of youth in urban policymaking. This forges a path towards the building of a mutual understanding and a store of social and intellectual capital that could be drawn on to enhance youth participation in future spatial plans.

2.6 Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to give a full description of the theoretical framework that will be used in structuring and analysing primary data. This chapter has addressed the first objective of the study, which is as follows:

*To theoretically examine the concept of systemic institutional design and its significance in investigating youth participation in spatial planning.*

The following questions have been addressed to meet the first objective of the study:

A. In what ways do successive planning models conceive youth participation in urban development?

B. How does the institutionalist approach provide deep understanding of spatial planning systems and embedded practice in specific context?

C. What are the planning systems and practices (institutional design) presented in the literature?

The beginning of the chapter examined the development of collaborative planning concepts from the time of the Second World War onwards. The discussion addressed three main areas within these theoretical models: type of knowledge used; key actors involved; and how the participation and the role of the underprivileged was addressed. A critical review was undertaken of the rational and comprehensive planning model; Davidoff’s (1965) advocacy planning model; Krumholz’s equity planning model (1982); Stephen Grabow and Alan Heskin’s (1980) radical planning model; the liberal and laissez-faire planning model; and finally the collaborative planning approach. The discussion presented criticism of instrumental rationality and its deficiencies in
understanding the social context (Healey, 2006a, p.19). It also presented the limitations of the liberalistic model and described how it enables large investors to have more influence on the nature of planning and direct decision-making and policymaking to support capital accumulation at the expense of public benefit. Following the critical analysis of the relevant planning theories in this chapter, prominent theories in urban politics are discussed and presented in section 2.3. This includes elite theory, pluralism, the Marxist theories, regime theory and, regulation theory, with particular emphasis on the neo-institutionalist turn in urban and regional analysis.

The institutionalist theory of collaborative planning was chosen as the theoretical framework for this research. The discussion of planning theories shows how each planning model has certain strengths with regard to achieving youth empowerment, but the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach most closely capable of addressing the research questions. Therefore, further discussion of the dimensions of institutionalist collaborative planning was undertaken. Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 explored areas of communicative rationality and Giddens’s structuration theory (1984) respectively. The chapter then moved on to critically analyse the adopted theoretical model: systemic institutional design for collaborative planning (see figure 2-1, above). The discussion covered the main two dimensions: soft infrastructure and hard infrastructure. The chapter concluded by presenting how key features and characteristics of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach are beneficial to the field of youth studies.

The following chapter will cover the research methodology and data collection techniques used for the empirical observation for the chosen case study of Amman 2025.
Chapter 3: Research methodology and data collection methods
3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the conceptual theories and analytical frameworks used to frame the research. Chapter three seeks to provide a rationale for the chosen methodological frameworks and to position and contextualise the research approach within the various research paradigms.

Research methodology refers to the techniques implemented for the analysis and interpretation of primary data collected for the purpose of addressing research questions (Farzaneh, 2011, p.44; Shawash, 2011, p.25; Saunders et al., 2009, p.3). Section 3.2 explains and compares different philosophical and methodological research approaches. Section 3.3 includes a critical review of prominent paradigms in the social science research, namely; the positivist, post-positivist, critical theory, critical realism, participatory research and the interpretivist paradigms. Of these, the interpretivist paradigm was chosen for this study.

Section 3.4 explores the key ontological and epistemological underpinnings prominent in the field of geography and other social sciences (see table 3-1, below). It follows by explaining the induction–deduction cycle of science and offers a clear account of the qualitative methodology employed throughout the research. Section 3.5 justifies the choice of the qualitative methodological approach that was used to conduct this research. It explains why a case study method was the appropriate research strategy for addressing the research questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Assumptions that we make about the nature of reality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>General set of assumptions about the best ways of inquiring into the nature of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Combination of techniques used to inquire into a specific situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Individual techniques for data collection, analysis, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-1: Ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods, source: Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p.31, cited in Abushaikha, 2014, p.79

Section 3.7 presents a description of the chosen data collection methods. It includes semi-structured interviews, focus group design and layout, question types and format, sampling and recruitment, and conducting of the data collection. Subsection 3.7.4 also discusses issues regarding the reliability and validity of the research. Later, in the
fieldwork section, the data collection and analysis methods used in this study are explained. Section 3.9 discusses the mechanisms of the thematic research analysis. It includes a discussion and justification of the methods and techniques used to analyse the qualitative data of this research. Section 3.10 covers one of the critical aspects of this research: the theoretical contribution. It starts with a brief discussion of the definition of ‘theory’. Then it moves on to present the main elements of theory and how they are related to each other. The approaches employed for theory testing and theory building are critically discussed and presented accordingly. Moreover, a taxonomy developed by Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007) to measure contribution to theory is discussed to evaluate the theoretical contribution of this research.

Section 3.12 concludes the chapter with a presentation of the challenges and limitations encountered by the author and the ethical considerations related to this research.

3.2 Research philosophy and methodology

Research philosophy refers to the way the researcher approaches the development of knowledge in accordance with his/her interpretation of the nature of that knowledge (Saunders et al., 2009, p.108). Discussion of philosophical assumptions is of critical significance to research quality (Gray, 2014, p.20; Robson, 2002, p.16). Philosophical assumptions have implications for research strategy; methods and data collection techniques; and the analysis of the empirical data the research draws on (Gray, 2014, p.19; Saunders et al., 2009, p.108; Stivers, 2005, pp.379–402).

Three prominent schools of thought constitute research philosophy: ontology, epistemology and axiology (Tracy, 2012, p.38; Saunders et al., 2009, p.106).

Objectivists believe that the actions of social actors are steered by the social entities embedded in their environment (Saunders et al., 2009, p.110). In contrast, the subjectivist school of thought entails that social phenomena are categorically constructed by social actors’ perceptions, interpretations and consequent actions (Tracy, 2012, p.48; Johnstone, 2007, p.105). In other words, social constructivists believe that knowledge is socially constructed from our experience of and interaction with our surroundings (Lincoln et al., 2011, p.167). The perception of the social constructivists is consistent with the adopted theoretical model of this research: the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach. Social constructionism requires the intervention of the inquirer in order to understand the context, the social setting and key actors’ perceptions of youth participation in spatial planning.

Ontologically, this research falls on the subjectivism continuum. The author believes in the importance of considering different stakeholders’ experiences, perceptions and opinions to obtain a wider image of the phenomenon of youth participation in urban development in Jordan. In this vein, social constructivism, which is also termed interpretivism (see further details in section 3.3), views knowledge as socially constructed according to our subjective experiences, cultural beliefs and social interactions (Tracy, 2012, p.40; Neuman, 2002, p.111). According to this paradigm, research findings are literally based on the perspectives of participants within a phenomenon (Hopkinson and Hogg, 2007, p.157). The varying schools of thought of the interpretivist theoretical perspective (e.g., constructionism, subjectivism) share a rejection of the notion that reality is objective (Bernard, 2006, p.24; Dobuzinskis, 2005, p.580). Instead, social constructivists believe that reality only exists after its social invention through language and interaction (Lincoln et al., 2011, p.175).

**Epistemology** explores the best way of perceiving the nature of the world in a particular field of study (the way of knowing) (Lincoln et al., 2011, p.175; Heron and Reason, 2008, pp.366–367; Bernard, 2006, p.3; Neuman, 2002, p.95). Saunders and colleagues (2009, p.112) described epistemology as a general set of assumptions to identify “acceptable knowledge”. There is a different epistemological approach within the geography field. In this context, two prominent schools of thought dominate the epistemological paradigm: positivism and relativism (discussed in detail in section 3.3, below) (Tracy, 2012, p.48).
Since interpretivism attempts to understand the meaning of human actions (Kemmis, 2008, p.122), this approach has been selected for the epistemological stance of this research. This research involves discussion of topics of youth participation, urban governance and spatial strategic planning. These concepts contain different interpretations and perspectives from various stakeholders (Checkoway, 2011; Albrechts, 2004; Albrechts et al., 2003; Brenner, 1999). This study recognises the importance of including these different views in the research analysis and findings. Therefore, the author has conducted 28 semi-structured interviews with a variety of stakeholders drawn from the state, the community and the market along with four focus groups with Jordanian youth to obtain and fully understand their different perceptions.

3.3 Social science research paradigms

According to Lincoln and colleagues (2011, pp.163–166), social science entails different research paradigms: positivist, post-positivist, social constructivist, critical theory and participatory. These paradigms are commonly referenced in the social research field, yet they entail differences in their social theories and research techniques (Neuman, 2002, p.96).

Most ongoing social research is based on positivism and interpretivism. Positivism and interpretivism are the two main overarching but contradictory philosophies of science (Clifford et al., 2010, p.5; Gaber, 1993). The former refers to the application of mathematical modelling and statistical methods to understand a phenomenon (Tracy, 2012, p.39; Saunders et al., 2009, p.113; Bernard, 2006, p.12), whereas the latter relies on words, experiences and observations to represent reality and describe people in their ‘natural’ settings (Saunders et al., 2009, p.115).

The following discussion entails a comparison of the six paradigms in terms of their ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. Table 3-2, below, presents this comparison in a tabular fashion. The table draws an analogy between the various social paradigmatic approaches on the basis of ontology, epistemology, the role of the researcher and the adopted methods for gathering, collecting and analysing data.

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34 Different disciplines use different terms and categorisation schemes for paradigms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Social constructivist</th>
<th>Positivist</th>
<th>Post-positivist</th>
<th>Interpretive</th>
<th>Critical</th>
<th>Participatory</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong> (nature of reality)</td>
<td>Relativism – reality is not something ‘out there’. Instead, it is co-constructed via communication, interaction, and practice</td>
<td>Naive realism – single, true and consisting of pre-existing patterns or order that science can study</td>
<td>Imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible – reality is independent of our thinking, inherently partial but can be discovered</td>
<td>Relativism – socially co-constructed realities through human interaction</td>
<td>Reality is value-cognisant, constructed through power relations, and crystallised over time. Also, it is not pure, neutral and unmediated – that is, governed by hidden, underlying structures</td>
<td>Subjective–objective reality co-created through the researchers’ and research participants’ interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong> (nature of knowledge)</td>
<td>Knowledge is co-created, transactional, subjective and value-laden</td>
<td>Truth is dualist, objective and dualist yet can be discovered</td>
<td>A priori / objective / modified dualist</td>
<td>Knowledge is socially constructed through language and interaction. Dependent / value-laden / transactional / subjective</td>
<td>Knowledge is value-mediated, hidden and transactional and produced through power relations</td>
<td>Knowledge is co-created, experiential and propositional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong> (strategies for gathering, collecting and analysing data)</td>
<td>Qualitative methods. Hermeneutical (interpretative) / dialectical (discourse)</td>
<td>Experimentation. Mostly quantitative methods are used to test hypotheses and gather data. However, qualitative methods are also used to generate hypotheses</td>
<td>The researcher seeks to falsify his/her hypotheses (since proof is mainly fallible), mostly by using quantitative methods. However, qualitative methods are applicable for generating hypotheses</td>
<td>Often qualitative or / and quantitative</td>
<td>Variety of mixed quantitative and qualitative methods</td>
<td>Participatory action research. Participatory, qualitative and naturalistic methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>Social constructivist</td>
<td>Positivist</td>
<td>Post-positivist</td>
<td>Interpretive</td>
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<td>Synonym</td>
<td>investigating</td>
<td>verifying</td>
<td>predicting</td>
<td>hermeneutics – holistic understanding</td>
<td>emancipating</td>
<td>improving and transforming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal of research / role of the researcher</td>
<td>The researcher is passionate about understanding and interpreting a phenomenon from the perspective of those who experienced it. S/he aims to facilitate a multi-voice reconstruction</td>
<td>A post-positivist paradigm is similar to a positivist one in terms of relying on scientific methods, theories and laws to obtain reality in social research. The goal of science is to hold steadfastly to the goal of getting reality right</td>
<td>To understand why and how; to analyse a phenomenon from the actors’ standpoint, thus granting participants greater opportunities for their voice</td>
<td>The purpose of social science is to disrupt power relations, confront injustice, liberate and empower the underprivileged. In this context, the researcher is engaged in mobilising political action for transformative endeavours</td>
<td>Social researchers should strengthen their connection with research participants to thoroughly understand and improve local status or address dilemmas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-2: selected social paradigmatic approaches on selected issues, source: Tyson, 2014, pp.1–10; Tracy, 2012, pp.48–49; Neuman, 2002, p.121
Critical Institutionalist Analysis of Youth Participation in Spatial Planning: The case of Jordan – Chapter 3

Positivist paradigm

According to Aliyu and colleagues (2014), the introduction of positivism is attributed to Auguste Comte (1798–1857) during the Enlightenment period and it was introduced to study social activity in a ‘scientific’ way. Comte explained that human behaviour is influenced by laws of cause and effect (Neyman, 2002, p.97; Crotty, 1998, p.19).

In this regard, positivism’s ontological perspective regards reality as externally existing and the world as deterministic (Bygrave, 2007, p.36; Neuman, 2002, p.102). The philosophical system of positivism believes that truth and reality are distinctive and independent of the viewer and observer interference (Aliyu et al., 2014). Consequently, positivists believe that there is a world ‘out there’ that we can examine via direct measurement of the phenomenon being studied (Wigren, 2007, p.365; Bernard, 2006, p.5; Spicer, 2005, p.272). Positivism does not rely on the details of people’s internal mental states to analyse a social phenomenon. Rather, positivists seek to establish a consistent and unbiased object measurement based on established theoretical propositions, which will promote scientific rigour and help to eliminate any potential bias in research (Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.155; Crotty, 1998, p.24).

Positivism has proved to have many shortcomings in the area of social science research (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Smith, 1987). It is believed that using the positivist approach in researching social phenomena will yield controversial results because of its deficiencies in understanding the social context in any setting (Aliyu et al., 2014). In their critique of positivism, Williams and May (1996, p.27, cited in Gray, 2014, p.19) described positivism as “one of the heroic failures of modern philosophy”.

In agreement with this, the author discarded the positivist approach for not being appropriate for the domain of this research. As mentioned later, the ontological and epistemological assumptions of positivism propose the direct measurement of a social phenomenon in isolation from researcher interaction. Positivism approaches social and political understandings through rational explanation and the use of scientific knowledge (Swantz, 2008, p.32). Researching spatial planning, public participation and urban governance makes it necessary to obtain details of people’s social settings (Smith, 2009, p.9; Healey et al., 2002, p.24) and their “sensation[s], reflection[s] or intuition[s]” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p.28) to portray the social, cultural and political context of
a particular phenomenon: “The world addressed by positivist science is not the everyday world we experience” (Crotty, 1998, p.28).

Post-positivism

The post-positivist perspective emerged out of the growing criticism of positivism (Groff, 2004, p.3). Nevertheless, a post-positivist paradigm is to a large extent similar to a positivist one (Tracy, 2012, p.39; Wigren, 2007, p.384). Proponents of both paradigms believe in applying scientific methods (i.e., searching for causal explanations of patterned phenomena) in conducting social research (Tracy, 2012, p.62; Groff, 2004, p.4). However, in contrast to positivists, and in agreement with interpretivists, post-positivists believe that researchers’ knowledge and values are significant yet it may affect the subject under investigation (Saunders et al., 2002, p.133). From this perspective it follows that human researchers and their methods are flawed (Abushaikha, 2014, p.83; Tracy, 2012, p.40). Post-positivists consider researchers’ understanding of reality to be inherently partial, while science is considered objective and self-correcting (Saunders et al., 2009, p.133; Groff, 2004, p.4). Thus, triangulation of multiple measures and observations is strongly needed to reduce possible bias (Tracy, 2012, p.40). In consequence, the positivist or the post-positivist type of research criteria is mostly suitable within the modernist assumptions of an objective reality (Lincoln et al., 2011).

Critical realism

The philosophical perspective of critical realism views positivism and interpretivism as complementary paradigms instead of contrary extremes in investigating a social phenomenon (Pedler and Burgoyne, 2008, p.325; Blundel, 2007, p.54). Critical realists believe that social science is intrinsically meaningful and relies excessively on the observer’s ability to capture reality and avoid bias (Blundel, 2007, p.70; Kouzmin and Dixon, 2005, pp.708–709). The paradigm of critical realism implies that the social world cannot be investigated in the same way as its natural counterpart (Neuman, 2002, p.94). People’s meanings cannot be measured or counted and should be placed into their contextual setting, and the preconditions of social phenomena should be taken into consideration (Saunders et al., 2009, p.115; Johnstone, 2007, p.104). Meanwhile, in accordance with positivism, and in contrast to interpretivism, critical realism sees reality as existing ‘out there’ and composed of multiple layers: the empirical; the real; and the actual and socially constructed (Neuman, 2002, p.111).
This research, following the adopted sociological basis of institutionalism, does not view knowledge as a unified object or asset occurring ‘out there’ to be discovered (Healey et al., 2002, p.17). Following the theoretical approach adopted in this research (see subsection 2.4.1, chapter two), knowledge does not merely objectively exist; rather, it is socially constructed, maintained or transmitted via social interaction (Lincoln et al., 2011).

**Critical theory**

Critical urban theory belongs to the Frankfurt School, in stark rejection of the approaches inherited from the Chicago School of urban sociology (Brenner, 2009). Prominent critical urban theorists include Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, Manuel Castells and Peter Marcuse (ibid.). According to critical urban researchers, the purpose of social science is to empower the under-represented (Neuman, 2002, p.112). Critical urban researchers work towards unveiling the truth and producing knowledge that is critical to developing a fair and equal society (Murray and Ozanne, 2007, p.52). Critical urban theory is a ‘transformative intellectual’ means to question, challenge and address inequalities and conflict (Abushaikha, 2014, p.85). This intellectual effort would result in removing oppression originating from the struggle for power. In this approach, the role of the critical researcher is to probe cases of exploitation and unfairness and reveal false consciousness (i.e., misleading thoughts and perspectives) among the underprivileged (Tracy, 2012, p.44; Swantz, 2008, p.24; Neuman, 2002, p.110).

Critical theory creates an ‘antagonistic relationship’ with inherited urban knowledge, established urban formations and, most importantly, with the state (Brenner, 2009). Consequently, some social scientists believe that critical theory fuels insurgent social movements as it produces “the kind of information and insight that upsets institutions and threatens to overturn sovereign regimes of truth” (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2003, p.433, cited in Johnstone, 2007, pp.104–105). Generally speaking, this theoretical philosophy is grounded in studies of justice, communication and education more than in disciplines such as management (Tracy, 2012, p.43). It could be understood that this philosophical trend is compatible with the radical planning model and ‘insurgent’ planning, which has been dismissed as a planning model for this research (see section 2.2, chapter two). The theoretical background of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach does not aim to abolish the role of the state from the spatial planning arena. Instead, the adopted model aims to develop and sustain a long-term relationship...
among the three spheres of the state, the market and civil society based on the principle of collaboration and balance of power and influence (Healey, 1999).

**Participatory**

According to this paradigm, the inquirer engages with research participants through long-term collaborative research activities to help them address, understand and respond to local issues (Bergold and Thomas, 2012; Tracy, 2012, p.56; Swantz, 2008, pp.31–33). Participatory practices entail three main interrelated elements: systematic inquiry, professional practice intervention and stakeholders’ participation in decision-making (Tracy, 2012, p.56; Hughes, 2008, p.385).

Through engaging collaboratively by ‘opening communicative spaces’ with the underprivileged (Tracy, 2012, p.56; Leitch, 2007, p.148), the researcher aims to question and resist the ‘monopoly of knowledge’ among powerful networks (Fals Borda and Rahman, 1991, cited in Heron and Reason, 2008, p.374). Bergold and Thomas (2012) pointed out that a ‘democratic’ political framework is vital to support the work of the researcher. Moreover, a collaborative methodology requires a planned, long-term research process (Hughes, 2008, p.385).

However, the properties of participatory action are not consistent with the aims and objectives of this study. This research aims to examine the opportunities for greater youth participation in the process of spatial planning rather than participating in any social action or creating bonds between the researcher and youth communities in Amman. Therefore, this philosophical trajectory is dismissed, and the interpretivist approach is believed to be more appropriate to the scope and aims of this study. The next section highlights and deeply analyses the features of the interpretivist paradigm with deeper clarification of the rationale behind its adoption in this research.

**Interpretivist paradigm**

The interpretivist paradigm will be adopted as the philosophical basis for carrying out the institutional design analysis for youth participation in Amman 2025. Key actors’ and participants’ perceptions and the lifeworld of young people are essential in understanding planning practices in Amman 2025 in terms of social, intellectual and political capital. The interpretivist paradigm was introduced in response to the need for a perspective capable of capturing ‘our’ social world (Cronin, 2011, p.61; Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.158). For Bryman and Bell (2011, p.18), interpretivism is “philosophy that is
concerned with the question of how individuals make sense of the world around them and how, in particular, the philosopher should bracket out preconceptions in his or her grasp of the world”.

An interpretivist researcher does not search for ‘truth’ but seeks an understanding of the social context and how people interpret a specific phenomenon (Tracy, 2012, p.41; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.8). In this vein, people’s meanings, perceptions and interpretations may differ as a result of ‘our’ heterogeneous social interactions (Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.158; Neuman, 2002, p.84). Accordingly, a different meaning is attached to the same phenomenon, and it is the role of the researcher to evaluate these interpretations and provide a descriptive analysis of why and how different people interpret certain things differently (Saunders et al., 2009, p.111).

This study is explanatory in nature and seeks to understand the phenomenon of youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan. In order to address the research problem and answer the research question, this study will adopt the interpretivist approach for the following reasons. Firstly, the philosophical stance of this thesis falls into the social constructivist domain. The institutional design analysis of Amman 2025 draws on the sociological strand of institutionalism in social science (see subsection 2.4.1, chapter two). A philosophical basis sensitive to the social and cultural context is of high importance for investigating the quality of institutional capacity in Jordanian planning (Tracy, 2012, p.7; Berglund, 2007, p.88). Therefore, the interpretivist approach will be considered to gain a deep understanding of youth participation in spatial planning in the context of Amman. Secondly, power in planning is ‘multilayered’, multi-related and context-based (Hasan, 2012, p.III). Planning “draws individuals together into an aggregate interest, the citizens or ‘ordinary people’, versus powerful external forces” (Healey, 2006a, p.124, cited in Hasan, 2012, p.15). Accordingly, different groups of people have different perspectives and opinions based on their interests, history and environment (Emerson et al., 2012; Googins and Rochlin, 2000). Therefore, deploying the interpretivist paradigm in this research enables different groups with varying levels of power and influence on planning decisions to participate in the making of research findings and conclusions. Thirdly, the author believes that his interaction with the interviewees is critical to obtaining a valid account of the informants’ perceptions and to exploring the context of the phenomena being investigated (Bryman, 2012, p.28; Bryman and Bell, 2011). In this research, findings and conclusions are the result of the process of
interaction between the inquirer and those being inquired into (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). The inquirer seeks to understand the social setting and the culture where the data are collected to reflect the actual meaning of the data in the case being investigated (Lincoln et al., 2011). Fourthly, the dearth of spatial planning publications about Jordan means the interpretivist paradigm fits the purpose of the research in understanding and explaining the social and cultural world (Crotty, 1998, p.74) and thus facilitates the research’s contribution to knowledge.

### 3.4 Research approach

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) distinguished three basic types of logical reasoning: deduction, induction and abduction (Blundel, 2007, p.55; Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.161; Neuman, 2002, p.114). The distinction is in the degree of certainty: deductive reasoning aims to be completely certain, while inductive and abductive reasoning seek understanding from different perspectives (ibid.). Deduction seeks to predict and control quantitative research techniques (Saunders et al., 2009, p.125); induction proves a phenomenon has an impact on something else in reality (Saunders et al., 2009, p.126); and abduction offers hypotheses that further investigation may dismiss (Neuman, 2002, p.114).

The deductive approach refers to the process of deriving accurate inferences from general instances (Farmer, 2005, p.249). It aims to develop and test a theory by establishing a relationship between variables (e.g., a cause-and-effect link) (Gray, 2014; Saunders et al., 2009, p.124). In this manner, the researcher seeks to derive a set of hypotheses and then designs a research strategy to test those hypotheses empirically following operational terms separate from the researcher’s influence (Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.160). As a result, findings are used to assert, modify or refute a theory (Saunders et al., 2009, p.124; Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007).

Contrary to the deductive approach, the inductive approach refers to the inference of general reasoning from a particular instance (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014; Tracy, 2012, p.22). The purpose is to build a theory through the analysis of the empirical data (Saunders et al., 2009, p.126; Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007). In the beginning, the researcher starts by gathering data for the sake of formulating a new theory, then analyses the empirical evidence to come up with a new theory to explain a social phenomenon (ibid.). The inductive approach depends on humans’ interpretations of the social world where such events take place (Blundel, 2007, p.56; Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.161).
In addition to the deductive approach (theory to observations) and the inductive approach (observations to theory), there is the abductive approach, where the researcher shifts between the research findings and the theory to explore lines of inquiry as they emerge (Kovács and Spens, 2005). Lipscomb (2012, p.244) defined the abductive approach as “the creative, imaginative or insightful moment in which understanding is grasped – or is thought to be grasped”. In this approach, abductive reasoning is used to understand a ‘new’ phenomenon (Kovács and Spens, 2005).

However, abductive reasoning is also related to the process of generating explanatory critiques, hypotheses, theories or explanations (Neergaard, 2007, p.271; Neuman, 2002, p.114). Abductive reasoning is focused on revealing underlying patterns within a selected phenomenon to gain a broader and deeper understanding of a complex reality and expand scientific knowledge (Råholm, 2010a, b, cited in Mirza et al., 2014). Abductive reasoning applies two types of reasoning approach: generation of hypotheses; and evaluation of hypotheses (Mirza et al., 2014). In this way, a researcher using abduction ‘tries on’ a potential rule and asks the question of ‘what if’ to interpret a ‘puzzling situation’. Therefore, researchers who engage in abductive reasoning should possess wide and extensive experience and knowledge in their field (Mirza et al., 2014).

The present research is positioned within the inductive–deductive reasoning approach and cycle of knowledge. The ‘hybrid’ approach of inductive–deductive reasoning means the researcher begins by setting up a theoretical model from the literature review, followed by a deductive or theory-driven coding system, while allowing new themes that emerge inductively from raw data analysis to be integrated into the theoretical model (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Mangan et al., 2004). In this concept, the researcher keeps moving, top-down and bottom-up, between the adopted theoretical framework and the empirical data to address research questions and make a unique contribution to the research. In this research, the author began by defining basic planning models and critical areas of investigation before deploying a practical approach to qualitative data collection techniques and analysis to generate research findings.

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35 A detailed illustration of the use of the top-down, bottom-up approach for drawing conclusions and reaching findings is given in the research analysis in section 3.9, below.
3.5 Quantitative and qualitative research methods

Methods for conducting social science research can be divided into two different types: quantitative and qualitative (Neuman, 2002, p.167).

The **quantitative framework** treats knowledge as universal, quantifiable and predictive (Tracy, 2012, p.24; Neuman, 2002, p.282). Quantitative research methods can be explained as a methodology of determining hypotheses that are subsequently tested by deploying controlled experiments or statistical analysis to find out possible causal relationships among variables (Saunders et al., 2009, p.482; Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.816). A quantitative researcher attempts to compartmentalise phenomena into universal and quantifiable categories to predict or generalise findings (Bryman, 2012, p.160; Golafshani, 2003). A high degree of standardisation is crucial in designing quantitative data collection techniques (Saunders et al., 2009, p.351). Quantitative researchers favour a highly ordered format and prescribed responses over open-ended qualitative interviews (Wigren, 2007, p.385). The researcher’s impartiality on the object being observed is essential to ensure scientific rigour and enhance research value (Saunders et al., 2009, p.302).

In comparison, **qualitative data** are textual or visual data collected from interviews, observations, documents and records, which can be analysed in either a statistical or a thematic manner (Tracy, 2012, p.189; Bernard, 2006; Neuman, 2002, p.177). Such methods enable the researcher to investigate a social phenomenon without numerical measurement (Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.753; Mack et al., 2005).

Qualitative methods are directed at extrapolating the meaning that people have formed in relation to a phenomenon in a specific context, mainly through the employment of verbal description and explanation (Taylor et al., 2015, p.8; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Qualitative methods are designed to gain an in-depth understanding of a social phenomenon where “little is yet known” (Custer et al., 2000, p.18, cited in Farzaneh, 2011, p.48). Qualitative research stresses that a relationship between the researcher and what is being observed is vital and that reality is socially constructed (Taylor et al., 2015, p.9).

The literature embraces a substantial debate over the use of qualitative or quantitative methods, or both, for conducting research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This research draws on Saunders et al.’s (2009) criteria to determine the most convenient data...
collection method. Saunders and colleagues (2009) asserted that the selection of either or both research strategies depends on the following criteria: the research questions and objectives; the amount of existing knowledge regarding the phenomenon under study; the availability of resources; research scope and project duration; and the research’s philosophical stance. In this approach, the use of the qualitative approach alone was deemed most appropriate for this research.

Firstly, research questions are descriptive (what is going on) and explanatory (why is it going on) in nature. Questions and related objectives addressed in this work are designed to generate knowledge, contribute to the literature, and develop theory regarding youth participation in spatial planning. This study aims to examine the possibilities for greater youth participation in the process of spatial planning in Amman, the capital of Jordan. Investigating the nuances of the Jordanian institutional context and understanding local government’s performance and policies is an important way to address the research question. Accordingly, and due to the dearth of research on governance, development, and youth and public participation in Jordan (Al Nammari, 2014, 2013), qualitative research will be employed to generate knowledge and fill in the gaps in the literature. Quantitative methodologies commonly lack concern for contextual details, while the nature of qualitative analysis offers explanations of embedded practices, patterns and regularities, and thus enables the researcher to understand real-life events, reflect realities and, eventually, produce knowledge. Qualitative research places emphasis on the process through which urban plans are drafted and through which key actors operate and produce plans. Secondly, the social constructivist philosophical orientation of this research was deemed most suitable for use with qualitative research (Mangan et al., 2004, cited in Abushaikha, 2014, p.90). In this way, research participants’ experiences, perceptions and opinions are believed to be critical to offering a more in-depth understanding of the social context and to understanding the rhetoric and practice of the institutions involved in the Jordanian spatial planning system.

Overall, the research used qualitative research methods for the following purposes:

- The researcher is interested in gaining in-depth insight into how key actors in spatial planning in Amman construct their meanings, motives and perceptions in relation to Amman 2025
• The researcher is interested in how key actors explain their opinions of youth participation in decision-making according to the cultural context of Jordan (Tracy, 2012, p.7)

• The researcher is interested in exploring youth participation in the public realm through their subjective worldview

• The researcher is interested in giving youth the chance, through focus groups, to tell their stories and personal experiences in an unstructured manner. Their feedback is important to deepen and validate the research findings

• This researcher is not interested in generalising findings so much as in producing valid, respondent-led and rigorous research findings.

Following this justification of the use of the qualitative approach in this research, section 3.6 discusses the procedure followed in conducting the literature review, followed by a discussion on the case study strategy used in this research.

### 3.6 Literature review

A literature review is a critical and vital starting point for establishing a research inquiry and determining its focus (Naoum, 2007, p.18; Neuman, 2002, p.126). In this study, the fundamental insight drawn from the literature review determined which analytical tool to deploy for organising data collection and analysing the empirical evidence and the conceptual question. Accordingly, the literature review is structured into five major sections. The review begins with a chronological and analytical consideration of the most influential planning models according to Schoenwandt (2016), with a focus on the theoretical underpinnings of neo-institutionalism and communicative planning theory (see section 2.3, chapter two). Chapter one starts with a review of published literature regarding youth participation in public policy and development (see section 1.1, chapter one). Subsection 2.4.1, chapter two, looks more specifically at the analytical model – systemic institutional design – for the analysis and organisation of primary data. The fourth and fifth sections are contained in chapters four and five and investigate the institutional settings of Amman 2025 at the macro and micro levels respectively. On one hand, the macro level covers issues of national policies regarding the economic, political and administrative levels in Jordan. On the other hand, the micro level digs deeper in the literature to investigate specific aspects and unique features of the institutional context of urban governance in Amman.
Mango (2014) claimed that the urban development context in Jordan has not been well explored. Despite the limited and patchy secondary data (Tayeh, 2012, p.24), the author has extensively reviewed the existing scholarly literature on modern Jordanian urban development to reveal strategic planning policies, their principal actors, settings, networks and coalitions, and urban development regulation frameworks. Secondary data include grey literature,36 government publications, planning authorities’ websites, archives and published academic theses.

Also, this research deployed secondary data from general statistics and publications available from several sources in Jordan: the Royal Geographic Centre; GAM; the DoS, Jordan; MoMA; and the Higher Council for Youth (HCY). In addition, the author approached a number of public libraries and academic institutions in Amman, which contain geographical maps and historical information about urban development and planning in Jordan. These include the JU Library, the GAM Public Library (Downtown Amman), the University of Science and Technology Library (Irbid) and the Shouman Library (Amman).

These resources were mostly available in Arabic and related to the organisational structure of urban development and its effects within a Jordanian context. The author searched extensively for PhD or MSc theses published through EThOS, and, while a number of important PhD theses were found that were relevant and significant for the context of this research,37 none of them provided evidence to answer the research objectives. Therefore, further information was required and gathered through semi-structured interviews and focus groups to fill the gaps in knowledge and literature regarding urban governance in Amman.

3.7 Case study strategy

Yin (2009, p.8) identified various research strategies for collecting and analysing empirical evidence: experiment, survey, historical analysis, archival analysis and case study. Among these, a case study approach was chosen for this study. The purpose of

36 ‘Grey literature’ or ‘grey data’ is the body of materials that is not available through an academically recognised publisher (Ryan and Soule, 1995): “Gray literature is foreign or domestic open source material that usually is available through specialized channels and may not enter normal channels or systems of publication, distribution, bibliographic control, or acquisition by booksellers or subscription agents” (Ryan and Soule, 1995, p.2).

this section is to justify the adoption of a case study methodology as the principal method to investigate youth participation in the Jordanian spatial planning system.

Yin (2003, p.13) defined a case study as “*an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context*”. A closer look at the qualitative case study method was provided by Merriam (1998): “*an intensive holistic description and analysis of a single instance, phenomenon, or social unit*” (p.27). Yin (2003) has also divided case study research into two main discrete dimensions. The first dimension includes two types of single case study and multiple case studies (Saunders et al., 2009, p.146). At the conceptual level, single case studies are used for deepening understanding and explanations of extreme or unique events, where little research has previously been conducted to examine a phenomenon (Neergaard, 2007, p.267). On the other hand, “*A multiple case study often highlights complementary aspects of a phenomenon. It is a bit like a jigsaw puzzle: by putting individual pieces together, a more holistic picture is obtained*” (Neergaard, 2007, p.268).

Although multiple case studies are preferred by critics over single case studies for their rigorous conclusions (Bennett and Elman, 2010, pp.499–500; Yin, 2009, pp.14–15; Maoz, 2002, pp.164–165), this study has chosen a single in-depth case study to answer key research questions (Mariotto et al., 2014; Birch, 2012, p.7; Flyvbjerg, 2006). In this regard, qualitative researchers ought to be aware of the inherent limitations of utilising single case studies to carry out their inquiry (Yin, 2003, cited in Saunders et al., 2009, p.174). Critics argue that one case or a small number of comparative cases involve a limited number of examples as the basis for generalisation, while others argue that case studies as a research approach are an inadequate way of fully and exclusively testing hypotheses (Tellis, 1997). However, this study is inclined to follow the non-generalisable position. It is not the intention of this study to generate new international urban development theories, or to generalise findings at the national or international level. Rather, this research’s conceptual question is formed to explore and describe the soft and hard institutional infrastructure of spatial planning in Amman and whether the current planning system and practices enable or hinder youth participation in urban planning. Moreover, this study relied on the following list, presented by Yin (2009, p.47), of purposes for which using a single case study approach is justified:

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38 Yin (2003) identified another dimension in the classification of case studies: unit of analysis. Unit of analysis also applies to holistic or embedded case studies (Saunders et al., 2009, pp.146–147).
• performing a critical test of a theory
• dealing with unusual kinds of circumstances\textsuperscript{39}
• investigating whether a case is convincing
• seeking information
• producing an extensive review.

This case study falls into three of these categories. Firstly, the case study is evaluated and analysed against systemic institutional design as developed by Healey and colleagues (1997). The first objective adopted for this study explores whether the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach is an agenda that can realistically be introduced in Jordan. The second objective aims to test the theory in the Jordanian context and see whether the findings support the dimensions of the main two levels of institutional design: soft infrastructure and hard infrastructure.

Secondly, on the policy content side, Amman 2025\textsuperscript{40} stands as a unique example of spatial planning in Jordan, in that the public was invited to participate in the decision-making of Amman 2025 (Debruyne and Parker, 2016, p.451; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011). The conventional methods of ‘command and control’ and the scientific instrumental approach are characteristic of urban planning in major cities across Jordan (Alnsour, 2016; Haddad and Fakhoury, 2016; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Al Rabady et al., 2014; Daher, 2005). Therefore, the single case study approach was chosen because it is an effective strategy for researching an insufficiently studied phenomenon (i.e., youth participation in urban planning from the inception of Amman 2025 in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015).

Thirdly, given the dearth of internet-based information on spatial planning in Jordan and the lack of available high-quality secondary data (Tayeh, 2012, p.24), an in-depth case study was deemed the most appropriate strategy to answer the research questions (Bennett and Elman, 2010, pp.505–506). The focus of an in-depth case study is to thoroughly understand and provide a rich description of a phenomenon and its context (Walsham, 1995).

The availability of rare and revelatory cases (Yin, 2009, p.47) from the Jordanian spatial planning field means that the use of a single case study for the purpose of this research

\textsuperscript{39} Also see Neergaard (2007, p.267).
\textsuperscript{40} Chapter five of this research provides clear and valid justification for selecting Amman 2025 as a research case study.
is justifiable. Amman 2025 has not previously been scientifically investigated, as is obvious from the lack of secondary data (Tayeh, 2012, p.24). Shanks (1997) states that a single in-depth case study is a complex social activity and therefore its success depends significantly on the researcher’s understanding of the case study organisational context; therefore, a deep investigation of the micro and macro levels of institutional settings in Amman 2025 was conducted prior to primary data collection. Exploring the national and local planning context expanded the researcher’s understanding and outlined the scope of the study. It also provided insight into how key actors within urban governance are linked, identified decision-making process, and revealed how urban governance discourses are translated into action within the specific context of Amman.

This study demonstrates that a significant proportion of young Jordanians are either marginalised or minimally involved in urban development planning, and that a very small group of major business owners is the most influential group in spatial planning. Investigating aspects of youth marginalisation and weak public participation requires a methodology that is descriptive (it answers questions of what the institutional context of spatial planning is in Amman) and explanatory (why, and in which ways, young Jordanians are excluded from the planning process). Therefore, the nature of the case study adopted in this research is both descriptive and explanatory.

### 3.7.1 Case study protocol

Case study protocol refers to the statement of the set of instruments, procedures and general rules applied by the researcher in carrying out data collection (Perry, 1998). A case study protocol is critical for the data collection process since it uses significant data collection guidelines (Eisenhardt, 1989) to enhance reliability through the data collection process (Perry, 1998) and to guide attention “to key elements that should be examined within the scope of the research” (Yin, 2003, p.22). Case study protocol prevents an explosion of data, helps the author to focus on research objectives, facilitates the process of data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989) and defines the research audience (Abushaikha, 2014, p.94). In this regard, research protocol should be lean and flexible, where the interviewer or focus group leader is able to move back and forth between research questions (Brereton et al., 2008; Riege, 2003).

Therefore, before the main fieldwork for data collection started, a case study protocol was developed in accordance with Perry (1998) and Yin (2009) and is presented in appendix 9. Both the individual interviews and the focus groups followed the same
protocol of welcoming the participant(s); explaining the aims and objectives of the study; assuring confidentiality; and recording the interview as permitted. Following this procedure during the interviews and focus groups meant that participants felt more comfortable to express their true opinions and provided information on the scope of the research and its purposes (Brereton et al., 2008).

3.7.2 Collecting evidence from case study research

In this research, two qualitative techniques were used to generate data: focus groups and semi-structured interviews. Both techniques complement each other to generate sufficient and rich data to address research concerns. On one hand, focus group discussions give youth the opportunity to speak for themselves, resulting in themes that seem more relevant for young participants and that have not been addressed in individual interviews (Hennessy and Heary, 2005, p.236). However, semi-structured interviews were more appropriate for exploring issues surrounding the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman, and Jordan in general (Birkmann et al., 2010; Desfor and Jørgensen, 2004). The following discussion demonstrates how the use of both interviews and focus groups made it possible to fully understand the issues surrounding the institutional context in Amman’s urban governance.

Semi-structured interviews

Interviews are verbal interactions that provide people with an opportunity to share their information and experiences about a social phenomenon (Longhurst, 2010; Malhota and Birks, 2007, p.207; Mack et al., 2005; Robson, 2002). Qualitative interviewing is usually intended to be either structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.227; Johnstone, 2007, p.109). Structured interviews contain a set of predefined questions that are put to different groups, while semi-structured interviews are more flexible and contain a list of themes or main topics derived from an understanding of the main theoretical framework. Unstructured interviews provide interviewees with greater control over the process of the interview in comparison with structured and semi-structured interviews (Corbin and Morse, 2003). Among these, the researcher has chosen semi-structured interviewing for a number of reasons. The first is its advantage in exploring a wide range of issues relevant to the research questions (Saunders et al., 2009, p.358; Chambers, 2008, p.297). The second is the flexible nature of semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews may differ depending on the particular organisational context and the circumstances of the interview (Longhurst, 2010).
Interview structure may diverge from the predefined structure, and wording may vary depending on the organisational context and the interviewee profile (Bryman, 2012, p.470). The nature of semi-structured interviews paves the way to achieving more flexible discussions by pursuing unanticipated topics. The flexible characteristics of semi-structured interviews are particularly necessary so that the interviewer can adjust the questions to the immediate situation, thus enhancing rapport (Martin et al., 2007, p.367). Thirdly, the use of semi-structured interviews allows participants to express their views, which is consistent with the epistemological methodology of this study (Saunders et al., 2009, p.358).

The semi-structured interviews were designed to explore the institutional context of local urban governance and planning organisations in Amman, and to what extent the planning system and practices in Amman changed from when Amman 2025 started, in 2006, to the collection of primary data in 2015 (Birkmann et al., 2010; Abu Ghazalah, 2008a; Desfor and Jørgensen, 2004). The author was careful to choose the people who could provide accurate and relevant information (Saunders et al., 2009, p.358). Potential interviewees were identified partly by reviewing recent textual resources on Amman’s urban development planning (i.e., newspaper articles, personal blogs and journal articles) and also by using the snowball sampling technique (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). The snowball sampling technique is a method that has been widely used in qualitative sociological research (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981), and it is a successful networking strategy that helped the author to identify and interview people who had the most informative and relevant experiences.

The participants were those with significant roles in the planning process in Amman or those who participated in the making of Amman 2025. The planning professionals included planning faculty members from various schools of architecture and urban planning in Jordan; academic researchers in urban planning; housing and real estate developers; senior decision-makers within government bodies including MoMA, MoPIC, the MoI, and the administration of GAM, in addition to other non-government...

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41 Snowballing is a networking technique that “yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest” (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981, p.1). Feild and colleagues (2006) distinguished between two types of sampling techniques that differ in their recruitment strategies: probability sampling (i.e., systematic random; stratified; multi-staged cluster) and non-probability sampling (i.e., snowball sampling). In this manner, snowball sampling was used and recommended by Kundu (2010, p.61) as the most efficient technique in reaching those most convenient for the research rationale (in this study, government and public officials).
agencies such as the Center for the Study of the Built Environment (CSBE). Engaging academics and researchers in the data collection process offered the opportunity to obtain different stances and perspectives on the urban governance context in Amman and to reveal controversial issues relating to the urban development of Amman (see triangulation in section 3.8, below). Input from academics supported the fostering and transfer of scientific knowledge and ideas, especially in a country with a lack of secondary data and limited academic research regarding spatial planning, partnership, governance and youth participation. These three main concepts were deemed vital to deeply understanding the institutional context in Amman regarding spatial planning. This research has overcome this challenge by compiling perspectives from different researchers and stakeholders to enhance research credibility and ensure rigour.

Most of the interviewees were contacted in advance via email or phone to request their participation (see appendix 9-1). 55 individuals were invited to participate in the semi-structured interviews, of whom 28 were successfully interviewed. A total of 27 face-to-face interviews and one Skype interview were conducted with the main actors of the three spheres of the state, civil society (including academics) and the market. The average time for each interview was one hour, with the shortest interview taking 40 minutes and the longest lasting over 75 minutes. Most of the interviewees chose to conduct the conversation in Arabic. Although it created an extra burden of translation, this allowed the participants to freely express their opinions without linguistic barriers.

The second source of data in this study was that of the focus groups, as explained in the following section.

**Focus groups**

Primary data were also collected from young Jordanians living in the city of Amman through the focus group technique. A focus group involves a discussion among a small number of participants (around four to twelve), and groups are either homogenous or heterogeneous (Saunders et al., 2009, p.344; Hennessy and Heary, 2005, p.236).

One of the distinctive features of focus group interviews is their insightful communication and their usefulness in illuminating different perspectives and feelings about a single issue (Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.82; Mack et al., 2005). Participants are

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42 See appendix 10-1.
43 In this case the interviewer resorted to Skype to interview G.P. as s/he is located in Canada.
invited to discuss and respond to a particular topic in order to obtain their views and opinions collectively (Glesne, 2006; Robson, 2002, p.293). Hence, a focus group can generate large volumes of data in a relatively short time span (Krueger and Casey, 2015; Robson, 2002, p.296). Longhurst (2010) found focus groups to offer effective interaction that involves greater variety of communication and helps to identify the social, cultural, political, economic and personal dimensions of a phenomenon.

Four focus groups were conducted in this research. One focus group was arranged with the assistance of Professor N.K. and Dr Wael Al Azhari in the Architectural Engineering Department at the JU. The author gave a short presentation explaining the research aims and objectives to attendees at random lectures. Owing to the sensitivity of the questions asked, the researcher clearly explained that the purpose of the research was purely academic and that participants’ perspectives were essential to the production of knowledge and theory building regarding youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan. Following the presentation, the researcher held an open conversation to answer students’ questions. Those who were interested in participating answered screening questions to formally state their interest (see appendix 9-3). This step is especially significant when the content of the interview risks negative impacts for the interviewee (Prokopy, 2008). Therefore, it was implemented in all four focus groups to safeguard individual interviewees’ interests.

The other three focus groups took place at AJYC centres, two at the East Amman branch and one at the West Amman branch. The author arranged a meeting with the AJYC public relations officer, Mr Amjad Kreemen, who kindly offered the author his assistance. Then the author presented the research and met with interested participants at AJYC venues in Amman. The AJYC helped in introducing the researcher to many young participants, saving time and making it easier for the researcher to approach hard-to-reach groups in Amman, particularly young Jordanian women.

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44 Focus group participants in the case study research were selected based on explicit criteria (see appendix 9-3). The questions were in the form of multiple choice, designed to be simple, understandable and easy to answer. The focus of the screening questions was generally on personal information to determine the participant’s age, area of residence and whether s/he was concerned about development in her/his area and, lastly, whether the participant was interested in taking part in a focus group discussion.

45 The AJYC is one of the innovative programmes sponsored by the state through the Royal Hashemite Court (RHC) (King Abdullah II Fund for Development) to support youth communities, and one of their aims is to encourage ‘hard-to-reach’ young group to become more involved in the public realm.
Participants in this research method were selected according to age (18–24) and whether they had been living in Amman at least five years. Between six and eight different young people attended each of the four focus groups (see appendix 10-2). Youth participating in each focus group were chosen from different backgrounds in terms of education, gender and knowledge and income levels. The researcher was eager to promote equal contributions from all participants. The structure of the focus group contained a flexible question format as a prompt for commencing and probing conversations (Barbour and Schostak, 2011; Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.67) (see appendix 9-4), and the agenda was flexible to allow discussion of the central themes of the research in relation to Amman’s urban built environment, governance and development while exploring areas of interest as they arose in the discussion. The focus groups were intended to gather data on young people’s ideas regarding urban development planning and how young people can participate in the decision-making process. In addition, the focus groups provided an opportunity for participants to discuss their feelings about Amman’s urban development and how to improve the process, and whether they had any previous experience in participating in public debate in the city.

It was beneficial that the focus group discussions were conducted at AJYC venues and at the meeting hall at the Architectural Engineering Department of the JU. The researcher saw that being familiar with the place provided participants with a relaxed atmosphere and encouraged all of them to engage in the discussion. Nevertheless, a number of issues were encountered in discussions undertaking focus groups. One of the issues concerns those young people who did not participate in focus groups. Although the researcher presented research findings clearly and simply in front of a large number of young people, a relatively small number turned up and showed interest in participating. The issue of weak turnout by young participants demonstrates the need for more interactive recruitment techniques for gaining youth interest in the research. Innovative recruitment strategy might include engaging them through visual arts, theatre and youth-led debates where the researcher observes and takes notes (Al Kodmany, 1999). Such interactive

46 Determining the length of residence enabled focus group discussions to involve residents who are familiar with issues in Amman, thus making focus group discussions richer and more informative. Length of residence and attachment to place have been found to be strongly correlated (Raymond et al., 2010; Hernández et al., 2007; Stedman, 2006), which is important to community participation and planning (Manzo and Perkins, 2006).

47 According to Bagaeen (2006), the term urban built environment refers to the “buildings, structures, physical, and social infrastructure that enable people to live, work and play, circulate and communicate” (cited in Alnsour and Meaton, 2014, p.67).
approaches, visual or verbal, attract youth, especially in the age range 18–24, in order to obtain their perceptions of the local area. On the other hand, Weber (2007) stated that group dynamics could cause problems and misdirect discussions. Weber (2007) referred to occasions when discussions are ‘derailed’ and irrelevant topics are debated among participants rather than the original theme. In this context, the researcher significantly benefited from a focus group proforma (appendix 9-4), along with maintaining intense concentration during the course of focus group discussion. For this purpose, the researcher found it useful to memorise the questions so that more time was available for note-taking, thus maintaining continuous discussion. However, a copy of the proforma was still within reach to act as an aide-memoire for the researcher.

**Documentary evidence**

Modes of data collection in case study research also include evidence from documents – in this case, documents published by local government bodies and research institutions in Jordan (e.g., Ai). Documentary information was a helpful source of evidence for this study. The documentary materials used in this research include the following (Yin, 2009, 2003):

- government reports and policy/strategy documents
- newspaper clippings and other articles appearing in official gazettes
- governance plans, legislation (i.e., spatial planning frameworks in Jordan), reports and organisational websites.

Documents played a key role in understanding the context of the case study. Moreover, documents played a significant role in constructing validity by enabling the triangulation of data that were collected by other methods. However, despite the advantages of using documents, it was by no means easy to collect or to systematically organise and analyse them. Complications with this source of data arose in gaining access to the policies and published data from local organisations.

Scott (1990) formulated quality control criteria that are meaningful to ensure document reliability (cited in Gaborone, 2006, p.224). Scott (1990, p.6, cited in Bryman, 2012, p.544) identified four criteria for assessing the quality of documents: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. Authenticity addresses the originality of document resources. The researcher collected government documents by either downloading them from the official website or requesting them in person by visiting the
relevant institutions. Official sources were accessed in order to make sure that documents were not forged, altered or manipulated. In addition, the researcher confirmed documents’ authenticity by confirming their authorship and place and date of publication. The researcher dismissed any documents with distorted or dishonest content, or incorrect information, to ensure credibility of the resources by examining whether the document is typical of its kind (Gaborone, 2006). The third criterion, the document’s representativeness, is best described as its reliability. The researcher followed Scott’s (2006) advice by questioning all documents gathered to demonstrate their authenticity, credibility and representativeness before drawing on them. Documents were also assessed through initial textual analysis of whether the source was clear and comprehensible in its content. This was to ensure that meaning (the fourth criterion) was achieved. In agreement with this, all documents used in this research match the aforementioned criteria forwarded by Scott (2006) and thus were used in the research analysis.

3.7.3 Issues in recording, transcription and translation

Carrying out data collection through qualitative methods in two languages poses specific dilemmas in translation and transcription (Shawash, 2011, p.57; Temple and Young, 2004). The following discussion will highlight the issues encountered by the researcher and the measures taken to overcome these challenges.

Recording qualitative data

A high-quality audio device was used to record semi-structured interviews and focus groups (Bryman, 2012, p.219). The recording device can capture the sounds of participants from a distance, deemed vital in recording focus group discussions. An added advantage of using an audio device is its significant storage capability and its capability of recording continuously for up to eight hours. All recorded interviews were directly backed up to avoid any loss of data and transcribed verbatim after finalising the interviews and focus groups (Bryman, 2012, p.219).

Transcription process

Research recordings were used to transcribe primary data verbatim (Neuman, 2002, p.465). 23 out of 27 semi-structured interviews and discussions from all four focus
groups were transcribed by the researcher. Following transcription, primary data were ready for analysis. Each hour of recording took between two and half to three and half hours to complete. The researcher used one of the available media players to pause, rewind, play and slow down the recording. In addition, notes were used to refresh the researcher’s memory during the transcription of the interviews. These notes were written during or after each semi-structured interview and focus group. Field notes were helpful to refresh the researcher’s memory regarding the interviews conducted, to review the situation.

Generally speaking, transcribing is extremely time-consuming and tiring. Also, transcribing recordings manually resulted in vast amounts of paper when analysing the data. Therefore, mistakes in transcription could occur as a result of mishearing, fatigue and carelessness. In this vein, the author repeatedly referred to field notes and memos to ensure the integrity of transcripts. Interviews with professional planners and city officials involved more formal language, which made it easier and less challenging to transcribe and translate them. On the other hand, transcribing and translating focus group discussions was more challenging and time-consuming as participants used colloquial Arabic language in the four discussions. Other drawbacks included an unclear voice recording in focus groups, as some speakers were sitting far away from the recording device. In such cases, the author repeated the recordings a number of times until the dialogue was precisely captured. For this reason, the researcher transcribed interviews within four days of conducting them to ensure they were fresh in the mind of the interviewer.

**Translation between English and Arabic**

Generally speaking, researching a subjective topic in two languages entails methodological challenges in translation (Shawash, 2011, p.57). The university sponsoring this study is English-speaking and the vast majority of the literature reviewed, including theoretical frameworks and thesis texts are in English. As the data collection was carried out in an Arabic-speaking country – Jordan – translation was needed. All interviews and focus groups were conducted in Arabic, apart from a single interview with an interviewee who is a native English speaker. Accordingly, direct translation was

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48 Two of the semi-structured interviews conducted were eliminated from the research analysis. These semi-structured interviews infringed the ethical standards set for qualitative research by the Ethics Committee at the School of Energy, Geoscience, Infrastructure and Society (EGIS) at Heriot-Watt University. See subsection 3.11.1, below for further information.
carried out by the author as his native language is Arabic. The researcher chose not to involve a translator in the research. The fact that the primary data translation was conducted by the author ensured respondents’ confidentiality, and the translation process also gave the researcher the chance to delve more into the raw research data. This provided the researcher a greater understanding of the context, and to ‘sketching out’ the architecture of the possible concepts and codes that emerged from primary data.

However, as mentioned above, translation in qualitative research involves methodological challenges, particularly when the language of the participants is not that of the research (Fersch, 2013; Shawash, 2011, p.57; Temple and Young, 2004). Temple and Young (2004) highlighted how these issues become a matter of concern if the epistemological stance of the researcher(s) involves using “objective instruments” (p.163) to draw out research findings or conclusions. In this manner, greater attention must be paid to avoiding bias while translating from one language to another. Avoiding bias in translation assumes that knowledge is value-laden and subject to influence from researchers’ values and beliefs (see table 3-2, section 3.3, above). Based on this, the author acknowledges that his own understanding and values may have affected the translation of meaning, expression or perspectives. Nevertheless, this does not mean that translation in this research was carried out in a chaotic or incorrect manner. Any translation of primary or secondary data gathered from research participants or documents used in the research was completed with accuracy and credibility. A high level of accuracy in translation was necessary to ensure that no meaning was lost, misunderstood or manipulated in the translation process (Fersch, 2013).

3.7.4 Criteria for judging the design rigour of case study research

Ensuring validity and reliability in interpretivist research (qualitative research) is very important for assessing the quality and rigour of the conclusions (Bryman, 2012, p.46; Golafshani, 2003; Patton, 1999). Qualitative research is often accused of generating invalid and unreliable findings (Whittemore et al., 2001). Kapoulas and Mitic (2012, abstract) stated that the inherent weakness in qualitative research is that of the “contextually embedded findings, vague standards for data analysis, presentation of voluminous amount of qualitative data and theoretical criteria for judging the quality of studies”. For these reasons, Yin (2009, p.40) provided a logical set of the most relevant statements that should be applied throughout the course of research to ensure validity and reliability in qualitative research (see table 3-3, below).
## Construct validity

Construct validity refers to developing adequate operational measures for the concepts being investigated (Neuman, 2002, p.217; Whittmore et al., 2001). For Trochim (1985), “construct validity refers to the degree to which [observationalisation] can be said to reflect their theoretical construct” (p.567).

In this research, the construction of validity has been carried out according to Yin’s framework. Table 3-3, above, shows that constructing validity entails the application of several criteria, namely the use of multiple sources of evidence, or what Yin (2009) described as triangulation (see section 3.8, below). The use of multiple data collection methods would significantly contribute to the development of “converging lines of inquiry” for greater accuracy and more convincing arguments (Yin, 2009, p.116). The second is establishing a chain of evidence to let an external observer track the steps (the chains) in either direction, from case study questions to case study report or vice versa. A chain of evidence was established in this research by developing a case study protocol as discussed in subsection 3.7.1, above, and presented in appendix 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Case study tactic</th>
<th>Phase of research in which tactic occurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construct validity</td>
<td>• use multiple sources of evidence</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• establish chain of evidence</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• have key informants review draft case study report</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• do pattern matching</td>
<td>data analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• do explanation building</td>
<td>data analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• address rival explanations</td>
<td>data analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• use logic models</td>
<td>data analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• use theory in single case studies</td>
<td>research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• use replication logic in multiple case studies</td>
<td>research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• use case study protocol</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• develop case study database</td>
<td>data collection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-3: Case study tactics for four design tests, source: Yin, 2009, p.33

Following the social constructionist approach, this study has deployed Yin’s assessment framework. Further discussion of the four dimensions and its application in the research will be presented as follows:

**Construct validity**

Construct validity refers to developing adequate operational measures for the concepts being investigated (Neuman, 2002, p.217; Whittmore et al., 2001). For Trochim (1985), “construct validity refers to the degree to which [observationalisation] can be said to reflect their theoretical construct” (p.567).

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Internal validity

The extent of research validity determines research quality and the robustness of research findings and outcomes (Miller, 2008, cited in Shawash, 2011, p.53; Malhorta and Birks, 2007, p.307). As depicted in table 3-3, above, internal validity is ensured through the data analysis stage of the research. This research followed the inductive–deductive cycle of knowledge to demonstrate rigour in thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The study started with deductive reasoning by examining the theoretical model of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach and its application in the systemic institutional design for collaborative planning. The second stage was inductive reasoning, commencing with the design of the case study protocol (see appendix 9), followed by collection of primary data regarding youth participation in Amman 2025. The purpose was to observe then explore patterns in the database that differ from or match patterns from the theoretical model. Pattern matching made it possible to ensure internal validity by conducting an accurate analysis of pattern matching.

Internal validity is ensured through research analysis (see table 3-3, above) (Yin, 2009) or triangulation. Firstly, the pattern-matching technique was used in the thematic analysis (see subsection 3.9.1, figure 3-2, below) in order to ensure internal validity (Golafshani, 2003). Pattern matching means matching an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (Cho and Trent, 2006). All theories provide information that enables the generation of patterns. Therefore, certain conditions in the theoretical realm lead to other conditions in the raw data sphere.

External validity

Ensuring external validity is one of the major challenges facing case study researchers (Cho and Trent, 2006). It concerns how far research findings can be applied to situations beyond the immediate case study (Yin, 2009; Golafshani, 2003). However, this research is not interested in generalising findings as much as producing valid, respondent-led and rigorous research findings. The study was intended to follow the non-generalisable position. The aim was to draw conclusions about youth participation in the urban development of the city of Amman. However, generalisation is only possible to a certain degree given the disparity of regulatory and socio-economic specificities of major Jordanian cities. Extending generalisability and ensuring external validity for research
findings at the national level of Jordan requires multiple case studies, which are suggested as a future research path in section 8.9, chapter eight.

**Reliability**

Reliability refers to the extent to which the study’s operations (i.e., data collection procedures) could generate the same result if repeated later by a researcher following the same procedures (Yin, 2009, p.33). The aim of this test is to indicate the extent of any personal bias in data collection and analysis (Golafshani, 2003). Therefore, an earlier researcher should document the procedures followed in a case study to enable external reviewers to test the reliability of case study findings.

In this study, the author has provided the data collection mechanisms followed by the researcher (presented in appendix 9) by which an external examiner would be able to judge the quality of research design and reliability for further validation of research findings.

**3.8 Triangulation of data and information**

Process validity and empirical grounding are both crucial to ensure good qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003). Creswell and Clark (2007, p.210) provided several strategies to ensure the validity of qualitative studies. One is that research should diversify its methods of addressing research questions by using a variety of sources, methods and theories. The strategy of diversifying research methods and data sources has been referred to in academia as ‘triangulation’ (Biggerstaff, 2012). Denzin (1978) recommended triangulation as a strategy to analyse the complexity of a phenomenon by studying it from different angles via a variety of methods or combining a range of methodologies (Denzin, 1978, p.291).

Patton (2015, p.662) defined four types of triangulation: methodological triangulation (multiple methods); data triangulation; theory triangulation; and multiple analyses triangulation. Methodological triangulation stands for the use of ‘multiple operationalism’ (Biggerstaff, 2012, p.182) by combining a variety of methods – for instance, merging both qualitative and quantitative data collection in investigating a single phenomenon (i.e., questionnaires, interviews, focus groups and observations all combined). The rationale behind this combination is that the weakness of one method is addressed by the strengths of the others (Pope and Mays, 2009; Pope et al., 2000). It has been argued that every social research method has its weaknesses and strengths (Pope
and Mays, 2009); thus, deploying a single social research method within social research will probably yield biased, imperfect and weak research outcomes (Bernard, 2006).

Notwithstanding these limitations, and in agreement with the relativist paradigm, according to which a social phenomenon should be observed inclusively (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p.27), this research sought to achieve credibility by analysing data based on different respondent standpoints (Golafshani, 2003). More specifically, the benefits of triangulation in this research are threefold. Firstly, triangulation helped the author to define the research problem and thus gave direction to the research rationale. Secondly, triangulation was a necessary method applied to weave together the patchy and limited literature, especially regarding the institutional context of Amman. Thirdly, it facilitated the analysis of the primary data by providing enough fundamental information for future analysis. Triangulation of data sources helped the research to assess the impact of different social actors on the local decision-making process.

In terms of respondents, the author found that relying on individual informants was not enough to obtain deep understanding of the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman (see figure 3-1, below). Therefore, investigating the standpoints of informants belonging to the three spheres of society (i.e., the state, the market and civil society) along with secondary data sources is critical in providing unbiased conclusions in case study research by conducting an accurate analysis of events (Yin, 2009), hence assuring the credibility and confirmability of the case study analysis and findings (Greene et al., 2011) and supporting and elucidating the author’s themes and perspective.
Triangulation

The state:
King Abdullah II discussion papers; Ai publications; GAM website; All Jordan Youth Committee website; CSBE website; publications by the DoS, Jordan; MoI website; MoMA publications; MoPIC publications

The market:
Amman Chamber of Commerce; Amman Chamber of Industry; Jordanian Construction Contractors Syndicate; Jordanian Housing Sector Investors Association

Civil society:
NCHR website and publications; CSS publications; CSBE website; UN Jordan various branches’ websites and publications; World Bank database; IMF website; other NGOs’ websites

Other:
Academics; focus group screening questions; media reports; personal communications; archival records; PhD and master’s theses

Figure 3-1: Triangulation of data sources, source: the author
3.9 Research analysis

Qualitative data analysis is not a simple surfing of data collected, nor it is a distinct phase isolated from other research processes (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Robson, 2002; Pope et al., 2000). Qualitative research analysis refers to turning raw data into a meaningful and informative story that generates literature and gains a readership (Neuman, 2002, p.477; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.11). It also entails examining, categorising, tabulating and testing collected evidence, moving back and forth between research process sequences, to address the original proposal of a study (Yin, 2009).

A variety of qualitative analysis traditions and approaches are available within the qualitative research milieu (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2008; Punch, 2005, cited in Alnsour, 2006, p.157). This section outlines four main approaches: content analysis, discourse analysis, narrative analysis and thematic analysis (Malhotra and Bricks, 2007, p.260; Braun and Clarke, 2006; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Thomas, 2006).49

Content analysis is a form of textual analysis approach that seeks to quantify and categorise verbal or behavioural data from human communications (i.e., newspaper, books, websites, blogs, etc.). A researcher conducting content analysis seeks to quantify content following a systemic and replicable technique (Stemler, 2001). S/he starts by operationalising research variables, then goes on to create a coding scheme; conduct sampling, code, and quantify the codes (Bryman, 2012, pp.293–298).

The limitations of the content analysis approach hinder its application in this study. In addition to being an arduous and time-consuming method, content analysis is purely descriptive and does not take the context of the study into consideration (Kassarjian, 1977). Analysing the context in which urban governance is embedded is critical for addressing research questions through the institutionalist analysis approach. Moreover, secondary data or grey data related to youth participation in spatial planning in Amman 2025 are either insufficient or unreliable for a comprehensive content analysis (ibid.). This limitation also hinders the application of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis refers to methodologies for analysing the production of and investigating meaning in spoken or written texts (e.g., emails, letters and closing statements) (Bagaeen, 2011; Gregory et al., 2009, p.167). To overcome insufficient secondary data or resource

49 In addition to these approaches, ground theory is a prominent analysis approach. This technique is discussed in section 3.10, below.
inaccessibility, Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2008) suggested narrative analysis. **Narrative analysis** starts with the collection of stories through which people represent themselves and their world (Bryman, 2012, p.582). In contrast to content analysis, narrative analysis is significant in paying attention to the social, historical and cultural contexts of research respondents (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2008). “*When narrators tell a story ... [t]hey position characters in space and time*” (Bamberg, 2012, p.77).

Narrative analysis enables research participants to express their identity, relationships and emotions (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2008). Similarly, **thematic analysis** is critical in understanding the research environment by transforming primary data into themes. Narrative analysis is common in qualitative research using unstructured interviews to collect evidence and the inductive approach to extract meaning from stories (Priest et al., 2002). This research follows an inductive–deductive cycle of knowledge to understand the institutional context regarding spatial planning in Jordan and uses semi-structured interviews as a data collection method. Accordingly, thematic analysis was found to be the most convenient analytical methodology to extract research findings and build conclusions. The following subsection provides an in-depth discussion on the processes and procedures followed in this research to carry out the thematic analysis.

**Thematic analysis**

Braun and Clarke (2006, p.6) defined thematic analysis as “*a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within the data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail*”. Accordingly, primary data were analysed thematically to extract sub-themes and build explanations from people’s perceptions of the institutional context of spatial planning in Jordan, and to learn why youth have a marginal role in its decision-making.

Nilsen (2005) and Braun and Clarke (2006) identified two methods in thematic analysis: a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ approach. According to Nilsen (2005), the former refers to applying an existing theoretical framework to the data; it is a theory-driven approach where the researcher draws on existing categories to guide the empirical material. On the other hand, the inductive or ‘bottom-up’ approach refers to deriving theoretical categories grounded in the data: “*themes identified are strongly linked to the data themselves*” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.12). It enables the researcher to go beyond the “*explicit or surface meanings of the data*” for a profound investigation.
to identify the ‘latent’ meanings that people assign to their experience (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.84).

However, the ‘top-down’ approach does not suggest that the researcher overrode the meanings and experiences of young people. The researcher was keen to ensure that their opinions and input were not distorted or manipulated. Through the use of the bottom-up analysis approach, youth input has significantly contributed to the research recommendations and to knowledge. For example, cultural barriers and issues of parental control expressed during semi-structured interviews and focus group sessions have not been emphasised in systemic institutional design in the theoretical literature (see figure 2-1, chapter two). Youth issues, concerns and experiences that have a profound impact on the research analysis and findings also emerged from the primary data. Youth opinions and suggestions had many benefits in clarifying the peculiarities of the studied setting and assisted in explaining how youth perceive urban development in Amman.

Figure 3-2, below, depicts the top-down (deductive) and bottom-up (inductive) analysis process carried out in this research. For Bhattacherjee (2012, p.27), scientific research runs on two parallel planes: the theoretical plane and the empirical plane. The new theoretical contribution in this research is presented in the theoretical realm of institutionalist and collaborative theory. The cultural capital theme was constructed using methods of ‘explanatory power’ (see section 3.10, below). The theme of cultural capital was repeatedly mentioned and stressed by many research participants (see discussion in subsection 6.2.4, chapter six). Although pattern matching was deployed to ensure internal validity (see subsection 3.7.4, above), it was also used to measure the extent to which the adopted theoretical model fits the context of Jordan (theory test) (see section 3.10, below). The result of the pattern matching was the modification of the theoretical plane according to input from the research participants. Theory testing and building made the model more applicable to the context of Jordan, and particularly to the field of youth participation in spatial planning.

3.9.1 The arrangements of thematic analysis
This research followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006) guidelines for carrying out thematic analysis. Merriam (1998) stressed the importance of undertaking analysis concurrent with the data collection process. After revising and refining transcripts, the author
started organising field notes and preparing visual materials (i.e., images, maps, and tabular and statistical data). Having done that, the researcher became more familiar with the range of material types at hand (Braun and Clarke, 2006). However, the research analysis in this study started in earnest after the author returned from Jordan in September 2015. It began with the reviewing, reading and rereading of the interview and focus group transcripts (Cope, 2003, cited in Greenaway, 2011, p.136; Platt, 1976, cited in Percy-Smith, 1999, p.205).

Richards (2009) considered that disaggregating the mass of qualitative data would be meaningful for systematically and rigorously reading and analysing data. Therefore, data organisation followed the adopted theoretical model. Data organisation helped the researcher to form preconceived ideas at the outset of the fieldwork rather than being confused about the large volume of data gathered.

Throughout the analysis process, memos were taken continuously on different-coloured stick-it notes (Roth and Bradbury, 2008, p.356; Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.391). Every colour stood for a specific concept or theoretical theme by which to organise the data collection process. The use of coloured stick-it notes and markers is deemed useful for future pattern matching and then construction of concepts, particularly for those who conduct qualitative analysis manually. As a result, a plethora of views and concepts (sub-themes) emerged and were grouped together into the six conceptual dimensions of systemic institutional design provided by the theoretical model. These are, on one hand, social capital, intellectual capital and political capital in the global theme of soft infrastructure. On the other hand, in the global theme of hard infrastructure, are the legal system, the administrative system and the political system. It is worth mentioning that the structure of interview questions in the case study protocol in relation to the semi-structured interviews was organised and arranged in advance according to the theoretical model (see appendix 9-2).
The theoretical realm: The institutionalist and collaborative planning approach

Systemic institutional design

Soft infrastructure
- Social capital
- Intellectual capital
- Political capital
- Cultural capital

Hard infrastructure
- Legal system
- Political system
- Administrative system

Observing embedded theoretical pattern

Searching/generating patterns
- Documentary evidence
- Semi-structured interviews and focus group transcripts
- Data organisation
- Coding

Raw data sphere:

Secondary data
- Documents: GAM publications, AI publications, academic work, etc.

Legend
- Deductive
- Inductive

Figure 3-2: Structure of research analysis, source: the author
The key work of the researcher started with generating and applying initial codes to the data set. The initial data organisation resulted in large segments of data-rich information. Then these data segments were carefully studied by inspecting and interpreting them through a coding process (Richards, 2009, p.95). Coding is the process of categorising data under an idea, theme or category (Lewins and Silver, 2007, p.81, cited in Greenaway, 2011, p.136; Neuman, 2002, p.480), whereby subjective data generated from a qualitative approach become meaningful and comprehensible for readers (Richards, 2009, p.93).

Corbin and Strauss (2008) identified three types of theoretical coding: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. Open coding refers to describing phenomena in the form of concepts, which “allows the researcher to identify patterns within and between sources” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.219) and to extract themes, topics or issues in a systematic manner.

At this stage, codes were preliminary and constructed from the literature review and raw data and the researcher’s understandings and memos. After the initial coding, tentative concepts were formed by merging and grouping those that were similar in meaning into larger units referred to as concepts. The naming of codes was decided on the basis of the review of the literature on the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach and other literature on development planning, governance, management and democracy.

Axial coding aims to refine theoretical concepts that emerge from raw data by finding connections and interrelations among different codes. It involves the move from codes to concepts through the selection of the most promising categories related to the research issue and the author’s perceptions. In this research, following the coding process, categories were further developed by searching for relationships, interconnections and generalities among codes. This step has been referred to as pattern matching (see figure 3-2, above). Pattern matching is the core procedure of testing theory to see how far the theoretical model (here, institutionalist analysis) is applicable or matches the context (here, Jordan). Pattern matching involves comparing the two patterns of each concept in both the theoretical realm and the emerging concepts from the raw data, then trying to find similarities or disparities. This transitional step has been interrogated and reviewed as a vital step in addressing research objectives and
related research questions. The last coding procedure is selective coding. It is done after the preliminary interrelating of codes for further refining of concepts in an iterative process. An example of the coding mechanism is presented in appendix 11.

The analysis in this research has been a process of conceptually stepping back and forth to review and retrieve data for further scrutiny. The qualitative research analysis process is not a distinct phase. Instead, it is an iterative process where the researcher moves back and forth between research design, primary data and analysis (Bryman and Burgess, 1994, p.217, cited in Percy-Smith, 1999, p.206).

Braun and Clarke (2006) noted how thematic analysis enables the researcher to identify the consistency, variety and divergence of raw data. Theoretical freedom enables the researcher to generate profound insights and meanings from respondents’ opinions. On this basis, thematic grouping (fragmenting and merging of collected data) helps to identify themes pertinent to research questions (Ryan and Bernard, 2003). Despite the many advantages it offers, thematic analysis has been criticised for following unclear ways of identifying themes and patterns (Braun and Clarke, 2006). A person-centred analysis approach would yield biased outcomes that diverge from the context of respondents’ accounts. To address these deficiencies, a full description of the data collection measures has been taken to ensure research reliability, and validity has been ensured through pattern matching in accordance with Yin (2009), as discussed in subsection 3.7.4, above, on internal validity.\(^50\)

The research analysis in this study faced challenges in the form of many twists, dead ends and false starts. It is believed that not using qualitative analysis software means the process takes longer, particularly in correlating focus group data with semi-structured interview data, and with other secondary data in the pattern-matching stage. In contrast, a conventional method of coloured pens and stick-it notes was used for assigning codes and forming categories. The research community is sharply polarised in terms of whether or not to employ computer-assisted software in qualitative analysis (Crowley et al., 2002). In this regard, the author eschewed the use of computer-assisted analysis software for methodological reasons. The interpretivist approach requires the researcher to be closer to the data collected. Computer-assisted software (e.g. NVivo) would create distance between the researcher and the raw data collected. Regardless of

\(^50\) See appendix 9 for detailed information.
the extra time and effort spent, this gave the researcher the opportunity to be more engaged with and delve deeper into the raw data, and thus better understand the coding process and thus the concepts and emerging themes. Also, computer-assisted software is known for the large amount of time and high specification of computer properties required to master it (Zamawe, 2015; Welsh, 2002).

3.10 Theory testing and building

The theoretical model of systemic institutional design was developed by Healey (2006a, pp.284–310) to manage coexistence within a fragmented society in a collaborative manner. However, this theoretical model was fundamentally developed in relation to the planning context in the West, particularly in the UK (Healey, 2006a, pp.285–286). Arguably, the Jordanian and the British contexts differ significantly, particularly in terms of the social political, economic and cultural context (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Abu Dayyeh, 2004; Fischbach, 1994, pp.80–81). Therefore, this research aims to achieve its theoretical contribution firstly by investigating whether this model is applicable and fits the Jordanian context (see the first research objective); and secondly, and more importantly, by examining whether it can be deployed to analyse youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan.

Different social scientists define theory from various angles and perspectives. One school of thought defines theory as the relationships between independent and dependent variables (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007). On this trajectory, Campbell defined theory as “a collection of assertions, both verbal and symbolic, that identifies what variables are important and for what reasons, specifies how they are interrelated and why, and identifies the conditions under which they should be related or not related” (1990, p.65, cited in Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007, p.1281). Other scholars refer to theory as a composition of narratives and accounts. In this vein, DiMaggio defined theory as “an account of a social process, with emphasis on empirical tests of the plausibility of the narrative as well as careful attention to the scope conditions of the account” (1995, p.391, cited in Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007, p.1281).

However, and before talking about the concepts of theory testing and theory building, it is meaningful to discuss and understand the main elements of theory. Figure 3-3, below, shows the four main blocks of theory. According to Whetten (1989), theory is

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51 This discussion is directed towards addressing issues in relation to theories in the social science field.
composed of four main integrated elements: constructs (concepts); propositions; logic; and boundaries. Constructs are related to the abstract concepts (i.e., culture) by which a chosen phenomenon is explained. Propositions are the logical explanations of how these concepts (dependent variable or independent variable) are linked and related to each other (e.g., cause and effect). Logic is about ‘why’ these concepts are related, while boundaries address issues of ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ in these concepts and propositions.

Figure 3-3: The concept of logical consistency in theory testing, source: Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.28, drawn by the author

Theory testing, as the name suggests, refers to the extent to which evidence from empirical studies confirms (or does not support) an existing theoretical structure. In theory testing, the research uses evidence through specific sorts of data to investigate whether this theory (or model) provides a good explanation for the targeted phenomenon. But before testing theory, it is of great importance to become familiar with all aspects and limitations of the theory to be tested (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.26; Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007). Therefore, at the beginning of this study, a critical literature review was conducted, and it is presented in sections 2.3 and 2.4, chapter two. The critical review included deep discussion of the theoretical model (systemic institutional analysis) (see subsection 2.4.1, chapter two) and the theoretical
underpinnings of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach (see subsections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, chapter two). Discussing the dimensions of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach led to greater understanding of the theoretical model and thus to deploying it to frame the empirical data collection.

In the vein of theory testing, Bhattacherjee (2012, p.28) provided different means to differentiate a good theory from a weak one. Bhattacherjee’s (2012) attributes were devised to test the adopted theoretical model. The four suggested methods are as follows:

- logical consistency
- falsifiability
- parsimony
- explanatory power.

Logical consistency determines whether the main components of theory (constructs, propositions, logic and boundaries) are all intermeshed and integrated with each other (see figure 3-3, above). Falsifiability means a theory is not a good theory unless it can be tested empirically. Parsimony refers to the simplicity of a theory. In this regard, simplicity means the best theories are the simplest ones. However, the method of theory testing most commonly used in the literature is that of measuring a theory’s explanatory power. Under this category, a good theory explains (or predicts) reality or a target phenomenon better than rival theories.

This research relies on the fourth category to test the theoretical model. This study measures the extent to which systemic institutional design explains and investigates the phenomenon of youth participation in spatial planning. In this qualitative research, the strength of this theoretical model was tested through pattern matching, by observing the extent to which the concepts and patterns embedded in the theoretical model match the concepts and patterns emerging from the empirical data (see figure 3-2, above). Those patterns and concepts that do not match or fit the model but were repeatedly pointed out and labelled ‘critical’ in the raw research data and they generated a new theme named cultural capital. The process of expanding/modifying a theoretical structure has been tagged in the literature as ‘theory building’ and is explained as follows.
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) and Eisenhardt (1989) stated that building theory could involve the use of empirical evidence from one or more case studies. According to Steinfield and Fulk (1990, pp.16–18), four main techniques were presented in the literature to ‘build’ a theory:

- ground theory building
- bottom-up conceptual analysis
- applying existing theories in new contexts
- extending or modifying existing theories.

Ground theory involves an “iterative process of collecting and [analysing] data in order to build a theory about how actors interpret their daily realities” (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007, p.1282). However, one of the main criticisms of Ground theory is that the resulting theory is subjective and non-confirmable (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.28; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The principles of Ground theory were used in this research to generate and validate concepts, patterns and themes from primary data through open coding, axial coding and selective coding. As previously discussed, it was never the intention of this study to generate a new theory. However, this research was intended to extend/modify the theoretical model (systemic institutional design) to make it more applicable to the Jordanian context.

The second technique, bottom-up conceptual analysis, is about building theories through “[identifying] different sets of predictors relevant to the phenomenon of interest using a predefined framework” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.29). In this approach, there is a defined model or framework with a simple input–process–output framework. Researchers who adopt this approach try to figure out how the inputs, processes and outputs are connected to each other.

The first two approaches are inductive in nature and rely heavily on the researcher’s abilities to interpret the data being studied. According to Bhattacherjee (2012, p.29), prior knowledge of the theoretical model may lead to biased results in these two inductive approaches. As this research started with extensive reading and a critical review of the theory of the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach, it is believed that the first two inductive approaches are incapable of achieving theory building and thus dismissed as techniques for theory building.
The third approach refers to applying existing theories in new contexts. Applying existing theories in new contexts has a high level of similarity to the approach of extending or modifying an existing theory (the fourth approach), as both approaches are deductive in nature. The researcher chose a particular theoretical model and placed it in a completely new context (the Jordanian context). In this model, the researcher was trying to explore ‘constructional’ similarities between the two contexts. However, such approaches are more applicable to contexts with high structural similarities than those with radical and structural differences, as with British and Jordanian planning practices (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Abu Ghazalah, 2010, 2008a; Abu Dayyeh, 2004; Fischbach, 1994, pp.80–81).

The fourth approach is about extending or modifying an existing theory. This study followed this approach to explain a specific phenomenon (i.e., youth participation in spatial planning) in its context (the Jordanian context). In this approach, the researcher refers to certain pre-identified concepts, propositions or boundary conditions of the ‘old’ theoretical model to retain/modify/extend the model to make it fit the new context better. In this way, a better explanation of the target phenomenon would be achieved.

To put it simply, the constraints and challenges that define the theoretical model (systemic institutional design) adopted to achieve collaborative planning are primarily developed according to the Global North context, and particularly according to the UK context (Farzaneh, 2011, p.20). However, this research is trying to adapt this very theoretical model to achieve the theoretical contribution of the research. According to the institutionalist paradigm, the barriers that hinder youth participation in the UK are different from the structural or embedded barriers in the Jordanian context. Yet there are some structural similarities between both contexts in terms of planning systems. At the inception of the Jordanian state, the governance body of Amman relied to a large extent on the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 to develop its embryonic planning system (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Abu Dayyeh, 2004; Fischbach, 1994, pp.80–81). Both contexts encompass highly complex bureaucratic planning institutions (Harris, 1958, p.87). As discussed in section 2.2, chapter two, scientific rationalism in policy analysis assumes that the state is capable of making public policy and ‘controlling’ the locations of development single-handedly (Healey, 2006a, p.99). Therefore, the ‘old’ model is to some extent applicable to the Jordanian context. However, planning practices in the two contexts to a large extent differ from each other.
in social, cultural and political terms (Al Rabady et al., 2014). Also, the subjects of plans differ significantly. British planning practices are more directed towards urban regeneration and the promotion of sustainable urban development (Vigar et al., 2000, p.10), in contrast, the Jordanian plans are more about regulating urban expansion and zoning in principle, encompassing building density and the zoning of new urban land (Tewfik and Amr, 2014; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Haddaden, 2009, p.25; Potter et al., 2009; Bagaeen, 2006a).

Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007) provided a taxonomy to level the theoretical contribution of an empirical study (see figure 3-4, below). On the vertical axis of the chart, Y1 and Y2 represent a low level of theory building. Replications of previous findings do not contribute to existing theory, nor do they introduce new relationships or constructs. They build on previous findings to confirm new relationships between concepts already described in past research. Y3 represents a moderate level of theoretical contribution because it only clarifies existing theory. At this level, empirical studies may supplement a new substantive mediator or moderator of an existing relationship or process. Levels Y4 and Y5 represent a high level of theory contribution. Empirical studies rated as Y4 or Y5 have investigated and introduced previously unexplored relationships or processes of the theoretical structure. Ideas presented in an empirical study that are rated Y5 represent a radical departure from the extant literature.

This study has brought new conceptual thinking into the theoretical model and thus it belongs to level Y4. The introduction of the theme of sociocultural forces into the model is a departure point for generating a number of new research directions that can shape future thinking on youth empowerment policies in Jordan.

The horizontal dimension of the chart measures theory testing. X1 and X2 both represent low levels of theory testing. Mostly inductive studies rated X1 employ the hypothetical-deductive model and are low in theory testing. For X2, empirical studies rely on the extant literature to ground a priori hypotheses. According to Sutton and Staw, referencing past findings with no logical explication is no more than “a smoke screen to hide the absence of theory” (1995, p.373, cited in Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007, p.1285). However, if an empirical study succeeds in convincing reviewers of the explication of all the causal logic on which predictions are based this may result in a moderate level of theory testing (X3). Nevertheless, predictions of empirical studies
rated X3 have not been developed based on existing theory, nor do they deeply examine the target phenomenon. X4 and X5 represent a high level of theory testing. Research questions in this study are grounded in an existing theoretical model to examine the phenomenon of youth participation. This implies that it falls at the level of X4 in terms of theory testing. Accordingly, this study comes closer to theory testing. However, a theoretical model is only a symbolic representation of the original theory. All studies that ground their prediction in existing theory are at the highest level in theory testing.

According to Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007), empirical studies offer strong theoretical contributions if they offer strong theory building or/and strong theory testing. Studies at this level are termed by Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, in figure 3-4, below, as the expanders. This has served as the foundation for new theoretical constructs in the adopted theoretical model of systemic institutional design (level Y4, according to figure 3-4, below). Also, this design of research objectives and related research questions was grounded in the theoretical model of systemic institutional design (X4).
Figure 3-4: Taxonomy of theory building and theory testing, source: Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007, p.1283
3.11 Ethics in research

Ethics in social research is imperative in the academic arena (Bryman, 2012, p.135; Hay, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009, p.183). Research ethics is a guiding framework that contains a set of principles to manage research dynamics (Cronin, 2011, p.72). Ethical research practice is further explained by Bell (2005); it involves:

- being clear about the nature of the agreement you have entered into with your research subjects or contacts. ...
- It involves reaching agreement about the uses of this data and how its analysis will be reported and disseminated. (Bell, 2005, pp.45–46)

Most importantly for the context of this research, Crow and colleagues (2006, p.83) described young people as vulnerable to “coercion, exploitation or harm by more powerful others”. Therefore, three main ethical research criteria were carefully considered for this study: informed consent; avoiding harm; and confidentiality and anonymity (Tracy, 2012, p.227; Johnstone, 2007, p.116; Neumann, 2002, p.145). These ethical considerations and their implementation in this research are discussed as follows.

**Informed consent**

During both parts of the data collection process – focus groups and semi-structured interviews – the author explained to participants that the study was sponsored by an academic institution situated in the UK and the research was for personal academic purposes, with no relation to any government agencies or non-government organisations (NGOs). For the semi-structured interviews, prospective interviewees were sent an invitation via email before the data collection field trip (see appendices 9-1). The invitation described the purpose of the study, the reason for conducting the interview and the type of information required from them (Mack et al., 2005). Participants were made aware of the time needed to answer interview questions and the right of any participant not to answer any particular question, or to quit the interview at any time if they felt uncomfortable. Also, research participants were informed how their input would be stored, used and reproduced in all stages of data representation, analysis and interpretation. Participants were made aware that all transcripts and field notes
would be stored on the author’s personal computer in a locked file with password-protected access.

The interviewer avoided asking participants for written consent as they “might justifiably feel anxious about signing anything, particularly […] when the interviewer may be unknown to him or her” (Bell, 2005, p.45). Bell’s (2005) argument was also underscored by Bhutta (2004): “Many individuals in developing countries are wary of voluminous and complex consent forms because they are perceived as carrying other legal risks” (p.775). Therefore, written waivers and consent forms were not used, and instead only explicit verbal consent was obtained from participants before recording the interviews/focus groups.

In the case of the focus groups, the author attempted to maintain and achieve a level of openness and transparency by obtaining informed consent to participation after a clear explanation of the research purpose and possible outcomes (Crow et al., 2006). In addition, all participants were given the space to ask for further clarification (Mack et al., 2005).

Avoiding harm

Preventing harm to participants is a substantial doctrine in research ethics (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Piper and Simons, 2011). Researching public policy (i.e., spatial planning) in an authoritarian regime can often result in intervention and advocacy, for instance where corrupt practices are discovered (Ahram and Goode, 2016; Cronin, 2011, p.72). Therefore, the researcher should ensure that involvement of participants in data collection is not likely to cause any physical harm, psychological abuse, or risk to them or to the researcher himself/herself (Saunders et al., 2009, p.196; Neuman, 2002, pp.147–148). Accordingly, the author resorted to the use of pseudonyms in the entire document to mask the true identity of the participants.

Another important area of ethical consideration relates to the safety of the researcher (Saunders et al., 2009, p.196). Before starting the data collection trip to Jordan, the researcher declared all the possible risks involved to the Ethics Committee of EGIS (then the School of the Built Environment) of Heriot-Watt University. The researcher reported any fears of political instability in a politically uncertain region; mobility safety measures; hazards to health, etc. Also, during the course of the data collection
field trip, the author followed travel advice provided to all Britons travelling to Jordan by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Only after being fully acquainted with the possible risks, and informing the sponsoring university, did the researcher start his data collection trip.

Given that the researcher was travelling alone, strict measures were also taken to avoid personal risk at all costs in situations where personal harm seemed possible. Therefore, all of the interviews and focus groups were conducted in public places. However, the researcher was prepared to halt and withdraw from any meeting if any abnormal body language or threatening tone of voice was displayed by the participant(s). However, all interviews were conducted in a peaceful manner without any signs of imminent danger or risk.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality is concerned with protecting the privacy and personal information of research participants (Gray, 2014; Bryman and Bell, 2011; Piper and Simons, 2011). Interviewees in semi-structured interviews were granted the right to privacy and anonymity during data collection and in the writing of research reports (Malhotra and Birks, 2007, p.225; Neuman, 2002, p.154). Participants were assured that their responses would only be used for the purpose of academic studies and that recorded interviews would only be accessible to the research team (the principal researcher and the research supervisors). However, in some cases, the author found it meaningful to relate interviewees’ points of view via direct quotations. Quoting research participants was only done with the approval of the respondents in question (Piper and Simons, 2011) and the use of pseudonyms. The use of pseudonyms ensured that all potentially identifying information was removed in order to depersonalise the data to guarantee the anonymity of respondents.

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52 According to the DoS, Jordan (2015), a total of 64,975 Britons visited Jordan in 2015, meaning that more Britons travelled to Jordan that year than any other European nationality, followed by Germans, with 49,495 visitors. The fieldwork was conducted in the summer of 2015.

53 The travel advice covers a total of 225 countries and territories around the globe and is available online and periodically updated. The advice highlights risks and action plans regarding issues of terrorism; safety and security; health; and local laws and customs.
3.11.1 Avoiding potential ethical dilemmas

The researcher placed great importance on ethical issues since it involved young participants, although not under the age of 18. The primary group of participants targeted in this study is youth between the ages of 18 and 24. The Jordanian constitution (Act 61 of 2003) states that the legal age of majority in the country is 18, so this means that further ethical consideration (i.e., parental consent) is required by law for conducting research with underage youth or for issues of informed consent and avoiding harm to them. Therefore, researching with underage youth may have a high potential for serious ethical dilemmas, particularly for a novice social researcher. Investigation of underage youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan could be left to a future researcher with greater experience in researching or working with underage youth.

Prior to fieldwork, the researcher declared the potential ethical issues that might be encountered. Nevertheless, some ethical challenges occurred during the data collection process and in relation to the credibility of the research (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). These hurdles mainly occurred when the author was interviewing research participants. Two incidents happened when visitors, without appointments, entered and interrupted the course of an interview. The first incident occurred with an interviewee from the private sector and the other with one from the state sector. In each case, the author halted the interview. The interviewee from the state sector explained that as we were in a public office and under the instruction of the then prime minister of Jordan, access to official offices by the public would not be denied unless a confidential meeting was going on inside. However, the same interviewee agreed to rearrange the meeting. The interviewer attended as agreed, while the interviewee gave instruction to his secretary to prevent anyone from getting into the office while the interview was underway. Also, interviews with some senior officials were repeatedly interrupted by phone calls and urgent meetings that jeopardised the interview progress or, in some instances, terminated the meeting even though the appointment had been made in advance.

3.12 Constraints and limitations of the fieldwork

According to Glesne (2006), declaring research limitations is key to boosting the trustworthiness of the empirical data. Following Glesne’s (2006) recommendation, this
section highlights these limitations and subsequently provides recommendations of how future researchers might avoid such obstacles.

Based on the research’s philosophical background (see section 3.2, chapter three) and the nature of the research questions (see section 1.7, chapter one), the inquirer has chosen a qualitative approach suitable for obtaining sufficient information to address the research inquires. The deployment of the qualitative interpretative form forged a path to deeply investigating and understanding youth participation in the context of Amman’s urban governance. As the author comes from an architectural engineering background, his training regarding urban planning is based on analysing quantitative data (i.e., analysing numbers), charts and technical drawings, and he has had limited experience in critically analysing the social, economic and political dilemmas in cities. As part of the architectural engineering course in Jordan, urban planning pedagogy is delivered under the mentality of comprehensive rationality in planning and the scientific methodology for urban design, with a greater focus on blueprints and quantitative surveys and with minimal attention to qualitative inquiries. Therefore, the inquirer needed to learn new ways of collecting and analysing people’s views and experiences, by attending several training sessions and workshops to develop his skills and knowledge in relation to the qualitative research approach.

Semi-structured interviews produced challenges mostly in meeting and approaching senior and junior state officials. The researcher used a conventional way of approaching some of the officials by ringing the office of the people in question and requesting interviews. Admittedly, in some institutions, the researcher succeeded in accessing data or completing interviews only because he was a familiar and trusted figure to some senior staff working there. However, the author was unable to interview some of the professional individuals he intended to meet. Most prominent among these were the former mayor of Amman Omar Maani, the former Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs H.E. Sheadeah Abu Hdeeb, Member of Parliament Mr Mahmoud Al-Karabsheah and, from the private sector sphere, the Chairman of the Jordan Chamber of Commerce, and the Chairman of the Jordan Chamber of Industry, whom the author contacted regarding an interview several times without success.

Another limitation lay in the limited access to key documents and government publications referred to as grey literature (see section 3.6, above). Generally speaking,
one of the main limitations of the research lay in the lack of secondary data (Tayeh, 2012, p.24). In addition to the difficulty in verifying the available grey literature in many of the relevant government institutions in Jordan, the suppliers were reluctant to share this kind of data with outsiders. Also, junior employees, particularly in the state and market spheres, were reluctant to express sincere criticism of the administrative system or the political system in general. The author repeatedly explained the strict data protection policy followed by the sponsoring institution to ensure they expressed their views openly and accurately. For this reason, and within this bureaucratic and top-down hierarchical environment, it was always necessary to contact senior officials and to get their permission to obtain the required documents.

Arranging focus groups with the targeted participants’ age groups was challenging. Young people’s schedules are known for being busy with study or work (Phaswana, 2008; Percy-Smith, 1999). As mentioned before, the AJYC offered great help in organising three focus groups at their premises at the request of the researcher. At focus group sessions, the researcher was eager to engage with the participants and to ensure a friendly environment where they could answer freely and express their perspectives. However, some young participants were self-conscious when they were asked for their opinions about democracy in Jordan, while some were incapable of expressing their views or felt uncomfortable about publicly sharing political ideas. Some participants believed that if their opinions or suggestions reached security authorities, they would be in trouble. In a developing country, where democracy is nascent, it is possible that some of the research participants may give vague answers. Accordingly, the interviewer repeatedly assured participants of the confidentiality of data handling and assured them that the research was only for academic purposes. However, it is believed that youth preferred to be anonymous to other participants/colleagues and might prefer individual interviews instead.

Another challenge facing the researcher was that the beginning of the fieldwork took place during the holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast for long hours and dedicate much of their time to religious rituals and social obligations. In a country where 95% of the population are Muslim, it was challenging to get individuals to participate in the researcher’s data collection process during Ramadan. Accordingly, the researcher was unable to interview any of the proposed participants and had to wait until Ramadan was over to start interviewing participants.
In addition, the sweltering summer heat in Jordan, which sometimes reached 45 degrees Celsius (113 degrees Fahrenheit), made it a daunting task for the researcher to travel and to move around and approach interviewees.

### 3.13 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the rationale behind the research approach, the research strategy and the fieldwork techniques and methods that were deployed in this study. The chapter commenced by reporting on various philosophical paradigms and methodological issues in conducting the research, then a detailed discussion of research methodology, research design, research tools and techniques was provided.

The chosen data collection methods were significant in answering the research questions. Having established the general theoretical framework, semi-structured interviews and focus groups were employed to examine an in-depth case study on spatial planning practices in Jordan in relation to Amman 2025. They were supplemented with secondary data from reports, documents, grey literature and other academic publications. Data collection methods were described, and limitations noted later in the chapter. All interviews were semi-structured, where the interviewee has greater freedom to express his/her opinions and suggestions on research issues while the discussion is kept within the boundaries of the research aims and objectives. The deployment of focus groups provided sufficiently robust data in the form of feedback and informed opinions and suggestions from youth. In parallel, semi-structured interviews provided data about interviewees’ experience and understanding of the institutional context of urban development in Amman, and their prior experience regarding Amman 2025.

The chapter discussed how primary data and information from the transcripts were prepared for coding, and how internal validity was secured by applying the pattern matching technique. The analysis followed inductive–deductive reasoning in accordance with the sociological institutionalism strand of knowledge to evaluate the institutional capacity for engaging youth in urban development decision-making in Amman. This hybrid approach has also demonstrated rigour in thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The analysis identified challenges for youth participation and systemic difficulties within the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman. The institutionalist approach made it possible to recommend ways
to build the institutional capacity of urban governance and thus promote the quality of urban planning in Jordan (Harpham and Boateng, 1997) by increasing youth participation in the decision-making process.

Section 3.12 provided an account of the ethical considerations arising in this research and of how the resulting challenges were overcome. Ethical challenges were threefold: ensuring confidentiality, avoiding harm and gaining informed consent. In addition, this section shed light on the key limitations and constraints encountered during the research process, which may help future researchers avoid them or understand how to handle them.

The following chapter (chapter four) aims to describe the macro-institutional setting of spatial planning in Jordan. It includes discussion on the structure of the Jordanian state and its administrative system and the socio-economic and political context of Jordan. It illustrates the structure of informal civil society, which takes the form of tribes and networks of clans. The structure of formal civil society is also discussed, illustrating challenges and constraints.
Chapter 4: Setting the context of Jordan: socio-economic and political influences on spatial planning
4.1 Introduction

The rationale of chapter four is to provide a better understanding of the research case study context.

Planning is a “highly political activity embedded in its social, political and economic context” (Greed, 1996, p.5, cited in Bagaeen, 2011, p.357). Healey and colleagues (2002, p.31) emphasised the significance of ‘setting the scene’ for any qualitative research on urban governance. A qualitative researcher in spatial planning should take into consideration the wider context in which the case study is situated (Hasan and McWilliams, 2015; Smith and Jenkins, 2015; Emerson et al., 2012; Alexander, 2001). Accordingly, this research argues that urban governance must be analysed against the background of its specific context. Documenting this background is instrumental in providing insight into the major ‘forces’ that govern urban governance structure in Jordan. The rationale is to illustrate how macro-level issues impact on the institutional capacity of local governance in terms of soft and hard infrastructures.

Accordingly, an overview of the main aspects of the political and socio-economic context of Jordan will be presented. Discussion of the political and socio-economic context of Jordan is directly linked to the second objective of this study:

To critically explore the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman regarding youth participation in decision-making.

The field of spatial planning encompasses three main strands of knowledge: economic planning; physical development; and public administration and policy analysis (Healey, 2006a, p.18). This chapter is a preliminary to understanding the context in which the hard infrastructure and soft infrastructure of spatial planning are embedded. According to Healey (2006a, p.285), the planning system is composed of the administrative, political and legal systems. Therefore, the chapter begins by presenting the three branches of the state: the executive branch, the legislative branch and the judicial branch. In this chapter, a description of the administrative divisions in Jordan was also presented to highlight the highly bureaucratic, top-down government system.

Section 4.3 presents features of democracy and political liberalism in Jordan. The section anatomises the political context with a closer look at issues of political centralisation and political reform. The discussion covers the legal structures that
characterise the political arena in Jordan. The next chapter (chapter five) will take a closer look at the legal structure that underpins the spatial planning system in Amman.

Drawing on Marxist political economy, Urry (1980, cited in Healey, 2006a, p.207) stated that societies are composed of three main, overlapping actors: the market, civil society and the state (see appendix 3). In terms of the economy, it is believed that socio-economic status in the Global South (e.g., Jordan) is directly linked to levels of public participation (Zuhair and Kurian, 2016; Lindeque and Cloete, 2005; Cohen et al., 2001). Therefore, section 4.4 will shed light on the socio-economic aspects of Jordan. It includes a description of Jordan’s socio-economic status while covering issues of poverty, unemployment and economic challenges, supplemented by figures and tables from reliable sources.

The institutionalist approach views spatial planning as an interactive process in the field of public policy (Healey, 2002, p.73). In this concept, the focus is not only the technique and procedure, but also the social context through which coexistence in a place is managed and collective action is accomplished (Healey, 2006a, p.73). The following section (section 4.5) is intended to explain the structure of formal and informal civil society in Jordan. It starts by providing a conceptual definition along with aspects of its formal and informal structure in Jordan. As youth are a segment of civil society, the chapter ends with a more detailed discussion of issues related to Jordanian youth, their demographic, youth NGOs and their capacity for influence, and an overview of the state–youth relationship.

Information, facts and data presented and discussed in this chapter are drawn from the relevant secondary data. It includes academic theses, reports and papers, international agencies’ reports, and central and local government documents, media reports and newspaper clips on Jordan. These data were patchy and limited in form and did not directly illustrate the framework of urban development governance. Therefore, they were not clear enough to enable the researcher to determine decision-making actors in planning, planning practices or the position of youth in this context. A further investigation was carried out to fully answer the research question related to the second objective based on primary data gathered from semi-structured interviews.

As chapter four aims to introduce the Jordanian context, the following chapter (chapter five) takes a closer look at the context of Amman. Both chapters are necessary and
complement each other to draw an overall picture of the institutional setting, thus facilitating a better understanding of the research case study context. They are critical as they provide the foundation on which the analytical chapters (chapter six and chapter seven) will rely when considering the macro-level and micro-level issues of Amman 2025.

### 4.2 Jordan: issues of the state, economy and civil society

The sociological strand of institutional analysis focuses on the prevalent institutional structure in a locale, regarding the social, economic and political factors within a particular environment (Kim, 2012; Hall and Taylor, 1996). The culture of urban governance is highly embedded in the environment and current circumstances of an area (Healey, 2006a, p.60; Jessop, 2002). This has also been noted by Coaffée and Healey (2003), who described how the organisation of collective action is strongly affected by the three main spheres of political, economic and social life. In this perspective, changes in any of these spheres would lead to a shift in formalised ways of conducting the business of government (Healey et al., 2002; Innes and Booher, 1999). Consequently, this section presents and discusses the political sphere in Jordan in relation to the state structure and its three main apparatuses: the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Section 4.2.1 entails a review of the centralised administrative division of Jordan to expound how systemised power over development decision-making is embodied at all levels of planning (i.e., national, regional and local) (appendix 5).

#### 4.2.1 The Jordanian state: a resilient authoritarian regime

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is located in the northern part of the Arabian Peninsula on the east bank of the Jordan River (see figure 4-1 and figure 4-2 below). Syria borders Jordan to the north, Iraq to the north-east, Saudi Arabia to the east and south, the Red Sea to the south, and the West Bank in the Palestinian National Authority (see figure 4-2, below). The area of Jordan is 89,213 km², of which 88,884 km² is land, with a desert region that spans approximately 75% of that area, and 329 km² is water (Huneidi, 2014, p.10; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012, p.368; Harris, 1958, p.49) (see figure 4-3, below).
According to the census conducted in November 2015,54 Jordan had an estimated total population of 9,798,000 in 2016 (DoS, Jordan, 2016), which is mostly an urban population (83% living in urban areas) (Al Zu’bi, 2017, p.74; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Alnsour and Meaton, 2009), with an annual growth rate of 2.8% (Royal Jordanian Geographic Centre, 2014) (see figure 4-4 and appendix 2-1). Almost half of the population resides in the Greater Amman–Russeifa–Zarqa conurbation55 (Ababsa, 2011a, p.45; Ababsa, 2011b, p.208; Abu Ghazalah, 2008b) (see appendix 2-2).

Over the past 55 years, Jordan’s population has increased more than tenfold following the geopolitical instability that has hit the region and resulted in forced immigration and greater numbers of refugees (Alnsour, 2016; Ababsa, 2011a, p.51; Alnsour and Meaton, 2009; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009). Figures 4-4 and 4-5, below, demonstrate the population growth (annual percentage) of Jordan in the period 1960–2016 according to World Bank data.

54 Since 1952, five general censuses of population and habitat have been carried out in Jordan by the MoI and the DoS, Jordan (Ababsa, 2011b). The DoS carried out the latest general census of population and housing during the period October 01/15 to December 01/15. The census aims to provide statistical data regarding population size and geographic distribution; age and gender ratios; marital status; and education.

55 A conurbation is a region encompassing two or more cites. The term conurbation was coined by Patrick Geddes in 1915 to explain how adjacent cites would agglomerate and merge due to population growth, horizontal expansion and the advancement of new technology in power supplies and transportation (Gregory et al., 2009).
Figure 4-1: Jordan’s location in the Mediterranean Basin, source: WG, 2010, cited in Hasan, 2012, p.45
Figure 4-2: Jordan’s location within the Middle East, source: UN, 2011
Figure 4-3: Political map of Jordan, source: CIA, 2017
Figure 4-4: Population growth (annual percentage) of Jordan between 1960 and 2016, source: World Development Indicators, 2018

Figure 4-5: Population growth in Jordan between 1990 and 2016, source: World Development Indicators, 2018

The Jordanian constitution is the set of fundamental principles that underpin the functions of the state, the structure of government operation and the regulation of the government’s finances; protect the rights of citizens; and ensures the enforcement of the law (Shinn, 1974, p.155). Following the termination of the British Mandate in 1946, a new constitution was introduced to the Transjordan government structure (Harris,
1958, p.87) (see appendix 2-3). Jordan is currently working under the constitution of 1952\textsuperscript{56} with several amendments having occurred during 2011.

The government consists of three branches: executive, legislative and judicial (Burgis, 2007) (see figure 4-6, above). The executive authority consists of the king and his council of ministers. The government executive arm is led by a prime minister, who is appointed by the monarch, along with a cabinet of ministers. The monarch selects the prime minister from well-known outstanding figures or those who are pioneers in public service. The cabinet, after being endorsed by the king, is responsible for administering and providing universal welfare services\textsuperscript{57} for Jordanians: agriculture; communications; defence; foreign affairs; education; municipal and rural affairs, etc.

The legislative authority or the National Assembly consists of the upper house and the lower house. The king and the National Assembly share the legislative powers. The king chooses Senate members from the Jordanian intelligentsia – those who possess

\textsuperscript{56} The constitution first endorsed during the interlude of King Talal bin Abdullah between 1951 undill1952.

\textsuperscript{57} Articles 6 and 23 of the Jordanian constitution establish the concept of a welfare state in Jordan (Harris, 1958, p.93). This assumes that it is primarily, but not exclusively, the responsibility of the Jordanian state to protect the welfare of Jordanians by ensuring social justice and promoting economic growth and wealth redistribution policies (Gregory et al., 2009, pp.805–806).
cultural awareness, in-depth and varied life experiences and political influence (Huneidi, 2014, p.158). The deputies of the lower house are directly elected by universal suffrage by Jordanians aged 18 years or above. The parliament is vested with the responsibility of discussing legislation and laws before raising them before the government and the Senate.

Under the Court Establishment Act of 1951 and the constitution, the judicial branch is an independent branch of the government. Jordan’s constitution guarantees the independence of the judicial branch, clearly stating that judges are “subject to no authority but that of the law”. Nevertheless, the king must approve the appointment and dismissal of judges. Article 99 of the constitution divides the courts into three categories: civil, religious and ad hoc tribunals (Abu Karaki et al., 2011; Majali and Qaddoura, 2008).

**Local administrative division in Jordan**

The administrative division in Jordan is pyramidal, with clear subdivisions of functional and power boundaries (Wiktorowicz, 2000). The system is divided into functional groupings of ministries with different levels of importance and without a clear structure, and subdivided vertically into less powerful groups of local authorities (see figure 4-7, below) (Al Nammari and Alzaghah, 2015; Al Rabady et al., 2014; Al Nammari, 2013; World Bank, 2005a, p.4).
The main cities in Jordan are governed by two intra-national systems of institutions and authorities (Al Akayleh, 2005, p.239). The first is a top-down structure consisting of regional actors acting on behalf of the central government for matters of socio-economic planning and social security. They are called governorates and they act as regional managers under the MoI. The second system is a municipal system headed by MoMA. Both tiers of local governance structures in Jordan will be discussed as follows:

**Governorates**

The authority and services of central government extend to 12 prefectures: Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun and Mafraq in the northern region, Amman, Zarqa, Balqa and Madaba in the central region, and Karak, Taffileh, Ma’an and Aqaba in the southern region (Huneidi, 2014, p.10; Al Akayleh, 2005, p.95). The division is based on clear distinctions of geography, social identity and socio-economic status.
According to the Administrative Divisions Act of 2000, no.46, each governorate is headed by a governor assigned by the council of ministers based on the recommendation of the Minister of Interior, who also determines and allocates the governorate budget (Al Akayleh, 2005, p.241; World Bank, 2005a). The governorate is in charge of socio-economic planning and matters of regional development (Al Akayleh, 2005, p.235). However, the role of the governor is simply to coordinate the administrative authority for all government departments at the national, regional and local levels (Al Akayleh, 2005, p.241). The governor acts on behalf of the central government at four successive territorial levels: governorates (mouhafazah), districts (liwa’), sub-districts (qda’) and chief towns (nahia’) for the coordination and supervision of line ministries at the regional level58 (Al Zu’bi, 2017, p.90; Ababsa, 2011b, p.212; World Bank, 2005a, p.4).

Each governor is assisted by two appointed councils to fulfil his/her responsibilities: the executive councils and the advisory councils. The executive branch consists of heads of sectoral line ministries (directors) in the governor’s respective area. On the other hand, the members of the advisory/consultative council are 25 people selected from the local communities as a way to reflect a participatory approach (World Bank, 2005a, p.4). They are mostly mature male adults who have previously served as state officials, for example as MPs, mayors, heads of tribes, directors of NGOs, etc. Members of both councils are employees of the MoI and are appointed by the Minister based on the recommendation of the governor and the approval of the prime ministries. The advisory team assists the governor in determining and highlighting area needs and priorities and proposing projects to central government, while the executive team is in charge of coordinating sectoral policies. In addition to these two councils, each governor is assisted by the so-called Local Development Unit (LDU). The LDU conducts periodic studies to analyse central socio-economic policies and to enhance coordination at the regional level (R.D., interview, 11/08/2015).

Although these councils and the LDU are working under the governor, they are subject to central government influence. It is believed that their freedom of action in horizontal

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58 According to the Administrative Divisions Act of 2000, no.46, Jordan consists of 12 governorates; 51 districts with 753 towns and villages; and 38 sub-districts with 400 towns and villages (World Bank, 2005a).
planning and development at the regional level will be weak as long as the MoI controls and dominates decisions (Al Zu’bi, 2017, p.90). In fact, on all important issues, they have to coordinate with the MoI (Al Zu’bi, 2017, p.90; Bergh, 2010).

Moreover, the process of budget allocation has a major impact in perpetuating the top-down hierarchical structure in Jordan. In fact, regional authorities (i.e., governorates) have no budget of their own. Governorates’ funding mainly depends on central budgets approved by the prime ministries. The formal arrangements of local governance entrench sectoral limits and divisions and undermine the possibility of a mutual and collaborative working environment, which has a negative impact on development plans. Consequently, the culture of collaborative networking among government bodies is believed to still be immature. The concept of shared decision-making is still ‘embryonic’ and not ‘well-developed’ in the governance arena of planning in Jordan (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012).

*Municipalities in Jordan*

The Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41, defines municipalities in Jordan as local public institutions, self-ruled through democratically elected officials. Municipal councils (mayors and council members) are elected by local residents for four consecutive years. However, the capital governorate, Amman, is treated differently in terms of financial resources and the appointment of the mayor (Ababsa, 2011a, p.52). Half of the GAM council are appointed by the government while the other half are directly elected by local residents in various Amman districts.

The Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41, classifies municipalities into four main categories:

- first-tier municipalities: municipalities that belong to this category have more than 100,000 residents
- second-tier municipalities: cities that belong in this category are district centres (*liwa’*), or those whose inhabitants exceed 15,000
- third-tier municipalities: cities that belong in this category are sub-district centres (*qda’*), or those that have between 5,000 and 15,000 inhabitants

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59 Councils for villages are appointed by the relevant governor within his/her jurisdiction.
fourth-tier municipalities: all municipalities that do not fall into the other categories belong to this tier.

The vast majority of municipalities have limited scope in spatial planning, with more power over physical development (i.e., zoning and construction permission) and minimal control over economic planning, policymaking and planning (Al Nammari and AlZaghal, 2015; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Alnsour, 2006, p.79). The role of the municipalities has been confined to municipal-service-related work60 (; Qdais, 2007; Daher, 2005). Although the Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41, defines municipalities as autonomous entities, the central government still intervenes in local governance through MoMA (Daher, 2005). In fact, municipalities in Jordan are systematically depoliticised and ‘deprived’ of sufficient political and financial power, in addition to lacking professional resources to administer public policy (Al Rabady et al., 2014; Qdais, 2007; Daher, 2005).

4.3 Understanding Jordan’s political system

This section discusses aspects of the political context of Jordan and its attributed legal foundations. There is a strong link between the political context and civil society engagement in the public realm (Newman et al., 2004; Tolbert et al., 2003). Following the institutionalist perspective, Section 4.3 presents the major aspects of the political context (i.e., political freedom and freedom of association) and transmission points in the history of Jordan (see appendix 2-4) to examine levels of urban governance and also examine institutional capacity in terms of the existing political capital for youth mobilisation (see subsection 6.2.3, chapter six). Understanding the nature of political constitutions is vital to the research’s analysis of formal channels and opportunities available to foster youth agency, which is linked to the political capital of planning practices.

Following decades of political regression61 in Jordan, the beginning of the 1990s witnessed a radical shift in its political scene (Jarrah, 2009) (see appendix 2-4). One of

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60 This includes waste management and collection, sweeping and overhauling roads and streets (asphalt paving), park maintenance and landscaping, etc.
61 The late King Hussain (1935–1999) imposed a ban on all forms of political parties and civil organisations in Jordan from 1957 until 1989 with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood organisation. Historically, restrictions on freedom and democracy relate to the regime’s fear of instability caused by the Palestine Liberation Organisation and pan-Arab nationalist movements who backed PLO activities in Jordan that affected ordinary Jordanians and national infrastructure (Debre, 2014, p.55).
the reasons for political liberalisation and democratisation was the destabilising fiscal crisis and economic hardship of the 1980s (Debre, 2014; Nevo, 2001). The economic downturn necessitated an International Monetary Fund loan (Al Rabady et al., 2014; Ababsa, 2011b, p.289). Accordingly, comprehensive and substantial macroeconomic liberalisation was launched following the requirements of the IMF’s neoliberal policy (Catillejo and Tilley, 2015; Coskun, 2013). IMF neoliberal policy “is used to introduce a new force of global and economic domination which, through adopting the ‘western late-capitalist mechanism and ideology’, could be leading to diminishing the authority of the central state itself” (Daher, 2000, cited in Al Rabady et al., 2014, p.258).

4.3.1 Political freedom in Jordan

Levels of political freedom and public involvement in the public realm are inexorably linked (Habermas, 2001, p.73). Jordan is a non-democratic country and a highly authoritarian state where the monarchy enjoys a wide range of forms of authority and constitutional power over the executive, the judiciary and the legislature (Schwedler, 2017; Brumberg, 2002; Brynen, 1992). According to the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), fewer than half of Jordanians believe that they can freely express their political opinions, participate in sit-ins or organise demonstrations (Lust-Okar, 2006). Other polls show that 74.6% of Jordanians believe that the state would question them if they criticised the government (Coskun, 2013; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009).

The deceleration of political reform stems from the prioritisation of national security over civil rights and liberties, yet in some cases there have been encroachments on human rights (see the National Centre for Human Rights’ report on Jordan) (Ryan, 2011; Jarrah, 2009, p.3). The GoJ has shown less interest in addressing any political grievances, fearing the political instability that might result from granting the public additional powers (Brumberg, 2002). Lack of trust between the state and civil society dates back to 1957, when the government banned political parties and put the country under martial law following the social unrest that occurred at that time (Mahafazah,

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62 The CSS was established in 1984 as the first academic centre at the JU. CSS’s research covers issues in the fields of regional conflict, international relations and security. Most importantly, CSS addresses issues of local matters such as planning democracy, political pluralism, development and the environment (CSS, 2017).

63 According to a study carried out by CSS in 2005, 83.2% of Jordanians are afraid to publically criticise the government or public policy because of their fear of torture, either of themselves or of members of their family (El-Said and Harrigan, 2009, p.1243).

2011). Restrictions on political parties have disempowered civil society groups, thus hindering youth communities in joining or establishing any political lobbying (hence youth mobilisation). According to Bandura (2006), self-regulated action is one of the most important facets in developing human agency. A weak and fragmented civil society is anathema to wide and authentic public participation in public policy (Habermas, 2006). Therefore, a long history of top-down authoritarian governance would hinder the provision of space for youth agency and political capital, which is the ‘fuel’ for a long ‘journey’ of youth participation in the public realm (Healey, 1996).

Also, there are several laws that consecrate political centralisation in Jordan (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015; Jarrah, 2009; Brumberg, 2002). Accordingly, the GoJ passed laws that control civic groups, using state security apparatus to restrict public freedoms and democratic development in the name of security (ibid.). Depoliticising political parties has resulted in the disempowerment of civil society organisations (CSOs). Both the Political Parties Act of 1992, no.32, and the Press and Publication Act of 1998, no.8, circumscribed political liberalisation in the Kingdom and limited its boundaries (Lucas, 2005, p.67). Observers and published reports from Human Rights Watch and Freedom House indicate that these restrictive legislations have given the GoJ, via its security apparatus, the right to detain individuals or dissolve groups for being unlicensed, or gathering to discuss political and social issues (Debre, 2014). Civil associations and political parties must obtain a licence before practising any political activities. The formal arrangements of registering political parties are lengthy and complicated, with no guarantee of approval from the state security apparatus. Also, the act grants the government the right to intervene in internal activities to monitor local and foreign funding. As a result, political capital, the third conceptual element of soft infrastructure, is circumscribed in Jordan by a strict legal framework that limits its expansion and development. According to Healey (2006a), political capital is fundamental to determining whether to “mobilise and limit policy and action in the area of spatial planning” (p.84).

The preceding discussion on aspects of democracy in Jordan and its related legal instruments aimed to provide context to the current opportunities available for youth,

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65 Bandura (2006) distinguished between three forms of agency: personal, proxy and collective. This research will focus mainly on the collective agency of youth communities.
as a segment of civil society, to participate in the public realm. Pourgerami (1988) has demonstrated that genuine democracy and expansion of individual freedom are correlated with innovation in urban governance. In this research, innovation in urban governance is understood as genuine youth participation in the development agenda. The nature of a political system and its structures creates either the opportunities for or the constraints on involving youth and their ideas and concepts in decision-making.

4.4 Socio-economic aspects of Jordan

Jordan is a rentier state of an “upper middle-income country” with a highly centralised type of governance (Jreisat, 2017; Garaibeh, 2015; Daher, 2011, p.69). Jordan lacks both natural and financial resources to back its government revenues (Beblawi, 2015, p.194). The economic structure of Jordan is composed of a weak manufacturing base, a small tourist sector and a few major exporting industries (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Jreisat, 2017; Al Haija, 2011). The public sector in Jordan is the largest employer and provider of social services (Kassay, 2011, p.268; Nazzal, 2005, p.3). The World Bank has estimated Jordan’s gross domestic product (GDP) to be approximately US$37.52 billion, with estimated growth of 2.4% (see table 4-1, below) (World Bank, 2018). The largest sectors are finance and insurance services, transport, storage and communications, and electricity and water (World Bank, 2018). The services sector is the dominant sector; it hires over 75% of the local labour force, making it the biggest contributor to Jordan’s GDP (Sawalha et al., 2015).

66 The term rentier or semi-rentier state refers to states that regularly depend on sources of exogenous rent for national revenue rather than depending on domestic production or taxation (Huneidi, 2014, p.50; Mahdavy, 1970). In accordance with this, Beblawi (2015, pp.51–52) has discussed the main features of the rentier state. Rentier nations drastically rely on external rent in comparison with internal rent. Beblawi also emphasised the distribution and construction of wealth. The character of a rentier state involves a few segments of society being engaged in the production of wealth, while the majority are either excluded or merely involved in the distribution or utilisation of wealth.
Jordan is one of the world’s least stable and fastest-growing economies (Huneidi, 2014, pp.53–54), given its geopolitical instability, political spillovers and scarcity of natural resources, and an increase in oil prices and fluctuating remittances (Huneidi, 2014, p.52; Lucas, 2005, p.2). Economic instability has resulted in mounting pressure on many Jordanians, particularly those below the poverty line (Daher, 2011a). 67 An official study carried out by Phenix and FES (2016) on poverty in Jordan estimated that 14.2% of Jordanians were below the poverty line. Over the past few decades, the Kingdom’s economy has undergone a profound change to liberalism from the early model of the 1980s (Nazzal, 2005, p.6) (see appendix 2-3). Economic liberalisation includes minimising state involvement in the economy through structural adjustment programmes and privatisation of state assets, and thus public spaces (Wiktorowicz, 2002). In January 2000, the monarch addressed attendees at the World Economic Forum in Davos, stating that “We have taken the initiative to make free markets the only norm of resource allocation” (Nazzal, 2005, p.1). Accordingly, the Kingdom embarked on radical changes and moved towards greater globalisation that would lead to Jordan’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Al Zyoud, 2010; Lucas, 2005). In 2000, Jordan signed a free trade agreement with the United States and became a member of the WTO, and in 2001 Jordan joined the European Free Trade Association (Nazzal, 2005, p.1).

In alignment with this economic liberalisation, Jordan had to undertake serious political liberalisation and decentralisation under the standard structural adjustment programme.

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67 According to Phenix, 2013, the extreme poverty line for Jordanian households reached JOD380 in 2010.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
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<th>2016</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Real GDP Growth (%)</strong></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inflation Rate (%)</strong></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal Balance (incl. grants) (% of GDP)</strong></td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Account Balance (% of GDP)</strong></td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
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Table 4-1: Key economic indicators for Jordan’s economy, source: World Bank, 2018
Therefore, 1989 witnessed a radical transformation in the Jordanian political landscape (Jarrah, 2009). The late King Hussain gave the government the green light to lift the ban on political parties and professional associations associated with political activities (Nevo, 2001). Accordingly, the government softened its grip on the internal affairs of civil society (Jarrah, 2009). Political liberalisation was evidenced by the conducting of a national parliamentary election (the first since 1967) with a strong presence from Islamic Front Action, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. The general election of 1989 was considered a serious move towards comprehensive political and economic reform (Coskun, 2013).

4.5 The structure of civil society in Jordan

Zakus and Lysack (1998) emphasised the importance of understanding the nature of community and human social interaction to efforts to ensure effective and long-lasting community planning. Therefore, this section provides a thorough explanation of the local community’s internal social relationships and its informal institutions in an attempt to analyse the structure of Jordanian civil society.

In simplistic terms, civil society is “people and civic organisations that are domiciled in a district” (Smith, 2004, p.66).68 Away from market competitiveness and the self-interested objectives of service and goods production by the private sector, the term civil society emerged as a third segment in the modern democratic society (Sandercock, 1998). Civil society has been widely recognised as consisting of non-profits, voluntary groups69 and non-government organisations that manifest the interests and concerns of grass-roots bodies associated with the advancement of common interests (Sandercock, 1998).

Jenkins and Smith (2001b, p.17) illustrated two types of civil society schemes: the formal structure, which is based on the vertical network ties that make it recognisable among other forces in society, and the informal structure, which builds on horizontal network ties. In this vein, Antoun (2000) indicated two views of civil society. The first perspective identifies civil society as “associational life and formal organisations; civility, the toleration of the ‘other,’ and pluralism; limitations on the arbitrary exercise

69 According to a study sponsored by CSS in 2005, only 15% of Jordanians have membership of voluntary organisations (El-Said and Harrigan, 2009, p.1243).
of state authority; full rights of citizenship and dissent, including arenas to present oppositional views; the peaceful management of differences” (Antoun, 2000, p.456). In agreement with this, Debre (2014, p.82) defined formal civil society institutions as “independent, formally organized, voluntary and democratically oriented non-governmental organization[s]”. On the other hand, Richards-Schuster and Pritzker (2015) identified embedded informal processes and institutions among societies as the second conception of civil society. The following discussion will investigate the nature of both models in Jordanian society.

4.5.1 Formal structure of civil institutions in Jordan

The concept of formal civil society is a nascent concept in Jordan, as the state itself is relatively new (Catillejo and Tilley, 2015; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Robins, 2004, p.31; Nevo, 2001). Historically, it was professional associations that laid the foundation for the creation of formal civil society in Jordan (Novel, 2001). The institutional manifestation of civil society can come in many shapes and forms. Formal civil society structure includes voluntary, professional and religious associations, labour unions, unions, associations, clubs, royal non-government organisations (RINGOs), independent newspapers, political parties, etc. (Desse, 2012; Antoun, 2000; Clarke, 1998).

According to the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) (2015), there were a total of 4,555 registered CSOs in Jordan in 2015, largely concentrated in the city of Amman (MoSD, 2016). Nevertheless, NGOs in Jordan suffer from multifaceted issues, hurdles and systematic constraints. Among these are internally generated problems such as technical, financial and administrative failures. NGOs’ limited capacity has prevented them from being active in their localities and curtailed the impact of their advocacy for democracy (Jarrah, 2009; Clarke, 1998). Technical challenges include lack of technical expertise to execute activities; weakness of administrative bodies; and staff that are

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70 According to Robins (2004, pp.31–34), in the early 1990s, Jordan only had a few departments to manage the business of the welfare state. These were the Department of Public Affairs, the Department of Mail and Telephone, the Department of Public Health and the Department of Education and Antiquities.

71 The first professional associations of civil societies in Jordan date back to the 1940s (Novel, 2001). These were syndicates for professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, dentists, pharmacists and agricultural engineers.
unqualified and insufficient to build up a participation base or to make the logistical arrangements necessary to mobilise for volunteerism (Debre, 2014; Jarrah, 2009).

Financially, NGOs in Jordan suffer from poor funding and a lack of resources and financial transparency as a result of ineffective management (Jarrah, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2002).

Legally, a set of impediments has been established by the government to constrain and control organised civil society activities (Ababsa, 2011a, p.55; Nevo, 2001). For example, the state must approve NGOs’ registration, by-laws, policies and internal election results (Coskun, 2013; Jarrah, 2009). The Societies and Social Organisations Act of 1996, no.33, is the current law regulating NGOs in the Kingdom (Wiktorowicz, 2002).

Despite the political transformation in Jordan in 1989, the state still practises administrative repression and oversight over NGOs’ activities through its security apparatus and the MoI, the MoSD and the Ministry of Culture (Coskun, 2013; Wiktorowicz, 2002). Therefore, the ability of NGOs to promote innovative governance and public participation will be constrained until central government eases its grip on NGOs (Clarke, 1998). Engaging NGOs in the decision-making process is a promising model of better governance (Mercer, 2002). Their flexibility and multinational networks allow them to transcend the restricted boundaries of national government, which facilitates local authorities’ adoption of innovative governance (Nanz and Steffek, 2004; Mercer, 2002).

4.5.2 The informal structure of civil society institutions

In addition to the formal civil societies in Jordan, there is a fundamental type of civic activism and solidarity in Jordan that is manifested in tribal structure (Debre, 2014; Al Haija, 2011; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009; Harris, 1958, pp.48–57). Middle Eastern societies have a long tradition of strongly patterned social relations and thick association networks, and Jordan is no exception (Kassay, 2011, p.267; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009). Droz-Vincent (2011) described Jordanian societal organisation as complex and manifold. According to studies of social anthropology in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, informal civil society in Jordan can be found in networks of kinship and neighbourhoods via “corporate (legal-like) groups; as non-corporate genealogical units; as administrative units; as coping mechanisms; and as
the reinterpretation of tradition, either separating ethnic from national identities or embracing them in a wider framework” (Antoun, 2000, p.445).

Scholars have paid greater attention to personal modes of intermediation, to kinship and to informal methods of social control when studying civil society in the Middle East (Antoun, 2000). Civil society in Jordan is much more family- or tribally oriented in urban and rural areas (Daher, 2011a, p.70; Droz-Vincent, 2011, p.109; Harris, 1958, p.2). According to Godelier72 (2009), tribe is defined as a “form of society that arises when groups of men and women who recognize each other as being related by birth or by marriage come together to act in concert to control a territory and appropriate its resources” (cited in Rowland, 2009, p.11). The tribal aspect of Jordanian society is strongly articulated at the grass-roots level via a societal pattern of trust, cooperation and interactions among societal actors (Debre, 2014; Kassay, 2011, p.267; Wikitorowicz, 2002).

Kinfolk play a significant role in determining leadership roles in Jordanian society (Droz-Vincent, 2011, p.122; Harris, 1958, p.56). Leadership in nomadic tribal society is demonstrated in the protection of members’ interests against the ‘aggression of despotism’ from the state (Kassay, 2011). Civil society in Jordan is to be found as the first line of defence in times of difficulty or when a crisis hits ordinary citizens (Antoun, 2000). 40% of Jordanians belong to one of the tribal institutions or extended kinship networks (Debre, 2014; Antoun, 2000).

Moreover, Ababsa (2011a, p.47), Droz-Vincent (2011, p.122) and Alnsour and Meaton (2009) asserted that the mechanisms of urban notability, rural familialism or Bedouin tribalism continue to play a crucial role in Jordanian public policy (and therefore in spatial planning) (Healey, 2006a, p.73). Tribal influence in Jordan has been described by Ababsa (2011a, p.50) as the “politics of notables”. The head of the clan (sheikh) is a true reflection of the form of authority practised in Jordanian society. Harris’s (1958) investigation revealed that civil methods of governance in Jordanian society are under the control of elders. The autocratic sheikh is subordinate to no one: “No vote is taken, and the sheikh in his capacity as chairman is able to influence the deliberations only through the force of his personality, wisdom, and understanding” (Harris, 1958, p.57).

72 Maurice Godelier is a prominent French anthropologist who has conducted a number of studies on the prominence of tribalism in Middle Eastern societies, particularly in states such as Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia (Godelier, 2010).
Tools and mechanisms implemented in the nomadic tribal society indicate the adult-dominated structure in public policy in Jordan and the historical background to youth marginalisation in public policy. The politics of notables is emphasised in the research analysis in chapter six.

Studying tribal structure gives the researcher insight into the accepted social meanings and social contracts embedded in most Jordanian tribes. In fact, reviewing the traditional social system revealed that there is no tradition of engaging with young people or taking their opinions into consideration. Within the tribal law of Jordan, youth are perceived as second to adults and do not have the right to object to or question their decisions. The civil and domestic law of Jordan (and hence planning regulations) has a large impact on the formation of tribal law (Faqir, 2001). The top-down tribal social structure is worrisome and challenging in trying to achieve genuine youth participation in public policy and thus leads the research analysis to focus on themes, patterns and connections emerging in relation to cultural constraints as viewed by most research participants (see subsection 6.2.4, chapter six).

73 Tribes in Jordan are bound together by tribal law: ‘al ganun al ashaari’. The traditional tribal framework deals with issues of conflict resolution, power, violence and exclusion, yet draws on patterns of cooperation and solidarity, within the tribes themselves and with their counterparts (Harris, 1958).
4.6 The status of youth in Jordan

Demographically, people under the age of 30 are the largest sector in Jordan, constituting 70% of its total population (CIA, 2017) (see figure 4-8, below). Consequently, section 4.6 is important to the study as it provides contextual understanding to enable the investigation and better understanding of the situation of youth in Jordan.

![Figure 4-8: Age pyramid in Jordan in 2014, source: CIA, 2017](image)

Generally speaking, youth in Jordan suffer from weak political and economic muscle and lack of influence on development decision-making (see Hart’s model in appendix 1). Unemployment among youth in Jordan is stubbornly high. Despite Jordan’s strong economic growth in the new millennium (see table 4-1, above), youth participation in GDP in Jordan is reported to be markedly low (Brown et al., 2014). In 2014, the youth unemployment rate was registered at 30.6% for youth aged 15–24 (26.3% among males and 53.3% among females) (Brown et al., 2014; Debre, 2014; Górák-Sosnowska, 2010). The youth unemployment rate in Jordan is far above the global average of 13.1% and is the fourth-highest national youth unemployment rate in the Middle East (ibid.). Lorenzini and Giugni (2012) demonstrated that youth unemployment has a minor impact on youth’s political participation. Other studies have stressed that
unemployment, financial austerity and economic hardship motivate youth to become more politically active, in response to feeling excluded from the system (Kovacic and Dolenec, 2018, p.388; Bay and Blekesaune, 2002). Paradoxically, a key barrier to young Jordanians’ participation in political parties and involvement in the public realm is the unpredictable economic situation (D.E., interview, 18/08/2015; N.A., interview, 12/08/2015; Górak-Sosnowska, 2010). Financial hardship is present among both the government and the Jordanian population in general (Huneidi, 2014, p.144), which limits young people’s desire to volunteer. Young people are more concerned about achieving financial security and getting a job than joining political parties (ibid.). The civic/political cycle of poverty suggested by Piven and Cloward (1989, cited in Pacheco and Plutzer, 2008, p.572) depicts how inequality and economic hardship could lead to marginalisation of the underprivileged; therefore, public policies will not reflect their interests. However, Jordanian youth demonstrate political activity by casting their votes in the national elections of parliaments and local elections of municipal councils (Williamson and Nimri, 2011). It is worth noting that Jordanian youth’s electoral participation is strongly influenced by tribal affiliations and pressures from adult seniors, separate from any political or ideological interests (Rowland, 2009, p.25).74

4.6.1 Jordanian youth involvement in politics

According to polls conducted in 2012, more than half of the Jordanian population believe they have no voice in public policies (CSS, 2012). Political alienation may stem from the state’s long history of despotism and its tight handle on political parties (Kort, 2007, p.99). Given this, while there is growing political liberalisation in Jordan, youth still have little impact on the main policy decisions in Jordan (Debre, 2014; Wiktorowicz, 2002; Antoun, 2000). State domination of public policy clearly suggests that the state provides welfare services in return for autonomy in decision-making and policy and to gain legitimacy and popularity among Jordanians (Huneidi, 2014; Daher, 2011a). Most of the democratic initiatives75 to empower civil society in Jordan were

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74 According to Article 3 in the House of Deputies Act of 1986, no.22, a person who has reached 18 years of age is eligible to elect members of the House of Deputies and participate in municipal elections. Article 18 allows those who have reached 25 years of age to nominate themselves for parliamentary elections. In order to become a founding member of a political party, Article 5 states, a Jordanian must have reached 25 years of age, while those who join a political party must be at least 18 years of age (Article 16) (Górak-Sosnowska, 2010).

75 These include, for instance, the National Agenda (2006-2015); the Jordanian National Charter (1990); and the All Jordan Charter.
reluctantly agreed to by the state and hence are not necessarily a genuine approach to youth empowerment (Choucair, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2002, p.112).

Furthermore, the vast majority of organisations relevant to youth (public organisations, private clubs and youth NGOs) are inactive, inefficient or reluctant to mobilise young Jordanians to engage in Jordanian politics (Brown et al., 2014; Hoffman and Jamal, 2012) (see appendix 4). Political parties and youth NGOs are carefully moderated by the state’s security apparatus and its central government through the MoI and the MoSD combined. According to Article 14 of the Political Parties Act of 1992, no.32, “The use of the premises, instrumentalities, and assets of associations, charitable organisations and clubs for the benefit of any partisan organisation, shall be prohibited”.

Following the Arab Spring, youth movements are considered a threat to national stability and regimes (Köprülü, 2014). Also, young people and student movements are not prominent in the history of Jordan due to the weak turnout by youth in political activities (Hussainy, 2012, cited in Debre, 2014, p.59). Accordingly, youth NGOs have stepped away from any political movements and done very little for advancement towards political democracy (Jarrah, 2009).

This does not mean, however, that young Jordanians are apathetic or have no political views. Although 67% of young Jordanians declared their interest in voting in the 2007 elections (Górak-Sosnowska, 2010), many of these expressed a lack of trust in politicians to serve their vision and aspirations. In agreement with this, polls show that Jordanian youth are afraid to join political parties or reach out to those who are in power (Brown et al., 2014; Hoffman and Jamal, 2012).

4.6.2 State-led empowerment policies for youth in Jordan

The state of Jordan, under the directives of the monarch, aims to meet the needs of young people and utilise their capacity to support society. The importance of Jordanian youth is stated in the fifth chapter of the National Charter: “Youth constitute both the future of society and its renewable human wealth”, directing the state to provide continuous support for youth through national programmes to enable them to gain

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76 In 2002, UNICEF carried out a survey involving youth in the 20–24 age group that showed that 75% of Jordanians believed their roles in their local communities and in decision-making were incommensurate with those of their adult counterparts (UNFPA Jordan, 2015a). They expressed their disdain at being excluded from issues that affect them at home, at school and in their neighbourhoods (Mouwad, 2007, p.15, cited in Górák-Sosnowska, 2010, p.25).
qualifications and harness their energy for innovation and creativity (National Charter, chapter five, 1990).

The Ministry of Youth (MoY) is the highest government institution responsible for formulating, developing and implementing youth policy in Jordan. The Ministry also collaborates with other relevant government and non-government actors to ensure all policies have multi-sectoral input. Their vision is to qualify youth for productive work, promoting innovation and creativity, protecting them from delinquency and directing their creative energies towards constructive development (Wiktorowicz, 2002).

In consultation with 50,000 Jordanian youth, the government launched a National Youth Strategy (NYS) (2005–2009) jointly with the HCY and the UNDP in cooperation with UNICEF (Górak-Sosnowska, 2010). The NYS provides a framework for developing a youth policy that fits the needs of young people and promotes their development. The main vision of the NYS is to

> raise and develop Jordanian young men and women who are aware of themselves and their abilities, loyal to their country and [proactive in taking part] in its progress and development, able to deal with the variables and developments of this age in a confident, aware and steadfast manner, within a secure and supporting environment. (HCY and UNDP, 2004, p.9)

The priorities identified in the NYS are as follows (Górak-Sosnowska, 2010):

- participation
- civil rights and citizenship
- recreational activity and leisure time
- culture and information
- information technology and globalisation
- education and training

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77 On searching for any youth empowerment strategies while surfing the website of the MoY, the author failed to find any strategy related to youth empowerment covering the period from 2009 to 2017. Accordingly, the author has depended on NYS 2005–2009, as the most recent policy on youth empowerment sponsored by the state. In this vein, the GoJ has launched the HRD Strategy (2016–2025). The strategy encompasses the objectives of enhancing the quality of primary, secondary, university and vocational education across Jordan. On examining the strategy, the author failed to find any mention of youth engagement in the public arena.
• employment
• health
• environment.

The first two priorities noted above are directly linked to the purpose of this research. The NYS could be considered an opportunity for a legally binding framework that sustains and ensures youth participation in public policy. The policy proposes integrating youth voices when setting goals, framing issues, allocating resources, designing policy and implementing programmes. Engaging youth in community planning promotes a stronger sense of ownership and commitment to their cities, enhancing social capital and trust, increasing their satisfaction and ensuring their welfare.

4.7 Conclusion

According to the second objective of this study, an in-depth analysis of the urban governance context in Jordan is necessary. The examination of Jordanian urban development is twofold: the three overarching spheres of the market, the state and civil society are studied in chapter four; then in chapter five, a micro-analysis of the urban governance context at the local level, in Amman, will be presented. This chapter contributed to the second objective by critically examining and providing a contextual understanding of the political, social and economic spheres in Jordan and how youth relate to these three major spheres of society.

This chapter started by examining the political sphere. Examining the political sphere involves explaining the administrative structure and the bureaucratic organisation of the state apparatuses. This was followed by a discussion on political liberalisation that demonstrated how democratisation is vital for empowering youth and nurturing their agency (Day, 2017). Next, the economic sphere (i.e., the market) was analysed according to the challenges and constraints that hinder the realisation of effective youth engagement policy. Urbanisation and public participation are highly affected by the pattern of economic growth (Head, 2011). Therefore, a brief discussion highlighting key aspects of the macroeconomics of Jordan was presented. Section 4.6, to provide more detail of youth engagement in the market sphere.
The chapter also contextualised the nature of Jordanian society – that is, its tribal structure. Section 4.5 explained the social structure of Jordanian civil society, which was presented in its formal and informal shape. Formal entities could include NGOs and CBOs, while the informal structure of civil society refers to the tribal structure and social relationship based on kinfolk. Informal civil society is considered to be more effective and powerful in the public realm than the formal civil society structure in Jordan (Jarrah, 2009). The cultural context of Jordan and the nature of informal civil society in Jordan formed the foundation for the research analysis and findings. Subsection 6.2.4, in chapter six, discusses how cultural capital is significant in determining levels of youth participation in the public realm. Therefore, mapping out influential CSOs is instrumental for effective institutional design (Healey et al., 1998) for greater youth participation in spatial planning. In addition, the range of NGOs and CBOs and their main challenges and constraints were discussed to illustrate how their limited organisational or functional autonomy hinders the realisation of youth agency in the formal structure.

Chapter four concluded by discussing the status of youth in Jordan. Section 4.6 started by discussing how a high rate of unemployment among Jordanian youth is considered a barrier to their participation. In addition, subsection 4.6.1 and appendix 4 included a presentation on the nature and characteristics of youth NGOs. Youth NGOs’ weak political muscle has a negative impact on youth citizenship and agency.

Both chapters four and five are designed to contribute to the second objective of this study. They depend on information obtained from grey documents. Next, chapter five aims to critically discuss the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman, based on the literature. Chapters four and five form the foundation for the analysis of the institutional context of urban governance in Amman. However, as they both rely on patchy and limited secondary data, the study needs more academically rigorous information to fully address the second objective.
Chapter 5: Amman 2025: defining the case study and its context
5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the social, economic and political dimensions of Jordan at the macro level of the case study context. The aim is to set the overall institutional context that forms the hard infrastructure (planning system) in regard to the legal, administrative and political systems. Chapter five explores the micro-level dimensions within Amman’s urban governance. The analysis involves investigating the soft infrastructure (planning practices) that evolved within and after Amman 2025. It is worth noting that planning practices in Amman are different from those in other cities in Jordan due to different planning regulation laws, socio-economic factors, and the scale of power devolved from the central government to GAM in comparison with other municipalities in Jordan.

This chapter contributes to addressing the second objective of this study, which is intended to explore the institutional context of urban governance in Amman.

To critically explore the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman regarding youth participation in decision-making.

The following related questions will be partially answered in this chapter to help address this objective:

A. What is the current structure of spatial planning in Amman 2025 regarding the key actor(s) and relationships, and who assumes responsibility for planning decisions?

B. To what extent, and in what ways, were youth incorporated in the strategy-making process of Amman 2025, from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015?

C. To what extent have the planning system (hard infrastructure) and the practices (soft infrastructure) followed in Amman 2025 been improved to ensure greater youth participation in policymaking?

In achieving this, the chapter starts by building a strong argument for choosing Amman as the geographical area for the study. Afterwards, section 5.3 starts by tracing the historical urban development of Amman from its radical transformation in urban
structure from a village to a major metropolitan city. Further, the account includes an organisational overview of GAM and the tasks of its administration, the main players in the governance sphere and the role of the city council.

Section 5.4 presents a more detailed overview of Amman 2025. The information relates to what has been presented in discourse and based on grey literature. It also focuses on the innovative methods deployed in Amman 2025 regarding collaborative urban governance, community planning and plan management and implementation.

Different sources and types of information were drawn on to find information regarding the chosen case study. The chapter relies on grey literature, published government documents, newspaper clippings from the *Jordan Times* newspaper, and relevant legal frameworks. Secondary data such as published documents, reports and newspapers, and academic works were used to explore further and deepen understanding of the context. These data were collected from international agencies, and central and local government reports commissioned mainly by GAM, the Ai78 and the DoS, Jordan.79 The research also draws on knowledge of previous academic research undertaken on the subject of urban planning and development in Amman and some historical studies on the governance and urban management of Amman. These theses are mainly published by local universities (e.g., the JU and the University of Science and Technology in Irbid) and international universities in the UK, Germany and the United States of America.

5.2  Why choose Amman?

The city of Amman80 has been chosen as the geographical area for the research’s empirical study (see figure 5-1, below). There are many different ways to identify a locality (Vigar et al., 2000, p.55). This research has used the administrative area under the jurisdiction of GAM.

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78 Ai was established in June 2008 by GAM as a not-for-profit institution. The institute was a think-and-do-tank whose aim was to establish and develop principles of urban governance, community planning and sustainable community development in the city of Amman. In addition, the institute provided assistance to other municipalities in Jordan and in the region.

79 In August, 2017, the Environmental Systems Research Institute awarded Jordan’s DoS an internationally renowned award in recognition of its excellence in implementing the 2015 population census electronically (*Jordan Times*, 16/08/2017). The award acknowledges the high level of reliability and validity of the census results.

80 The name ‘Amman’ derives from the Ammonites, who originally ruled the area that makes up the present-day city (Aljafari, 2014; Potter et al., 2009).
Amman has been described as “ever-growing” (Potter et al., 2009, p.81), dynamic and in continuous transition (Al Faqih, 2005, p.35). It is the Kingdom’s largest urban centre, and also one of the most important cities regionally due to the pivotal role Jordan plays in the political landscape of the Middle East (Ababsa, 2011a, p.51; GAM, 2008, p.18; Potter et al., 2007; Choucair, 2006; Nazzal, 2005, p.2). Today, Amman’s population exceeds three and a half million inhabitants, workers and refugees (DoS, Jordan, 2016). Since 1948, the city has witnessed the greatest level of population and urban growth in the Middle East (Ababsa, 2011a, p.57; Daher, 2011a, p.67) (see figure 5-2, below).81 More than a third of Jordan’s urban population lives in the urban agglomeration of Amman (Alnsour, 2016; Pilder, 2011, p.11; Abu Dayyeh, 2004). Most importantly for the focus of this research, Amman has a large youth population. Amman contains 42% of the population of Jordan, of which, more than half are under 24 years old (GAM, 2017). Accordingly, Amman accommodates a variety of government institutions and public services, including education and health organisations, religious organisations, political parties and international development organisations (Ababsa, 2011a, p.45; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011; World Bank, 2005a, p.11). The availability of government institutions and public infrastructure has resulted in 80% of foreign investment in Jordan ending up in Amman, with the remaining 20% being divided between Aqaba and other free zones in Jordan (Ababsa, 2011a, p.52; Kassay, 2011, p.259; GAM, 2008, p.18).

81 According to Ababsa (2011b, p.208), “Amman was expanding horizontally at an annual growth rate of 6.6% between 1983 and 1994, and its population grew at an annual growth rate of 5.5%; and between 1994 and 2005, the built-up area expanded at an average annual growth rate of 4.2%, compared to 3.1% for the population between 1994 and 2004”. See subsection 5.3.1, below, for further explanation.
Amman is a multicultural and diverse city (Al Rabady, 2013; Ababsa, 2011b, p.212; GAM, 2008, p.10; Al Faqih, 2005, pp.35–37), which makes it a hospitable environment to a variety of cultures as well as ethnicities and religious communities (Schwedler, 2012).

Administratively, Amman has been chosen as the context for the case study because of the power and authority devolved to GAM regarding physical planning, and also because of GAM’s long-standing experience in land-use planning. In fact, the GoJ feels more confident to transfer power to local authorities in Amman than to those in any other city in the nation (Al Rabady et al., 2014; Ababsa, 2011a; Kassay, 2011, p.270; Alnsour, 2006). Through building up relationships and trust, Amman is shifting towards a city-state status\footnote{According to Bagaeen (2007a), the term ‘city state’ refers to cities with independent administrative systems, particularly in matters relating to urban governance.} where greater autonomy over urban governance is devolved to the city administration body. Following the dissemination of trends of globalisation and decentralisation, civil society’s presence in the political arena has been rising steadily worldwide and dramatically in the Global South (Durose and Rummery, 2006; Newman et al., 2004). Therefore, the GoJ is under growing pressure to implement decentralisation and political liberalisation at local and regional levels of governance (Al Rabady et al., 2010). These developments have prompted the unprecedented growth of civil society in Jordan (Jarrah, 2009), particularly among young Jordanians in Amman (Beck and Hüser, 2015; Köprülű, 2014).
In terms of urban planning, research has highlighted planning issues in Amman on both the micro scale, at neighbourhood and district levels, and the macro scale, at the metropolitan level (Alnsour, 2016; Mango, 2014; Khirfan and Momani, 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Kassay, 2011; Abu Ghazalah, 2010; Potter et al., 2009; Bagaeen, 2006b). Arguably, the majority of local communities have been adversely affected by the rapid urban development in Amman (M.Y., interview, 30/06/2015). In addition, Potter and colleagues (2009) defined different planning issues on the metropolitan scale in Amman. These include a weak and unintegrated public transport system and a shortage of potable water (Al Haija, 2011). Most importantly, Potter and colleagues (2009) reported the absence of contemporary physical development planning. As a result, haphazard urban growth has brought Amman’s cultural identity to the edge of decline (Khirfan and Momani, 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Daher, 2011a, p.77; Al Faqih, 2005, p.40). Amman requires an updated strategy for responding to population growth that would regulate and institutionalise spatial planning in terms of integrated physical planning along with economic development and administrative development. In this era of ‘super-fast urbanism’ (Bagaeen, 2007), spatial strategic planning is important as modern cities attempt to create a balance between preserving cultural identity and the trend of globalisation (Nijman, 1999), while implementing principles of smart growth (Chourabi et al., 2012). At the metropolitan level, local authorities in Amman lack the regulatory capacities to control the development of high-density, mixed-use real estate projects (HDMU) as a result of the economic boom augmented by “surplus arising from oil wealth” (e.g., the Jordan Gate Towers project, the Abdali Urban Regeneration Project, Limitless Towers and the Royal Village, etc.) (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Bagaeen, 2017, p.95; Hourani, 2014b; Tayeh, 2012, p.23; Bagaeen, 2006b). Bagaeen (2007) described HDMU projects in the Middle East as ‘cities within

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83 HDMU projects are mega-projects sponsored by transnational investors, mostly in city centres, as the main engine for growth. Based on the GoJ’s rhetoric, these projects are for the sole purpose of public socio-economic benefit (Abu Hamdi, 2017). However, opponents of these projects believe that these projects only benefit insular individuals’ agendas rather than grass-roots public benefits.

84 Jordan Gate Towers is a high-rise building that was commenced in the early 2000s. Jordan Gate Towers has been a topic of debate among spatial planning scholars and ordinary Jordanians in general. The 42-storey development is a multipurpose project consisting of a multi-storey podium; executive offices; a conference centre; a hotel; and retail premises (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011). The project is located in one of the affluent neighbourhoods in West Amman, some 35 km from Amman (Musa, 2014). The project is fraught with many problems. Site analysis indicates narrow streets surrounding the development site, accompanied by weak infrastructure.

85 The Abdali Urban Regeneration Project is a stark symbol of neoliberal urban transformation (Debruyne and Parker, 2016; Tayeh, 2012, p.19; Bagaeen, 2006b). A plot of land owned by the Jordanian army was transformed into a neoliberal development hub fuelled by petrodollars from the Gulf (Mango, 2014; Daher, 2011b, p.281).
cities’ caused by ‘super-fast urbanism’. Rapid urban growth highlights the need for comprehensive and integrated spatial planning for Amman, and that is how Amman 2025 originated.

In terms of social polarisation, social disparities are now among the main characteristics that distinguish West Amman and East Amman (Abu Thyab, 2012; Ababsa, 2010; Potter et al., 2009). The impact of the land-use category divisions and the associated building density provisions have resulted in social and economic polarisation in Amman (see appendix 6) (N.K., interview, 29/07/2015; Potter et al., 2009). In principle, the segregation between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ in Amman is socio-economic with a spatial dimension (Ababsa, 2010). The higher-income and elite families live on the western side of Amman, with well-developed infrastructure and facilities, while the poorer communities live in the ‘Eastern side’, the older part of the city, with relatively underdeveloped and deteriorating infrastructure (Potter et al., 2009). According to Wessel (2000), socio-economic polarisation is a reflection of weak social solidarity in localities. A fragmented society with weak social capital is inimical to achieving strategic spatial planning (Healey, 2006c, 1998c). Scholars and planners who were interviewed in this research attributed spatial polarisation to a high level of socio-economic inequality fuelled by the current land-use regulations (i.e., Building and Planning Regulations for the City of Amman Act of 1979, no.67), particularly residential zone divisions, and the land taxation system (A.N., interview, 23/08/2015; Tewfik and Amr, 2014; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Daher, 2011a; Potter et al., 2007).

5.3 Amman’s urban development institutional context

This section reviews the existing institutional context of spatial planning in Amman. It starts by presenting the rapid demographic growth in Amman since 1930 and the

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86 This has also been demonstrated by Ham and Greenway (2003, p.98, cited in Potter et al., 2007, p.11): “Eastern Amman (which includes Downtown) is home to the urbanised poor: it’s conservative, more Islamic in its sympathies, and has vast Palestinian refugee camps on its fringe. Western Amman is a world apart, with leafy residential districts, trendy cafes and bars, impressive art galleries, and young men and women walking openly arm in arm ... The upmarket district of Shmeisani is referred to by locals as ‘Shiny Amman’ while the Abdoun area sometimes, and not without a little irony, goes by the label of ‘Paris’”.

87 Under the Planning Cities, Towns, Villages and Buildings Act of 1966, no.79, land-use zones embrace a variety of categories from residential, commercial, industrial and special development zones. Residential zones are divided into standard residential zones A, B, C, D, special popular zones and green residential categories (see appendix 6). Following plan authentication, the landowner or project developers develop the property according to the plan. There is no need for planning permission to be acquired from any planning authority, but the developer often needs building permissions, which can be obtained from municipalities, and district committees in the case of Amman.
resulting dynamic urban growth. Subsection 5.3.3 includes an overview of the main master plans developed for Amman since 1938. There follows a discussion to identify the major players in spatial planning in Amman, and the legal forces that define them and their relationships. Since this section is mainly based on secondary data, these dimensions are discussed more deeply in chapter six following the analysis of primary data collected for this reason.

The sociological institutionalism strand of knowledge is used to conduct the analysis of the selected case study of Amman 2025. The analysis will investigate the institutional capacity of spatial planning in Amman in terms of youth participation in Amman 2025. Analysis of the hard infrastructure is critical to understanding the planning system in Amman. However, planning systems (i.e., organisational and legal forms) vary from place to place in the sense that they are a reflection of a place’s institutional histories and geographies (Healey, 2006a, p.8; Vigar et al., 2000, p.3). Therefore, it is meaningful for the purposes of institutional analysis to understand the particular history and current circumstances of urban growth in Amman.

Accordingly, the following discussion will start by reviewing the transformation of Amman from a small village occupied by a small number of peasants to a major metropolitan city with more than three million occupants.

### 5.3.1 Trends of demographic growth in Amman

Amman is one of the most rapidly geographically expanding cities in the Middle East (Alnsour, 2016; Ababsa, 2011a). At the time of writing, the city of Amman covers an area of around 700 km² and is populated by three and a half million people (38% of Jordan’s total population) (Ababsa, 2011b).\(^8\)

\(^8\) At the start of Amman 2025, it was planned that Amman would be 1,662 km² (equivalent to 1,661,904 dunums) (Aljafari, 2014, p.44; GAM, 2008, p.20). A dunum is a unit of measurement of land area. Jordan has used the metric dunum since 1928. This measurement unit, which originated from the Ottoman Empire, is equivalent to 0.247105 of an acre or 1,000 m².
In 1918, Amman’s population did not exceed 5,000 inhabitants and was scattered over .321 km² (Al Rawashdeh and Saleh, 2006). After Amman was declared the capital of Transjordan, the population increased to 10,500 inhabitants in 1930 (see figure 5-2 above) (Potter et al., 2009). The sharp increase in Amman’s population in the mid-1990s and onwards is ascribed to the first influx of Palestinian refugees, and it has continued to rise to the present day following the political instability in the Middle East on one hand, and soaring population growth on the other (Alnsour, 2016; Tayeh, 2012, p.18).\(^89\)

The unprecedented burgeoning population growth of Amman in the last six decades has resulted in a real estate development boom (Aljafari, 2014; Tayeh, 2012, p.18). The influx of refugees has created numerous challenges and thus decreased the ability of local authorities to control urban growth and provide urban services (Alnsour, 2014; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012). The city of Amman is the Jordanian city that has borne the responsibility of successive waves of refugees migrating from the turbulent region (Tayeh, 2012, p.18; Abu Dayyeh, 2004). The main political events that have increased Amman’s urban population are the Palestinian–Israeli conflicts starting from 1948

\(^{89}\) Jordan’s natural population growth hit 2.2% in 2009, while the fertility rate is 3.6 children per woman (Ababsa, 2010).
(including the Six-Day War), civil war in Lebanon in 1975, the First Gulf War in 1991, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the so-called Arab Spring in Syria, Egypt and Libya (2011) (Huneidi, 2014, p.57).

5.3.2 Amman: from a village to a major metropolitan city

By virtue of its geographical position, Amman in the past 45 years has gone through dramatic shifts in urban form and structure, resulting in its transformation from a small village to a town and now to a major metropolitan city (Daher, 2011a, pp.76–77; Potter et al., 2007) (see figures 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, below).

Amman is one of the oldest and most continuously inhabited cities in the Middle East (Aljafari, 2014, p.20; Kassay, 2011, pp.260–261). It is an ancient home of civilisation and dates back to the year 8,000 BC (Kassi, 2011, pp.260–261). Throughout history, it has been inhabited by many civilisations including the Heksus, Bani Ammon, Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, Ghassanids, Umayyad and Abbasids, who left their imprints on the city in the form of caves, religious buildings and amphitheatres (Kassay, 2011, pp.260–261; Abu Ghazalah, 2010).

The modern history of Amman dates back to the 1870s, when Circassian immigrants settled in Wadi Amman after fleeing the Caucasian War of 1817–1864 (Abu Ghazalah, 2010; Potter et al., 2007; Bowersock, 1977). At the time, Amman consisted of rural areas with no features of urbanisation. The only existing communities were a group of Bedouin tribes scattered across the undulating topography (Aljafari, 2014, p.21; Shawash, 2011, p.126). Members of the peasant Circassian tribe of Shabsough were the first to establish agricultural communities around Wadi Amman (currently named ‘Downtown’) (Aljafari, 2014; Potter et al., 2007; Abu Dayyeh, 2004; Findlay and Samhua, 1985). In the fourth quarter of the 19th century, owing to the availability of fertile soil, Amman witnessed the spread of corn and wheat fields, particularly on the southern side of Amman (Kadhim and Rajjal, 1988).
Figure 5-3: The physical expansion of Amman (1920–1956), source: Abu Ghazalah, 2010, p.126; Potter et al., 2009, p.85
Figure 5-4: Amman urban growth 1961–1983, source: Abu Thiab, 2012
Figure 5-5: Amman urban growth 1994–2005, source: Abu Thiab, 2012
In the 1900s, Amman became a pilgrimage stop across the Hejaz railway (Shawash, 2011, p.152). The construction of the Hejaz Railway Line in the 1900s boosted urban development and brought contemporary urban features to Amman (Potter et al., 2009). Also, a new method of trade and economic practices was brought into the nomadic society of Amman. Moreover, the Hejaz Railway Line brought about a significant transformation in the socio-economic landscape of Amman (Daher, 2011a; Abu Dayyeh, 2004): a move from an agricultural economy to a commercial and service-based economy (Amawi, 1996; Mufti, 1972, cited in Aljafari, 2014, p.22).

At that time, Jordan (although it had not yet acquired that name) was still under the Ottoman rule, which continued until the end of the First World War when the British Mandate over Transjordan started (Harris, 1958, p.1). By the end of 1928, Emir Abdullah I officially pronounced Amman the capital city of the newly independent nation Transjordan (Aljafari, 2014; Kassi, 2011; Pilder, 2011). Emir Abdullah I preferred Amman because of the relatively well-established administrative infrastructure left behind by the Ottomans after they fled the Middle East after their loss of the Second World War (Aljafari, 2014). Emir Abdullah’s decision laid the foundation of modern Amman (Ababsa, 2011b).

The second half of the 20th century witnessed the sudden uncontrolled growth of Amman’s population. The political instability in the Middle East brought major waves of migration to Amman (Aljafari, 2014).91 Despite the enormous challenges of hosting communities, these waves of immigration, along with remittances from Jordanian expatriates working in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), brought significant capital investment (Daher, 2011a; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009). Accordingly, Amman has become a regional commercial centre for trade and business. Immigrants’ remittances have speeded up national economic development (Harrigan and El-Said, 2009). With the increasing importance of Amman, and the influx of refugees and immigrants, the city has had several spurts of growth that have affected its structure (Al Rawashdeh and Saleh, 2006).

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91 Findlay (1986, cited in Aljafari, 2014, p.24) estimated Amman’s population to be around 56,000 residents in 1945. According to the 1952 census, Amman’s population had reached 250,000 residents, with peasants and Bedouin living side by side (Abu Dayyeh, 2004).
following section presents the comprehensive master plans that were drafted for the city of Amman from 1938 up to the recent spatial plan of Amman 2025 in 2006.

5.3.3 Amman’s master plans (1938–2006)

The year 1938 witnessed the launch of the first land-use scheme, as proposed by the then British mayor Andrew Park Mitchell (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010; Potter et al., 2009) (see appendix 7). The physical plan involved the first schematic road plan. After the establishment of the Department of Land and Survey in 1929, proprietorship became regulated and institutionalised by law (Tewfik and Amr, 2014). The first comprehensive plan for Amman was introduced in 1955, accompanied by the promulgation of the Municipalities Act of 1955, no.29, and the Building Regulations Act of 1955 (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010; World Bank, 2005b). The plan was funded by the United Nations (UN) and drafted by consulting agency Mack, Lock and Partners (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012). The main principles adopted in the plan are the preservation of green and natural heritage and the concept of a Garden City proposed by Sir Ebenezer Howard (1965) to control the encroachment of urban expansion on rainfed agricultural land (Shawash, 2011, p.154; Abu Ghazalah, 2010, 2008a; Bagaeen, 2006a; Abu Dayyah, 2004; Parsons and Schuyler, 2004). It also included the introduction of public spaces and parks (Shawash, 2011). In 1966, Jordan enacted the first legal framework that regulated the urban planning process. The Planning Cities, Towns, Villages and Buildings Act of 1966, no.79, was developed with the assistance of the British planner Vernon Newcombe. Newcombe had previously worked on multiple development projects with Jordanian planners in Jordan (Al Rabady et al., 2014).

In 1978, GAM commissioned the Government of Japan to draft a new master plan to accommodate the newly emerging economic boom manifested in commercial centres and urban sprawl, yielding to increased car ownership and traffic congestion and enhancing the organisational capacity of GAM (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010, p.25). At that time, Jordan witnessed an economic upturn following the global inflationary capital surplus crisis (Shawash, 2011, p.154). However, seven years later Jordan passed through a difficult economic crisis; the Greater Amman Comprehensive Development Plan (GACDP, 1988–2005) was launched in 1983, and funded by USAID to obtain US$31 million to improve infrastructure and services in Amman (Aljafari, 2014, p.43; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010). The GACDP aimed to control
urban growth fuelled by land speculation by landowners and speculative developers (Al Rabady et al., 2014). The GACDP was designed to redirect urban expansion towards the deserted areas in the east of Amman. Therefore, the plan proposed a ring and radial road network (Aljafari, 2014, p.43; Abu al Haija and Potter, 2013). However, the plan failed to control urban sprawl towards the meagre agricultural areas of West and North Amman. In contrast to the rationale of the GACDP, the plan designated and implemented new infrastructure and major roads in the south-west and the north of Amman. The construction of public infrastructure encouraged development on scarce agricultural land in Amman (Abu al Haija and Potter, 2013).

According to Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina (2011), none of the master plans produced to manage urban development were translated effectively: “Most of them ended up idle on the mayoral office shelves” (R.B., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic). The absence of a preconceived and collective vision on Amman’s urban growth has resulted in chaotic, disordered and complex urban forms and social disparity (Alnsour, 2016; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Ababsa, 2010; Potter et al., 2009; Razzaz, 1996). Urban growth in Amman has been guided or regulated by obsolete zoning by-laws for over 25 years (Aljafari, 2014, p.45).

Since its establishment in 1987, GAM, as the main urban governance body in Amman, has failed to issue a legally binding, participation-based plan to govern urban development. The absence of a comprehensive master plan may stem from the conventional method of drafting master plans. It is believed that master plan documents are often out of date by the time they are published, particularly for a city that is expanding quickly, like Amman (Abu Dayyeh, 2004). The five master plans developed for the city of Amman have directly or indirectly been formed and influenced by foreign consultants from Europe, North America or Japan (Pilder, 2011; Potter et al., 2007; Abu Dayyeh, 2004).92

Accordingly, the city of Amman has during the last 30 years undergone significant social, political, cultural and physical change, with the absence of clear strategic spatial vision. The absence of a clear growth strategy and a strategy for the organisation of

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92 Abu Dayyeh (2004) and Alnsour and Meaton (2009, p.302) argued that British planning ideology has had a strong impact on the urban structure of Amman. British land-use planning has manifested itself in the control of urban sprawl through prevention of peri-urban and suburban growth through the establishment of green belts while channelling urban growth into satellite towns (Abu Ghazalah, 2010; Vigar, et al., 2000, p.10).
space has resulted in haphazard urban growth (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Da her, 2011a, p.77). Consequently, Amman 2025 was launched to control the urban growth of the city of Amman under an institutionalised framework and clear vision (Khirfan et al., 2013). Amman 2025 was a well-articulated strategic spatial plan that delivered a radical shift in the way urban plans are drafted in Jordan (F.Y., interview, 25/08/2015).

5.3.4 Urban development government authorities

In Jordan, land is classified into either planned or unplanned zones (Alnsour and Meaton, 2009). Under the Building and Planning Regulations for the City of Amman Act of 1979, no.67, planned urban land in the city of Amman, or any other municipality in Jordan, is governed by a master plan to determine its different uses. Master plans in Jordan are considered to be the key regulatory instrument to manage urban development (World Bank, 2005b). The management of master plans in Amman mostly falls under the authority of GAM and is implemented through a special unit created for this purpose: the Comprehensive Planning Unit (CPU).

The first municipal council of Amman was established in 1909 (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010). The city council is considered the top of the administrative pyramid in the municipality’s organisational structure (see figure 5-6, below). In 1987, GAM was established as a primary governance body for the city of Amman (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010). Today, with a budget of almost £550 million (Jordan Times, 2015), GAM is a financially independent public institution whose funds have come mostly from central government and levy collection. GAM is guided by the legal framework of the Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41. According to the law, GAM is directly linked to the Prime Minister’s Office, in contrast with all other municipalities in Jordan, which are under the authority of MoMA. The council ministers appoint the mayor of Amman following the recommendations of the Minister of Municipal Affairs. The mayor is assisted by an elected deputy mayor who is responsible for carrying out the mayor’s duties in the mayor’s absence (see figure 5-6, below).
Figure 5-6: GAM’s organisational hierarchy, source: GAM, 2018, adapted and translated from Arabic by the author
5.3.5 Organisational structure for urban planning in the city of Amman

The management structure of Amman’s urban land is twofold. The first is municipal management: addressing issues concerning the city in general, such as planning, evaluation, supervision, budgeting and external cooperation. The second is district management: dealing with particular issues specific to each geographical location – issues may include zoning, road maintenance and construction, applying regulation frameworks, levy collection, waste management and health inspection on food and beverages outlets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning scale</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Planning scope</th>
<th>Description of responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The metropolitan scale</td>
<td>City council with assistance from the Amman Planning Board</td>
<td>Around 700 km² of planning area</td>
<td>The highest level of land-use planning in Amman. Responsibilities include zoning regulations, environmental and ecological management, demographic prediction settlement strategy and issues of urban structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The planning area scale</td>
<td>Planning area committees</td>
<td>8 planning areas: 5 urban and 3 peri-urban or rural</td>
<td>Providing finer planning details, approving changes to lower-scale areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The community scale</td>
<td>District committees</td>
<td>228 neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Publishing detailed plans and land zoning for the 228 neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-1: Organisational structure for land-use planning in the city of Amman, source: Aljafari, 2014, p.47; GAM, 2008, pp.22–23

Land-use regulations and development in Amman are a function of both the national government and the city municipality (see subsection 5.3.6, below). Table 5-1, above, represents the organisational structure for planning within GAM, with the four levels of the city council, the Amman Planning Board, the planning area committees and the district committees.

5.3.6 Spatial planning frameworks in Amman

Spatial and urban planning in Amman is determined by a combination of various regulatory frameworks at the national, regional and local levels. In Amman, the key legal instruments that define urban governance and spatial planning are presented in table 5-2, below.
Spatial planning legal frameworks in Amman

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical planning</th>
<th>Socio-economic planning</th>
<th>Public administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Building and Planning Regulations for the City of Amman Act of 1979, no.6793</td>
<td>• Planning Act of 1971, no.68</td>
<td>• Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• City of Amman Planning Act of 1965, no.60</td>
<td>• Encouragement of Investment Act of 1995, no.16</td>
<td>• Management and Administration of Government Properties Act of 1984, no.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Land Division within Municipal Jurisdiction Act of 1968, no.11, and its various amendments</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Public Administration Act of 1965, no.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expropriation Act of 1987, no.12</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Administrative Divisions Act of 2000, no.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Administrative Land Subdivision Act of 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Decentralisation Act of 2015, no.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Land-use Planning by-laws 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-2: Spatial planning legal frameworks in Amman, source: the author

Contemporary Jordanian urban planning is derived from rules that stem from the Ottoman civil codes concept, with some amendments by British planners during the period of the British Mandate (Al Rabady et al., 2014; Tewfik and Amr, 2014; Abu Ghazalah, 2010; Alnsour and Meaton, 2009; Potter et al., 2009; Abu Ghazalah, 2008a; World Bank, 2005a, p.5).

According to the Planning Cities, Towns, Villages and Buildings Act of 1966, no.79, the first phase of drafting master plans requires site analysis and surveying of the social, natural and environmental aspects (see appendix 5). Site analysis and surveying is followed by the envisioning of the draft plan based on planners’ vision, residents’ needs and observed priorities. Following this, draft plans are discussed by the respective district committees in their jurisdiction. Draft plans are then displayed in Amman City Hall and in residents’ services offices in the district committee buildings. Plans are displayed for two months to allow appeals and expression of public opinion. If an appeal case has been raised, it is the role of the district committee and the planning area

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93 The Planning Cities, Towns, Villages and Buildings Act of 1966, no.79 (along with its various amendments) is the key planning Act for other municipalities and economic zones in Jordan.
committee to make a final decision. Typically, the process of preparing land-use plans in Jordan has two main phases: data collection and project design (N.K., interview, 29/07/2015). According to the Planning Cities, Towns, Villages and Buildings Act of 1966, no.79, the first step employs a detailed study of population and other statistical information about employment and socio-economic figures, to draw a picture of who is living in the area and their socio-economic status. Also, the first phase involves consultation with stakeholders and a review of existing topography, drainage, vegetation, infrastructure, protected areas and cultural sites. The outcome of this process is ‘as-built’ maps of infrastructure, facilities, conservation areas, tourism zones, types of land proprietorship and current land use. To gain an understanding of urban development, this is followed by consultation with stakeholders to assess the demand and opportunities for growth (i.e., future population, tourism, commercial, industrial development pressures and agriculture). The second phase includes the development of detailed guidelines and policy documents that will guide proposed development and the roles and responsibilities of the government and other relevant stakeholders. In this way, it involves a public appeal for comments from those affected by the proposed plans.

5.3.7 Neoliberal urban restructuring in the city of Amman

The emerging neoliberal patterns of flexible production, the attraction of financial capital, entrepreneurialism, deregulation and privatisation have been steadily adopted by the state to tackle issues of economic deceleration (see figure 5-7, below) (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Tayeh, 2012, p.96; Daher, 2011a, p.87; Daher, 2011b, p.286; Harvey, 1989a). As a result, policies of market-oriented economic growth, land markets and urban planning have been designated by the government as a vehicle to reinvigorate the urban economy (Wessel, 2000): “The ‘modernization’ strategies enshrined within IMF regulations, in turn, transformed urban spaces into commodities for circulation on global markets” (Abu Hamdi, 2017, p.103).

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94 In some cases, district committees reach decisions different from those of the planning area committees. In such cases, the final decision goes to the planning area committee as a higher-tier planning authority.
The growing power of large real estate corporations and speculative developers in Jordan could be understood as the new face of the authoritarian practices in urban governance. Research demonstrates how state–economy and state–society relations in Jordan are contested (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Tayeh, 2012). The neoliberal movement resulted in mass privatisation of public space, thus granting young people little room to benefit from urban development (Osborne, et al., 2017). The GoJ encourages economic liberalisation policies via financial agreements between government and private investors. With the legal and regulatory support of the state, planning has become a tool for facilitating the involvement of private investment in local economies and its power to boost them (Tayeh, 2012, p.18). The neoliberal urban transformation rests on the removal of socialist principles in parallel with the formation of rules to suit the state and its oligarchic networks (Hourani, 2014a; Daher, 2011a, p.87; Daher, 2011b, pp.286–293). Neoliberal notions of governance have resulted in the restructuring and strengthening of the relationship between the state and real estate development sector, which on one hand allows planning acts to follow the demands of market forces, and on the other delegates more powers and authority to big businesses (see figure 5-7, above). The changing Amman cityscape is an accurate reflection of the reconfiguration of authority and global pressures for modernisation (Tayeh, 2012, p.19; Parker, 2009). In this vein, the Encouragement of Investment Act of 1995, no.16, has played a key role.
role in legislative changes that facilitate urban land commercialisation, granting real estate investors lavish allowances with regard to land use (Tewfik and Amr, 2014). Accordingly, the state has been attracted by gigantic investments and launched an active partnership with the private sector. As a result, urban land in Amman has become a mere commodity for profit-making by prominent landowners, with weak public authority ability to control escalating land prices (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Alnsour, 2016; Tewfik and Amr, 2014).

5.4 Choosing Amman 2025 as the case study

The case of Amman 2025 has been chosen to provide a better understanding of the models of youth participation in public policy decision-making in Jordan, and its development from the start of the strategic project until the research’s primary data was collected in 2015. Amman 2025 is the most important planning strategy in the planning timeline of Amman (see appendix 7) (Aljafari, 2014, p.45; Tewfik and Amr, 2014; Khirfan et al., 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012) and Jordan as a whole (Debruyne and Parker, 2016, p.440; Ababsa, 2011a, b; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010). Amman 2025 is a spatial strategic plan that determines how and where Amman will grow with a clear strategic vision (Aljafari, 2014, p.45; Khirfan et al., 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012). It has delivered a radical shift from the traditional approach of fixed blueprints via land zoning to a strategic growth initiative to accommodate the development boom in real estate and population growth in Amman (Aljafari, 2014, p.45; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012) (see section 5.5, below, for further details).

Moreover, Amman 2025 is a highly relevant case for the author, who has knowledge of and access to the main players in the city’s body of governance. Such social relations made it possible to collect primary and secondary data without having to establish familiarity and trust from the outset (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.34).95

In accordance with the aforementioned justifications, the researcher’s situation and the innovative practices adopted in Amman 2025, Amman 2025 was therefore chosen as the case study for addressing the research objectives and related questions. Throughout the process of Amman 2025, it has been claimed that from its inception in 2006 to the collection of the research’s primary data in 2015, decision-making and learning were

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95 Miles and Huberman (1994, p.34) provided a set of criteria to ensure successful selection of case studies. These are deep understanding of the research question; access to key actors relevant to the context of the case study; availability of information; generalisability; and adherence to research ethics.
bi-directional, with GAM, along with relevant local authorities in Amman, listening and attending to the needs and interests of local communities rather than imposing spatial planning frameworks and guidelines (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015). Also, employing skilled experts through Planning Alliance\textsuperscript{96} and Bearing Point was critical for the learning process and a way of exchanging experience, thus enhancing the capacity of the GAM planning team (R.B., 23/07/2015; R.O., 27/06/2015). This was achieved through processes of negotiation, reflection and institutional learning to manage and facilitate the process of spatial planning at earlier stages of the project (Khirfan et al., 2013; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011). Their joint efforts resulted in the creation of Ai, a not-for-profit planning consultancy and think-and-do-tank for spatial planning purposes for the city of Amman and other regional cities in Jordan and the Middle East (Ai, 2010).

5.5 Amman 2025: a vision for smart urban growth

In 2006, a royal decree marked the launch of Amman 2025.\textsuperscript{97} At the outset of Amman 2025, the then mayor of Amman, Omar Maani,\textsuperscript{98} summoned Bearing Point, a consultation firm, to assist GAM in managing the process of Amman 2025 (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010). The entrusted consultants were asked to replace the largely abandoned 1987 GACDP (see subsection 5.3.3, above) with an effective spatial development strategy (Aljafari, 2014, p.45). Maani stated that the rationale behind Amman 2025 was “to ensure systematic and stable growth of the city rather than haphazard expansion”, and he added that the plan was “a step forward towards a tidy and organized city, preparing it for decades beyond 2020” (Jordan Times, 09/03/2017).

Amman 2025 embraced significant innovation in plan management and implementation (Debruyne and Parker, 2016; Aljafari, 2014, p.45; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010). Amman 2025 is a unique initiative to create Amman’s first legally binding, participation-based plan to govern Amman’s growth (Ai, 2011). Amman is a rapidly developing and changing city (Daher, 2011a). The conventional mechanisms adopted in previous master plans for

\textsuperscript{96} Planning Alliance is consultative firms are based in Canada and have long experience in planning cities in the Global South (Khirfan et al., 2013).

\textsuperscript{97} See Appendix 8 for information regarding the main six phases of Amman 2025.

\textsuperscript{98} At the time Amman 2025 was developed, Omar Maani was the mayor of Amman. Omar Maani is a businessman and the founder of the Maani Group. He was mayor of Amman between April 2006 and March 2011 and he was succeeded by Aqel Beltaji.
Amman failed to accommodate the pace of urban development and dynamic changes in society in a sustainable manner. The traditional method of master plan preparation requires considerable time to be spent on technical preparations, government transactions for approval and addressing appeals. Arguably, plan documents are often out of date by the time they are published, particularly for a dynamic city like Amman.

Amman 2025 was not a rigid process of drawing blueprints for land zoning. Rather, it was an integrated approach addressing drawbacks in Amman’s urban governance regarding its legislative, administrative and organisational capacity in addition to issues of physical and economic planning (Khirfan et al., 2013; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010). Amman 2025 implemented a new approach to spatial planning where planning and implementation run in parallel (Aljafari, 2014, p.45). There are several reasons why this approach was implemented. The inception of Amman 2025 witnessed a real estate boom; Amman was emerging as a luxury real estate ‘hotspot’ (Abu Ghazalah, 2006). Real estate investors could not wait for the long periods involved in preparing blueprints, particularly in heated competition between many regional cities to attract petrodollars (Tayeh, 2012, p.96; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011).99

A new approach to planning urban development in Amman was advocated by King Abdullah II through his directives and vision of Amman. In his letter to the newly appointed mayor, Omar Maani, the king was eager to see the growth of Amman make it a welcoming city for international investment, tourism and international agencies, while preserving its authentic cultural identity – a city where ‘capital’ and people could grow and thrive hand in hand to enable effective governance or bring about sustainable urban products (Khirfan and Momani, 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Abu Ghazalah, 2010; GAM, 2008).

*Our leading challenge is to strike the right balance that encourages the growth, development and modernisation of our city on the one hand, while preserving the aesthetic quality, culture, tradition and charm that uniquely characterise and

99 Amman was seen by Gulf investors as a place with significant potential, as a ‘regional hub’ of real estate investments in a time of a heated regional competition, notably among Beirut, Doha, Cairo, Dubai and Amman (Tayeh, 2012, p.21; Bagaeen, 2007a).
differentiate our city. (His Majesty King Abdullah II’s letter to the Mayor of Amman, 2006, translated from Arabic)

The Amman 2025 plan was perceived to be unconventional compared to the master plans previously prepared for Amman (Debruyne and Parker, 2016; Khirfan et al., 2013; Ababsa, 2011a, b). In an attempt to adopt international best practice, Amman 2025 aimed to transform how planning exercises are perceived: from planning for community to planning by community (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015). What has been understood from the rhetoric is that Amman 2025 delivered metropolitan, urban and community planning in conjunction with community input. The vision of strategic spatial planning was translated into operational objectives that would be implemented in the preparation of Amman 2025. Amman 2025 transcended the limitations of inherited approaches in zoning and land management in Amman. In contrast to past plans, Amman 2025 solicited key institutional issues such as civic engagement and the building of GAM’s institutional capacity. Community planning or citizen-centred governance was an integral part of Amman 2025 (ibid.). Municipal staff and professionals, along with community leaders, came together to establish a new approach to grass-roots planning (Ai, 2010).

Following the constant directives of the monarch issued in his discussion papers and public speeches, the GoJ has started to adopt democratic approaches in decision-making on issues that matter to the public (Jarrah, 2009). Amman 2025 has delivered a new vision of involving civil society in shaping the public realm of Amman (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Ababsa, 2011a, p.53). Engaging the public in the planning of Amman 2025 was a new move in Jordanian planning history (Aljafari, 2014, p.45; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010).

In order to facilitate public input, the Amman 2025 planning process adopted ‘planning by PowerPoint’ (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010). Planners presented gathered data on PowerPoint slides and circulated it to relevant stakeholders for data analysis and feedback, and to facilitate innovative ideas. Afterwards, the information that emerged was transformed into a visual presentation for easy and transparent communication. Eventually, the final documents of Amman 2025 took the form of a compilation of the various completed PowerPoint presentations.
In terms of regulatory reform, Amman 2025 established legally binding city growth plans based on community input for the next 20 years of development (GAM, 2008). Amman 2025 enacted a number of new regulations, and suspended some, to deal with rapid urban growth in a sustainable manner (R.B., interview, 23/07/2015). Amman’s zoning and building regulations were revised to control real estate investment and public infrastructure projects (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012). The revamping of the regulations was mainly directed towards real estate development with the aim of easing developers and investors by mitigating bureaucratic government transactions (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010). For instance, Maani introduced a ‘one-stop shop’ that would enable investors to bypass GAM’s bureaucracy and other government transactions (Debruyne and Parker, 2016; Tayeh, 2012, p.19). Seven different agencies were located in one ‘window’ to obtain approvals for large and complex projects. Moreover, Amman 2025 enacted a new zoning by-law that preserves Amman’s natural and cultural heritage system by identifying and preserving new greenfield areas (Aljafari, 2014; Potter et al., 2009).

In terms of physical planning, Amman 2025 adopted a new approach in land-use planning named the densification and intensification policy, with a focus on efficient and cost-effective infrastructure (Aljafari, 2014; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012) (see appendix 8). Amman 2025 embraced the concept of HDMU development to tame horizontal urban encroachment on rainfed agricultural land and to accommodate ‘spillover’ development (Aljafari, 2014, GAM, 2008).100

The following points summarise the key elements of innovation mentioned in discourse in regard to Amman 2025 (Debruyne and Parker, 2016; Aljafari, 2014; Khirfan et al., 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010):

• strategic collaboration among all relevant administrative bodies in Amman, and integrating their policies to catalyse the formation of cross-sectoral public private partnerships

• the establishment of horizontal and vertical networks for a joined-up approach to regional and local planning to tackle the growing imbalance of power among government sectors

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100 According to Bagaeen (2006a, p.118), the concept of the compact city was first introduced by the Commission of the European Communities (1990) under the concept of sustainable development.
• use of a combination of participatory planning techniques to ensure that urban growth meets the social and economic needs of society

• radical reform of urban governance; this includes improving the policy and regulatory framework of spatial planning by which the principles of a holistic and coordinated approach could be implemented.

5.5.1 Youth role in Amman 2025
This section discusses the institutional infrastructure developed by Amman 2025 to build relationships that support youth participation in urban governance. Various public participation mechanisms, public consultation forums, programmes for university students and schoolchildren, websites, public exhibitions and meetings were used to engage young Jordanian in the planning process. In this way, Ai established a welcoming institutional environment to retain young talents in order for them to contribute to Jordan’s development (Ai, 2010).

In February 2009, GAM hosted an interactive and lively discussion on the role of youth in the city: the centennial youth forum. The forum was chaired by the then mayor and targeted youth communities in Amman. Youth were given a platform to voice their concerns to civic leadership (Ai, 2010). In this manner, attendees had the opportunity to express views regarding their vision of Amman. Discussions revolved around three major themes:

- the role of youth in the public arena: taking Rainbow Street\textsuperscript{101} regeneration as a case study, participants discussed whether their perceptions and opinions were implemented
- public transport: youth were dissatisfied with how public transport was organised and managed in Amman. In fact, public transport in Amman is unreliable and underdeveloped. Youth explored solutions by referring to other successful examples in the world

\textsuperscript{101} Rainbow Street (formally called Abu Bakr al Siddiq Street) is located in Jabal Amman. Since the 1990s, commercial activities and social life in the street have started to decline due to Amman’s urban expansion to the north and south-west. In 2006 the street was regenerated by GAM and TURATH (local architecture and urban design consultants) into a heritage attraction and public space. The Rainbow Street generation project consists of physical rehabilitation with minimal architectural interventions to preserve its historical and cultural value and to create inclusive public space for all residents (Daher, 2012, cited in Aljafari, 2014, p.95).
• Amman post-2025: this theme involved the hopes and aspirations of Amman residents for their city. Participants were asked what they thought Amman would be like in 2025. The interviews highlighted overarching issues in Jordanian society, such as problems in the educational system, the lack of gardens, unsafe pedestrian routes, etc.

Another main project adopted by GAM and Ai’s planners and architects were internship programmes for local and regional university students. Interns were involved in a capacity-building programme by introducing them to a real-world project of urban design, research and surveys that dealt with various urban issues. In this vein, Ai hosted scholars from the University of Chicago and the University of Waterloo, the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Ghent University, Columbia University, MIT and the University of California at Berkley (Ai, 2010). They provided training and mentoring on Amman’s geography, history and identity in interactive sessions.

5.6 Conclusion

Chapter five sought to understand the institutional structure of spatial planning in Amman. Accordingly, this chapter presented a description of the case study and an overview of the micro-institutional setting of Amman 2025. First, the main characteristics of the city of Amman were introduced. An overview of the urban development of Amman, and its radical urban transformation from a small village to a metropolitan city, was given. The aim was to provide an overview of the rapid urban growth articulated in horizontal urban encroachment over meagre rainfed agriculture land in Amman. Afterwards, a background analysis of the urban development institutional context in Amman was presented. Section 5.3 started with an overview of the dramatic demographic growth in Amman since 1930. Then it presented the composition of government authorities in Amman in charge of managing and administering urban development planning and implementation. The discussion highlighted GAM’s long experience of supporting municipal services in comparison with relatively limited experience in strategic spatial planning. An overview of the key legal infrastructure that governs urban development in Amman was given. At the end of the section, neoliberal urban structuring was highlighted in subsection 5.3.7 due to its importance in the analysis of the state–market relationship.

Section 5.5 presented the rationale for choosing Amman 2025 as the case study of this research. The section that followed was designed to describe further the main features
of Amman 2025. The innovative approaches used for community empowerment were discussed and linked to the purpose of this study. Afterwards, subsection 5.5.1 presented the role of youth communities in Amman 2025 as presented in the relevant documents mainly published by Ai.

Secondary data significantly contributed to the construction of chapter five. Chapter five built on archival work, government documents, newspapers and public documents available through personal visits to the GAM headquarters or by accessing official government websites and downloading publications. Triangulation of multiple data sources was used to ensure the credibility and validity of discussions presented in chapters four and five (see subsections 3.7.4 and section 3.8, chapter three).

Both chapter four and chapter five act as a segue between the theoretical framework presented in chapter two and the in-depth and critical analysis of the analytical chapters (chapters six and seven). This research seeks to establish an understanding of the institutional context of Amman 2025. Chapter five has delivered part of the required understanding and has partially answered questions relating to the second objective. Accordingly, chapter six is designed to complete the research picture and provide an understanding of the institutional context of urban development in Amman.
Chapter 6: Analysing the institutional infrastructure of Amman 2025
6.1 Introduction

The theoretical part of this research (chapter two) presents a discussion of the systemic institutional design for collaborative planning as suggested by Healey (2006a) (see subsection 2.4.1). Also, section 2.3, chapter two demonstrated how the institutionalist approach is useful and valuable in analysing and assessing the institutional capacity of Amman 2025 to more collaborative decision-making. The value of an institutionalist approach provides an understanding of the institutional context, including both soft and hard infrastructures, investigating both planning practice and structure. Most importantly, the institutionalist approach forges a path to understanding the impact of the cultural context in the targeted case study on planning practices (Healey, 2006a, p.64) (see section 2.5, chapter two), thus contributing to more grounded participatory tools to youth empowerment. The inductive–deductive cycle of science helped to foster the empirical understanding of the planning system and practices employed in Amman 2025. Accordingly, chapter six seeks to answer the following proposed research questions, which underpin and fulfil the second objective of this research:

To critically explore the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman regarding youth participation in decision-making.

This objective is designed to figure out to what extent Amman 2025, from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015, delivered new institutional forms and collaborative platforms of urban governance in Amman capable of actively involving civil society groups, and youth communities in particular, in Amman’s planning practices and system. The following questions will be addressed in this chapter to meet the second objective:

A. What is the current structure of spatial planning in Amman 2025 regarding the key actor(s) and relationships, and who assumes responsibility for planning decisions?

B. To what extent, and in what ways, were youth incorporated in the strategy-making process of Amman 2025, from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015?

102 Participatory tools are mechanisms for enhancing the participation of Jordanian youth in the public realm.
C. To what extent have the planning system (hard infrastructure) and the practices (soft infrastructure) followed in Amman 2025 been improved to ensure greater youth participation in policymaking?

D. What are the opportunities or challenges within the institutional context of spatial planning that enable or hinder the promotion of sustainable youth participation in Jordan?

The adoption of thematic analysis of the qualitative data permitted a higher level of detail concerning the different understandings and perspectives among participants on the experience of spatial planning in Amman. The analysis involved primary data collected from 28 semi-structured interviews, along with four focus groups from young Jordanians aged 18-24. In addition, in the research analysis, existing knowledge gathered from documents about Amman 2025, including publications on Amman 2025’s governance, partnership and public participation, was reviewed (see subsection 3.7.2, chapter three for a full discussion of methods used to collect evidence from the case study).

Discussion in this chapter focuses on both levels of systemic institutional design (i.e., soft infrastructure and hard infrastructure) to develop a comprehensive and precise understanding of the institutional context in Amman, and on how much it has changed since the start of Amman 2025. The first two sections of this chapter discuss the opportunities or challenges facing institutional design in engaging youth in Amman’s spatial planning, and whether Amman 2025 has delivered the necessary institutional efforts to ensure systemic youth participation in policymaking. The content on soft infrastructure addresses issues of practices for developing and maintaining youth participation in Amman’s spatial planning. Hard infrastructure is specifically related to investigating the planning system in Amman in terms of the administrative, legal and political systems that structure the rules and resources of Amman 2025.

Significant omissions were indicated by the interviewees: most notable, and the concern of this research, was the omission of youth communities in the decision-making process of Amman 2025. Most of the interviewees and focus group participants stressed how sociocultural forces are a major hindrance to engaging youth in planning practices in Jordan. This chapter will present a central theme emerging from the thematic analysis – cultural capital – as a new dimension for understanding systemic institutional design in
the delivery of sustainable youth participation and collaborative spatial planning in Jordan. The thematic analysis identified the importance of sociocultural forces when addressing questions about youth participation in spatial planning in Amman, and across Jordan. Therefore, this research has added cultural capital as a fourth dimension to the institutional capacity model (soft infrastructure). This contribution emphasises the extent of sociocultural forces of Jordanian society in the context of collaborative spatial planning in Jordan.

6.2 The quality of institutional capacity in Amman 2025

The term institutional capacity refers to the compilation of relational resources (social capital), knowledge resources (intellectual capital) and mobilisation capacity in a locality (see subsection 2.4.1, chapter two). Subsection 6.2.1, below examines the relational resources by reviewing the morphology of relational nexuses that surrounded, intersected with or were created throughout the making of Amman 2025. This subsection examines the extent to which Amman 2025, from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015, has improved social capital in Amman, with particular focus on building and strengthening relationships and fostering mutual trust among key actors in society. Subsection 6.2.2 presents a critical review of the range and quality of knowledge resources available to youth communities as part of Amman 2025, and how far youth input was taken into consideration by those who assume responsibility for planning decisions. Mobilisation capacity is examined to explore issues and opportunities in relation to youth agency, collective action for changing planning practices (power to) (Dyrberg, 1997 cited in Vigar et al., 2000, p.48) and youth leadership. Lastly, the theme of cultural capital has emerged inductively from the primary data. The theme will be further discussed in subsection 6.2.4. The following subsection represents the nature and strength of the relationships developed between different stakeholders throughout and beyond Amman 2025, up to the collection of primary data in 2015.

6.2.1 Relational richness developed throughout Amman 2025

The generation of relational resources and networking is an important outcome of a collaborative policymaking process (i.e., spatial planning) (Healey, 2006a, p.70). The institutionalist and collaborative planning approach seeks to challenge the notion of urban governance as being merely the activities of formal or government authorities (Emerson et al., 2012). In order to examine relational richness in Amman 2025, subsection 6.2.1 explores the range of governance actors in Amman 2025 and the
morphology of their relational webs/social networks (Healey et al., 2002, pp.19–20), and to what extent new stakeholders were involved from 2006 to 2015. This section seeks to analyse the nexus of stakeholders in Amman 2025 and to identify under which circumstances these relations were formed or transformed. Moreover, the relational resources theme examines whether the networks of relations in Amman 2025 were integrated and inclusive enough to engage a vast array of stakeholders. In particular, and of specific concern in this research, this section also clarifies whether Amman 2025 has effectively extended relational webs to encompass relationships with youth communities, or worked against their involvement in the public policy arena.

Amman 2025 and its key actors

It is meaningful and useful for the research analysis and for the overall understanding of Amman 2025 to determine the main key players who were/are active in Amman 2025 and how they relate to each other and to other social groups (i.e., youth communities) in Amman. The stakeholder mapping diagram depicted in figure 6-1, below, is presented to give readers an understanding of the range of stakeholders and their different sectors and formal institutional levels. Figure 6-1 also shows the architecture of the state–economy and state-society networks that have developed since the beginning of Amman 2025 in 2006.

The city of Amman is Jordan’s largest urban centre and its first administrative region (Tewfik and Amr, 2014; Potter et al., 2007; Choucair, 2006; Nazzal, 2005, p.2). The scale of Amman 2025 is reflected in its ambitious cross-sectoral plans spanning the economic, state and civil society spheres, drawing on local, regional, national and international institutions within the governance arena (Albrechts, 2004). As a result, Amman 2025 has become a significant site of political struggle among different stakeholders (firms, agencies, NGOs, households, etc.) with a broad range of interests. Navigating this complexity suggests the need for a significant institutional effort to integrate ‘multilayered’ networks, linking the knowledge, resources and experiences of business, institutions, government bodies and local communities across different scales to achieve collaborative spatial planning (Healey, 2006a, p.300). Such institutional efforts are crucial in establishing and strengthening ways to create mutual understanding and trust between those with diverse interests, thus encouraging a “public realm of multi-cultural argumentation” (Healey, 2006a, p.295).
Figure 6-1: Network morphologies surrounding Amman 2025, source: the author
Figure 6-1, above depicts the array of stakeholders involved in the formation of Amman 2025, and the architecture of social relations that intersect or surround Amman 2025. Local environments may contain complex power structures that rule our social relationships and relational webs (Healey, 2006a, p.17). For Al Nammari (2013), researchers investigating urban governance should take into account dominating powers in a locality. Al Nammari (2013) referred to Lukes’ (1970) conception of levels of power to construct her three typologies. Accordingly, power structures include the three typologies of visible power, hidden power and invisible power.¹⁰³

Arguably, the visible power of decision-making in Amman 2025 resided with the city’s leadership: the mayor of Amman. The mayor is the leader of the city council, appointed by royal decree through the RHC, the consultative body for the monarch, and reports directly to the prime minister of Jordan. Nevertheless, in what is a highly centralised administrative system in Jordan, and since the Amman mayor’s office is directly linked to the Prime Minister’s Office, Amman’s mayor is the most senior and influential figure in Amman’s urban governance (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Abu Ghazalah, 2010). The existing urban planning and management structure is partially institutionalised, leaving a large institutional space for the mayor’s discretion (Daher, 2011a), and Amman’s various mayors, with their various planning policies, have had both positive and negative impacts on Amman’s urban development (Aljafari, 2014; Potter et al., 2009; Abu Dayyeh, 2004).

In the first instance, the planning process is linked to the mayor’s mentality and his/her perception of concepts of planning, development and local society. (R.O., interview, 06/07/2015, translated from Arabic)¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Lukes (1974) presents three dimensions or ‘faces’ of power. The first dimension is obvious, visible power. It is embedded in decision-making power. The second is the invisible power deeply ingrained in our social practices. In planning, it could resemble a specific coalition setting a policy agenda. The third dimension is modes of thought or ‘mental models’ that shape systems of meaning and frames of reference. Healey (2006a, pp.326–327) built her dimensions of governance framework based on Lukes’ conception of power but in a more social constructivist way, following Dyrberg (1997 cited in Vigar et al., 2000, p.48). The framework contains and distinguishes three levels of governance: specific episodes, governance processes and governance cultures (see section 2.4, chapter two).

¹⁰⁴ Job titles of interviewees are presented in appendix 10-1.
From the very early stages of Amman 2025, Mr Maani, the then mayor of Amman, took the chair at all meetings on key urban issues and used his statutory power to direct and influence the project (F.Y., interview, 25/08/2015) according to directions from the RHC.

Because there is no formal opposition or political representation within the city council, the mayor has responsibilities towards, and is accountable to, all councillors. According to the programme manager at the UN-Habitat Jordan office, chairing the planning team has given the mayor a feeling of mastery over the plan. She pointed out that “Planning in Jordan is not institutionalised. If a mayor/minister becomes convinced of a specific approach, s/he will implement it” (I.Z., interview, 18/08/2015, translated from Arabic). One focus group participant also agreed with I.Z., stating that:

The responsibility for decision-making is only held by one person. There is no delegation of responsibility. For example, in our neighbourhood, they [the municipality] decide what is best for the neighbourhood and then take action to implement their plans. (L.S., focus group, 29/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

For many interviewees who became involved in the research, the elected city council’s role in the decision-making of Amman 2025 was peripheral. In fact, the mayor mostly referred to the Amman Commission (which had been renamed the Mayor Roundtable) for assistance in decision-making and planning management. The Mayor Roundtable, the executive committee for Amman 2025, is considered to have been more influential in the Amman 2025 decision-making process than the city council. The Mayor Roundtable was chaired by the mayor himself and members included prominent local architects, planners, lawyers and engineers. The Mayor Roundtable did not have any representation from the local community, residents or NGOs. Members of the

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105 The city council comprises 68 members. Half of the city council members are directly elected by the citizens of Amman, while the other half are appointed by the mayor and include government personnel with past experience in municipal services or social welfare departments. The elected councillors are mostly independent public figures with no political affiliation. They mainly represent their tribe or a tribal coalition (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015).
Roundtable were mainly the following (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010):

- Directors of GAM departments
- representatives from central government ministries
- local architects and economists
- individuals from the public utilities
- the mayor of Jordanian city Al Salt
- investors from housing and real estate sector.

The following discussion analyses the morphology of relational webs between the state and the market sector following the domination of neoliberal policy at the national level and also analyses how this is reflected in spatial planning at the local level.

*State–market relationships in Amman 2025: a rentier politics*

Research analysis reveals that there was a hidden power by which ‘big businesses’ was influential in planning decisions in Amman 2025. According to inputs from interviewees, a strong connection formed between the mayor’s office and major real estate business developers. Entrepreneurial relationships were carefully maintained and nurtured throughout and after Amman 2025.

*The relationship between big businesses and the governance body in GAM is very strong. As you know, the nature of the relation between Amman mayors or any high-ranked officials in the city dictates the nature of urban plans.* (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Due to greater pressure from the real estate investment community and RHC to publish the policy framework for Amman 2025 (i.e Interim Growth Strategy (IGS)), the policy agenda only provided a narrow focus on property development issues and away from youth concerns or community interests. Urban entrepreneurialism was clearly emphasised by many research participants from the state and the civil society as well, this is articulated as follows:
During the preparation of the Interim Growth Strategy, the market was overheating. The planning department received many applications for high-rise buildings. The capability of our department is limited compared to the scale of the project, and the size of the city of Amman. All these factors limited the consultation process. (R.O., interview, 06/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

The vision of Amman in the master plan is that of a regional financial and business hub. Consider, for example, the appointment of [G.P.], [s/he] is a business developer, not a planner. GAM privileged investors from the Gulf States interested in turning their large sums of capital into high-density, mixed-use commercial real estate projects. (M.Y., interview, 30/06/2015, translated from Arabic)

There is a lot of pressure from powerful businessmen on planning authorities to influence the planning process. Changing land-use plans will have an impact on the value of the property. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Shifting from government to governance requires a strong partnership between local and regional authorities on one hand, and with local communities on the other (Geddes, 2006). Unfortunately, the relationship that developed between youth and planning authorities during Amman 2025 was fragile and not supported by an institutional framework. As a result, the involvement of youth communities in Amman 2025 was short-lived and ineffective. Research on the neoliberal transformation in urban policy106 has demonstrated how the rights of local communities and youth have been undermined

106 This refers to a new form of liberal governance characterised by feeble democratic participation mechanisms and elite-driven urban development (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). The neoliberal political transformation in Jordan has reformulated urban policy and its mechanisms, widening the gap between the elite and middle-to-low social classes (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Daher, 2011b, p.290).
(Sukarieh and Tannock, 2008; Harvey, 2007b; Purcell, 2002). Neoliberal policy orientation provides more resources, investment in infrastructure and privileges to real estate investors at the expense of social needs in Jordan (Osborn et al., 2017; Tayeh, 2012, p.97; Bagaeen, 2006a, b). Local authorities’ powerful oligarchic networks, normally with real estate developers, have subsequently launched a series of projects insensitive to community needs (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Hanssen and Falleth, 2014; Tayeh, 2012, p.97; Bagaeen, 2006a, b).

As a result, youth groups became progressively less involved and eventually dropped out of the consultation space, which was then occupied by big corporate companies operating in the real estate sector. Interpreting it on the basis of Hart’s ladder of youth participation (see appendix 1), youth participation can be seen to have been meaningless and tokenistic. According to Jones (1995, p.93), entrepreneurial relationships between non-elected bureaucrats and large businesses are a fundamental problem in modern democratic theory. The relationship between youth communities and planning authorities is not of a participatory and collaborative form, in the sense that young people are often included in one-off discussions, as a tokenistic form of engagement. During the process of Amman 2025, the opportunities offered to youth communities were too narrow to integrate their needs into the strategic development of Amman. This relates to the fragile relational infrastructure between municipalities and local communities at large. Moreover, the focus group discussions pointed out the issue of the inaccessibility of municipalities to youth groups. Youth felt that their interests were seldom addressed in council meetings, believing that municipalities are largely for investors, adults or property developers. One focus group participant shared his experience regarding his contact with local authorities:

*I never dealt directly with the municipality [GAM] or those who are responsible for our neighbourhood. I think these institutions are only for adults, or property owners or investors who seek to manage their business.* (R.A.A., focus group, 29/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

State–market relationships in Amman 2025 showed the influence that the market sector and, particularly, big businesses have on spatial planning decision-making. State–
market relationships are manifested by the neoliberal investment policies that facilitate the interests of real estate developers in Amman (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Mango, 2014, p.51; Hanssen and Falleth, 2014; Hourani, 2014a; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Tayeh, 2012; Daher, 2011b, p.87). Following the neoliberal economic transformation under the rubric of economic reform, the GoJ is building and maintaining web-like networks among large business groups and investors. These networks have been actively and carefully nurtured to create fertile ground for international and regional investment mainly from the GCC nations.

Since the beginning of the economic reform projects, the state has sold the idea on the basis of bringing in millions of dollars through big slogans, such as ‘let’s sow gold over the sands’. But the Jordanians did not see any impact – paradoxically, the situation is going from bad to worse. (A.J., interview, 26/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Such thick state–market relations in the land and property development sector are a direct result of “fiscal stress in the public sector and the leverage of neoliberal political philosophy” (Healey, 1998b, p.5). With the economic hardship that has buffeted the Jordanian economy, the GoJ has brought practices of neoliberal ideology into the planning policy arena to facilitate capital accumulation. Neoliberalism in Jordan provides the state with a measure of elasticity, and the ability to, under the premise of reform, reinvent its role and responsibilities in the project of development, chasing the promise of a prosperous future (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Hourani, 2014a; Nazzal, 2005). The following is an example of the responses of two interviewees from the state and the civil society, reflecting their shared views on how economic hardship has affected Amman’s urban governance structure:

The Jordanian state, due to its weak financial capabilities, has moved from providing welfare services to facilitating and regulating the provision of those services throughout the legislative and administrative framework. (R.A., interview, 29/06/2015, translated from Arabic)
In Jordan, we do not have natural resources to trade with, therefore the government resorted to land as a commodity to stimulate economic growth in the Kingdom. Land economics is dominant and most vibrant in Amman, the capital. Land is becoming more of a commodity than a place to live. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Consequently, many interviewees believed that GAM’s central purpose was to enhance the economic and physical infrastructure of Amman, in order to enhance the competitiveness of the city.\(^{107}\) This was articulated through the normalisation of neoliberal urban practices, making the city more marketable and attractive for lucrative consumption and investment (Abu Hamdi, 2017; Mango, 2014, p.222; Tayeh, 2012, p.19; Daher, 2011a, p.87; Parker, 2009). To succeed in this contest, city officials worked hard to establish less restrictive systems for HDMU, relaxing planning controls and simplifying the planning process for real estate investors, as a result of which market forces played a greater role in urban governance and control (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Moreover, Planning Alliance launched organisational restructuring in GAM to address complex internal considerations and ambiguous rules and unnecessary bureaucracy standing in the way of capital mobility into Amman’s real estate sector.

Tax exemptions and state policy towards urban lands encourage landowners and real estate developers to turn land into a lucrative business. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

For economic purposes, investors in Jordan have unabated support from the state. For instance, look at the site of Jordan Gate Towers. The site was a public park for youth to meet up and play. Sadly, it has been given to investors for mere commercial

\(^{107}\) See also Tayeh (2012, p.96).
purposes with no benefits to the local community. The project created a variety of problems for the district in terms of security, pressure on service infrastructure and traffic congestion, etc. (N.K., interview, 29/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

As a result, Amman’s city space has become an arena for capital accumulation with limited social benefits (Hourani, 2014a, b). Bagaeen (2007, p.177) believed that the purpose behind these developments in the Middle East is to “create an image of progress and dynamism where the fastest, biggest, most amazing structures are being built in order to attract the affluent [international entrepreneurs] and the talented [designers]”. The new urban entrepreneurialism in Amman is manifested in the commodification of urban space at the expense of community and social indicators (Bagaeen, 2006a). The neoliberal transformation takes place mainly in the inner-city brownfield areas, in public parks and on the outskirts of Amman (Tayeh, 2012, p.98; Daher, 2011a; Bagaeen, 2006a). The main form these developments take is that of gated communities in compounds of high-rise buildings, fenced and equipped with sophisticated CCTV security systems, providing privacy and exclusivity for the investors and the emerging ‘high-end’ social strata of Jordanian society (Bagaeen, 2010, p.15; Landman, 2010, p.57). As noted by Dupuis and Dixon (2010), these urban enclaves are self-selecting and exclusive in their membership.

**Spatial coordination amid functional sectionalism in Amman 2025**

Coordination and partnership among planning authorities at all levels of local, regional and central government is essential for the successful preparation and implementation of inclusive and holistic spatial plans (Al Nammari and Alzagh, 2015; McGuire, 2006). After examining the structure of government, it can be seen that the GoJ is organised as a grid with vertical and horizontal structures. MoPIC, the MoI and, MoMA have their centralised budgets allocated by the national budget; resources flow from ministries at the top-down to the directorates in their geographical regions. On the

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108 Brownfield areas are “land that had been previously developed including camps, airfields, live firing training areas and other defence facilities and places” (ODPM, 2000, cited in Bagaeen 2006a, p.117).
109 Gated communities can be defined as “closed urban residential schemes voluntarily lived in by a homogenous social group where public space has been privatised, restricting access through the implementation of security devices” (Roitman et al., 2010, p.5).
vertical line, the MoI, MoPIC and MoMA operate with three layers of authority: national, governorate and municipal. In principle, socio-economic planning at the national level is the responsibility of MoPIC, while MoMA administers land-use planning (i.e., physical planning) and manages the affairs of municipalities. The MoI is responsible for ensuring horizontal coordination among local authorities at the regional level. The power of local governance in Jordan is given to the governors, who are appointed as a regional managers under the control of the ministry of MoI.

The management of Amman’s urban affairs and services is not solely in GAM’s hands. Other government authorities have a shared responsibility to address any urban issues such as issues with universities, school, hospitals, security, water, land registry, etc. However, these government institutions are organised in a silo fashion with a long history of not working collaboratively to manage and address urban issues in Amman. Urban development in Amman is rapid and complex. Ensuring sustainable urban development in a locality requires coordination, partnership and a high level of communication skills that do not all exist within the current urban governance structure (Smith, 2004; Jenkins and Smith, 2001a, b; Rhodes, 1996). As mentioned by some interviewees from the state and civil society, levels of inter- and intra- governmental integration are not satisfactory for dealing with rapid urban development in Amman:

*Historically, there is no integration between GAM’s urban plans and the regional plans prepared by surrounding municipalities, governorates or local authorities. They consider themselves as a separate body.* (I.Z., interview, 18/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

*According to our studies and analysis, we found that there is bad coordination between the centre [central government] and the local administration, and between the local authorities themselves inside the governorate [regional level] and the central level [policymakers].* (H.HH., interview, 26/07/2015, translated from Arabic)
According to Bagaeen (2011), the role of the state or local government in planning is perceived as being that of a ‘neutral arbiter’ “between different social worlds, between unequal power relations, between competing interests” (Healey, 2006a, p.316). However, complexity and fragmentation in government activities could weaken state capacity to be an “arbiter or judge of competing societal claims” (Stoker, 1995, p.58). Therefore, Planning Alliance worked hard during the preparation of Amman 2025’s policies to foster relational nexuses among different government and institutional arenas in Amman (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015). At the local and regional levels, Planning Alliance worked to link public service silos in order for them to work closely and efficiently. Based on the primary data collected, different public service silos, with their different motives and actions, were invited to work together. The Mayor Roundtable’s strategy was to bring together delegates from various agencies, including education, the health sector, urban management and municipal services to make consensual decisions to address urban challenges. The director of the CPU at GAM pointed out the significance of the institutional arrangements for intra-government collaboration that were developed in Amman 2025.

*We were working as one team. At the beginning of the project, the Canadian team [G.P.’s team] and us [local authorities] worked hard day and night to publish the Interim Growth Strategy. It was a learning experience for all of us.* (R.O., interview, 06/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Consequently, an entirely new governance landscape for the government authorities in relation to GAM was formed and facilitated by Planning Alliance. It tackled the obsolete governance division, creating a platform for joined-up working and coordinated efforts, thus speeding up and facilitating the planning and implementation process of the IGS.110 Moreover, most government officials who were interviewed in this research noted that learning and knowledge exchange was a positive experience:

*Plans were produced in a collective effort. There were a lot of meaningful meetings during the course*

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110 See appendix 8 for more information about the first phase of Amman 2025.
of plan preparation for the IGS. The Canadian team helped us a lot. They taught us [local authorities] many things in planning we didn’t know before through training and workshops. (R.B., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Strong horizontal and vertical communications between government agencies ease the inertia of bureaucracy (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015; Tayeh, 2012, p.19; Parker, 2009). Inter- and intra-government relationships and social capital conquered the challenges and overcame the limited organisational capacity of GAM to produce and implement the policy of IGS. In order to institutionalise the intra- and inter-governmental relationships developed during Amman 2025, GAM introduced the Special Project Unit, vested with facilitating coordination among different government sectors to mitigate the inertia of bureaucracy that accompanies the issuing of mega projects’ construction licences. The ‘One Window’ service offers a one-stop shop for HDMU scheme registration and planning permission services. The Special Project Unit at GAM is staffed by authorised representatives from all government entities responsible for issuing approvals and providing investors with information and data. Establishing coherent vertical communications has resulted in improved coordination among planning authorities and inter-ministerial coordination with agencies that previously worked in a ‘silo fashion’, thus facilitating knowledge exchange and the sharing of experiences. Many interviewees support the notion of the Special Project Unit in GAM and its role of boosting collaboration and coordination among different government sectors and units. However, some interviewees claimed that the Special Project Unit only served the interests of ‘big business’ and was thus an articulation of the power of the market, particularly the real estate sector, over the strategic decisions related to Amman 2025. A deeper analysis of the range of knowledge sources used in Amman 2025 is presented in the next section.
6.2.2 Knowledge resources and institutional learning\textsuperscript{111} opportunities in Amman 2025

This theme examines the range of the knowledge resources deployed in Amman 2025, and whether youth conceptions of place were involved in the decision-making of Amman 2025 from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015.

Following the institutionalist approach, comprehensive spatial plans pay attention to different forms and types of knowledge and reasoning (i.e., communicative rationality and instrumental rationality) to address the complexity of urban issues (Albrechts et al., 2003). These include practical consciousness, local knowledge and systemised scientific and technical knowledge (Healey, 2006a, p.264; Schilderman and Ruskulis, 2005). The theme of qualities of knowledge resources examines opportunities available for social actors for social learning, by which youth can come together with other social actors to learn about each other, about their different points of view, developing different forms of knowing, forms of reasoning and systems of meaning that facilitate cooperation (Webler et al., 1995). Bringing in many different ways of thinking and ways of expressing claims represents an ideological shift from the rationalist conception of knowledge, with its narrow instrumental rationality, confining responsibility for spatial planning to state authorities, towards a process of interactive multi-dimensional urban governance (Rhodes, 1996).

The range of knowledge resources in Amman 2025

Integrating multiple layers of knowledge and experiences is vital for the success of public policy and thus integrated spatial plans (Healey, 2006a; Campbell and Marshall, 2002). Under the institutionalist paradigm of governance, urban issues are no longer resolved via arithmetical optimisation, but in a political and democratic process attentive to the interests and the needs of communities (Tironi, 2015).

However, as many interviewees argued, the tactics used to form Amman 2025’s knowledge base were very systematic, rigid and traditionalistic. The tendency to take a physical and economic approach to the plan diminished the variety of knowledge resources obtained for Amman 2025. Instrumental rationality in Amman 2025 has been

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\textsuperscript{111} Institutional learning draws on the concept of ‘learning region’, which primarily developed in the field of regional economic development analysis (Vigar et al., 2000, p.44). The term refers to governance capacity in a locality, by which the flow of knowledge, ideas and learning is facilitated (Florida, 1995).
demonstrated by an ex-Ai officer, Sandra Hiari. Hiari views the process as having been purely technical, with the mayor and his planners dominating the planning process:

The mayor, with Ai behind him, [...] treated planning as physical and technical and not as ‘political’ [...] they had a sort of colonial approach. (cited in Debruyne and Parker, 2016, p.442)

A technocratic approach is followed by the GoJ in dealing with urban issues in Jordan. In this way, and as many interviewees commented, Amman 2025 was a mere technical process devoid of collaborative dialogue or communicative rationality. The quality of knowledge resources\textsuperscript{112} has always been a point of deficiency when it comes to public consultation matters in Amman. Research participants felt that local knowledge\textsuperscript{113} had not been effectively mobilised or integrated into Amman 2025.

If public participation occurs, authorities are selective in choosing who to be involved. They choose those who come from a technical background or local elites who have a high profile in society. This makes the process partial and not open to everybody. (J.N., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

The problem of planning in Jordan is that we plan our cities behind desks and on the blueprints. We [the planners] do not survey or communicate with people. To date, Jordan does not have communicative planning. (M.Y., interview, 30/06/2015, translated from Arabic)

\textsuperscript{112} Quality of knowledge resources is defined as the variety of knowledge resources that young participants have access to; the capacity of planning authorities to absorb their ideas; and the extent to which frames of reference (i.e., conceptions, meaning, etc.) are shared between youth and key stakeholders in the planning process.

\textsuperscript{113} According to Geertz (1983), local knowledge is “a mixture of systemised, formalised and calculated knowledge, and that acquired through social interchange and experience, a ‘common sense’ and a ‘practical reason’, a store of proverbs and metaphors, and of practical skills and routines conveyed as much in what is not said as in what is” (cited in Healey, 2006a, p.38).
The traditional method of master plan preparation often takes a long time because of technical preparations, governmental transactions for approvals or the addressing of appeals. Arguably, plan documents are often out of date by the time they are published, particularly for a city that is quickly expanding, like Amman. The conventional process followed by planning authorities in Jordan is twofold. On one hand, it requires the analysis of and research into markers of the incumbent economic, environmental and social status, such as inventory land uses; local government capacity; and laws and regulations. On the other hand, it requires population and employment projections to be figured out. Amman 2025 was mainly based on statistics regarding projected growth, investment levels and workforce estimations covering issues of urban design, traffic management and waste management. Accordingly, Amman 2025 aimed to accommodate the burgeoning urban population – fuelled by the influx of refugees – and to regulate property development following the neoliberal urban transformation in Amman (Tayeh, 2012). Therefore, the policy framework revolved around regulating building density and accommodating population growth. The intensification and densification strategies (see appendix 8) was based on a detailed study of population growth, investment and employment patterns, and the expected direction of urban expansion within Amman.114

From my perspective, GAM clearly followed a scientific approach in plan preparation. Most of their studies, unfortunately, have a lot of gaps and mistakes. As a result, most of the plans prepared for Amman are shelved and have never been considered for future urban development. (A.N., interview, 23/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

The lack of local knowledge in the Metropolitan Growth Strategy (MGS) and IGS (see appendix 8) undermined the rights of large numbers of low-income groups living in Amman who had never actually been consulted or involved in the decision-making. Along with physical development and public administration improvement, economic planning is a branch of spatial planning (Healey, 2006a, p.10). Economic planning in

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114 Amman’s urban growth is concentrated on the south-west side of the city (see figure 5-5, subsection 5.3.3, chapter five).
Amman 2025 aimed to implement an entrepreneurial governance approach to economic development. The participants revealed that the main providers of knowledge resources were the Mayor Roundtable planners in cooperation with real estate investors’ consultants. They applied their professional knowledge to identify urban issues that hinder business development in Amman and asked investors to suggest solutions. The nonexistence of a socio-economic vision within the planning process resulted in ineffective plans in terms of being able to adequately serve the city. Guiding the production of comprehensive urban development plans through concepts of ideal urban forms has often meant they fail to achieve their intended purposes (Black, 1990). Many interviewees pointed out the conflict and contradiction between the Mayor Roundtable planners’ ideal models of rational planning and technical approach towards urban management on one hand, and the urban complexity articulated in patterns of spatial inequality, oppression and political struggles over access to resources on the other. In this conflict, planners were often perceived as a “technical servant of dominant groups and interests” (Vigar et al., 2000, p.36). The institutionalist paradigm opposes this view, and perceives planners as forming a complex entity whose emotions, feelings and cultural sensibilities have a strong influence on the planning process. Therefore, the following section analyses how state officials perceive spatial planning, and whether Jordanian planners recognise youth inputs as an important contribution to sustainable urban plans.

State officials’ mental model\textsuperscript{115} of youth input

By the end of the 1990s, institutionalist analysts and planning theorists were focusing their attention on understanding the interactive social processes by which the planning systems is translated into planning practices (Vigar et al., 2000, p.36). Vigar and colleagues (2000) believe that those involved in translating planning systems into planning practices, from government officers and city officials to consultants are “not just cogs in an administrative machine” (p.36). Following the neo-institutionalist approach, state officials’ political and cultural perceptions, emotions and morals are

\textsuperscript{115} According to Jenkins and Smith (2001b, p.21), the term ‘mental model’ in urban development refers to formal legal frameworks that rule the development process and to socially developed perceptions regarding a specific issue or phenomenon in urban development (see section 2.4, chapter two). This subsection only addresses the second dimension of the term, by analysing the underlying perceptions of state officials regarding youth participation in the public realm. The analysis of the other dimension (i.e., formal structure) is presented in section 6.3, below.
reflected in their translation of the direct power of command of a law or government statements into planning practices (Healey, 2006a, pp.298–299).

It is with no doubt that young groups who have been living in Amman have experienced Amman urban issues and development differently from how adults have experienced them. This has resulted in youth developing forms and types of knowledge that differ from those of local adults (Osborne et al., 2017). Youth communities build up their perceptions and images of the city according to their everyday activities and lifestyles (Lefebvre, 1997). As mentioned previously, Jordanian planners put considerable faith in science and technology, relying heavily on their professional experience and knowledge to manage urban development. Youth alienation from public policymaking was demonstrated by Al Nammari (2014, 2013) in her research on similar cases of community participation in Jordan. Al Nammari (2013, p.227) revealed that youth were missing from leadership posts in all community participation initiatives, as it was “[argued] that they have no experience in such strategic matters”. In this vein, most of the Jordanian planners interviewed in this research agreed with the arguments of Osborne and colleagues (2017) and Lefebvre (1997). Those were interviewed expressed their doubts about whether they understood place from the perspective of young people. The quotes below indicate that Jordanian planners and practitioners realise the limits of the value-neutral, technical approach of less socio-politically oriented models and their ability to accomplish and satisfy public needs.

*Local knowledge has benefited us many times. Most of our ideas and perceptions of a specific region have been proved wrong after speaking with the locals. Local knowledge has enriched our information.* (I.Z., interview, 18/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

*We should take youth opinion into consideration. Just as adults have ideas and opinions, youth also have a perspective, different from that of adults. I think youth have ideas; sometimes it surprises us. Youth have a vision and insight that is different from...*
that of adults, yet mature. (H.J., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Further quotes from the focus group participants stated their opinions regarding the importance of youth input to spatial planning in Amman are also noted:

*Planners cannot be acquainted with all urban issues in Amman and within society.* (I.S., focus group, 29/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

*Of course youth should have a role in building their cities. Youth interact more with their surrounding environment and thus we know about our city and its problems.* (F.D., focus group, 22/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

The above quotes echo the writings of Henri Lefebvre on the city and politics. Lefebvrian ideas of the ‘right to the city’ have gained greater momentum in the wake of neoliberal restructuring and its threat to democracy and social justice (Purcell, 2006). Lefebvre (1974) suggested that urban residents must be empowered to participate in the making and remaking of political and economic structures in cities (Purcell, 2002).

GoJ officials interviewed in this study believed that Jordanian youth, particularly those aged 15–24, are not equipped, qualified or knowledgeable enough to engage in planning activities. They remarked that the task of urban management is complex and felt the average young person is incapable of contributing to public matters, which should be left to those who are experienced at it. This represented a form of elitist116 decision-making where the knowledge of younger people was afforded lower status. The following quote is the opinion of the then director of the LDU at the MoI:

*Youth are a significant component of Jordanian society. However, youth lack the awareness needed to be engaged in the planning process. In general, the chosen age category in your research is too*

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116 See more on elite theory in section 2.3, chapter two.
immature to be involved. (R.D., interview, 11/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

The quote below shows the response from GAM’s CPU head of department:

Youth participation should be confined to specific topics and they should not be consulted on all urban issues. (R.O., interview, 06/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

These quotes supports the research of Brown and colleagues (2014, p.24) who conducted focus groups with young Jordanian participants. As one young person commented in their study:

No one listens to us. The officials somehow think that we are idiotic. We want to make changes, but nothing happens. We try to speak, but nothing happens. No one listens.

The above quotes reflect the rational planning mentality and management-by-objectives (MBO) approach to spatial planning in Jordan. A negative and regressive attitude regarding youth input on the part of the state could hinder the efficient allocation of resources to youth and consequently minimise youth capabilities for engagement. Innes and colleagues (1994) and Innes (1990) stressed the importance of city officials and planners in opening up the value of diversity among the plurality of interests within a political community. Those in governance positions (i.e., city officials, experts, planners, elected city councils) have a moral and ethical responsibility to act for young people and undertake programmes that they have shown interest in, and to report back to them on the progress achieved. However, the majority of nominees’ election campaigns for Amman city council contain local and municipal service promises that are devoid of any political ideologies or public empowerment (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015).

In this research, the term political community refers to a group of people with shared interests or a community of acknowledged stakeholders and does not necessarily involve a territorial definition or boundaries of political jurisdiction (Healey, 2006a, p.206).
The investigation revealed how Amman’s city officials followed a more entrepreneurial approach (i.e., urban marketing approach), and this is articulated in the introduction of the ‘One Window’ service and a number of memoranda of understanding designed to ease HDMU sector restrictions and speed approvals. The urban entrepreneurialism approach aims to attract investors, using tax incentives and exemptions for larger and taller buildings that are described as ‘overly generous’ at the expense of social demands (Tayeh, 2012, p.13; Bagaeen, 2007). This urban policy and reform strategies are centrally designed and top-down, imposed on society in an anti-democratic governance style.118

*In my opinion, the expansion of Amman came about to satisfy powerful investors who own properties in these areas, to increase the value of their assets, and at the expense of GAM’s coffers.* (M.Y., interview, 30/06/2015, translated from Arabic)

The development framework imposed by central government on most Jordanian municipalities lacks a full and inclusive reciprocal dialogue that shares knowledge between different actors (Al Rabady et al., 2014). These interpretations echo Harvey’s (1989a) argument regarding the state’s policy shift from following the ‘managerial’ approach in planning services to adopting the ‘entrepreneur’ role to boost local development and stimulate employment growth. The entrepreneurial governance approach in Amman has resulted in one-way communication, which has failed to turn public participation into formal practical strategy in the community planning process. GAM’s entrepreneurial policy119 has a limited capacity to absorb new ideas from youth or encourage creative learning opportunities. Economic recession in Jordan has raised the need to engage in economic diversification and long-term investment strategies in

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118 Healey (2006a, pp.224–227) described this governance model as ‘corporatism’ or the ‘techno-corporatist’ form. The model is believed to be socially insular, often misunderstanding the lifeworld of a political community in a locality. It involves an interactive relationship between politicians and big business owners, with the small business sector often being marginalised. The ‘techno-corporatist’ form of governance model is rapidly becoming evident in Amman as they attempt to maximise the chances of capturing surplus petrodollar investments from the GCC nations.

119 Gilbert and colleagues (2004) defined entrepreneurial policy as a set of government policies designed to harness the market power of large corporations to back startup and viability of entrepreneurial firms.
the real estate development sector. It seems the main concern of planners at GAM is to deliver an increased standard of living following the economic depression in Jordan.

6.2.3 Youth mobilisation capacity

Enhancing the quality of knowledge and relational resources is deemed vital for effective and inclusive youth participation policy in planning practice. However, mobilisation techniques and strategies are necessary to ensure that youth participation in spatial planning is sustainable (Heinrich and Million, 2016). Sustainable youth participation requires youth (e.g., youth rights activists) to have the capacity to observe institutional dynamics and make use of opportunities, or, as termed by Healey and colleagues (2002, p.21), ‘cracks’ (e.g., the Arab Spring, the king’s speeches or directives to government to involve civil society, or any social movements), in order to demand greater representation in the policy agenda (e.g., spatial planning). This theme investigates how far Amman 2025 sponsored youth agency during the formation of the policy in 2006, and whether it continued to foster youth mobilisation afterwards. Drawing on these ideas, the thematic concept of youth mobilisation has been critically investigated and presented in the following two concepts:

- youth will to participate
- Ai as an institutional locus for nurturing youth leadership.

Youth will to participate

The analysis of the relational resources in Amman 2025 has revealed that the urban governance system in Jordan is hierarchically structured, with limited organisational space for youth input. The state and its oligarchic networks from the market are the main players in formal spatial planning in Jordan. This is not to suggest that youth are not willing to participate in or apathetic about community affairs. Despite their weak political influence, young participants in the four focus groups showed commitment and a sense of moral obligation to serve their communities and cities.

Despite the absence of a rigorous mechanism to engage youth, and because they are enthusiastic, we hear of a lot of youth-led initiatives in their neighbourhoods. I recall a case where youth were so motivated. They asked to meet Amman’s mayor.
Youth have a positive spirit towards development and participation. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Youth, according to our experience in the UNDP, are very active. They are courageous and positive and have the ability to participate, but they need support from society. (N.A., interview, 12/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

These remarks were made by focus group participants stressing their willingness to volunteer and participate in urban planning.

We [youth] are willing to participate. I would love to sit down and discuss my neighbourhood issues. But the municipality has many other issues to be concerned about. (R.A.A., focus group, 29/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

We, the youth, are ready to volunteer to address any issue in our neighbourhood. (R.R., focus group, 22/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Youth showed a strong sense of ownership and patriotism towards their city, Amman. They are passionately keen to offer their knowledge, time and effort for the common good of their local communities. Their enthusiasm and strong will to participate is an opportunity to ensure long-lasting and sustainable youth participation in the public realm (Heinrich and Million, 2016).

In contrast, real estate has greater institutional space and more political tools to influence Amman’s urban governance. Following the leverage of neoliberal economic policy, large investment corporates have been offered a large institutional space (i.e., a supportive legal framework for reduction of taxes on businesses) to challenge the established structure of the ‘old’ authoritarian state and impose an economic agenda in Amman 2025 (Tayeh, 2012, p.18). These measures introduced legal reforms and
discourse intended to promote open market principles to the Jordanian economy, leading to more empowerment for the private sector (Tayeh, 2012, p.18; Bagaeen, 2006 a, b). National policies in Jordan have also spurred public-private partnership, seen as the key to addressing the deteriorating economic situation in Jordan. The technocorporatist form of governance has resulted in the development of rich and thick relational networks between local authorities and investors.

**Ai as an institutional locus**\(^{120}\) for nurturing youth leadership

Amman Institute for Urban Development (Ai) provided a substantial step towards the institutional development of spatial planning in Amman and youth mobilisation during the formation of Amman 2025. The establishment of Ai was considered to be one of the most prominent and successful outcomes of Amman 2025 in terms of fostering community planning (Khirfan et al., 2013; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012). Ai supported and nurtured prominent young leaders in their communities. Youth leadership enhances youth presence in public policymaking and represents their needs in the policy agenda. Therefore, this research recognises the importance of reviving Ai as a significant organisational space for nurturing youth agency. This section examines and investigates the success story of Ai in depth and extracts lessons that should inform any future strategic spatial planning in Jordan to forge a path towards community planning in Jordan.

During the plan preparation process, G.P. and Samir Subhi, then director of the CPU at GAM, set up Ai as an active vehicle to promote community planning and development. In 2008, G.P. met with the then mayor Omar Maani and suggested the creation of Ai. The notion of Ai came from G.P. (co-director of Amman 2025) and was primarily intended to boost GAM’s organisational capacity for greater public participation in policymaking (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015). The establishment of Ai was a step towards the reformation of the public administration and the fostering of the capacity of the planning team at GAM. In order to increase the efficiency of public participation, Ai, along with Planning Alliance, targeted GAM’s organisational structure. GAM’s administrative governance was in immediate need of restructuring; personnel needed

\(^{120}\) In this study, the term ‘institutional locus’ is understood to mean the organisational space that was provided in Amman 2025 for youth participation to take place. Organisational space includes the formal and informal participation mechanisms and tools employed to facilitate youth participation in the decision-making process.
shifting and department roles needed to be altered and new ones introduced to make service delivery more efficient and enhance public–GAM relations (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010). The process of shaping Ai’s opportunity for action came from the desire of the mayor for there to be more public involvement in urban governance (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015). Therefore, Ai was established to assist GAM’s planning department in community planning, sustainable development and citizen-centred governance. The technical planning team consisted of two major bodies: the then Planning Department Unit of GAM, with Samir Subhi as a co-director, and Ai, with G.P. as the second co-director. The PDU was in charge of the technical analysis, blueprint preparation and detailed engineering drawings of the plan. However, Ai was directed towards fostering communication and coordination among the stakeholders involved.

[Ai] was an initiative to spread the culture of community planning to other municipalities in Jordan and the Middle East. (R.B., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Ai’s main agenda revolved around sustainable community development applied through citizen-centred governance. Building social capital encourages young people, along with other social groups, to get involved in public policymaking (Lang and Hornburg, 1998). Many of the interviewees argued that Ai succeeded in expanding GAM’s relational resources domain and trust to include local and regional actors in the governorates of Amman (Ai, 2010). Initially, the institute launched a public relations tour with different CSOs and NGOs, challenged established practices in land-use planning and set up the foundations of a public participatory framework for strategic collaboration in Amman’s urban governance (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012).

The analysis of data from the semi-structured interviews revealed that Amman 2025, in its initial phase, maintained close relationships with young communities. Ai extensively considered youth as part of the project, and from the outset, it sought to develop a powerful relationship between the city’s body of governance and local residents.

The first thing we did, we approached the elected representative of the Children’s Council. I brought
[T.M] a consultant, to work with us. She worked with the Children’s Council to prepare a submission to the mayor, and throughout the process, they kept tracking back with the young. (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015)

Ai targeted the ‘hard-to-reach groups’ in Jordanian society: youth, children and women (H.H., interview, 10/08/2015). The institute gave youth the chance to get involved and established a proactive programme to engage both children and youth in its planning and governance initiatives, with a focus on building citizenship and leadership skills (Ai, 2010).

Also, we [Ai staff] arranged urban workshops. [Attendees] were from a mix of age groups, mostly people in their twenties and early thirties, some older ... we listened to them ... we did include their views, and we balanced them with the views of the investment community. (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015)

Its focus was on transforming public expectations into tangible results by enhancing and nurturing youth leadership and social responsibility, which is crucial for the longevity and institutional sustainability of youth participation (Day, 2017). The following points present the strategies adopted by Ai to reach youth groups in Amman and to nurture their agency (H.H., interview, 10/08/2015; G.P., interview, 23/07/2015; R.B., interview, 23/07/2015; Ai, 2010):

- Ai, in cooperation with the GAM planning team, processed and organised a number of initiatives in the form of consultative forums, public exhibitions, and a model-based design exercise in cooperation with international NGOs and a representative from local communities
- Ai staff held public forums with university students to reach a larger base of youth and to identify their aspirations for the city (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010)
• Ai set up a partnership with international financial institutions, the private sector, academia and NGOs to fund their initiatives on public engagement and knowledge exchange

• Ai repeatedly reached out to residents and youth groups, conducting door-to-door surveys and organising youth forums

• Ai approached primary and secondary schools to encourage and train children and young people to have an input in the planning process (H.H., interview, 10/08/2015; Meaton and Alnsour, 2012).

In this way, young leaders would have the opportunity to learn from one another, get to know one another’s expertise, and exchange ideas across different areas of responsibility. Such elasticity can be achieved by promoting an environment that fosters equilibrium in relationships among the main social actors: state, market and civil society. The institutional structure of planning authorities should embody principles of good governance to acknowledge youth as an integrated component of sustainable Jordanian cities, where youth opinions and suggestions are collected and reflected in the strategic spatial plans of Jordanian cities. Therefore, Ai was involved in establishing partnerships with the AJYC and educational authorities to provide youth with training, advice and information regarding Amman’s development (H.H., interview, 10/08/2015). This suggests that building up relational richness with youth institutions may encourage youth to voice their concerns to city officials.

*We arranged urban workshops for youth. We approached the AJYC who introduced us to active young people in their communities.* (H.H., interview, 10/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Most importantly for youth mobilisation, Ai’s administration recognised the importance of investing in young people and children (Day, 2017). G.P. recruited 52 distinguished professional young Jordanians in the fields of urban planning, urban design, sustainable development, social planning, economics and governance. Capacity training programmes helped Ai take over the task of writing up the master plan from Planning Alliance, meaning the plan was drafted by local young people. Ai became a consulting entity as its staff were able to provide research and planning services to GAM and other local municipalities and regional cities in the Middle East (Beauregard
and Marpillero-Colomina, 2011, 2010). The efforts of Ai were praised by the then mayor, Omar Maani, for reducing planning and consultation costs, a reduction accompanied by enhanced institutional capacity and learning opportunities offered for the planning profession in GAM (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015).

_Ai has conducted different studies that ended up on the shelf, they have not been implemented on the ground. Plans were ready but they did not get legal authorisation, for reasons that we do not know._

(H.H., interview, 10/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Nevertheless, Ai was facing political obstructionism and bureaucratic hurdles that curtailed its routine administration and made fulfilling its duties as a ‘middleman’ more demanding and challenging (H.H, interview, 10/08/2015). Ai was a remarkable and unique institutional effort to encourage youth to become involved during the process of Amman 2025 and beyond. However, Ai was built on ‘thin ice’, in the sense that there was no institutional support (i.e., a regulatory framework) or formal arrangements that enmeshed Ai within the wider formal planning structures and processes. Following the appointment of a new mayor in 2013, Ai was dissolved, and most of the participatory projects that were underway were suspended.121 Ai laid the foundation for community participation in urban policymaking. Ai was a key mediator between GAM and the citizens of Amman and a significant actor in youth mobilisation. In Jordan, a country with a fledgling democracy, community engagement is not an easy task. It could be considered that those running the security apparatus of the state were concerned that Ai activities could mobilise youth against the status quo. Moreover, youth-led initiatives are underestimated and devalued by adults and other influential social gatekeepers. The following section sheds light on sociocultural forces and their impact on youth empowerment in Jordan. Nevertheless, and despite its short lifespan, Ai managed to devise practical methods to expand relations with youth communities in Amman, thus gaining their trust. For example, young groups among other social groups and business

121 Another explanation to Ai’s closure was explained by one Jordanian planner interviewed by Khirfan and colleagues (2013, p.7). S/he believed that Ai planners triggered the angst of other planners in GAM, who had been unintentionally excluded as they lacked the willingness to learn.
owners in Rainbow Street worked collaboratively to address the negative factors that affected the First Circle area (e.g., the deteriorating urban and architectural heritage, heavy vehicular traffic and shortage of parking spaces, noise, and inefficient solid waste management) (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015). The outcome was an innovative type of governance taking the form of a youth-led initiative called *Nashmio Nashmeyah*, in which young groups, along with local residents, volunteer to rejuvenate the urban image of the neighbourhood. Innovative governance includes widening the range of those involved in the decision-making, so that multi-agencies, along with youth-led initiatives, work together with state authorities, the private sector and civil society groups towards an integrated action plan (Healey, 2004; Amin and Thrift, 1995).

### 6.2.4 Cultural capital

Following the institutionalist approach in urban politics presented in chapter two, urban governance encompasses the aggregation of formal organisations and informal relationships, through which it mobilises or limits collective action in the area of spatial planning. The combination of the institutionalist and communicative rationality approaches would address many of the issues this research is trying to examine. The institutional analysis focuses on the interactions within a social context and not on the decisions and outcomes of spatial planning per se (Kim, 2012; Raitio, 2012). Therefore, the chosen model enabled the researcher to deeply investigates the fine grain of planning practices by which some stakeholders (including youth) are hindered in joining the ‘game’ of public policy (Healey, 2006a, p.5). It emphasises the importance of paying attention to social and cultural contexts of contemporary urban regions rather than a mere analysis of formal planning institutions (Healey, 1999). Culture includes modes of thought, systems of meaning and frames of reference through which informal civil society’s behaviours, interests and decisions are formed (Healey, 2006a, p.37).

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122 The term ‘cultural capital’ previously been employed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977). Bourdieu’s (1977) work *Outline of a theory of practice* aimed to offer a new point of departure in understanding human conduct away from the orthodox approaches (Burris, 1980). Structuralism and abstract sociological theories have failed to profoundly explain human behaviour (Bourdieu, 1977, p.237). Bourdieu (1977, p.89) argued that cultural assumptions, which develop in people’s habitus, are significant in determining spatial organisation. For instance, he explained how strict gender segregation, such as in conservative communities in Algeria, could shape urban space (i.e., places of assembly, the market) (*ibid*).

123 See section 2.3, chapter two for further details on the various analytical approaches to urban politics.
Many of the semi-structured interviews highlighted the issue of lack of awareness about the importance of involving youth in the public sphere. This research has demonstrated that this negative perception is common among Jordanian locals, economic elites, decision-makers, state officials and technocrats. Youth found it difficult to engage in the public conversation within the community meetings, or even to find a way to express their opinions, complaints and problems. Such negative thoughts about youth participation, norms and mental models have translated into obstacles that limit youth agency, thus creating a cycle of disengagement. Cultural forces were repeatedly mentioned by most research participants as a key barrier to the realisation of youth participation in policymaking in Jordan. In the following subsection, the concept of sociocultural forces is discussed according to inputs from both the semi-structured interviews and the focus groups.

**The impact of sociocultural forces on youth participation**

Traditionally, urban planners in the ‘era of modernism’ have assumed that civil society is more or less a homogenous group (Healey, 2006a, pp.126–127). In contemporary societies, many planning conflicts rapidly take on the form of ‘us’ and ‘them’, with a struggle between capital and labour, hegemonic state and ordinary citizen. Therefore, planning becomes a practice of interlinking various dimensions of contemporary life in order to mediate between competing interests in a locality (Healey, 2006a, p.224).

This research accepts the diversity of youth, as a distinct social group, in comparison with other social groups coexisting within Amman’s political communities.

The analysis of Amman 2025 shows that the level of youth involvement in spatial planning in Jordan was not aligned with the emerging political rhetoric of democracy in Jordan. Youth, as the dominant age group in Jordanian society, should be given greater chances to become involved in the development of their localities.

Putnam (2001, p.6) stressed the significance of civil society characteristics in promoting democracy. Civil society is multidimensional in nature (Kārkliņa, 2014); it could take the shape of formal institutions (NGOs, faith-based organisations (FBOs), CBOs, etc.) or have an informal structure (see subsection 4.5.2, chapter four). Informal CSOs rely on non-institutionalised means to protect the interests and rights of citizens from arbitrary state power, away from the excessive bureaucracy and administrative
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procedures that inhabit the formal structure of civil society (Narayana, 1992). Informal CSOs in Jordan form via channels of kinship and tribal bases (Tewfik and Amr, 2014). Informal civil society structures include urban notability, rural ‘familialism’ and cultural beliefs and practices (Droz-Vincent, 2011).

Interviews and focus group data revealed that traditional social customs and habits are a significant barrier to an active youth participation in Jordan. The domain of kinship and the mechanisms of tribalism are apparent and have a strong influence on the political scene in Jordan (Droz-Vincent, 2011; Lucas, 2005, p.129), thus public policymaking. The prominence of tribalism in Jordan’s political landscape has brought sociocultural forces to the forefront of systemic institutional design for collaborative planning in Jordan. Social exclusion124 for Jordanian youth is demonstrated in their lack of access to public conversations within the community (Omar et al., 2016) and thus to the mainstream politics of urban governance in Amman. ‘Cultural imperialism’125 is commonly exercised in Jordan by powerful urban elites and rural chiefs, or, as Al Rabady and colleagues (2014, p.261) referred to it, “colonialism within the country”.

A culture of youth engagement in decision-making hardly exists within the present tribal system in Jordan. It is believed that the morphology of social relations in Jordan prevents, to a large extent, wide segments of voiceless communities from participating in local decision-making structures and influencing local service delivery. It seems that this fact not only marginalises youth in mainstream politics but also denies them active civic engagement and citizenship (Lauwers and Vanderstede, 2005). This research has demonstrated that tribalism still plays a prominent role in the socio-political realm in Jordan. There have been many accusations from research interviewees of the prominence of tribalism as a major hindrance in achieving authentic dialogue in urban policymaking. Politics in Jordan have become increasingly ‘tribalised’ in the past couple of decades (Rowland, 2009). A prominent planner in Amman 2025 shared his experience regarding this matter:

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124 Social exclusion is defined as a “process whereby certain groups are systematically disadvantaged and discriminated against because of who they are, for example by their age” (DFID–CSO Youth Working Group, 2010, p.8).

125 The term cultural imperialism gained importance in the 1970s. According to Yusuf (2016, p.15), international communication literature involves various synonyms for the term cultural imperialism – i.e., ‘structural imperialism’ (Galtung, 1979); ‘cultural dependency and domination’ (Mohammadi, 1995; Link, 1984); and ‘cultural synchronisation’ (White, 2001; Hamelink, 1983).
You know Jordanian society much more than I do. Looking at the whole city and its tribal urban areas, tribalism and urbanism do not necessarily match in terms of engagement. (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015)

There is a problem at the community level. The community marginalises youth. Youth believe that they do not have voice. Look at the degree of debating when arguing about public issues. Low and bad levels of debate and communication skills. I can summarise the problem as people here just refusing to recognise others. Therefore, I reckon that the notion of youth participation will face difficulty in being accepted in Jordanian society. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

The lack of a culture of debate within Jordanian society is a major disadvantage for authentic dialogue and participation. In contemporary societies there are always different views and interests. The task of promoting and building a culture of dialogue in Jordanian society is of critical importance for ensuring understanding and cooperation, thus creating harmony among different political communities. A culture of dialogue implies young people, among other social groups, learning and visioning together, exploring their lives and acknowledging their differences. The goal is the integration of all concerns and interests into a new social contract. The discussions with focus group participants showed cognitive obstacles and negative perceptions among locals, economic elites and government officials that hamper youth participation or limit its effectiveness. Arguably, youth suggestions were not implemented, and were often dismissed amid claims of ‘talking shops’.

I have attended many local meetings on issues regarding our neighbourhoods. Frankly, they did not take my opinion into consideration just because I’m younger than them. I felt that I was marginalised and my attendance was just to listen
to their [adult] conversation. I believe if someone else older than me suggested the same idea I suggested, it would receive greater attention. (M.N., focus group, 22/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

I think it is a social problem rather than an issue of laws and politics. The common perception in Jordan is that adults have more knowledge and experience than young people do. (Y.M., focus group, 22/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Most people look at participants’ ages. Most often, parents think he is just little kid; he is talking nonsense. (F.H., focus group, 29/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

These words reflect the frustrations of youth in the face of the powerful ‘social gatekeepers’ in their communities. The traditional power structure and adultism in Jordan grants higher respect to the views of older people than to youth perspectives and opinions. Despite civil society being on the rise in Jordan, youth have limited space and opportunity in which to express or practise their interests (Górák-Sosnowska, 2010). The young people who participated in the focus groups referred to people’s cultural expectations, traditional values, patriarchal structures and societal norms (frames of reference) that limit their involvement in civil associations, thus hindering them in developing their agency. Moreover, the activities of these associations revolved around the social welfare of tribe members carrying out traditional and custom activities, rather than practising any political exercise (Huneidi, 2014).

One of the major obstacles in youth participation is more cultural than legal. As long as there is tribal influence, there will be no public participation in its purest meaning. Young Jordanians in tribal society do not get a word in if they are sitting beside adults. This society has a system of values and traditions
Participants in the focus group discussion claimed that their communities resisted the input that came from “young faces”. They expressed frustration that their suggestions were deemed illogical and immature, as one participant claimed that “they feel what they say is not taken seriously by adult politicians or our local community” (E.S., focus group, 22/08/2015, translated from Arabic). Another facet of cultural imperialism is that of patriarchal influence over youth in Jordan. What young people in Jordan have stated is that most of the decisions related to their future and personal life are made for them and forced on them by older adults and family members.

In general, our culture is limited. If the father [head of the household] says a word, it is final, and there is no discussion. You will reach a level where you see a young person in university with no opinion because [s/he] has been raised to believe that [his/her] opinion is not important, while your father’s opinion is right. (R.R., focus group, 22/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Parents do not encourage young people to do volunteering. This may be a result of the financial difficulties that many of the Jordanian families are going through. Youth are encouraged more to search for a paid job than for voluntary service. (M.S.S., focus group, 24/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

I think youth should have a bigger role in political life. Jordanian society is distinguished by the domination of the paternalistic or tribal mentality over youth. When I was young, I was deprived of self-determination. When we were participating in any election, it was our parents who decided on our
behalf. Whether to cast your vote or not, or who to elect. (H.J., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

The above quotes indicate how the public policy system (i.e., spatial planning) in Jordan is still largely affected by tribalism and kinship relations in rural areas, and it appears to be prominent in urban areas as well. In fact, Jordanian society, particularly in the suburbs, is patriarchal and hierarchical (Huneidi, 2014, p.124). The patriarchal system in Jordan leaves youth dutiful to the older generation. In fact, centralization of power and the existence of lines of authority and hierarchy are deeply embedded in Arab values and customs (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015; Sawalha et al., 2015). In Jordan, tribal structure means that young people’s structural position in Jordanian society is that of passive receivers of instruction, rather than active members of their communities.

6.3 Hard infrastructure in Amman 2025

The aim of this global theme is to put forward other aspects of the challenges embedded in the systemic institution design for collaborative planning in Amman 2025 in terms of youth participation. Analysis of the planning system in Jordan will make it possible to generate context-based recommendations for creating enduring youth engagement in future spatial planning in Amman. Accordingly, this section contributes by presenting the planning system that delivered Amman 2025 and highlighting the challenges or constraints that hindered youth engagement in Amman 2025.

6.3.1 Administrative system

In Jordan, strategic plans and development visions are being closely monitored by the central government via several institutions at the national level. For spatial planning, this includes the MoI for preparing the technical tasks of land-use planning (see appendix 5); MoPIC, in charge of socio-economic planning; and MoMA for managing the administrative operations in municipalities, (Tewfik and Amr, 2014). The concepts of bureaucratic inertia, weaknesses in local government capacity, corruption

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126 The properties of social systems and the tribal aspects of Jordanian society have influenced and shaped the built environment in Jordan. Bagaeen (2010) argued that modern gated communities in Jordan ascribe to trends of communal responsibility, local traditions and contingencies. See also Bourdieu’s (1977, p.89) argument.

127 However, in many cases other ministries, such as education, health or public works, have been involved.
and lack of transparency are mentioned by research participants in relation to the constraints in the administrative system on youth participation in the Jordanian planning system.

**Hierarchically structured bureaucracies**

The examination of the existing institutional framework depicted in figure 6-1 above, shows that the planning team in Jordan follows a top-down consultation process for decision-making (Jreisat, 2017; Ababsa, 2011a, p.52; Abu Ghazalah, 2010) (see also appendix 5). Local authorities and municipalities in Jordan are extremely weak because of unnecessary bureaucracy, thus granting limited access to particular stakeholders, mostly to local and economic elites (Al Rabady et al., 2014; Tayeh, 2012, p.18), while excluding youth communities (J.N., interview, 23/07/2015).

GAM was seen by the interviewed Jordanian planners as being ill-informed about youth issues, overly bureaucratic and unresponsive to the needs, insights and potential of some of Amman’s most important constituents – its youth. Looking at the planning process close-up from inside, the most influential administrative authority regarding Amman 2025 can be seen to be Mayor Roundtable. During the making of the plan, the Mayor Roundtable acted as the executive final planning committee in charge of giving permission for any strategic amendments made to the original version of Amman 2025. However, the analysis of relational resources in Amman 2025 shows how the administrative body of GAM was closely linked with and monitored by the Prime Minister and RHC (see subsection 6.2.1 and figure 6-1, above).

*Amman’s plan [Amman 2025] suffered from a frightening bureaucracy in decision-making.* (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Although the administrative body of municipalities (i.e., mayor and city council) in Jordan is directly elected by the local community, municipalities play a relatively minor role in strategic spatial planning. Municipalities are more highly authorised to deal with issues regarding the urban form and land zoning of their localities, rather than strategic planning or defining the local vision for growth.

*There are plenty of royal and constitutional directives to involve civil society and youth in*
decision-making as an instrument for development and evolution. The problem is not there, there are a lot of officials who understand administration in a different way. There is an authoritarian perception. They trust neither people nor local authorities. There is a severe centralisation in administering state operations, particularly in relation to planning. (A.N., interview, 23/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Most interviewees commented that municipalities in Jordan are weak, given the current centralised institutional urban policy and management (Yaghi, 2008). The relation between central and local government in Jordan has been described by Al Rabady and colleagues (2014, p.261) as a “dominant-submissive relationship”. Given the strong legal position, MoMA enjoys executive powers over the elected body within municipalities. Municipalities are monitored by the MoMA for their administration performance, while the Ministry of Finance supervises their financial affairs, through the Cities and Villages Development Bank. In this type of atomistic, “state-focused relationship” (Al Rabady et al., 2014, p.255), the ministry in the centre creates what is called a culture of dependency among Jordanian municipalities on state funds and guidelines, making them less autonomous in urban policy and strategic planning (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015; I.Z., interview, 18/08/2015).

As an international agency operating in Jordan, we always have to get the permission of [MoSD] for any youth empowerment project or proposal. We may also seek the permission of other ministers; it all depends on the nature and the scope of the project. (N.A., interview, 12/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

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128 GAM has greater autonomy than other municipalities in Jordan. However, the mayor of Amman is still required to report to the prime minister on strategic issues and concerns.
The ‘representative governance model’ followed perpetuates a hierarchically structured bureaucracy that is perceived as inimical to youth participation in spatial planning (Heinrich and Million, 2016). In this model, officials in charge of spatial planning design their actions and decisions to meet the ‘commands’ of their seniors, rather than the demands of their constituencies. Hierarchical organisation, particularly in spatial planning, is criticised as serving the officials, fostering a traditional separation between the public and civil society.

*The authority for planning is always in the hands of central government. Any state official at the local or regional level needs permission from the central government to execute any decisions proposed at the local or regional level.* (H.HH., interview, 26/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

It is through this ‘obsolete’ structure of urban governance that limited opportunities have been offered to youth to have their say about the future of Amman’s urban development. The earlier discussion revealed how physical planning in Amman fosters a top-down approach to spatial planning. These limitations have kept youth and local community at a distance from the development process and in accordance with GAM’s will. The long tradition of systematic and inflexible frameworks within the spatial planning system affects the sustainability of any urban product and encourages forms of governance less fitting to people’s needs. In fact, the centralised governmental hierarchy has left municipalities without sufficient political, financial or professional resources to administer planning processes from design to implementation (Al Rabady et al., 2014).

Some attribute this executive decision to hand over spatial planning to the central government to concern over local governments’ abilities to run and professionally manage the complex process of spatial planning (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015; Al Rabady et al., 2014; Bagaeen, 2006b). Centralisation in spatial planning has confined the role of local government to providers of welfare services (education, health, policing, etc.) (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015; Wessel, 2000). For example, GAM
has a long tradition of shouldering municipal services to local communities,129 with weak experience in relation to preparing a strategic vision for urban growth. The next section discusses how the inertia of bureaucracy in the Jordanian planning system has weakened the capacity of local authorities in delivering spatial planning.

**Limited local government capacity**

Friedmann (1987) believed that spatial planning will become more integrated and inclusive whenever local government has greater power and autonomy. However, and from the administrative standpoint, municipalities in Jordan are incapable of steering, implementing and monitoring planning activities without referring to higher governmental authority at the regional or national level (Al Haija, 2011). Lack of capability to run public participation projects was conceded by one of the then programme managers of Amman’s city centre urban regeneration project: “We are asked to involve local residents, but we ourselves do not know what participation is” (Ababsa, 2011a, p.53).

Research participants highlighted how municipal staff normally lack the knowledge and capacity to work with young people. GAM has a relatively small planning department and lacks well-trained people130 with competences to carry out the multiple dimensions of spatial planning (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012). GAM is too ill-informed to manage urban growth in a sustainable fashion, and it is struggling to service the expanded boundaries of Amman.

*In GAM, the urban planning team competence is relatively moderate. Only the head of the planning unit has a major in planning, while others learned planning by practising or training. In addition, we are only 12 personnel for 750 km². The number of staff is way less than is required for the area*

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129 According to the Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41, municipalities are responsible for the delivery of most municipal services in their localities. These include but are not limited to waste management and recycling, small-scale infrastructural development, park maintenance, building of sidewalks, maintenance, cleaning and lighting streets, etc.

130 According to Abu Ghazalah (2010), the planning department in GAM in charge of Amman 2025 was staffed by 29 personnel. Of these, only one certified planner was involved, while the others were mainly economists, sociologists, environmentalists, statisticians, geologists, drafts people, clerks, typists, surveyors, attendance controllers, supplies workers, development specialists or architects.
Most of the interviewees commented that local authorities are unable to plan youth involvement activities or build relational nexuses with youth. Due to the weak organisational and institutional capacity of local authorities in Jordan, the task of fusing professional and local knowledge has become very challenging. The analysis sheds light on organisational challenges in the fields of human, financial and technological resources in local government in Jordan. It is believed that these factors contribute to the weakness and fragility of local government in Jordan (World Bank, 2005a). Thus, the responsibility for spatial planning is often transferred to the higher government bodies in the central government that prepare urban development plans and then pass them to local councils for public appeal (see appendix 5). Central government control and domination of planning reduces municipalities’ control over spatial planning and limits their responsibility to the maintenance, control and supply of a certain number of basic services.

Most of the planning team in municipalities are architects. They are mostly fresh graduates with no experience and poor knowledge of planning regulations. There is underemployment in municipalities. Planning staff are not well educated and not professional and cannot help in dealing with planning issues. Also, the environment is not encouraging or an incentive to attract good planners. (I.Z., interview, 18/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Generally speaking, comprehensive planning is multidisciplinary. It involves economics, political science, demography, anthropology, policy, legislation, etc., along with public participation. All of these disciplines are integrated into the planning system. Therefore, those who are in charge of planning in Amman are not capable of

covered by the master plan. (R.B., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic)
understanding or assimilating the concept of planning. Therefore, they resort to individual decisions away from any institutionalised approach. (A.N., interview, 23/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Consequently, GAM, in addition to other local authorities across Jordan, lacks the proper capacity to prepare participation tools to accommodate the nature of youth. The planning authorities’ methods of public engagement are outdated and inefficient in attracting young people. There is no particular department or any qualified staff to maintain, build or develop relational nexuses with vulnerable groups that can be utilised at the time of plan-making (Al Nammari, 2014).

Most of the youth incentive techniques used by GAM are conventional and inefficient in reaching youth – the vast majority of the public. Such methods serve those who are in the older age category with lots of experience and free time. We, the youth, have limited free time. I suggest using innovative means for information exchange and to inform us. (A.S., focus group, 25/08/2016, translated from Arabic)

Municipal staff are in dire need of capacity building, particularly in terms of planning and how they deal with urban issues. They should also be trained in how to approach communities and youth alike. (N.A., interview, 12/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

In addition to the technical incapability inherent in their administrative system, municipalities are facing mounting financial difficulties. The Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41, defines a municipality as “a financially independent national institution”. Financially, municipalities depend on central government (Al Rabady et al., 2014), development banks, and national and international institutions in addition to revenues
from municipal property to cover the expenses of providing municipal services to areas under their jurisdiction.

There is also a weakness in levy and property tax collection capacity. Fewer than one-third of the Ammanis and those in other municipalities are paying their taxes. This has increased their deficit, resulting in higher dependency on the central government. (I.Z., interview, 18/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Originally, and according to the law, municipalities should be financially and administratively independent, but that is not the reality. Municipalities and local committees suffer from severe financial difficulties that put them under the authority of the ministry. (R.A., interview, 29/06/2015, translated from Arabic)

Despite the diversity of the sources of their finances, two-thirds of Jordan’s municipalities are in very high levels of debt and experiencing chronic annual deficits (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015). Financial debts have affected their capacity to deliver their core services and mandates (e.g., land-use planning, municipal service delivery, etc.) and resulted in municipalities’ dependence on government aid, which undermines their autonomy over spatial planning.

The following subsection will address how the rampant phenomena of connection and nepotism have undermined the possibility of achieving youth input in real projects.

**Corruption and lack of transparency**

The semi-structured interviews revealed that ‘reciprocal relations of obligation’ (Healey, 2006a, p.229) between city officials and investors have a strong impact on planning practices in Jordan. Research participants repeatedly pointed out the rampant phenomena of *wasta* (the Arabic term for connection) and favouritism in urban development and management in Jordan (Khirfan et al., 2013; Alnsour and Meaton, 2009; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009). Healey (2006a, p.230) referred to nepotism,
cronyism, favouritism and patronage of obsolete legal instruments, which provide opportunities for corrupt practices, making plans less innovative, less inclusive and unresponsive to local needs. Corruption\textsuperscript{131} and lack of transparency in Amman 2025 were also emphasised as follows:

\textit{The process of preparing land-use plans in Jordan is haphazard and not institutionalised. There is no clear approach for land-use planning. There are a lot of connections and wasa. The process lacks transparency and is full of corruption.} (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

\textit{Most of the problems in Amman are a direct result of the absence of accountability, and bribery.} (A.A., focus group, 22/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

\textit{Wasta can change and amend decisions and plans in agreement with the will of the powerful.} (M.Y., interview, 30/06/2015, translated from Arabic)

In the development of Amman 2025, the quality of trust between GAM and local communities was in short supply (Khifran et al., 2013). The following quotes are taken from the semi-structured interviews in relation to transparency and mutual trust in Amman’s urban governance:

\textit{There is a trust crisis between Jordanians and the state. It is everywhere around the world, but in Jordan, it is on a larger scale. Citizens do not trust the state and its institutions. Everything adopted by the state is refused by the people.} (A.J., interview, 26/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

\textsuperscript{131} The concept of corruption has often been cited in the context of the malpractice within public offices, when state officials seek private gains at the expense of public funds. According to the 2015 Transparency International Index, corruption in the Jordanian public sector ranked 45 out of 167. For example, the hiring of staff is mainly based on patronage and personal relations, not qualifications, leading to significant overstaffing in municipalities in Jordan.
Citizen participation in municipal elections in Amman was less than 10%. This is a clear indication that citizens do not trust planning authorities and state institutions that run the planning process. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Lack of transparency and trust has hindered opportunities to observe, suggest and question planning authorities’ actions. Planners who were interviewed stressed how GAM’s administrative body developed nexuses of relationships that resulted in centralised and behind-the-scenes management, hidden from democratic scrutiny, thus reducing transparency. In this matter, youth involvement has greatly reduced due to the perception youth have developed that efforts at public participation in spatial planning within such a corrupt system are in vain. Lack of transparency has also manifested in the information provided to the public regarding the densification and intensification plans in Amman 2025. In fact, information provided by the planning authorities regarding Amman 2025 was manipulative and misleading. For example, city officials declined to talk about the true future repercussions of mega-project development (HDMU projects) in terms of land acquisition, visual impact, pollution, traffic congestion and shopping facilities that are already predicted to be unaffordable to local communities.

There is no doubt that corruption damages the social capital and the institutional fabric of urban governance that enable people to act collectively (Woolcock, 2001). It is essential that people have legal backing that supports their right to challenge urban plans (Innes et al., 2004). Setting up legal frameworks and ensuring accountability would lead planning authorities entrusted with spatial planning to act in accordance with the law and for the public good. Subsection 6.3.2 explores the legal system and analyses how institutionalising youth participation in planning regulations would enhance the chances of youth getting into the planning arena.

6.3.2 Legal system

The urban governance context is primarily formed by the legal frameworks through which levels of public participation and the power balance in spatial planning are formed and defined (Alnsour, 2016; Hasan and McWilliams, 2015; Al Rabady et al.,
2014). The following subsection focuses on the extent to which the legal frameworks that rule spatial planning in Amman are attentive to youth participation, and whether Amman 2025 delivered progress towards more inclusive planning frameworks from when it started, in 2006, to the collection of primary data in 2015. The research analysis focuses on the absence of a regulatory framework for youth participation, and addresses the consequences of legal limitations in the planning system in Jordan on youth participation in urban policymaking, and how such limitations have resulted in an organisational structure that has kept youth participation periodic and at the behest of either the state or international donors.

**Absence of a regulatory framework for youth participation**

Following Lefebvrian ideas of the ‘right to the city’, the right of youth to participate in the structuring and restructuring of cities is irrevocable (Purcell, 2006, 2002). In Amman 2025, public participation was introduced by Planning Alliance and later developed and managed by Ai. One of the main challenges facing Ai was that the concept of participation is not formally institutionalised.

*The law doesn’t provide the space to run a public participation initiative in planning. As a result, planners hesitate to make decisions regarding public involvement. Planners will be afraid of investors’ pressure if the public participation results conflict with the investors’ private interests.*  
(R.O., interview, 06/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Most of the planners who were interviewed think it is hard to find any sections on ensuring youth participation in the current legislation.132 In many cases, youth participation in development planning in Jordan is top-down and carried out in the form of ‘pilot’ projects, often at the behest of international donor agencies and under the will of the state (Ababsa, 2011a, p.53). Without a long-term institutionalised process of

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132 Building and Planning Regulations for the City of Amman Act of 1979, no.67 is the physical planning framework for the city of Amman; while Planning Cities, Towns, Villages and Buildings Act of 1966, no.79 is the physical planning framework for other cities in Jordan under MoMA. However, Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority and the Petra Development and Tourism Region Authority have autonomy over planning policies in their jurisdictions.
youth participation in spatial planning, youth engagement will only ever take the form of one-off, shallow consultation which fails to demonstrate a commitment to engaging a variety of stakeholders.

Generally speaking, the legal structures and development policies of spatial planning in Jordan work to enable major corporates and speculative developers to enhance capital accumulation, with no legal grounds for youth or public participation (R.D., interview, 11/08/2015). The only possible access for youth to decision-making is via Article 4, para. A,\textsuperscript{133} and Article 30, para. D,\textsuperscript{134} in the Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41, and those do not directly target youth.

\begin{quote}
I believe we are walking towards democracy in Jordan. It is evident in the latest promulgation of the decentralisation and municipality laws. This came under the directives of his Majesty King Abdullah. This act grants municipalities and local authorities greater autonomy over master plan preparation. Municipalities are the closest agency to the public, and they should bear the responsibility of preparing master plans. (J.N., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic)
\end{quote}

In contrast, there are also several laws constraining democratic life and participatory/pluralistic democracy in Jordan. Following the Arab Spring, the state and its security apparatus politicised and put restrictions on most of the youth NGOs in Jordan (Beck and Hüser, 2015; Köprülü, 2014). The Freedom of Association Act of 2008, no.51 (amended in 2009) considerably limited the freedom of youth to gather and banned a considerable range of political activity for them. Also, the Political Parties

\textsuperscript{133} The article states that “The council’s sessions shall be in public and every citizen with a direct interest in any topic listed on the agenda may participate in the discussions on that topic, provided that the decisions are made in a confidential meeting. Confidential sessions may also be held for the topics deemed necessary by the Council” (Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41).

\textsuperscript{134} The article states that “The council may, with approval from the Minister, delegate any of his powers or functions to any local council pursuant to public interest requirements, provided that the authorization is specific and time bound” (Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41).
Act of 2015 put more barriers in the way of the Kingdom’s liberalisation, curtailing institutional space for youth to express their opinions.

Such a restrictive legal framework in Jordan affects the health of democracy. It will lead to the undermining of local democracy by allowing the state and its oligarchic networks to control the outcomes of planning rather than to the implementation of a shared vision (Hourani, 2014a). Maximalist participation is when people’s political roles transcend the boundaries of representative democracy and enable them to engage in a substantial, multidirectional political process (Carpentier, 2011, Jones, 1995, p.75). The exercises in public decision-making manifested in the municipal and parliamentary elections are anything but genuine democracy (Collins et al., 2016; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009).

### 6.3.3 Political system

This theme addresses the following questions: to what extent does Jordan’s political system welcome youth as fully-fledged members of Jordanian society, and did tangible and democratic changes occur from the inception of Amman 2025 in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015. The political instability in the Middle East has planted the seed for democratisation in the Jordanian political system. Jordanian urban policy has been moving towards democratising and decentralising the governance arena and has involved a variety of stakeholders and international organisations in a drive towards sustainable urban products (Al Rabady et al., 2014). As mentioned above, this is demonstrated by the instigation of the new Municipalities Act of 2015, no.41, and the Decentralisation Act of 2015, no.49, where the governorate council has been introduced as a new level of regional governance. The aim is to politically empower people over spatial planning matters and shift more power from the central government to local authorities.

> During the Arab Spring, there was an attempt by state institutions to communicate and liaise with people. When someone complained, at that time government took it more seriously. Nowadays, after the demise of the Arab Spring, things have become as they were before. People are totally ignored.
Our studies revealed that the Jordanians’ experience in debating and collaborative work is limited and at the behest of the monarch. For example, the National Charter, the All Jordan Charter, Jordan First, the National Agenda, etc.

(A.J., interview, 26/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

However, these changes have been cautious and limited. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Jordanian regime has provided signs of acceptance for liberalisation and democratisation but simultaneously illustrates timid attitudes towards accepting change in the political order (Köprülü, 2014). One focus group participant attributes that to government fears of potential instability. In this sense, the state’s values, beliefs and attitudes are ambivalent towards liberalisation and the democratisation of youth communities because most of the demonstrations in the Arab Spring were spearheaded by young people (Beck and Hüser, 2015; Köprülü, 2014).

I think the state treats citizens like a small, unaware child. The state does not trust those who have been chosen by the people. It is like a paternalistic relationship. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

There is a particular discrepancy between rhetoric and practice regarding youth empowerment in Jordan. In rhetoric, the outbreak of the Arab Spring in the MENA region pushed Jordan towards more genuine political reform (Beck and Hüser, 2015), bringing newly emerging social groups, mainly youth, into the political landscape (Barari, 2013). In reality, however, the GoJ has offered only limited attempts to achieve genuine youth participation, which has also narrowed youth’s personal and collective agency. It appears that the Jordanian state contravenes human rights for the sake of national security.
The government sees the Jordanian people as not ready for democracy. The state deems security and stability to be the top priorities. (M.N., focus group, 22/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Many young Jordanians fear to participate in public policy. We have been raised to avoid and stay away from any aspects of political participation. Youth fear participating in urban planning as they think it is a political subject. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Research has revealed that the existing political system in Jordan is neither sufficiently listening to nor effectively representing youth groups. Although Jordan praises youth as the ‘knights of change’, youth are rarely engaged in decision-making. There is a disconnect between youth and ‘embryonic’ political institutions in Jordan. Participants in the focus group reported that they were not consulted on issues directly impacting them and their priorities were not being addressed at a political level. In a highly volatile political situation in the Middle East, particularly after the rise of the Arab Spring, the notion of ‘youth agency’ became problematic and challenged in Jordan (Beck and Hüser, 2015; Köprülü, 2014). A negative meaning was constructed, and youth empowerment was considered a threat and an issue of concern for most of the undemocratically elected governments in the MENA region. Such negative thoughts have been translated into a culture of tokenistic participatory projects (Al Nammari, 2014, p.159). Political grievances limit the opportunities and life trajectories of young Jordanians and hinder their meaningful participation.

135 The idiom ‘knights of change’, identifying young Jordanians as the nation’s future, was first used by His Majesty King Abdullah II when he addressed the nation on the 61st anniversary of the country’s independence in 2007 (Shirazi, 2012).
6.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the challenges for engaging youth in Amman’s spatial planning according to the institutional design framework suggested by Healey (2006a, pp.284–310). The discussion involved two levels: the soft infrastructure of practices for developing and maintaining policies enabling youth empowerment in Amman (section one), and the hard infrastructure of the rules and resources of the planning system (section two). The cultural dimension was integrated into planning practices (soft infrastructure), to make it more applicable to the context of Jordan.

The relational resources theme investigated key actors in Amman 2025 and their relationship spheres, the range of stakeholders included in Amman 2025, and whether youth were involved in the process. Research analysis reveals that significant omissions were indicated by the interviewees: most notable, and the concern of this research, was the omission of youth communities. Weak relational resources and lack of trust, normally between underprivileged communities and planning authorities, are a prevailing pattern in urban governance in Jordan (Al Nammari, 2014, 2013). What most of the interviewees stated is that the planning authority’s connection with the community as a whole is still nascent and embryonic (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012).

Planning authorities in Jordan have sporadic or no connections with young communities. A weak relational nexus has resulted in their needs being deprioritised, and only limited programmes have been implemented to foster youth involvement.

In terms of knowledge resources, Amman 2025 was not conducted in a discursive collaboration in which different needs and interests were debated and valued. Instead, Amman 2025 was instrumental and technical, emphasising a synoptic, top-down approach that did not create opportunities for meaningful bottom-up engagement for youth. The discussions above revealed how architects and urban planners perceived themselves to be the principal decision-makers in Amman, a technocratic view that has prevented the voice of younger people, and other powerless social groups alike, from emerging. This arises because of the judgemental nature of the regulatory process. The planning system in Amman relies heavily on formal knowledge and the knowledge of experts to address urban issues, and the experience of younger people are afforded lower status. Amman 2025 was managed in a hegemonic approach by city officials,
bureaucrats and real estate investors, and, if civil society was consulted, it was members of prominent local and economic elites who were involved.

National policymakers and local politicians, along with local and big businesses, have directed the neo-institutional framework for urban development and stepped in to support a particular developmental vision that serves capital accumulation (Debruyne and Parker, 2016). Accordingly, limited opportunities have been offered to work with youth to involve them from the very beginning so they can have their say about urban development projects in Jordan. Findings revealed that youth were to a large extent absent from leadership posts in Amman 2025.

Youth in the four focus groups showed strong enthusiasm for participating in activities related to public policymaking. The paradox is that their enthusiasm for participation is often antagonised by the discourse of their limited experience in such strategic matters. On the contrary, focus group discussions indicated that they have the ability to clearly envisage the city they want and articulate its urban issues, which have an impact on their living environment and neighbourhood.

Subsection 6.2.4 covered an important theme that was repeatedly noted and emphasised by many research participants – that is, sociocultural forces. This research has termed the theme cultural capital. It is considered essential to ensure full and sustainable youth participation, along with the hard and soft infrastructure in Amman’s urban governance.

In terms of hard infrastructure, the analysis shows how Amman 2025 was immersed in a highly structured bureaucracy in terms of the administrative system. The top-down planning system in Jordan hinders the implementation of youth empowerment policies at the local level. This study joins other research in demonstrating how government bureaucracy and centralisation is inimical to public participation in policymaking (Moynihan, 2003; Wang, 2001; King et al., 1998). In terms of public accountability, there is a lack of transparency in the engagement process that has prevented the meaningful involvement of young people in spatial planning. Corruption and nepotism in Amman’s urban governance have prevented informed engagement with youth, leaving many of Amman’s youth feeling less motivated to engage in the process. Moreover, the findings revealed the absence of a clear legal framework to support the
involvement of youth in the public realm in Jordan. The notion of youth participation has not been fully integrated into the spatial planning legal frameworks.

It is possible to identify lessons and recommendations in respect of the findings, in order to meet the third objective of the research. The analysis has highlighted the need for a fundamental reorientation of the institutional context in Amman to ensure long-lasting youth participation in spatial planning. Chapter seven presents recommendations for actions to ensure durable and long-term youth participation in the Jordanian context of urban planning. Chapter seven has been designed to answer the third objective and its related research questions.
Chapter 7: Systemic institutional design for greater youth participation in Jordan’s spatial planning
7.1 Introduction

This study is concerned with investigating the institutional context (the planning system and planning practice) in spatial planning in Jordan. More specifically, the research aims to examine the notion of public participation in spatial planning, with a particular focus on the degree of youth involvement in the decision-making process of Amman 2025. The previous chapter (chapter six) analysed the existing planning practice and system in Amman. Following the neo-institutionalist paradigm, chapter six discussed embedded institutional challenges that act as barriers to the true engagement of youth in spatial planning in Amman. By doing so, chapter six addressed the second objective of this study and fully answered its related questions.

This chapter builds on the analytical work conducted as part of the research to identify lessons and recommendations for promoting the quality of spatial planning in Amman so that youth have greater influence over decision-making and processes of urban governance. The contribution of chapter seven is to address the third and final objective of this study, which is as follows:

To identify context-based recommendations for effective youth participation to enhance the quality of spatial planning in Jordan.

More specifically, this chapter answers the questions related to the third objective:

A. Is the collaborative planning and institutionalist approach a realistic agenda for introduction in Jordan?

B. What strategies should be designed to promote Jordanian youth participation in spatial planning?

In Jordan, youth participation in spatial planning requires a long-term, concerted process of institutional design and capacity building to alter institutionally deeply rooted cultural perceptions and norms, especially to increase youth abilities and their rights and empowerment. The development of rigorous institutional design of formal and informal structures would lead to the creation of organisational space for youth participation in spatial planning. Accordingly, this chapter consists of two main sections. Section 7.2 briefly outlines findings presented in chapter six regarding the dimensions of soft infrastructure (planning practices), and suggests improvements to enable greater youth engagement in the planning practice in Jordan. Section 7.3
identifies suggestions for improving the planning system by which youth can access and influence formal structures that rule spatial planning in Jordan. Formal institutional arrangements, legal frameworks and resource flows are critical to building institutional capacity (Innes et al., 1994).

7.2 Building institutional capacity for greater youth participation in planning practices

By diversifying relational resources, and fostering networks with youth communities, planning authorities in Jordan could draw on diversified knowledge resources that make plans more tailored and better suited to the needs of the community. This involves moving from “scientific to technical and practical understanding and reasoning, and from material understanding to [include] moral reasoning and expressive feeling” in policymaking (Healey et al., 2002, p.17). Research analysis shows that a significant number of the younger generation in Jordan are troubled by and disconnected from the mainstream politics of urban planning. However, through the mobilisation of transformative forces, youth have the potential to challenge ‘structured oppression’ (Healey, 2006a, p.46) and change the practice of exclusionary public policymaking. In this regard, the existence of charismatic leadership is deemed necessary to sustain youth engagement in the public realm (Stone, 1993).

Accordingly, this section has identified different strategies and mechanisms to improve social capital (relational resources), intellectual capital (knowledge resources) and political capital (mobilisation capacity) in the planning practise to enable better representation of young groups in Jordan’s spatial plan. Building institutional capacity in Jordanian cities would result in a high level of youth participation, a move away from tokenistic and manipulative participation (the lowest rung in Hart’s ladder of youth participation) to a position where young people, along with other social groups in a locality, share responsibility for decision-making (the highest rung in Hart’s ladder of youth participation) (see appendix 1).

7.2.1 Improvement of relational resources

Following the paradigm of communicative rationality, this research argues that a broad-based and dense array of social networks between youth and other key actors and relevant stakeholders in spatial planning leads to better youth ‘membership’ in the public realm. In this context, the notion of social capital refers to the capacity of key planning actors to build or strengthen relational networks, trust, and collaboration
among themselves (Sommerfeldt and Taylor, 2011; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009), which requires the involvement of new actors from young communities in the planning process. Following this conception, qualities of place in Amman are not judged only in terms of physical assets, but also in terms of relational capacity and levels of institutional thickness\textsuperscript{136} in the city (Innes et al., 1994). Consequently, this research recommends the following two strategies to improve relational resources for inclusionary planning practices in Jordanian cities:

- strengthening multi-partnership governance
- socialising the state–market relationship.

**Strengthening multi-partnership governance**

One of the main aims of spatial planning is extended networks and the making of new connections with a variety of stakeholders in a locality (Campbell and Marshall, 2002): “Diverse and extensive patterns of interdependence characterize the modern urban system” (Stoker, 1995, p.58). The analysis of this research shows that relational resources during and after Amman 2025 developed partially in the shape of business partnerships with real estate companies and speculative developers. The quality of Amman’s social capital requires further improvement, by extending relations with youth and other social actors, on the basis of trust and collaboration. This research argues that the responsibility for leveraging youth participation is shared among the three actors of the state, the market and civil society. Therefore, partnerships need to be created between a variety of planning authorities at the local, regional and national levels incorporating the private sector, CSOs and youth communities in particular. Stone (1993, p.6) argued that the efficiency and efficacy of planning authorities increases when governments ‘blend’ their capacities with other non-governmental stakeholders. Tackling the diverse and complex environmental, social and economic urban challenges requires an ‘institutionally thick’ region involving different stakeholders in the locality (i.e., social groups, firms, agencies, etc.). This requires

\textsuperscript{136} The concept of an institutionally thick region (or learning region) was developed by Amin and Thrift (1995). Amin and Thrift argued that the performance of special economic agglomerations is not only judge by the availability of raw materials, sites, labour quality, etc. It is also affected by the general social and cultural qualities in a locality (Vigar et al., 2000, p.44). The social, cultural and institutional forms are significant for overcoming the challenges imposed by globalisation on regional economic development (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In this regard, the concept of institutional capacity building explained in subsection 2.4.1, chapter two and developed in section 6.2, chapter six is found to be relevant to Amin and Thrift’s conceptualisation of ‘institutional thickness’.
relationship-building with key actors such that trust and reciprocity can be forged, creating the conditions for greater youth participation in spatial planning.

*The responsibility to enhance youth participation is a holistic social responsibility. This implies it is cooperative and not confined to a single sector separate from other sectors in society.* (R.D., interview, 11/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

*GAM and planning authorities ought to build networks with a variety of academic, political and social sectors to be ready for use to disseminate invitations to youth to participate.* (J.N., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

From a communicative rationality point of view, developing a culture of collaboration among planning authorities and local communities is essential in promoting youth participation in the public sphere. In Jordan, a culture of collaboration needs to be created between the government institutions in charge of spatial planning (i.e., the MoI, MoPIC and MoMA) at the local, regional and national levels.

Other research participants suggested the involvement of the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the MoY in the preparation and implementation of spatial planning to foster youth participation in Jordan’s public realm. The MoY could be granted more power and influence over national policy-making (H.J., interview, 07/07/2015).

*I do not think [GAM] have good networks with places where youth work or study.* (M.N., focus group, 22/08, 2015, translated from Arabic)

*If we want to reach all Jordanian youth, we must involve other government institutions, such as the Ministry of Education, so the processes are more integrated. We [the Higher Council of Youth] cannot fulfil the mission by ourselves. Without an integrated and participative approach from all state institutions in relation to youth, engaging youth*
becomes harder. (H.J., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Networks and extended relationships with places where youth study, work or play is of significant importance in enhancing youth involvement in spatial planning. The efforts of the MoE are needed to accelerate the process of youth engagement in the planning arena in Jordan. There is an emerging need to establish thick horizontal and vertical linkages between the city administration body and other educational institutions in a locality so that larger numbers of youth can be consulted in the making of spatial plans.

To sum up, the business of government can be efficient if it is delivered on the basis of ‘multi-partnership governance’ (Al Rabady et al., 2014; Jun, 2007). The network of connection – featuring intergovernmental and/or public-private sector cooperation – is of critical importance in contemporary urban planning practice (Polk, 2011; Alnsour and Meaton, 2009; Lauwers and Vanderstede, 2005; Amin and Thrift, 1995). The next section will shed light on how the private sector (e.g., real estate developers, financial institutions, investment firms, etc.) have a social obligation to support local communities and boost youth empowerment. The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been employed to enrich the discussion.

**Socialising the state–market relationship**

Harvey (2008, p.30) highlighted the importance of addressing the socio-economic issues and inequalities resulting from ‘mega-urbanisation’ in the Middle East (cited in Bagaeen, 2017, p.95). The analysis presented in chapter six shows how the web of relations between GAM and big businesses are compartmentalised, far from democratic scrutiny, with many negotiations occurring ‘behind closed doors’. It emerged from the interviews and focus groups that youth and local communities are not part of any of the powerful relational nexuses that control decision-making in Amman 2025. The morphology of the state–market relationship determines to a large extent how ‘accessible’ their networks are to different civil society groups. In fact, most interviews emphasised that GAM and real estate developers have built up tight webs of relations, with firm cores and strict boundaries that hinder civil society from accessing them, and youth communities from benefiting from this partnership. It could be understood that the dynamics, power and morphology in these urban webs work against the involvement of youth and many other social groups affected by the public-private partnership.
Investors are selfish! Their major aim is to achieve maximum profit even at the expense of the public good. (R.B., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

From my perspective, the flow of capital from the Gulf region to Jordan is not development. Such real estate development projects come with no benefits to the community. (R.D., interview, 11/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Features of neoliberal urban transformation (i.e., economic industrial agglomeration, brownfield development, urban regeneration, gated communities, etc.) should be bound together with a moral obligation to enhance and foster community development and youth empowerment, and to support youth agency in Jordan. Socially responsible development involves sponsoring and hosting programmes, initiatives and internships by which youth can enhance their leadership skills.

CSR could play a major role in the theory and practice of youth participation in spatial planning. Amman contains various well-established corporate bonds, and a variety of industry groupings and institutions (e.g., Amman’s chamber of commerce, Amman’s chamber of industry, Jordan Housing Developers Association, etc.), with their varying ways of valuing and benefiting from urban development. Unfortunately, corporate responsibility towards local communities is limited in Jordan, because of a neoliberal hegemony over national policies which has resulted in a weak commitment to CSR among large corporates and the absence of strict legislation (Abu Baker and Naser, 2000). Systemising and institutionalising CSR would facilitate youth empowerment (Jamali and Mirshak, 2007). CSR offers youth leaders, policymakers and youth NGOs the opportunity to gain useful knowledge and skills in building cooperation with the market sector. Youth will be granted more space to draft policies and develop planning initiatives and thus have greater input to the city’s governance process (Collins et al., 2016). Moreover, this partnership would help GAM to finance youth empowerment programmes to ensure social justice and comprehensive development (Abu Ghazalah, 137 Firms operating in Jordan are ruled under the Companies Law No. 22 of 1997 and its amendments up to 2006.)
2008b). Youth empowerment is based on the assumption that youth will be equipped with the necessary opportunities and skills that will support their participation in community action and promote positive outcomes (Al Nammari, 2014, p.159; Choucair, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2002, p.112). It involves designing programmes to equip youth with knowledge to become agents of positive change and devote their energy to the common good.

7.2.2 Improvement of knowledge resources

Improving relational resources leads to improvement in the quality of knowledge resources deployed in spatial planning, through greater emphasis on how youth conceptions of place are involved in the policy framework. The issue of quality of knowledge resources refers to the range of different ways of thinking and ways of expressing claims involved in the policymaking and implementation of Amman 2025. The following discussion presents the importance of diversifying knowledge resources as a key suggestion noted by research participants in relation to improving knowledge resources.

Diversifying knowledge resources in public policymaking

The comprehensive rationalist planning model was challenged by those who argue that the application of instrumental rationality would not bring social justice and equity of resource allocation to the majority of citizens, particularly for the powerless and the underprivileged (Checkoway, 1994; Davidoff, 1965; Davidoff and Reiner, 1962). Spatial plans should be comprehensible and take economic, social, environmental and physical aspects into consideration and ensure all different social groups and stakeholders are truly represented in decision-making, providing equal access to reliable and varied sources of information (Pierre, 2005). While planners have more expertise in technical skills, youth could bring their expertise and way of reasoning about their own daily issues and experiences to the dialogue. The analysis of knowledge resources in subsection 6.2.2, chapter six, highlighted that Amman 2025 was administered by the Mayor Roundtable, following the guidelines and general regulations set by the GoJ in a top-down decision-making process. Research analysis

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138 Instrumental rationality was critically discussed in section 2.2, chapter two, under the rational comprehensive planning model.
139 This may include, but is not limited to, local economic data, environmental data, quality of life, national surveys, etc. (Healey, 2006a, p.303).
reveals that the new experience of spatial planning in Amman still follows conventional methods of technocratic planning and lacks the necessary diversity of knowledge resources and discourses, because it pays less attention to public knowledge and youth input in Amman 2025.

_I was a member of the Children's Council from 2009 until 2011. We established Abu Baker Alsadeq Park in Alkoumeah, Southern Amman. An incident happened one time in this park, and GAM decided to shut the park. We suggested many solutions to enhance safety and security in the park, and we raised it with the city council. They dismissed our suggestions. Afterwards, we contacted a consultant who offered to help to produce a technical drawing of our suggestions. This time, it was the turn of the head of the local committee to dismiss our idea._

(M.B., focus group, 24/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

GAM, as one of the most influential governance bodies in Amman, should spearhead social initiatives and hold public meetings on day-to-day urban issues to facilitate collaborative strategy-making and discursive practices where youth and other stakeholders can come together to learn and acquire sufficient understanding of each other’s concerns, values, ways of acting and systems of meaning. In this conception, Healey (2006a, p.309) called for “more interactive relationships between experts and the stakeholder communities they serve”. City officials have been perceived as the ‘enablers’ of youth empowerment. The fear of youth by the state security apparatus and relevant authorities within the planning system of Jordan have hindered the development of more inclusive forms of collaborative dialogue. City officials (i.e., councillors, state planners and policymakers) have a moral responsibility to their political communities. In particular, they have a responsibility to undertake programmes that young people have shown interest in, and to report back to them on the progress achieved.

As revealed in focus groups, youth want to be in a position to advise public officials on urban issues and propose creative solutions to address them. Youth involvement in
consensus building and policymaking should not be confined to identifying urban issues and problems but should also address the invention and consolidation of organising strategies and directions. Strategies determine key priorities that people call on in certain situations. However, this requires a more integrated planning mechanism that benefits from youth’s tacit knowledge, thus raising the quality of planning (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012). To address this complexity, research participants suggested further investment in cutting-edge communication technology. Social media and communication technology helps in building alliances with and drawing on knowledge from youth organisations such as student associations, political youth organisations, FBOs and youth clubs (Maulana, 2016, p.240).

Consequently, planners should be equipped with the tools that they may require to address a variety of social, economic, systematic and technical issues at the municipal level (Forester, 1987). It could be argued that personnel in charge of planning tasks at the municipal level mainly lack the technical skills and operational competence to apply technology in collecting spatial knowledge and information from different stakeholders (see subsection 6.3.1, chapter six). However, Odendaal (2003) argued that it is not the limitedness of capacity or lack of resources that hinder local authorities in employing technology in spatial planning. Instead, Odendaal (2003) believed, local authorities in the Global South lack the strategic vision to employ technological advances (i.e., in information and communication technologies (ICT)) and implement the principles of ‘smart city’.

Abu Ghazalah (2010) suggested that GAM should enhance planning directorate capacity by achieving knowledge-based management via investment in technology and the latest computer software. There is an abundance of practical research on how technological advances can be harnessed to overcome the hurdles to greater communication among multiple stakeholders in community planning (Rinner et al., 2008; Esper and Williams, 2003; Odendaal, 2003; Ceccato and Snickars, 2000; Shiffer, 1992). For instance, the employment of geographical information systems (GIS) has correlated with a significant rise in promotion and facilitation of spatial planning (Simão et al., 2009; Dragićević and Balram, 2004; McCall, 2003; Jankowski and

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140 See also Sakil (2017) for more information regarding the advantage of ICT for the improvement of youth participation in urban governance.
141 The term GIS refers to the “collection of hardware, software, output devices ...that used to analyse and map spatial entities and their relationships” (Gregory et al., 2009, p.277).
Nyerges, 2001; Klosterman, 1999). The properties of GIS deemed compatible with provision of greater access to spatial information and the integration of scientific and local knowledge, thus enhancing principles of good governance (McCall, 2003). In addition, Simão and colleagues (2009) proposed a conceptual system framework by which multiple stakeholders can be involved in spatial planning. The system consists of information areas to facilitate access to spatial information, a Multi-Criteria Spatial Decision Support System designed to articulate decision objectives and evaluation criteria, and an argumentation map to address different facets of the planning process. GAM’s organisational structure involves a specific department in charge of managing the GIS service to the entire jurisdiction of the city of Amman (see figure 5-6 and subsection 5.3.4, chapter five). If GIS unit staff and municipal planners were trained to exploit the capabilities of GIS in community planning, this would establish broader communication in Jordanian society, thus widening the scope of planning to involve diverse knowledge inputs. In this regard, the advancement of ICT technology can be employed to maximise inputs from youth communities in regard to spatial planning in Jordan.

7.2.3 Improvement of mobilisation capacity

This form of institutional capacity focuses on creating a conducive environment for young Jordanians to participate authentically in all fields of public policy (i.e., spatial planning) (Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones, 2000; Healey, 1998). Once both knowledge and relational resources are built up, a third component of mobilisation capacity is required to realise their potential and sustain their participation for future planning initiatives beyond one-off participation (Healey et al., 2002). This research put forward the following recommendations to improve mobilisation capacity to ensure demand-driven youth participation in Jordan’s spatial planning:

- political education for greater empowerment of youth
- youth-led initiatives as an institutional locus for nurturing youth leadership.

142 The concept of demand-driven governance, or bottom-up participation, has been formulated by development agencies in response to criticism concerning the preparation of development plans in a centralised fashion. Top-down participation occurs when the targeted community is only asked to participate in the later stages, when developments plans have been set by planning authorities. In contrast, demand-driven governance occurs when the development process is significantly shaped by the public themselves.
Political education for greater empowerment of youth

This study sees political education as an essential right for young Jordanians and a means to achieve greater youth participation in the public arena. The main beneficiaries of political education are young people. Political education is a technique of creating empowerment by providing future ‘politicians’ and policy-makers with the necessary competencies to advocate youth participation more independently and collaboratively.

From my perspective, youth participation should start from an earlier age in life. Schools have a role in fostering youth participation through extracurricular activities. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Youth participation is supposed to start from school, to learn how to debate and the acceptance of the ‘other’. Schools inculcate the culture of democratic participation. (N.A., interview, 12/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

However, the education system in Jordan fails to sufficiently prepare young people to be aware of political issues affecting the community. Many of the interviewees said that young graduates often experience low levels of analytical and critical thinking and problem-solving skills due to the current educational system. As part of its educational reform, participatory pedagogical foundations in Jordan must be reoriented to emphasise more collaboration by introducing political education as an extracurricular activity at the school, college and university levels.

I believe that the process of youth participation starts in school. We need to raise awareness among youth. We need reform in education, in schools, universities and everywhere. There is no education about planning processes or even political

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143 In his seventh discussion paper, King Abdullah II linked educational reform to the comprehensive political development that Jordan seeks to implement (RHC, 2017).

144 According to Górak-Sosnowska (2010), 99% of Jordanian youth are literate (see appendix 2-1).
Improving the quality of education in Jordan is a national and strategic priority, yet no adequate steps have been taken to improve the quality of education for young people. The most important reason for politically educating youth is enhancing democracy, and providing the training and leadership experience necessary for community planning (Stone, 1993). In addition, political education would lead to demand-driven governance rather than top-down participation at the behest of international organisations or government agencies (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Political education can prepare youth for coalitions and consensus building through skilled debate and communication skills (Checkoway and Aldana, 2013; Kahne and Middaugh, 2012) when engaging with professional stakeholders. At the personal level, youth would gain skills, confidence and professionalism in articulating views and influencing decisions. These characteristics are key to the promotion of youth leadership in the public realm. The following subsection further discusses how the notion of youth council is significant in nurturing youth leadership. Youth leadership is significant in achieving their endeavour of broader representation in the public realm (O'Donoghue and Strobel, 2007; Kagwanja, 2005).

**Youth-led initiatives as an institutional locus for nurturing youth leadership**

This research argues that enhancing the capacity of youth leadership would increase the mobilisation capacity for securing youth participation in the future. In Jordan, and according to data extracted from a UNPFA (2015a) report on youth activities in Jordan, there are a total of 105 youth-led initiatives, the vast majority of which are located in Amman. They are non-profit, mostly run by young people, and depend on youth volunteerism, providing fertile ground for nurturing youth leadership and promoting youth agency in Jordan.

*In Jordan, and in order to foster youth participation, it is imperative to pay more attention to youth leadership. Youth leadership is critical in encouraging leaders and their friends to be more involved.* (H.HH., interview, 26/07/2015, translated from Arabic)
Youth-led initiatives adapt swiftly to new opportunities because of their flexibility, in contrast to the bureaucratic inertia and lack of vision displayed by many NGOs in Jordan (Myers, 2011; Cox, 1999). For example, Haqiq is a state-led initiative headed by Jordan’s Crown Prince Foundation and established in 2013. Haqiq, which means ‘achieve’, aims to foster youth’s sense of belonging to their nation and their patriotism, discovering and investing in young leaders so they can become strong advocates and ambassadors of ‘positive’ change in their communities. Much of the Crown Prince’s initiative promotes a model of partnership among key national institutions. Haqiq, in cooperation with the MoE, targets school children aged 16–20 through training workshops, field visits and camps.

Ezwitti is another example of an initiative that aims to build and strengthen social solidarity and economic interdependency among a variety of social and age groups of different socio-economic, educational and cultural backgrounds. Ezwitti promotes youth entrepreneurship to prepare and qualify young people to enter the job market and entrepreneurship in Jordan. It also targets children in order to inculcate the principles of participation to broaden the concept of civic entrepreneurship. Another successful volunteering opportunity available to young Jordanians is the Zikra initiative. This initiative was established by a young Jordanian entrepreneur to promote a high level of youth activism and commitment. Further discussion on the different types of youth NGOs in Jordan is presented and discussed in appendix 4.

Attention must also be paid to the notion of volunteering in Jordan. Through volunteerism, youth leadership skills and potentials would be improved and prospered. As most interviewees emphasised, voluntary work instils a sense of belonging in their communities and of ownership in their neighbourhoods. Through volunteerism, youth can develop leadership skills (Lockett and Boyd, 2012; Haski-Leventhal et al., 2010; Roker et al., 1999; Sundeen, 1989). In particular, the lack of government subsidies eliminates the promotion of volunteerism or the allocation of budgets to volunteer programmes.

There is a very important point – active citizenship is an attitude. Youth participation starts when youth

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For Bryson and colleagues (2006), leadership may involve formal and informal types of leaders along with two leadership roles: sponsors and champions.
are closely engaged in initiatives at the neighbourhood level, for example, street sweeping, then it moves up to reach a high level of decision-making at the local, regional or national level. (A.J., interview, 26/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

This research shows how Jordanian youth also prefer student councils in universities and youth clubs to other adult-led associations. When youth in the focus groups were asked about their preferred method of communicating with the city council, they preferred democratically elected youth representatives. Although the chief of one of the district committees thought that the district committee are a true representatives of youth and their concerns (F.K., interview, 19/08/2015), it was not what youth indicated when they were asked to tick their preferred method of liaison with policymakers and city officials. Two answers were the most popular: student unions and youth clubs. According to their experiences in representative democracy, they believed that student unions and youth clubs have a better understanding of young people compared to political parties or grass-roots organisations, which are seen by research participants as often being more distant from the concerns of most young people.

In our youth centres, we try to fight this approach [tribal influence over young people’s decisions]. We encourage them to be more involved in our programmes, to encourage them to be more active in political participation, to practise democracy in your work, in your studies, and to be more democratic with your family, at the household level, we teach youth how to be more diplomatic with their parents. These are very important things to do. (H.J., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Such associations, as highlighted by focus group participants, are closely related to youth concerns and take seriously the voices of young people and their issues. As noted by the director of the HCY’s Amman office, there is at least one youth centre in every Jordanian city (H.J., interview, 07/07/2015). These institutions could be used as a
platform for youth in localities to gather and discuss all issues relevant to the public realm in Jordan, especially urban development issues in their cities. If youth councils are formalised and treated as part of the structure of municipal government, youth will have access to policymakers and planners. Periodic meetings, youth summits and caucuses could be held as interactive platforms for deliberative governance.

The most distinguished feature in the Higher Council of Youth [HCY] is that we have the largest number of government facilities at the Kingdom level. We cover the whole nation. There are 390 youth clubs and 217 youth centres. There is no village or city without an existing youth facility. I think that through these assets we can reach all youth in the nation. (H.J., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

A youth council of the proposed kind could adopt the mechanisms, organisational structure and participation tools that make Ai an active organisational space for youth mobilisation in Amman 2025 and a successful case to draw lessons from. As mentioned in the research findings, Ai was a significant outcome of Amman 2025 in relation to youth leadership and to nurturing their agency. The institute was intended to generate stronger relations with local residents and young communities in all districts of Amman. However, this institutional infrastructure lacked long-term support, in the sense that Ai was dismantled in 2011 shortly after the announcement of Amman 2025 and the replacement of Mayor Maani with Mayor Beltagi.

Overall, establishing youth centres, or extending the scope of existing ones to be more politically active, would create opportunities for all active youth to plan and instigate community service actions at all levels of governance. Youth councils could be understood as a mechanism of collective empowerment with significant impact for youth at the personal level (self-fulfilment) and at the social level (greater political participation and accountability). Youth councils could sponsor activities where different stakeholders work together as partners, with decision-making responsibility, granting greater spaces for youth as they demonstrate their increasing competence and build trust with key stakeholders (Sommerfeldt and Taylor, 2011). The ultimate aim of youth councils is for youth to take the lead and initially become engaged in club
activities, then progressively move on to the broader political sphere with less adult support.

7.2.4 Promoting cultural resources for greater social learning

The cultural capital theme explores how far Amman 2025, from its inception in 2006 to the collection of the primary data in 2015, developed cultural capital by which different age groups are able to come together, negotiate their needs and search for common ground – in other words, to what extent Amman 2025 has defined and negotiated new mental models and forged a path towards a new social contract of intergenerational partnership. The analysis in chapter six showed how the tribal influence, adultism, and paternalistic culture embedded within planning practices in Jordan have failed to mobilise the capacity of youth. As a result, spatial planning becomes an arena where only the interests of specific groups are considered.

The notion of working with youth is not welcomed at the household level, in the tribal communities and the paternalistic way of bringing up youth. (A.J., interview, 26/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

Habermas (1984) stated that a failure to create authentic dialogue between various social groups creates tension and irreconcilable differences rather than conditions for collaboration. This section discusses the possibility and means of articulating the collective concerns of youth along with other social groups (i.e., state officials, investors, community leaders, etc.) regarding urban development in Jordan. It investigates opportunities for a cultural change towards the greater involvement of youth in public policy.

Building intergenerational partnership

The challenge of managing the plurality of interests that coexist in communities is exacerbated when political communities and cultural referents confront each other from different relational positions with no mutual understanding (Van Tatenhove, 2015; Percy-Smith, 1999). Due to the long tradition of top-down planning, youth and other social groups in Amman have no history of actual encounters with other social groups in their communities regarding public policy matters. Most national policies such as the All Jordan Charter, the National Charter or the National Agenda were drafted by government agencies along with selected technocratic ex-government figures and
economic and local elites (e.g., heads of clans) (A.J., interview, 26/08/2015). In this regard, the aim of the systemic institutional design is to:

create a structure which would encourage practices in which a full range of stakeholders were given respectful consideration, which would foster collaboration and the building of links through which social learning could take place, and which could encourage a public realm of multi-cultural argumentation. (Healey, 2006a, p.295)

Habermas (1984) believed that through interactions and ‘open’ dialogue about problems and objectives, facts and values emerge; policy priorities changes; hegemonic communicative relations are dispersed; and real shifts in power occur. This process is called ‘social learning’. Under the institutionalist approach, social learning generates new frames of reference, systems of meaning and social relations that result in institutional capital being built (i.e., relational resources, knowledge resources and mobilisation capital). Accordingly, this research deployed Habermas’s ideas of communicative rationality in order to foster intergenerational partnership (Lekies et al., 2009) and communication in Jordanian cities, where youth and adults can come to learn about each other and about different points of view. This research argues that ‘open conversation’ by which youth are engaged with other cultural referents would progressively generate the cultural capital necessary for greater youth participation in the public realm of Jordan.

Changing cultural conceptions or understandings is a cumbersome and hard journey. The extent to which the community will accept youth’s ideas or suggestions in Jordan is inexorably linked with people’s awareness. There should be strategic goals to make communities more open to the notion of debating. (A.J., interview, 26/08/2015, translated from Arabic)

I emphasise and reiterate the importance of the role of family and society in bringing up a generation of
youth capable of practising democracy. (J.N., interview, 23/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

According to Innes and Booher (2002, p.42), bringing diverse stakeholders into an authentic dialogue would produce relationships, reciprocity, learning and creativity. In the context of this research, youth participating in a collaborative dialogue with other social groups (e.g., adults, state actors, business developers, etc.) would realise their interdependency and the importance of collective action with respect to multi-stakeholder concerns (the first outcome of relationships). As a result, they would develop new “reciprocal relationships that become the glue for their continuing work” (Innes and Booher, 2002, p.42). A new relational nexus (i.e., social capital) could be built up among those diverse actors (the second outcome of reciprocity). Innes and Booher (2002, p.43) argued that even the least productive collaborative process would result in building mutual understanding and personal relationships.

The third outcome is identified as ‘learning’. As long as stakeholders develop their ‘reciprocal relationships’, they become more aware of each other’s interests, concerns and strategies (Innes and Booher, 2002, p.44). Social learning, according to Habermas (1984), forges effective ways to understand issues and find creative mechanisms to address them. Social learning processes, according to John Friedmann (1987), comprise two levels: single-loop learning and double-loop learning (see figure 7-1, below). The first level, single-loop learning, is less effective for future plans and involves issues of how an organisation can better perform a planning task. For example, when planning authorities in charge of spatial planning engage youth sporadically according to specific international donor requirements, this ignores the real causes of youth marginalisation and does not guarantee their future engagement. Another example in the context of this research is when planning authorities build partnerships with investors in collaborative action to promote economic growth, where the outcome is only beneficial for the municipality and its partners.
Double-loop learning refers to building up a store of mutual understanding and creating new relations of collaboration and trust, and, hopefully, shifting power bases (Healey, 2006a, p.263; Innes and Booher, 2003, p.42). Double-loop learning produces new cultural resources (i.e., frames of reference, systems of meaning and social relations) by which new governance values that support youth participation in spatial planning are constructed and developed. This form of learning involves reshaping points of reference and policy agendas in which youth issues are discussed, their perceptions of place identity are defined, and their suggestions to solutions are taken into account.

This study argues that a supportive social fabric for youth is a prerequisite for optimum youth participation in public affairs and policymaking in Jordan. Older generations perceive younger people and their opinions as ‘problematic’ rather than as resources and opportunities. In this vein, Rowland (2009) argued that tribalism in Jordan is not inherently anti-democratic. The tribal social system in Jordan could be used as a vehicle for democratisation and multicultural argumentation (Rowland, 2009, p.31): “[T]he current political system [in Jordan] allows the tribes to become political units and dominate the politics of the country, resulting in a decline in the quality of democracy” (Rowland, 2009, p.21). Consequently, the research suggests an action-oriented approach to addressing the issue of youth participation on the basis of building or strengthening relationships with different local groups and stakeholders within the community. Checkoway (2011) believed that youth participation is valuable and durable when adults and youth work together through intergenerational partnerships. Healey (1999, p.114) and Faludi (1996) argued that humans are ‘creative learners’, meaning that youth and adults can work together to challenge agendas, frames of reference and systems of meaning through intergenerational communicative exercises (Lekies et al., 2009). Supporting this argument, Kirshner’s (2008) findings suggest that youth and adults can work productively to reach agreement on plans in various
structural arrangements, where adults are open to youth ideas and opinions without dictating content and activities for them.

### 7.3 Designing a collaborative planning system for greater youth participation

As argued in section 6.3, chapter six, improving political, administrative and legal processes would give constitutional legitimacy to youth participation in public policymaking. Consequently, this section makes recommendations for overcoming structural constraints on youth participation in spatial planning in the Jordanian context. It elaborates on the findings of the case study to highlight the deficiencies in the planning system (hard infrastructure) in Jordan that hinder greater youth participation in spatial planning. In order to improve the hard infrastructure of the institutional context in Jordan, this research recommends the following strategies to ensure greater youth participation in spatial planning:

- devolving greater power to local authorities in spatial planning
- institutionalising youth participation in spatial planning
- democratising the political system in Jordan.

#### 7.3.1 Devolving greater power to local authorities in spatial planning

After analysis of the case of Amman 2025, spatial planning in Jordan has proved to be of a hierarchical and centralised nature, with youth communities having no institutional space for input into urban development. Sager (2012), Healey (1999, p.116) and Stone (1993) stressed the importance of inclusive multi-partnership working, where the future of a locality is deliberated and debated with input from local communities and other key stakeholders in a democratic fashion.

> Municipalities across Jordan should build a long-term relationship with local communities. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Accordingly, re-engineering ‘local government’ is critical to offer more ‘inclusionary governance’. Despite the fact that multi-government institutions and a variety of stakeholders need to be integrated into the spatial planning process (Kidd, 2007), it is important that one single government agency takes the lead in coordinating and engaging other stakeholders in the plan preparation process. This study sees municipalities as ‘niche’ organisations, in a strategic position for network building.
among all the departments and stakeholders in the planning process. Municipalities in Jordan are strategically situated as units of practice for spatial planning at the local level, and hence they should be flexible and approachable to youth and their relevant agencies (Checkoway et al., 2005; Jure and Jure, 1992).

Throughout our experience in political development at the regional and local level in the Kingdom, we found that elected officials are more open and welcoming to debate and participation than the appointed officials. Elected officials are linked and attached to popular electoral platforms. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

As we believe that public participation is important, we are working towards activating the role of municipalities and governorates in development. They are the closest to the local communities and youth alike and can identify their needs better. (H.HH., interview, 26/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Municipalities are locally elected bodies seen as local ‘antennae’ at the grass-roots level. However, municipalities in Jordan suffer from weak organisational and institutional capacity, which hinders the process of making spatial plans locally oriented (Alnsour, 2016). Municipalities in Jordan face severe shortages of the financial, technical and human resources required to deal with planning problems, manage public spaces and provide municipal services, and thus achieve a true culture of participation (Al Rabady et al., 2014).

We have conducted a study to survey and assess the needs of 37 municipalities in Jordan. There are many municipalities that are financially and technically insolvent. They cannot reach and liaise with local communities on a regular basis. (N.A., interview, 12/08/2015, translated from Arabic)
Youth participation requires sufficient and stable levels of financial resources that local authorities can rely on to deliver participation programmes (ARACY, 2006, cited in Head, 2011, p.542). Municipalities have little financial support in comparison to the scope of the services they are legally required to deliver. A highly dysfunctional municipal sector in Jordan, along with a parlous financial situation, is a major barrier to reaching youth communities and valuing their input. Accordingly, fiscal decentralisation and appropriate financial resources are critical in ensuring municipalities perform the duties assigned to them (Alnsour and Meaton, 2011). Without adequate financial resources allocated for youth participation, youth participation will remain ineffective and dependent on the government’s will or funders’ requirements.

In addition, municipalities in Jordan are incapable of steering, implementing and monitoring planning activities without referring to higher government authority at the regional or national level (Al Haija, 2011). Many interviewees emphasised that relations between the central government level and the regional and local government levels in the planning system are hierarchical and sectoral, and they apply conventional channels of communications to address urban issues (Al Rabady et al., 2014; Abu Ghazalah, 2010; Bagaeen, 2006b).

Municipalities in Jordan are financially and administratively dependent on central government. Any cheques for more than JOD500 must get the approval of the ministry. The relation between the ministry and municipalities resembles a guardianship or paternalistic relation. To put it simply, the ministry does not trust municipalities to make decisions on development. (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

Let’s move towards delegation of power, where power is not with a single person who assumes s/he knows best for everyone. (L.S., focus group, 29/07/2015, translated from Arabic)
Improving administrative systems (i.e., the structure of formal government at national, regional and local levels) enhances ways of doing the business of government, and can, to a large extent, shape the key players brought into the planning process (Healey, 2006a, p.84). Therefore, what is needed are “local/city/regional governance structures that possess genuine power and autonomy to decide priorities, allocate resources and demonstrate leadership” (Syrett, 2011, p.6, cited in Coca-Stefaniak and Bagaeen, 2014, p.64). The centralised institutional approach has weakened the capacities of local government and left them under the supervision and support of central government funds and consultancy (Alnsour and Meaton, 2009; King et al., 1998). For Healey (2006b) and Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), reforming the administrative systems involves the redistribution of power, which typically resides in the hands of central government, to the lower levels of administration and management of local authorities (e.g. city councils), which will eventually grant the public greater autonomy in shaping their development.

Public administration improvement seeks to create partnerships horizontally among local businesses, residents’ groups and city councils and vertically among all government tiers within the planning system (Jreisat, 2017; Healey, 2006b, 1998a). Shifting power to local government units can be conceptualised as a process of concession from central government by which greater autonomy over spatial planning and political rights is gradually extended to municipalities. Therefore, the GoJ needs to implement the provisions stipulated in the Decentralisation Act of 2015, no.49, to delegate more central prerogatives and to devolve spatial planning authority to local authorities. As the balance of power gradually shifts from central government towards local and regional authorities, this could increase the effectiveness of youth participation and accelerate the process of policy change and democratisation. However, it is vital to implement principles of accountability and transparency in local authorities to achieve the best of decentralisation (Azfar et al., 1999). Corruption, nepotism or favouritism is anathema to the credibility and sustainability of any development plan in Jordan (Jreisat, 2017; Al Nammari and Alzaghah, 2015; Alnsour and Meaton, 2009). To enable youth to exercise their rights, city governments and administrations should apply transparent and participatory means of governing and managing urban growth (Jreisat, 2017).
Increasing the capacity and organisational framework of the municipal administration system is critical to enhancing the quality of the spatial planning system in Jordan (Tewfik and Amr, 2014). In order to widen the scope of planning, planners should be knowledgeable on different issues that hinder public participation in spatial planning (Forester, 1987). This requires training the planners in the development of negotiation skills, inclusion and awareness and principles of social justice. In their graduate programmes, educational institutions could also improve critical skills for analysing and solving urban problems through involving the youth. Therefore, staff should attend periodic training and, where required, additional government staff with the necessary skills should be recruited. Training could be offered by building partnerships with international experts to transfer lessons and experiences through a variety of pilot projects (Khirfan et al., 2013).

Overall, the role of local government should transcend boundaries of service provision so that they contribute to policymaking and development, goal setting and spatial planning and become an active stakeholder in plan implementation. Jordan needs improved administrative systems to ensure that economic growth is accommodated without disrupting social and welfare services.

7.3.2 Institutionalising youth participation in spatial planning

Riggio (2002) and Francis (1993) stressed the importance of governance competencies in terms of tools and mechanisms of regulation through which such structures form. On examining the legal frameworks of spatial planning in Jordan (see subsection 5.3.6, chapter five), it is revealed that no section in the legal frameworks mentions garnering the opinion of youth in spatial plans. Also, the Jordanian planning gives local authorities and municipalities minimal power over urban planning. As revealed in the analysis, planning regulations in Jordan support the exertion of power and control by particular groups of people (mainly big businesses) in the domain of spatial planning. Following the neoliberal transformation, national policy has guided the restructuring of the institutional framework of land regulation towards greater emphasis on boosting business plan outputs at the expense of social outcomes (Alnsour, 2016; Tewfik and Amr, 2014; Abu Ghazalah, 2010).

The only participation mechanism guaranteed by law is public appeal after the preparation of the plans. The process is open for all who are interested.
Youth involvement cannot be truly fulfilled without strong commitment and political will translated into frameworks and legislation at all levels of governance. According to Innes and Booher (2004), planning regulations have a critical and significant role in mediating different interests among different stakeholders. In this concept, political communities may have the opportunity to challenge strategic decisions and policies in governance arenas. More specifically, this strengthens the power of youth ‘voice’ to challenge spatial plans and regulatory decisions. Youth participation in Jordan is challenged by the existence of a highly centralised legal framework that hinders the construction of democracy and the balancing of political power among different social groups. Changing the tradition of centralised decision-making in urban development is important to create a space for young communities to become involved in urban planning.

The Jordanian constitution\textsuperscript{146} is the Arab constitution that most clearly stresses civil liberties. Integrating youth rights in terms of voice and influence would enable youth to question governance systems, or any governance agency, dealing with spatial planning matters. Generally speaking, planning authorities should incorporate in law the right to challenge granted to secondary stakeholders –that is, those affected by property development on different scales in Amman –and not confine it to affected property owners.

In addition, youth participation and civil participation have been clearly stipulated in the NYS (2005–2009) (see subsection 4.6.2, chapter four). Jordan ratified and signed a number of internationally recognised rights-based legal principles to promote civil society and youth participation in particular. For example, the CRC was signed by Jordan in 1991, yet the right of youth in Jordan to participate in the public sphere is still not enshrined in the planning system. The reason is that planning authorities at the local

\textsuperscript{146} The first, and most liberalised, Jordanian constitution was signed during King Talal’s short reign (1951–1952), which in turn opened doors for liberalisation and democracy in Jordan (Abu Karaki et al., 2011).
level are either financially or managerially unable to deliver successful youth engagement. In addition, and following the mindset of the rational scientific model in planning, the state’s political will and its mental model still characterise youth as incapable of contributing to the planning debate. Translating signed conventions into regulatory form can impose legal duties to engage young people in planning development. Accordingly, it is essential to give the CRC constitutional status in order to monitor the observance of youth inclusion in urban development plans.

7.3.3 Democratising the political system in Jordan

Planning authorities across Jordan should alter their policy from ‘deferential democracy’ to more discursive practices and a more sympathetic governance culture with respect to youth communities. The success of youth participation requires state political commitment followed by a strategic vision to promote a political atmosphere that fosters democracy and civil liberties. The analysis shows how the state views youth agency (i.e., youth as organised groups) as a threat to national stability and public security, in the sense that they have been at the forefront of several political movements that have undermined stability in some countries in the MENA region.

_The general political policy of the Jordanian state has a significant impact on youth participation in planning their cities. We cannot separate politics._

_All these factors are interlinked._ (M.S., interview, 07/07/2015, translated from Arabic)

The fear of youth as a security threat to Jordan or as ‘troubling’ undermines the health of democracy in Jordan (). It could be understood that the government’s concern has been to address social issues while still maintaining a tight grip on the political landscape with cosmetic political reforms that may give youth the opportunity to participate in the public realm (Ryan, 2011; Dryzek, 2009). It is worrisome that the GoJ also perceives youth as a group that, if politically active, may be a threat to national stability. Many distinguished young Jordanians have innovative ideas but lack the resources or host agencies to develop their potential. Youth should be able to develop their leadership skills, represent their local communities and shape the design and execution of activities to meet the needs of their communities.
The research analysis shows how the long history of social exclusion and lack of democracy in Jordan has resulted in tensions and schisms between the state and civil society. Therefore, it is vital to (re)gain public confidence and trust in the state and its planning apparatus to build up governance capacity for collaborative strategy-making (Healey, 2006a, pp.299–300). Local authorities should promote ‘democratic scrutiny’ to enhance accountability and overcome trust issues between the state and civil society (Jreisat, 2017; Dryzek, 2009). Implementing principles of good governance at the local, regional and national levels would eventually enhance government accountability. The need to enhance transparency has gained prominence in the attempt to improve governance and promote active cooperation in addressing the impacts of rapid urbanisation (Chourabi et al., 2012).

7.4 Strategies for systemic youth participation in Jordan’s spatial planning

This section reviews the proposed prescriptive model for systemic institutional design for greater youth participation in Jordan, and discusses to what extent this model is specific to young groups in Jordan. In addition, this section highlights recent developments (if any) in the planning system and practices, covering the period from 2015, the year of the primary data collection, to the writing of this thesis in 2018.
This theoretical model consists of two main dimensions (soft infrastructure and hard infrastructure) that ought to work in parallel to achieve systemic youth participation in Jordan’s spatial planning (see figure 7-2, above). In terms of Jordan’s planning system, the proposed strategies are not specific to young groups in Jordan. As young groups are part of Jordanian civil society, devolving greater power to local authorities, institutionalising participation in a formal legal framework and democratising the political system would enable a wider space for the participation of Jordanian civil society in spatial planning. The research recommendations have revolved around the need for an innovative governance mechanism to democratically address the dynamic
and complex tensions between competing interests within the increasingly unequal power relations in cities.

As a step to enhancing political reform and liberalisation, the Jordanian national assembly introduced several new acts by 2015 to consolidate the democratic principle of the sovereignty of the people (Bani Salameh, 2018). Most importantly for the context of this study, the GoJ promulgated new legislation and constitutional amendments such as the Decentralisation Act of 2015, no.49, and the Municipality Act of 2015, no.41. These regulatory frameworks aim to restructure and reform the planning system in Jordan. The Decentralisation Act of 2015, no.49, aims to devolve greater planning power at the regional level, while the Municipality Act of 2015 aims to entrench decentralisation at the local levels. This institutional reform involved plans for improving institutional capabilities to enable local authorities to administer resource allocation (Al Zu’bi, 2017, p.231), thus managing urban growth effectively.

A new administrative division was introduced by establishing an elected council at the regional level to take over the responsibility of the previously appointed consultative council (Al Rabady et al., 2015). Under the Decentralisation Act of 2015, no.49, provincial councils (previously appointed by the cabinet of ministers) act as advisors to governors (regional managers). In doing so, provincial councils enhance public input and devolve greater power to regional authorities in terms of planning, growth and financing (i.e., preparing a budget for the governorates).

It has been three years since the promulgations of both acts. However, it is believed that progress towards reforming the planning system in Jordan is still trivial, while the decentralisation experience is fragile and weak (Bani Salameh, 2018). There is wide scepticism as to whether the amendments of federal structure proposed by both acts led to real devolution of power from the central government. The council is still headed by the governor, who is directly linked with the MoI. The responsibility of the elected members is confined to drafting proposals for capital spending for the relevant governorate. This draft needs the approval of the governor and the appointed executive council, making them dependent on the central government. Drafts and suggestions need to be within the parameters set by the GoJ.

Moreover, a new planning framework for Amman has been promulgated by the central government in 2018. The Building and Planning Regulations for the City of Amman
Act of 2018, no.28, was presented as innovative legislation for sustainable urban development. In comparison with the old Building and Planning Regulations for the City of Amman Act of 1979, no.67, the newly proposed planning schemes still deals with planning following the instrumental rationality approach. The new planning framework is still devoid of any aspect of integrating public opinions, perspectives and experiences in the decision-making process. The legislative changes introduced revolve around reforming the procedures of physical planning and urban form. This entails introducing new land-use categories in accordance with the intensification and densification strategy proposed in Amman 2025 (see appendix 8), changing provisions regarding setbacks in categories C and D, lowering the percentage of housing area in categories A and B, increasing the number of allocated parking slots per housing unit in category A, ensuring strict regulation to protect heritage buildings, and introducing new provisions regarding traffic impact analysis, retail impact analysis and environmental impact analysis on new real estate developments in the inner city of Amman. This implies that Jordanian legislators perceive urban planning from the managerial and engineering perspective, focusing on improving the quality of engineering and managerial techniques while averting any promotion of community planning, emphasising a top-heavy machinery of urban management and fostering an ‘apex’ structure for urban management away from democratic or political scrutiny. Most importantly, the newly proposed law does not involve institutional efforts to build new ways of mutual understanding among different political communities (i.e., urban conflicts will be addressed following legal reasoning). There is an absence of any provision or formalised structure that promotes participation or gives legitimacy to the outcomes of deliberative planning.

The other dimension of systemic institutional design that relates to greater youth participation is planning practice. The prescriptive theoretical model entails strategies to improve spatial planning practices that are closely related to the lifestyle, social status, cultural perceptions and norms of young groups in Jordan, and their understandings of urban development. Examining Amman 2025 from the perspective of public participation in general, the research analysis emphasised that adults and local elites in civil society have more influence on decision-making than do young groups in Amman. Local conflicts in Amman were portrayed as manifestations of unfair competition between youth and other social groups in civil society, and between youth
and the influx of petrodollar investments from the GCC nations. In terms of relational resources, it is not an exaggeration to say that Amman 2025 was built on lack of trust and limited relational resources between GAM and youth communities, youth-led initiatives, or youth NGOs, with no clear signs of improvement in levels of relational resources from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary research data in 2015. The results showed that Amman 2025 was established and is still administered by a variety of planners and technical advisors, with influence from speculative developers and policymakers who belong to the state and the market sector, or other social gatekeepers from civil society, leaving youth out of the scope of master-planning. Young people in Jordan have less of a presence in formal political activities and state-led public debates than older generations. This does not mean that young people in Jordan are apathetic. It is believed that young people in Jordan are the most active political community in Jordan. This is illustrated by the numerous youth-led initiatives in Jordan and the sit-ins spearheaded by young Jordanians. However, Amman 2025 still offers superficial institutional efforts and limited opportunities for utilising young people and their initiatives as a driving force for sustainable urban development. Weak relational resources have resulted in a lack of diversity in the plan preparation stage, and thus poor coverage and understanding of urban issues from young people’s perspective. For example, Amman’s urban image was successfully rejuvenated in the improvement of some parts of Amman (mainly the affluent west side of the city) through urban regeneration and revitalisation projects, but this did not address most of the problems that directly influence young people’s welfare, such as availability of affordable housing, employment, transportation and public spaces. In terms of sociocultural forces, tribalism, adultism and patriarchy are key barriers to youth participation in the public realm. The traditional hierarchy prominent in Jordanian society underestimates young people’s power to change and produce sustainable development. The perception of youth as inferior to adults is influential in the politics of spatial planning, granting only limited room for youth to participate in decision-making. Also, Jordanian families feel more comfortable when young family members are under their control and submissive to adults’ orders.
7.5 Conclusion

Developing youth agency requires continuous support from the three sectors of society, which would lead to greater participation and leading roles in the public arena. In addition to fulfilling the role of a key service provider, municipalities should work as facilitators to link different webs of networks within localities. It is important for the government to relinquish the present bureaucratic structure (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015), creating new relations with youth communities and other relevant stakeholders. Government authorities in charge of spatial planning in Jordan require innovative and collective planning mechanisms to foster a concentration on qualities of place and service delivery.

The value of the institutionalist approach is reflected in its focus on a variety of types and forms of knowledge to be integrated throughout the process of policymaking (Alexander, 2007; González and Healey, 2005; Healey, 1999). Accordingly, municipalities in Jordan, city officials and other relevant planning authorities should facilitate a reliable database of spatial information that youth and other stakeholders have access to at reasonable cost. For Habermas (1984), knowledge is perceived as a source of power that enables the underprivileged to participate (Bagaeen, 2011). What studies on youth participation have argued is that youth do not reach their full potential because of a lack of resources, a lack of access to urban knowledge and information, and the barriers created by society and institutions. In this case, research into the employment of GIS technology in strategic spatial planning has proved its efficiency in collecting, storing, and displaying spatially referenced information (Bunch et al., 2012).

To be effective and long-lasting, participation by the underprivileged (i.e., youth) has to be an integral part of their demands, through bottom-up participation, and not imposed in a top-down style (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Research has proved that political education is a significant tool to foster political campaigning, thus promoting demand-driven youth participation and accountability (Bergamini, 2014; Checkoway, 2011; Roker et al., 1999). Political education helps Jordanian youth to challenge power structures in spatial planning and mobilise for greater representation in the public realm. Political education could teach youth how to build collaboration, how governments function, how policies are made and how civil society can engage with government to create more sustainable urbanisation (Bergamini, 2014; Checkoway and Aldana, 2013).
Another primary concern noted in the analysis is the lack of youth associations through which young Jordanians can express their political opinions. This means there is no space through which younger people can engage in civil and political engagement. When youth are asked to speak for themselves and identify their own issues, it can motivate them to greater action (Checkoway, 2011). Youth councils would help young people connect with policymakers and actors in the urban governance arena.

The cultural context (i.e., customs, traditions and norms) underlies one of the main challenges in Jordan for developing effective youth participation. Previous discussion in chapter six revealed the existence of adultism, patriarchy and tribalism that have hindered the empowerment of youth communities in Jordan. The research found that youth are often perceived by adults to be incapable of making valuable and constructive contributions to urban development planning. Following the phenomenological and interpretive approach, these ‘cultural resources’ are never ‘obsolete’. They are developed, maintained, transformed and reproduced through our communicative efforts (Habermas, 1984). Promoting a broader governance framework based on social equity and empowerment requires the management of relationships and the resolution of intergenerational conflict (DFID-CSO Youth Working Group, 2010). However, this requires relationships and opportunities for intergenerational dialogue to be built as part of the development process (Lekies et al., 2009). According to Innes and Booher’s (2003) social learning process, bringing multiple stakeholders together could help develop a formal practical strategy of institutionalising youth participation and acknowledging youth input. In Habermas’s public realm, social interactions and the dialogue of participants develop a store of mutual understanding of each other’s differences, thus building trust and new governance values, which is necessary for a proactive and collective response to urban issues. Trust and mutual understanding would enable youth to bring their interests into the planning discourse, thus addressing their concerns about spatial coexistence, spatial organisation and qualities of place (Healey, 2006a, p.61).

There is also the lack of a systematic approach to youth participation in Jordan, and a lack of structured involvement of young people in the planning process. Participatory development involves reforming political systems to achieve more democratisation and pluralism (Dryzek, 2009). It is difficult to build a network with such ‘voiceless’ communities, particularly where programmes are dictated by a powerful economic
agenda and bureaucratic structures. The arena of spatial planning projects is vulnerable to serious power conflicts. The power imbalance between market forces and civil society in Jordanian society is a significant burden on planners, who are willing to involve all social groups, including under-represented ones.

The problem of weak public participation in urban development in Jordan is inherent in the structure of the urban development process: it runs in a top-down fashion with noticeable bureaucratic inertia (Al Nammari and Alzaghal, 2015; Ababsa, 2010). Devolving planning power to local government would result in enhancing well-being and qualities of place, making the place more livable and functional for all age groups (Omar et al., 2016). Accordingly, municipalities in Jordan must replace traditionalism with constitutionalism. A policy of devolution, if implemented by the GoJ, would enrich partnerships between municipalities and civil society in localities (Al Rabady et al., 2014), thus granting greater space for youth input (Derr, 2015). In addition, it is suggested that youth participation is institutionalised as a statutory requirement in the legal frameworks that regulate the processes of spatial planning in Jordan (see section 5.3.6, chapter five). Legislative underpinnings would contribute to a long-term institutionalised process and organisational space for youth participation in spatial planning decision-making.

To conclude this study, the next chapter presents a brief discussion of the research purpose, research findings and recommendations and how these answered the research objectives and related questions.
Chapter 8: Research conclusions
8.1 Introduction

Amman 2025 represents a case study for measuring democratisation and public participation at the micro-level in the Jordanian context. This research pays greater attention to the importance of youth participation in spatial planning, by using Amman 2025 as a case study to critically analyse youth involvement during the lifespan of the project. Amman 2025 is a spatial planning strategy that seeks to deliver a radical shift from the traditional approach (i.e., comprehensive rational planning) to a strategic growth outlook integrating economic and physical planning along with reform of public administration (Tewfik and Amr, 2014; Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina, 2010). Moreover, there are several innovative aspects to this case as far as physical development planning is concerned. Most importantly for the purposes of this research, Amman 2025 adopted the novel approach of involving civil society in decision-making in Jordan (ibid.). Thus, this PhD research topic was chosen in order to explore youth participation in Amman 2025 and suggest solutions to the challenges that negatively impacted on their genuine participation throughout the preparation and implementation of Amman 2025.

The empirical work of this research drew on inputs from many of those involved in Amman 2025, analysis of key policies, document review and inputs from groups of young group living in Amman. This research initially adopted the age range 15–24, defined as the age range of youth by key international donor organisations such as the UN, USAID and the World Bank. However, and in order to avoid ethical dilemmas (e.g., the complex issues of informed consent and ensure anonymity of young participants (Skelton, 2008)), this research ultimately excluded underage youth from participating in the research, and limited research participation to those aged between 18 and 24.

This research adopted Healey’s (2006a, pp.284–310) concept of the systemic institutional capacity framework to set up the theoretical framework for this research (see subsection 2.4.1, chapter two). Data gathered from the semi-structured interviews and focus groups were analysed according to Healey’s conceptualisation in terms of the planning system and planning practices within the institutional context of Amman 2025. Research findings and recommendations were presented in chapters six and seven respectively, and briefly reviewed in this chapter.
This chapter starts with a brief discussion of the research purpose, followed by a detailed section presenting how research objectives and related questions were answered throughout the body of the thesis. The research contributions to theory, knowledge are then presented, followed by a summary of the research’s limitations. The chapter concludes with suggested areas for future theoretical and empirical research.

8.2 Research purpose

It is claimed that youth participation and empowerment significantly enhance civic capacity and can be employed as a vehicle to address the problems young people encounter in the Global South (Hart, 2008; Skelton, 2008, p.165; Frank, 2006). Therefore, youth rights in public participation have received continuous recognition by policymakers and urban planners in the field of spatial planning (Hart, 2008; Frank, 2006). Accordingly, this study aims to pay more attention to youth voices in spatial planning. Youth participation is a mechanism that involves young people expressing their interests and exploiting their potential at the institutional and community levels of urban development (Derr, 2015; Richards-Schuster and Pritzker, 2015; Chawla and Driskell, 2006; Frank, 2006).

Greater recognition of youth rights requires those administering the town planning system in Jordan to be aware of youth priorities and understand how to incorporate and implement them in the planning system and practices. This research focuses on planning systems and the fine grain of planning practices through which policy agendas are framed, and the policy framework is defined in Jordan. In this way, it aims to make the work of spatial planning in Jordan more democratic and responsive to social needs, as well as more effective and efficient, by suggesting collaborative approaches that promote youth inclusion in policymaking. Therefore, this research investigated Amman 2025, as representing a style of public policy and new experiences in strategic spatial planning in Jordan, to understand the nature of planning in Amman, key actors and their systems of meaning, and spheres of relationships. It then critiqued planning practices (soft infrastructure) and the planning system (hard infrastructure) as grounded in instrumental rationalism, confronting techno-corporatist modes of governance in Jordan.
There are several reasons for choosing Amman as the geographical area for the case study. Firstly, Amman contains 42% of the population in Jordan, of which, more than half are under 24 years old (GAM, 2017). Therefore, it was considered the appropriate geographical area to choose to enhance the reliability and validity of the study findings and recommendations as presented by youth who participated in this study. Secondly, Amman is the largest business and financial hub in the Kingdom (Kassay, 2011, p.259). As a result, Amman is likely to be targeted by most of the forms of urban development that may take place in the country as it is the capital and the largest and most populated city in Jordan. Thirdly, from an administrative point of view, GAM is one of Jordan’s most developed and sophisticated public administration bodies. GAM’s organisational capacity is crucial to delivering strategic spatial planning. Finally, the author is a resident of the city of Amman, where he as a young person has encountered and experienced various challenges related to inattentive urban development to youth needs.

The research strategy to achieve the aforementioned research purpose involved the following tasks:

- building an account of the institutional setting at the national level (chapter three) and at the local and regional levels of governance, in Amman (chapter five and chapter six)
- mapping the actors involved in Amman 2025 and articulating their relationship spheres (chapter six)
- evaluating the quality of the ‘institutional capital’ towards engaging youth throughout the processes of Amman 2025 (chapter six)
- exploring systemic challenges within the hard infrastructure of Amman 2025 in terms of the political, legal and administrative systems (chapter six).

Eventually, recommendations are offered in chapter seven as a resource for spatial planning practitioners, policymakers and international donor agencies who seek to promote youth participation and foster their agency in the public realm.
8.3 Research conclusions

This research put forward this conceptual research question to formulate the research objectives and research question:

*By placing greater emphasis on systemic institutional design, in what ways can youth participation enhance the quality of spatial planning in Jordan?*

Accordingly, an inductive–deductive cycle of knowledge has been employed to answer the main conceptual question (see subsection 3.9.1, chapter three) and to ensure rigour in thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The research conclusions are summarised here by presenting the research objectives and their questions in tables 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3, below, and subsequently the answers to these questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The objective</th>
<th>Objective 1: To theoretically examine the concept of systemic institutional design and its significance in investigating youth participation in spatial planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The related research questions | A. In what ways do successive planning models conceive youth participation in urban development?  
B. How does the institutionalist approach provide deep understanding of spatial planning systems and embedded practice in specific context?  
C. What are the planning systems and practices (institutional design) presented in the literature? |

Table 8-1: The first objective and its research questions, source: the author

The first objective is designed to enhance the theoretical background on governance, neo-institutionalism and systemic institutional design for collaborative planning and managing coexistence in a locality (see table 8-1, above). Chapter one starts by reviewing the theoretical arguments regarding youth participation in development planning. Chapter two starts with a critical discussion of the most prominent planning models and theories in urban politics. The discussion revealed that the institutionalist and collaborative planning approach is the most convenient approach for the purpose of the objectives of the present research. A wide-ranging literature review was conducted, drawing on recent developments in regional economics and sociology to review the meaning of ‘institutionalism’ in social science. It also involved profound
understanding of Habermas’s theory of communicative action, with its communicative ethics, and Giddens’s theory of structuration. Chapter two concludes by discussing the systematic institutional design for collaborative planning and its two main dimensions: soft infrastructure (planning practices) and hard infrastructure (planning system).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 2: To critically explore the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman regarding youth participation in decision-making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The related research questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. What is the current structure of spatial planning in Amman 2025 regarding the key actor(s) and relationships, and who assumes responsibility for planning decisions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. To what extent, and in what ways, were youth incorporated in the strategy-making process of Amman 2025, from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. To what extent have the planning system (hard infrastructure) and the practices (soft infrastructure) followed in Amman 2025 been improved to ensure greater youth participation in policymaking?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. What are the opportunities or challenges within the institutional context of spatial planning that enable or hinder the promotion of sustainable youth participation in Jordan?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-2: The second objective and its research questions, source: the author

Chapters four, five and six all contributed to addressing the second objective (see table 8-2, above). The second objective was designed to explore the institutional context of spatial planning and the decision-making process in Amman 2025, with a particular focus on investigating youth’s role in policymaking, and on how far Amman 2025 improved youth participation in urban policymaking from its inception in 2006 to the collection of primary data in 2015. This enabled research findings to be identified and conclusions on the institutional urban development context of Jordan to be drawn, thus suggesting context-based recommendations, rather than a normative approach to youth participation without the peculiarities of the Jordanian context being taken into consideration (Newman et al., 2004).
Regarding questions A and B (see table 8-2, above), chapters four and five were designed to introduce the macro and the micro-institutional context for urban governance in Amman. Chapter four presented and analysed the political, economic and social contexts in Jordan. Understanding the very structure of the political, economic and social spheres reveals embedded norms and routines that become established and legitimated in the planning approach (Healey, 2006a, p.300). Chapter five provided a detailed account of the local urban development context of Amman at the micro-level, the emergence of the idea of Amman 2025 and its evolution into strategic spatial planning. By doing so, chapter five provided the background to the deployment of a unique spatial planning strategy in Jordan to manage urban development in Amman from 2006 until 2025.

Questions A and B were also fully addressed in chapter six, in relation to the primary data collected for this research. Chapter six followed an inductive–deductive cycle of knowledge to address the questions related to the second objective. Qualitative data derived from the semi-structured interviews with professional planners and other relevant actors, and input from focus groups involving youth aged 18–24, were used to fill the gap in our understanding of the institutional context of spatial planning in Amman.

More specifically, chapter six focused on addressing questions C and D (see table 8-2, above). The analysis presented in chapter six revealed three key barriers to youth involvement in spatial planning practices: authoritarianism of the state (planning system), traditionalism in spatial planning and policies (planning practices) and sociocultural underdevelopment among local communities (sociocultural forces). Youth exclusion in Jordan is perpetuated by formal planning policies (regulatory framework, planning act, national policies, etc.) as well as the official mindset and traditional beliefs about youth.

Opportunities for greater youth participation were clearly discussed in chapters six and are summarised here as follows:

- The inter- and intra-government partnerships developed throughout Amman 2025 are significant for supporting the implementation of youth empowerment policy at the local, regional and national levels (Jure and Jure, 1992; Singell, 1984). Youth empowerment policy requires strong and thick horizontal and
vertical relations to promote coordination and cohesion among the different planning authorities in charge of spatial planning in Jordan (i.e., the MoI, MoPIC, MoMA, MoE and MoY)

- Youth enthusiasm about being involved in and being active agents in the public realm (see subsection 6.2.3, chapter six). There are numerous youth-led initiatives spread around Jordan aimed at harnessing the power and energy of young groups in Jordan for a better and more prosperous future

- The establishment of Ai. It has been noted by many interviewees that the legacy of Ai significantly enhanced community planning. This institutional locus (i.e., organisational space) enabled youth and other underprivileged social groups in Jordanian society (women, members of ethnic minorities, etc.) to gain access to spatial planning in Amman. Ai is an important initiative that should be revived and replicated in the form of youth council across the Jordanian public realm

- The promulgation of the Decentralisation Act of 2015. This would facilitate youth membership in the planning system in Jordan. The new legal framework presents a critical basis for devolving planning power to local authorities at the regional and local levels. This enables greater institutional space for youth membership in spatial planning

- The political system in Jordan is becoming ever more welcoming to public participation and the empowerment of civil society. This has been clearly articulated in the monarch’s discussion papers and speeches and through his constant directives to government bodies and state apparatuses to open up space for democracy and good governance (Riggio, 2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The objective</th>
<th>Objective 3: To identify context-based recommendations for effective youth participation to enhance the quality of spatial planning in Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The related research questions</td>
<td>A. Is the collaborative planning and institutionalist approach a realistic agenda for introduction in Jordan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. What strategies should be designed to promote Jordanian youth participation in spatial planning?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-3: The third objective and its research questions, source: the author
The final stage of the analysis is presented in chapter seven and related to the third objective (see table 8-3, above), which was to suggest context-based recommendations for effective youth participation to enhance the quality of urban planning through achieving greater youth involvement in policymaking.

The research findings reveal many challenges that stand in the way of the achievement of authentic youth participation. These research findings do not mean that youth participation is unachievable in Jordan; however, youth participation demands a nuanced approach to urban governance (González and Healey, 2005). Youth engagement requires the collaboration and support of the three actors of society (i.e., the state, the market and civil society), who need to adopt a creative context-based approach to re-engineering the structure of urban development in Amman.

The research recommendations were mainly based on the information collected from research participants, and on youth experiences in particular. The focus of recommendations for improving urban development planning in Jordan was not improvements to the technical aspects of land-use planning per se or to public facilities and transportation. Rather, it was more about granting youth their rights as a marginalised and overlooked sector of society.

The following sections (sections 8.4 and 8.5, below) provide a deeper review of the key research findings and recommendations for the improvement of spatial planning in Amman as previously presented in chapters six and seven.

### 8.4 Summary of research findings

The capital of Jordan – Amman – is facing complex and rapidly evolving social, physical, environmental and economic challenges (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012; Ababsa, 2010; Potter et al., 2007; Abu Dayyeh, 2004). Therefore, Amman 2025 was presented by the city administration body (i.e., GAM) as a forward-looking strategy to guide and direct the dynamic changes and fast-growing development of Amman. The plan aimed to enable Amman to accommodate the growing population and the influx of real estate investments by commercialising the brownfield sites and public spaces of the inner-city area, while protecting its valuable agricultural land which is vulnerable to haphazard urban encroachment (Ai, 2010). Despite the growing demands to implement principles of community planning in the Global South, this research demonstrated that mechanisms for public participation in spatial planning in Jordan are still nascent and
underdeveloped. Most importantly for this research, it has been understood that youth participation in public policy is usually occurs as a one-off\textsuperscript{147} and is subject to the will of the GoJ or at the behest of donor agencies.

The first analytical theme of the adopted theoretical model is social capital. Relational resources addresses issues of institutional thickness, identify key actors involved in Amman 2025 and the nature of their social network. Many interviewees believe that the morphology of relational webs between the state and the market in Jordan hinders youth communities from participating in the public arena of spatial planning and mainstream politics in general. Spatial planning in Jordan is dominated by the state’s planning authorities and their oligarchic networks (i.e., big businesses and economic elites). This has an adverse impact on youth civic engagement and citizenship, leading to a fragmented society in Amman. As a result, weak social capital in Amman discourages young people from engaging in consensus-building ‘exercises’.

In terms of knowledge resources, this research has also demonstrated that spatial planning in Amman is rigid and singly focused on physical considerations and economic development making it a socially and culturally insular plan. Despite the high percentage of young people living in Amman, the extent to which their knowledge, opinions and experiences has been used in policymaking in Amman 2025 is very limited. This raises serious questions about the legitimacy of decisions taken regarding the plan. Subsection 6.2.2, chapter six showed how Amman 2025 was based on the concept of the utopian city articulated through the promotion of a rejuvenated urban image as envisioned by the Mayor Roundtable’s architects and engineers\textsuperscript{148} (R.D., interview, 11/08/2015). The Mayor Roundtable envisioned Amman as a regional city hosting mega economic development projects and attracting business, investment and tourism (N.K., interview, 29/07/2015). The entrepreneurial governance approach provided a ‘fragile’ opportunity structure for youth participation, as community planning in general was not a priority in the Amman 2025 policy agenda. In this respect, the executive board members of the Mayor Roundtable, as administered by the then mayor, Maani, turned to scientific and rational procedures to reinvigorate the real estate

\textsuperscript{147} That is, participation limited to a single time, occasion or instance (see appendix 1).

\textsuperscript{148} Members of the Mayor Roundtable were technocrats, involving prominent Jordanian architects, environmental planners, economic analysts and advisors on art and culture along with representatives from different government authorities.
market under the rhetoric of providing better public services and infrastructure, enhancing citizens’ empowerment and increasing quality of life. Paradoxically, this research has stressed that the guidelines implemented were no more than ‘architectural cosmetics’\textsuperscript{149} focused on physical development, rather than an integrated approach to sustainable spatial plans.

The above qualities of relational and knowledge resources are necessary for building the institutional quality required to ensure greater youth participation in spatial planning. However, they need to be deliberately mobilised by active young people for their potential to be released. Politically active youth in Jordan have been suppressed by the authoritarian state of Jordan via its security apparatuses (Beck and Hüser, 2015). After long decades of a technocratic and top-down urban governance system in Jordan, undemocratic procedures have reflected and become entrenched in planning practice in Amman (Al Nammari, 2013; Alnsour and Meaton, 2009). Amman 2025 employed a top-down youth participation process where development plans were set by related planning authorities, and then the targeted communities were asked to participate. An innovative governance mechanism (e.g., spatial planning partnership, strategic planning cooperation, etc.) is needed to challenge inherited practices of spatial planning and promote bottom-up youth participation, thus nurturing youth agency in the Jordanian public realm.

It could be expected that a weak and poor culture of engaging youth in the public realm would generate a population of young Jordanian who are apathetic or unwilling to get involved in policymaking. Instead, the youth in this research’s focus groups were incredibly ambitious and showed a strong desire to make active contributions to the communities in which they live. They consider themselves fully fledged members of society with a strong determination to devote their energy to community services. Their sense of opportunity, as revealed in focus group discussions, is linked to patriotism and communal duty to their country.

Nevertheless, research analysis found that the cultural composition of Jordanian society has been something of a hindrance to youth participation in urban development. A significant theme that has emerged from the primary data analysis is that of

\textsuperscript{149} The term ‘architectural cosmetics’ was coined by Daher (2005). Daher used this term to criticise the prioritisation of pure aesthetics in historical core regeneration in Jordanian cities, while less attention was paid to place identity and cultural and social factors.
sociocultural perception in relation to youth status in the Jordanian community and their capabilities in public participation. This research has confirmed other findings on how existing social structures, norms and systems in a community can dismiss the notion of youth involvement in policymaking (Derr, 2015; Balsano, 2005; Camino and Zeldin, 2002; Sherrod et al., 2002). Subsection 6.2.4, chapter six, argued that ‘cultural imperialism’ is inconsistent with the concept of youth empowerment in the Jordanian context, and the principles of good governance in general. The analysis discussed how the unwelcoming sociocultural climate and absence of debate culture in Jordan denies and undermines youth participation in programmes of urban development, implementation and evaluation.

Furthermore, the research found that barriers also exist at the household level. Based on the focus group discussion, many respondents stated that they get less attention and guidance from their families in relation to community services and volunteerism. When youth are discouraged from joining voluntary groups or delivering community services, this only perpetuates negative perceptions of youth capabilities and thus dilutes their participation in community affairs and political mobilisation (Teney and Hanquinnet, 2012).

In terms of the planning system, the research analysis reveals how urban governance in Amman is technocratic and representative: elected city councils, along with appointed city officials, administrators and experts, articulate the ‘public interest’ on any issues in spatial planning on behalf of citizens. Moreover, central government overlooks local authorities in urban development planning under the pretext of weak institutional capacity (World Bank, 2005a). Spatial planning in Jordan is administered by the central government. Physical development planning is carried out under the control of the MoI and MoMA (see appendix 5), while socio-economic planning is carried out by MoPIC (World Bank, 2005a). These planning institutions follow ‘command and control’ approaches to planning, which has resulted in ill-informed decisions, thus widening the gap between decision-makers and local needs. The existing governance structure is a one-way function, where a culture of collaborative working has failed to engage youth communities in public policy. Bureaucracy and rigid top-down resource flow strengthen neither vertical nor horizontal governance relations, encouraging competition rather than collaboration among stakeholders, with a focus on services and projects rather than integrated strategy and inclusive policy.
In Jordan, legal frameworks of physical planning define land-use planning as the process of guiding and ensuring sustainable development (Jordanian legislation, 1992, cited in Tewfik and Amr, 2014, p.86). Physical planning is accomplished by the preparation and application of guidelines and provisions to retain natural, geographic and demographic characteristics of Jordanian cities, including the sustainability of natural resources. Accordingly, the author reviewed relevant legal instruments that govern spatial planning in Amman (see subsection 5.3.6, chapter five) in order to understand and investigate the opportunities currently available for youth to participate in the formal structure of strategic spatial planning. Subsection 6.3.2, chapter six, demonstrated how the legal framework of spatial planning is devoid of any recommendations to make connections with civic agencies or residents or to support a bottom-up working pattern. Research analysis demonstrated that the absence of a legal framework to regulate public participation pushes great segments of Jordanian society, and youth in particular, away from the development process, thus affecting the sustainability of spatial plans. The formal institution of government and the legal framework are vital in ensuring public participation in urban development and decision-making (Hassan and McWilliams, 2014; World Bank, 2005b; Innes et al., 1994). Without a proper regulating framework that could institutionalise public participation, the systematic exclusion of young groups from spatial planning is perpetuated.

Politically, the expansion of political freedoms and space for civil society in the public realm in Jordan has been deemed superficial (Coskun, 2013). Despite some progress in political liberalisation and democratisation in Jordan, young people continue to encounter hurdles in their political activities (Wiktorowicz, 2002). Young Jordanian have weak political ‘muscle’ and ‘microscopic’ influence in the political sphere as a result of restricted freedom and the fact that democracy in Jordan is still nascent.

### 8.5 Summary of research recommendations

This research argues that achieving youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan is not a simple project, yet it is achievable. Youth participation is instrumental in promoting the quality of spatial planning, and many research participants and scholars have underscored this argument (Collins et al., 2016; Omar et al., 2016; Lauwers and Vanderstede, 2005). Engaging Jordanian youth in policymaking is not an illusion, but
rather a learning challenge for all society actors\textsuperscript{150} in the spatial planning process. Rapid urbanism entails an innovative systematic design by which new forms of urban partnerships among key social actors, including young communities, are developed for collaborative planning (Huxham et al., 2000).

The concept of institutional capacity building is deemed helpful and meaningful for understanding a crucial aspect of the soft infrastructure of urban governance in a specific context (González and Healey, 2005). Building institutional capacity is believed to be the best way to ensure greater youth involvement in spatial planning practices in Jordan. The very first requirement for enhancing the institutional capacity of Jordanian planning practices is the building of strong social capital in localities. This research recommends that planning authorities should deepen their relationship with youth communities, and with relevant government entities that nurture and support youth agency. Relational nexuses build up intellectual and social capital to be called on in future planning initiatives (Healey, 2006a, p.57). A large stock of social capital in a locality facilitates coordination and communication between youth communities and other actors (Teney and Hanquinet, 2012; El-Said and Harrigan, 2009). Building a close relationship between planning authorities and youth would enable sustainable and comprehensive spatial plans that are more sensitive and responsive to youth ideas and opinions (Derr, 2015).

Enhancing relational resources in planning practices is inexorably linked to the quality of knowledge resources (Polk, 2011). Relational webs connect different stakeholders to various stores of knowledge and understandings through deep deliberation and open dialogue. The criterion of knowledge resources refers to the capacity of planning authorities to involve new ideas from different stakeholder backgrounds (Amin and Thrift, 1995), thus young people’s knowledge, interests and voices will be integrated and fused into the policymaking process (Zapata and Kaza, 2015; Khakee, 2002; Amin and Thrift, 1995). Moreover, the quality of knowledge resources is judged according to the wide range of good-quality spatial information available to youth communities. A good-quality information base is a very valuable resource in fostering coexistence in a locality (Healey, 2006a, p.303).

\textsuperscript{150} These include planning authorities at the local, regional and national levels, stakeholders from civil society and the market sector and young Jordanians as well.
Thirdly, young people in Jordan need to develop a repertoire of mobilisation techniques to sustain momentum towards active and sustainable youth participation in policymaking. Mobilisation capacity emphasises the micro-political events where youth act to capture opportunities, or, as Healey and colleagues (2002, p.21) described it, ‘cracks’ to challenge established ways of planning practices. Some respondents from both the interviews and the focus group discussions suggested that youth councils be established to address issues at the neighbourhood level. Youth councils are a potential mechanism, and one of the desirable engagement activities mentioned by focus group participants, by which youth can address issues in their localities through community service, volunteerism, community assessments, counselling and policy-specific actions (Checkoway and Aldana, 2013).

In addition, research reveals that mobilisation capacity and youth leadership are inexorably linked. To help youth thrive in a competitive political environment, they should have greater awareness and knowledge of local and national issues, and political strategies and skills to build their agency (Levy, 2016). This research suggests a range of extracurricular civic learning approaches and volunteerism to foster youth leadership in spatial planning (Sundeen, 1989). Such capacity-building techniques include helping youth to understand how planning processes work and how they can influence the planning process. Therefore, political education is considered an effective tool to raise awareness regarding youth rights and duties (Bergamini, 2014; Checkoway and Aldana, 2013; Checkoway, 2011).

However, youth can be truly mobilised to participate in the implementation process if they feel respected and valued by their surrounding communities (Omar et al., 2016). Initially, it is a prerequisite to promote a culture of debating within Jordanian society at large. Without community support, disrespect for youth capabilities from their adult counterparts would leave them feeling less valued (Kirshner, 2008) and dilute social and cultural capital in Jordanian cities. The building of local, community-driven projects that facilitate youth-adult partnerships would foster developmental relationships by which the voice of youth may be heard and by which they may influence policy (Levy, 2016). Fostering youth–adult relationships would build mobilisation capacity so that youth would be more interested in addressing neighbourhood issues, arranging local programmes, and organising social and political action on issues emerging from urban development (Kirshner, 2008).
In this regard, communicative planning theory provides a rich seam of ideas and normative criteria to building cultural capital that promotes youth participation in Jordan. The institutionalist approach recognises that social learning generates policy ideas, systems of meaning and social relations to overcome the ‘dilemmas of coexistence’ in a locality (Healey, 2006a, p.201). In the spatial planning context, the nature of social relationships in a locality is significant as they either help to mobilise and increase acceptance of young groups in policymaking, or hinder and limit their involvement in addressing community issues. Also, the dynamics of informal structure would create/inhibit new knowledge, new relations and new cultural orientations, developing the “intellectual and social capital of a place” (Healey, 2006a, p.140). Habermas’s communicative rationality involves increasing institutional efforts to develop new ways of building mutual understanding and trust between youth and other stakeholders in a locality. Habermas claims that it is through “open conversation among diverse peoples ... we can arrive at ‘truths’ and ‘values’” that support collaborative multi-interest planning (Healey, 2006a, p.53). Through collaborative strategy-making, youth and adults in Jordan would develop relational resources and governance values by which they could learn, transmit or transform systems of meaning, understand ways of acting and build mutual trust to be called on in future. In this context, social learning is critical to overcoming cultural imperialism in Jordan and enabling youth, along with other social groups and stakeholders (i.e., individuals, groups or firms, etc.) in a locality, to work together in a collective ‘intellectual effort’ to address community issues (Innes and Booher, 2004).

Administratively, this study suggests devolving greater power and autonomy to regional and local authorities, particularly on issues of physical and socio-economic planning. Greater autonomy of local and regional authorities over spatial planning makes plans more attentive to local needs, thus enhancing well-being and the qualities of localities, making cities more ‘liveable’ and functional for all age groups and political communities (Omar et al., 2016). A governance approach in policymaking should be more ‘enabling’ of the values, needs and demands of youth, rather than following the ‘commanding’ and ‘controlling’ approach to spatial planning. The Jordanian state ought to change from a representative governance style, as a ‘welfare’ provider, to an inclusionary governance style, promoting the activities of business and the agency of young groups alike. The bureaucratic structure and process of ‘command
and control’ increases distance between local planning authorities and young groups, making cities more socially fragmented and diluting social capital. Therefore, research participants believed that the role of local authorities and municipalities should transcend boundaries of municipal service provision so that they contribute to policymaking and development, goal setting and eventually, administering spatial planning process. Local authorities in Jordan should work harder to re-establish trust and to repair youth’s faith in city planning systems. Otherwise, participatory projects for young people might turn into ‘prestige projects’, where youth become less and less interested in raising their voices in community planning.

Spatial planning systems incorporate systems of law and procedures that set the ground rules for the right to challenge spatial plans. Legally institutionalising youth participation would create the conditions for entrenched and long-term youth involvement in future urban development projects. The majority of interviewees strongly agreed that planning acts in Jordan are traditionalistic and suggested the creation of laws that make youth involvement a statutory requirement. Accordingly, this study calls for the institutionalisation of the CRC in all policies and regulations that control and guide urban growth and development in Jordan.

### 8.6 Research contributions

Amman is one of the most rapidly growing and changing cities worldwide (Ababsa, 2011a, p.57; Daher, 2011a, p.67) and youth participation in urban policymaking is of critical importance to its resilience and sustainable development. Therefore, the rationale of this research is to expand and contribute to knowledge and theory regarding youth participation in urban policymaking in Amman. In-depth and detailed information on experiences of youth participation in Jordan has been collected, analysed and discussed to achieve the research contribution to literature and theory. The following discussion sheds light on the research’s key contributions.

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151 This metaphor is associated with tokenistic participation (see Hart’s model of youth participation in appendix 1). Arnstein (1969) used tokenistic participation in her devised framework, the ‘ladder of citizen participation’, which has citizen non-participation at the bottom of the ladder and citizen control of decision-making at the top.
8.6.1 Contribution to knowledge

This study highlighted the obstacles embedded in the delivery of and the serious deficiencies in much-needed welfare services to youth in cities across Jordan. There is a paucity of genuine academic research on youth participation in Jordan’s urban policymaking. This study was among the few to identify the gap in the literature on youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan. There is a meagre body of academic research that investigates urban planning in Jordan from a political perspective under the institutionalist theory of collaborative planning, where the embedded power structure in the decision-making process regarding Jordan’s urban policymaking is still far from having been thoroughly investigated.

This study provided an in-depth account of the institutional context of spatial planning in Jordan, which is mostly patchy and limited and only documented in the form of grey literature, and thus this study provides an academic source of reference to spatial planning in Jordan. The discussion highlighted the key actors who assume responsibility in the decision-making of urban development. This study provided an important and significant body of knowledge in relation to the decision-making system of spatial planning in Jordan. Also, the study explores the creation of Amman 2025, in order to extrapolate the institutional capacity of the Jordanian planning system and practices for more interactive and inclusive urban governance in general, with particular attention to young people in Jordan. In doing so, this research presents an image of the status of youth in Jordan. This offers important insight to practitioners who endeavour to promote youth empowerment, thus assisting them in shaping effective practices. It calls on policymakers and practitioners in public administration to pay more attention to the sociocultural forces and the importance of building intergenerational partnership for collaborative urban policymaking. In terms of planning systems, this research seeks to make a contribution to the effort to transform the Jordanian bureaucratic structure from ‘government’ to greater ‘governance’, in which the meanings of a place are deliberatively articulated, debated and disseminated among all involved, interested and affected stakeholders.

8.6.2 Contributions to theory

Youth, in addition to policy and practice, should also receive more scholarly attention. The field of youth participation in spatial planning is under-theorised (Collins et al.,
2016; Richards-Schuster and Pritzker, 2015; Severcan, 2015; Kudva and Driskell, 2009; Cavet and Sloper, 2004), particularly in the Global South (Philipps, 2018). Accordingly, this study contributes to an existing intellectual project of collaborative spatial planning and joins a nascent movement in promoting an institutional approach to critically analyse youth participation in urban policymaking.

This research proposes a new prescriptive theoretical model\textsuperscript{152} that seeks to promote greater youth involvement in Jordan’s spatial planning (see figure 7-2). Healey’s systemic institutional approach to managing co-existence in fragmented places has been derived from the literature, presented in figure 2-1, chapter two, and employed to investigate the context of youth participation in urban policymaking in Jordan. This is considered a significant step towards overcoming the theoretical limitations in the field of youth participation in policymaking. Healey presented her conceptualisation of systemic institutional design to advance a governance framework in order to deal with matters of collective concern and to manage coexistence in shared spaces of multi-relational groups, or cultural communities, often with different priorities and interests (Healey, 2006a, pp.284–310). This research aims to draw on this theoretical work and adapt this model to be more oriented towards enhancing youth communities’ involvement in shared places along with other social actors in Jordanian cities.

However, the discussion argues that the systemic institutional design for managing coexistence in shared places is not immediately applicable to the governance context of Jordan, and in relation to the field of youth participation in particular. Following the postmodernist typology for collaborative planning theory, “theory is to greater or lesser degrees normative, a non-linear conception of time and progress” (Allmendinger, 2002, abstract). Therefore, theories should take into consideration “spatial and temporal variance in any understanding of the formulation, interpretation and application of theory” (ibid.). Spatial planning in Jordan should incorporate international theoretical models and best practice while being uniquely Jordanian (think global, act local) and pay greater attention to the distinctive social and cultural dimensions of the Jordanian context. By investigating youth participation from the

\textsuperscript{152} For Allmendinger (2017, p. 17), prescriptive theories are those type of theories which is concerned to provide the best and most convenient framework to achieve a desired outcome (i.e., greater youth participation in Jordan’s spatial planning).
institutionalist perspective, the study strengthened the much-needed link between theory and practice concerning youth empowerment policies in Jordan’s public policymaking. The deductive–inductive approach of theory testing and building was deemed a useful and meaningful approach in ensuring research rigour in relation to adopting and adapting the theoretical model of Healey to the Jordanian context. In doing so, this thesis joins other prominent scholars’ efforts (see table 2-2, chapter two) and recent studies in shedding light on the analytical power of the neo-institutionalism paradigm in fields of public participation in policymaking. The research has demonstrated that this form of institutionalist analysis has contributed to a more grounded context-based youth empowerment policy in Jordan, thus fostering links between theory and practice concerning youth participation in spatial planning.

Theoretical contributions involve theory testing and/or theory building (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007). Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007), according to the taxonomy presented in figure 3-4, chapter three, believed that the category of expanders offers the highest level of theory contribution. Expanders combine both theory testing and theory building. This study combines both: testing the adopted theoretical framework and building on (expanding) it to produce stronger theory by incorporating new themes that emerged from strongly emphasised elements of the raw data but which were not part of the original theoretical constructs. The research analysis has drawn out a number of themes and issues regarding youth participation in spatial planning in Jordan that warrant further consideration in theoretical research (see section 8.9, below). The model of systemic institutional design developed pays greater attention to cultural resources as a major theme in determining and shaping the concept of youth participation in the Jordanian context. This research deployed some of the ideas in Habermas’s theory of communication to enrich the discussion of Healey’s (2006a) work on systemic institutional design and represent it in a finer and more precise way in relation to youth involvement in policymaking according to the Jordanian context. It pays greater attention to the sociocultural forces and the embedded meanings within Jordanian society that shape planning practices (soft infrastructure) and are deemed a significant hindrance to youth participation in the public realm in Jordan.
8.7 Strengths and weaknesses of the research

Research strengths

One of this research’s strengths lies in treating the civil society in Jordan as a heterogeneous sphere rather than homogeneous one. Youth as a social segment in Jordanian society has distinct values with a different nature to their adult counterparts. Many public participation studies investigate civil society in the Global South as a homogenous social group. Vulnerable and under-represented groups in Jordanian society (i.e., ethnic minorities, women, elderly, etc.) have experienced urban development differently from other social groups (Osborne et al., 2017).

Research on spatial planning, urban governance and public participation requires careful sociological and qualitative work (Smith, 2009, p.9; Healey et al., 2002, p.24). The use of an in-depth case study gave the researcher the opportunity to enhance the exploratory nature of the investigation and to penetrate the complexity of the social processes deemed critical in understanding the relational webs and cultural resources that shape the formation and deployment of the planning system and planning practices in Jordan (Healey et al., 2002). Moreover, this study greatly benefited from the researcher talking to young residents in Amman, instead of just consulting the professional planning community, city officials or community leaders. Focus groups enabled greater understanding of how youth perceive themselves and their relations to other social actors in Amman, and their ability to work collectively.

The interpretive qualitative epistemology of this work was ideal for urban governance research of this nature. This methodology and its data collection strategies used semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to access a detailed, in-depth, interpretive understanding of youth participation in Jordan. The qualitative method was the most appropriate to studying youth participation in spatial planning in Amman. The methodology designed for the investigation was particularly effective as it enabled the capture of Jordanian youth’s systems of meaning and frames of reference that were critical for research focusing on revealing cultural challenges to authentic youth participation in Jordan. The methodology enabled categories to emerge from inductive reasoning, thus generating a new contribution to the theoretical framework, and thus developing a youth participation framework compatible with the Jordanian context.
Spatial planning is a complex and intertwined discipline (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010). The flexibility of semi-structured interviews yielded deeper explanations of the decision-making process in the Jordanian spatial planning system. Also, focus groups were helpful in providing shared experiences and popular solutions to overcome cultural and institutional barriers without compromising differences in opinion. These two strategies contributed to establishing validity, credibility and reliability to legitimise the research findings. Triangulation of methods and data is often recognised as a way to address weaknesses in qualitative studies (Seale and Silverman, 1997). The use of various sources from different qualitative methods (research participants involve those from the state, market and civil society sector) facilitated the triangulation of data, which strengthened the validity and reliability of research conclusion.

**Research weaknesses**

This study argues that if other spatial planning case studies in Jordan were used in research analysis, more new themes, connections and concepts could emerge, or more patterns could be discovered for extra validation of research findings. The researcher acknowledges that a single case study may preclude crucial insights that cross-city and cross-national case studies would highlight. Accordingly, the study, due to its use of a single case study and the size of the sample used, does not necessarily permit generalisation of findings to any context outside the city of Amman. In terms of planning practices, Vigar and colleagues (2000) argued that planning practices differ from place to place according to varying institutional contexts in terms of local knowledge resources, historical background and legacies of past policies (p.55). Nevertheless, the long tradition of a highly centralised planning system in Jordan has resulted in parallel institutional contexts in different cities across the nation.

With regard to Jordan’s move towards democracy, it would be interesting if this research could be furthered by repeating the methodology to involve a larger number of young people from different Jordanian cities. Since this study is based on a single case, the conclusions arrived at in this thesis are open to further refinement and critique. Youth who were interviewed in the research are all residents of the city of Amman. However, given the wide socio-economic and cultural disparities among Jordanian cities, future research could widen the sample of youth involved to include others from southern and northern governorates of Jordan. Much of the existing literature on public
participation distinguishes between different social classes in terms of their political engagement patterns (Archer, 2010, p.224). There may also be distinctions to discover between youth who come from different socio-economic backgrounds.

Other weaknesses were also notable in this research. Methodologically, the author acknowledges that his personal background is likely to have influenced the interpretation and analysis of the data. As a young resident in Amman, the researcher is deemed an insider in the case study; being an insider is likely to influence data interpretation, as the researcher will struggle to distance himself/herself. This challenge could be addressed by involving a third party who has access to the raw research data and engages in research interpretation. Moreover, Seale and Silverman (1997) believed that the mechanisms followed in thematic analysis overcome this methodological difficulty in achieving reliability and validity in qualitative research analysis.

### 8.8 Research limitations

It is important to mention that this research has faced some limitations with respect to collecting the data and conducting the fieldwork. These were detailed in section 3.12, chapter three, and are summarised here.

According to Healey (2006a, p.84), spatial planning in the 21st century ought to be a deeply political exercise. As the author comes from an architectural engineering background, his perception in relation to urban planning has had to switch from seeing planning as a collation of technical blueprints prepared by qualified experts and engineers to accepting planning as a value-laden activity where citizens form a complex entity, rather than being numbers, and whose emotions, feelings and experiences have to be integrated in urban policymaking. Switching disciplines in academia is a challenging task. The mentalities of architectural engineers and politicians are significantly different. The researcher had to become familiar with the qualitative research approach to critically investigate the values, psychology and frames of reference of Jordanian society. Throughout the course of the PhD programme, the author carried out thorough research into and read extensively from well-known and oft-cited sources in relation to social science methodology, as well as attending several training courses and workshops to develop his capability in social research analysis. In addition, an interdisciplinary scholar has to overcome the barrier of language. Architectural engineering and planning theories have different academic jargons. In
order to overcome this challenge, the author referred extensively to *The Dictionary of Human Geography* by Gregory and colleagues (2009) because of its simple way of defining key social science terminology.

With regard to the collection of secondary material, the author was challenged by the limited availability of research on the systems and practices of spatial planning in Amman. Also, the researcher faced the problem of the unavailability of documents and information regarding public participation in public policy within the context of Jordan (Meaton and Alnsour, 2012), and youth participation in the public realm in particular. Hardly any literature on Amman’s urban governance and spatial planning could be found through secondary data. The researcher relied heavily on primary data resources in addition to the available documents in relation to Amman 2025 to fill the gap in our understanding of the institutional context in Amman (see documentary evidence in subsection 3.7.2, chapter three). For example, there were no formalised statements or published participant observations or academic reflections on the processes of Amman 2025 from local researchers. Another major limitation was that of the formats in which data were available to the researcher. Most published research on Amman’s urban development that was found was limited and patchy. Triangulation of data resources was useful in overcoming this limitation (see section 3.8, chapter three).

Time and resource constraints limited the data-gathering process. The task process of primary data collection in a developing country (i.e., Jordan) is by no means an easy one. The researcher found it challenging, because of the limited range of secondary data, to find interviewees relevant to the research context who could take part in semi-structured interviews. Therefore, the snowball technique was deemed very useful in targeting research informants.

A further challenge was noted regarding semi-structured interview meetings. Although the author contacted the prospective interviewees two months before the proposed field trip, the author relied on word of mouth to arrange semi-structured meetings. Arranging semi-structured interviews was challenging, as many interviewees cancelled their meetings at the last minute without the author being informed. Therefore, data collection was time- and resource-consuming, and distressing on a couple of occasions. Nevertheless, the author is grateful to all the interviewees who kindly offered their time to participate in this research.
8.9 Areas for further research

Future theoretical research

The theoretical framework presented in figure 7-2, chapter seven highlighted significant issues that policymakers should bear in mind when facilitating youth engagement in spatial planning in the context of Amman. It also highlights the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in relation to youth participation in Jordan for the institutionalisation of their rights.

This research by no means claims to be a comprehensive evaluation of youth participation in the Jordanian context. The newly emerged theme of cultural infrastructure (i.e., cultural capital) needs further scrutiny and research. This could be achieved by analysing the findings of this study through the lens of cultural anthropology. Cultural anthropologists argue that cultural conceptions, customs and rituals shape daily practices and have a strong impact on “how the world works and how people should behave” (Vigar et al., 2000, p.48). This research demonstrated that youth participation in Jordan requires dialectic, recursive and evolving modes of governance and cultural capital that ‘link’ different social groups and youth communities together in ‘communicative’ policymaking. Therefore, it is important to avoid simplistic and normative approaches to participatory development and youth empowerment in Jordan, which are the approaches usually followed by international donor agencies and policymakers in the Global South (Hasan, 2012, p.226). It is vital to deeply understand the unique structure of civil society in Jordan and its relationship with other social actors in the Jordanian cities (G.P., interview, 23/07/2015). In fact, the domain of kinship cannot be separated from the domain of public policy. Understanding the cultural context of Jordan would deepen our understanding of the multidimensional, complex and layered reality of Jordanian communities. Future research may focus on the morphology of tribal hierarchy and family connections in Jordanian society, and how this challenge could be turned into an opportunity to foster youth involvement in the public realm (Rowland, 2009).

Future empirical research

Further empirical research is also required to achieve more reliable results for extra verification through a quantitative study and statistical analysis. It would also be beneficial to do a comparative study and analysis with another case – a successful case
of youth engagement in the Global North urban planning context. Comparative studies and adapting best practice would give the international donor agencies in Jordan the opportunity to benefit from international experiences in seeking the best possible context-based approach for youth empowerment.

It would be particularly interesting to expand the age categories involved in this research. Because of legal limitations of age and the requirement of parental consent for involving youth under 18, this study’s invitation was confined to youth between 18 and 24 years old. Due to the limited period of time in the field, the researcher controlled the quantity of data to be collected and the number of interviews to be conducted. Accommodating a broader range of age groups may reveal different experiences and points of view and thus different findings and recommendations. This research acknowledges this limitation and recommends expanding the age categories to include all ages from 15 to 24 in accordance with the UN definition of youth.

There is also scope for research to cover social media issues and its role in youth participation in Jordan. Most policy studies support claims that online social networking and digital platforms may lead to increased youth participation (Sakil, 2017; Kahne et al., 2012). Jordan still has extensive work to do on the development of eGovernment programmes and the digitisation of service provision to citizens (Alsoud and Nakata, 2012, cited in Nusir, 2014, p.4). Maulana (2016, p.244) stated that there is a variety of discourses in social media because there is no monopoly of power. Strikingly, the data collected reveal surprising results regarding the use of social media and youth participation. Youth did not refer, either in the focus groups or in response to the screening questions (see appendix 9-3), to technology and digital communications as a means of expressing their opinions or of participation. Social media and newsletters were preferred by the majority as ways to get information about any planning initiatives in their areas.

As the majority of youth possess at least one smart device and use the internet more frequently and for more social activities than older people do, Maulana (2016, p.244) believed it is a medium for the underprivileged to express their opinion without fearing any social or physical sanctions. Youth’s avoidance of social media could be attributed to the limitations of social media in transmitting nonverbal elements of communication (i.e., voice tone, expression, looks and manner, etc.) (Healey, 1992). Also, people using
social media cannot develop a healthy democracy, “because they can easily avoid engaging in rational argumentation or making consensus with others” (Maulana, 2016, p.244). However, this could form a future research case to further investigate opportunities for developing the role of digital communication and media literacy in youth involvement in urban planning.

Consequently, the researcher is looking forward to building a structured research framework relevant to public participation, urban governance and sustainable development in Jordan. The author is eager to develop conceptual and analytical frameworks to enable a better understanding of the urbanisation processes promoting sustainable environmental, economic and social development in Jordan. These concepts are still evolving and open to further scrutiny and development, particularly in the countries of the Global South (Najam, 2005). In addition, the researcher is committed to conducting further investigation of the sociocultural forces and explore other pressing challenges that hinder young groups from taking a role in the development of major Jordanian cities. The researcher aims to report his research findings to the youth of Jordan and the scientific community in the form of peer-reviewed journal papers.


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Critical Institutionalist Analysis of Youth Participation in Spatial Planning
The case of Jordan – References


Critical Institutionalist Analysis of Youth Participation in Spatial Planning

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