A NEW PRAGMATIC THEORY FOR FOCUS AND EMPHASIS

A Textlinguistic Analysis of Focus, Emphasis Proper and Specificational Emphasis in Modern Standard Arabic

By

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M. M. Dhanoon
Not Only Is Knowledge The Acquisition Of Theories But Putting These Theories Into Practice As Well.
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DEDICATION

To my mother, who taught me love and self-denial,
and to my friend Taalib Naasir, whom I tragically lost a number of years ago.
ABSTRACT

The primary concern of this thesis is to provide a new pragmatic approach to Focus, Emphasis in general and Specificational Emphasis in particular in Modern Standard Arabic. The approach is based on suggesting (i) two new proposals as to how these phenomena should be textlinguistically viewed, and (ii) a new pragmatic model which is more plausible than any of its rivals in the field. The model, whose characteristic merits would certainly show theoretical straightforwardness, comprehensiveness, and consistency, is based on the spirit of Grice’s pragmatic model, Halliday’s notions of choice and (in)congruence and the typologies of constative and receiver of Arabic rhetoric. The cardinal issue taken as a springboard to the present analysis of such phenomena is that one’s own knowledge of the veracity or falsity of a certain proposition usually necessitates actualization. The success or failure to actualize such knowledge is bound to transmit either verbal and non-verbal, or non-verbal contextual clues which motivate text producers to respond communicatively. The second cardinal issue pursued throughout the present work is that there is a natural linkage between form and pragmatic interpretation.

Most contemporary linguistic studies have more or less failed to provide an adequate and plausible account of unmarked Focus, i.e. Non-emphasis, Emphasis proper and Specificational Emphasis, let alone De-emphasis. Any comparison between the new theory of the present work and its current rivals is likely to reveal how inadequate the latter are.
ABBREVIATIONS

acc = Accusative
C = Consonant
CD = Communicative Dynamism
CP = Cooperative Principle
CSE = Contrastive Specificational Emphasis
ener = Energetic
FSP = Functional Sentence Perspective
gen = Genitive
G = Grammatical
HCSE = Hyperbolically Contrastive Specificational Emphasis
HESE = Hyperbolically Exhaustive Specificational Emphasis
imp = Imperative
ind = Indicative
jus = Jussive
L = Logical
nom = Nominative
p, q = Sentence variables
pred = Predication
RQ = Rhetorical Question
S = Specificational
SE = Specificational Emphasis
SP = Structural Parallelism
subj = Subject
sub = Subjunctive
TCSE = Truth-conditionally Contrastive Specificational Emphasis
TESE = Truth-conditionally Exhaustive Specificational Emphasis
TSE = Truth-conditional Specificational Emphasis
V = Vowel
The following phonetic description of the symbols used is basically adopted from Al-Ani (1970).

Vowels

- \( i \) — short high front unrounded vowel
- \( ii \) — long high front unrounded vowel
- \( a \) — low short central unrounded vowel
- \( aa \) — long low central unrounded vowel
- \( uu \) — long high back rounded vowel
- \( u \) — short high back rounded vowel
- \( ay \) — diphthong as in “Bay”

Consonants

- \( b \) — voiced bilabial stop
- \( t \) — voiceless dental stop
- \( th \) — voiceless interdental fricative
- \( j \) — voiced palatal affricate
- \( h \) — voiceless pharyngeal fricative
- \( kh \) — voiceless velar fricative
- \( d \) — voiced dental stop
- \( dh \) — voiced interdental fricative
- \( r \) — dental trill
- \( z \) — voiced dental fricative
- \( s \) — voiceless dental fricative
- \( sh \) — voiceless palatal fricative
- \( s \) — voiceless ‘emphatic’ dental fricative
- \( d \) — voiced ‘emphatic’ dental fricative
- \( l \) — voiceless ‘emphatic’ dental stop.
voiced 'emphatic' dental fricative
voiced uvular fricative
voiceless labiodental fricative
voiceless uvular stop
voiceless velar stop voiced palatal affricate
lateral dental
bilabial nasal
dental nasal
voiceless laryngeal fricative
bilabial glide
palatal glide
glottal stop
voiced pharyngeal stop

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INTRODUCTION

THE LINGUISTIC FRAMEWORK

The term "Focus" has come to be technically used in contemporary linguistics to cover a range of various meanings employable in a range of diverse contexts. Generally speaking, it is broadly used to designate the most prominent part of a given utterance regardless whether the utterance is emphatic or not. Such studies, few though they may be, have to a great extent been influenced by their respective theoretical methodologies applied to describe the structural realizations of Focus in natural languages. The claims such studies have made and the conclusions reached are useful contributory insights to the progress of modern linguistics in general and Focus phenomenon in particular. However, there still seems a great deal of dispute among contemporary linguists consequent upon apparent lack of understanding of certain linguistic areas, differences of methodology, the passive role assigned to the receiver in identifying the goals of actual communication, etc. In consequence, linguistic areas such as Focus and Emphasis seem to have puzzled those who endeavoured to unfold their mystery. In this respect, Grimes (1975: 323), for example, complains that

the words topic, focus, theme, and emphasis, appear freely in the linguistic literature, but with such broad ranges of overlap and confusion that they are nearly useless.

Dillon (1981: 101), similarly, points out that

focus, emphasis, and flow of information are terms referring to stylistic precepts and intuitions seeking a theory

Even most current pragmatic accounts used to provide contextual interpretations for such areas have more or less failed to formalize a comprehensive model that could adequately account for the two essential divisions of linguistics, namely content and form. For example, most of the examples pragmatically accounted for by Grice's maxim of quality represent only figures of speech, ironies, etc. Never before have I come
across any account that uses the maxim of quality to account for the relationship between the use of certain syntactic features, i.e. emphasizers, etc., and the text producer’s belief.

The present research is thus an attempt to provide an alternative theoretical and empirical account of Focus and Emphasis in general and a data-based analysis of Specificational Emphasis (henceforth S Emphasis) in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in particular.

Furthermore, the new theoretical perspective to be proposed for Focus, Emphasis proper, De-emphasis and S Emphasis, (henceforth Emphasis) is not only critical of both classical and contemporary linguistic studies but also theoretically consistent, eclectic and comprehensive. The crux of the new theory is to highlight the text producer’s final choice of Focus, Emphasis or De-emphasis which can relay a primary interpersonal function and a secondary textual function, and to show how a more appropriate utterance is to be realized and consequently dispatched in isomorphic and non-isomorphic contexts. I shall confine myself to illustrating the lexico-grammatical realizations of Emphasis and their possible respective discoursal functions in MSA argumentative discourses. Thus, for example, suprasegmental realizations of Emphasis in particular, will be referred to only when relevant.

Prioritizing the pragmatic account for Focus and Emphasis in the present research is not to the complete exclusion of some of the important syntactic and semantic considerations of Focus and Emphasis in general and of our data-based analysis of S Emphasis in particular. In fact the influence which pragmatics is likely to have on our choice of one syntactic feature over another will be the basic argument pursued throughout the present thesis. Perhaps, some linguists who are sceptical enough to reject such a view would not be complacent about such a prioritization for they would
like to see a semantic level as an intermediary between the two. However, it will be demonstrated that the semantic level has in fact a secondary role to play in the pragmatic interpretation of emphatic and non-emphatic utterances. Any possible syntactic adjustment in the structure of a given discourse is bound to reflect primarily contextual significance.

Further to its crucial contextual aspects, the use of Emphasis and S Emphasis has an equally cognitive psychological aspect as well. In effect, the over-use or under-use of Focus and/or Emphasis in a given context clearly helps reveal the text producer's own psychological tendencies and attitude, i.e. self-confident or not, phobic, too great an emotional attachment, etc., towards what is being said in a given communicative event. These tendencies will be informally discussed briefly in terms of the relation they have with the choice of Focus and Emphasis.

The research will primarily be confined to the provision of a detailed theoretical pragmatic account for emphatic and non-emphatic declarative clauses although a sporadic sketchy reference to non-declarative clauses in terms of the link they have with Emphasis will be made. The intention of such a reference is to show their standing and purposes within the new theory and the two new proposals to be advanced for the analysis of Focus and Emphasis. In addition, the terminology consequent upon the two proposals will be changed thereupon.

AIMS

The aims of the present research are manifold. It intends

1. to propose a new pragmatic theory that would account for not only Focus and Emphasis but also other possible linguistic areas by highlighting the importance of form and content alike; the model will certainly contribute to Halliday's functional theory by incorporating the systemic concept of choice into pragmatics and by forming a basic
pragmatic aspect of the interpersonal component which is both text producer- and receiver-oriented,

2. to suggest two new proposals whereby Emphasis is to be put in a new illuminating perspective,

3. to provide a theoretically and descriptively consistent pragmatic account of Focus and Emphasis in general and a detailed empirical pragmatic account of S Emphasis in particular in MSA; Emphasis is rarely found to be as adequately analysed by contemporary Arab linguists and Arab western-educated linguists as by the classical Arab rhetoricians,

4. to test the hypothesis that pragmatics impinges to a certain extent on syntax; that is, most, if not all, syntactic choices are pragmatically motivated (cf. Levinson, 1983: 164-5; Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 204; Hatim and Mason, 1990:101 and classical Arab linguists such as al-Jurjaanii and az-Zamakhsharii among others),

5. to resurrect for the first time the Arabic rhetoric typologies of receiver and constative whose pragmatic importance necessary for any comprehensive pragmatic theory intending to account for marked and unmarked literally encoded utterances together with figures of speech, has been wittingly or unwittingly left unnoticed by most western-educated Arab linguists,

6. to provide an FSP clause typology in Arabic whereby clauses are functionally distributed over the first and second instance classes postulated respectively by Firbas (1952) and Bolinger (1952); the distribution being intuitively suprasegmental classifies utterances in terms of Focus, Emphasis and S Emphasis; the typology is an attempt to resolve the long-standing contentious distinction between the Nominal and Verbal clauses in Arabic linguistic circles,

7. to provide a fairly concise account of classical Arabic rhetoric theory, which is too difficult to be accessible by contemporary linguists, and which, had it been noticed by western-educated Arab linguists, would undoubtedly have contributed to a great extent
to the development of modern linguistics as well as enhanced the current pragmatic theories,

8. to provide linguists, universalists, Arabists, and students of linguistics with as clear a picture as possible of the way Arabic grammar and classical rhetoric account for Focus and Emphasis,

9. to help translators understand and eventually be able to translate emphatic and non-emphatic utterances as impeccably as possible,

10. to provide a useful documentation of many linguistic issues relevant to the analysis of Focus and Emphasis; the intention is to bridge the theoretical and terminological gap between current pragmatic theories and classical Arabic rhetoric.

METHODOLOGY

Methodologically, we find the methodological approach of Halliday’s systemic functional theory most suitable for the analysis of Focus and Emphasis in the present study but with the endorsement of Leech’s pragmatic conception of the theory. What is significant in the theory and of which we shall avail ourselves is the crucial system networks available for the text producer to make his choices in the process of realizing the structure of the clause concerned. The paradigmatic relations in such networks represent the language potential from which the actual syntagmatic relations are derived. The interpersonal system networks of Focus and Emphasis will form a major part of explicating how our choices from such networks are likely to be contextually as well as psychologically constrained if we are to produce a more appropriate utterance in a certain context. The final choice from such interpersonal paradigmatic networks will not only underpin the contextual factors of the situation concerned but also the text producer’s attitude, mood and tendencies. Let us first outline Halliday’s model to be followed by Leech’s modifications.
the semantic system of a natural language is organized into a small number of distinct components, different kinds of 'meaning potential' that relate to the most general functions that language has evolved to serve. The first of these is language as representation: the semantic system as expression of experience, including both experience of what is round about us in the outside world and experience of the world of consciousness that is inside us. This we are calling the ideational component. There are two subcategories: an experiential, where we represent experience 'directly' in terms of happenings (actions, events, states, relations), entities that participate in these happenings (persons, animate and inanimate objects, institutions, abstractions) and circumstantial features (extent, location, time and space, cause, manner and so on); and a 'logical', where we represent experience 'indirectly' in terms of certain fundamental logical relations in natural language- 'and', 'namely', 'says', 'is subcategorized as' etc. -which are not those of formal logic but rather are the ones from which the operations of formal logic are ultimately derived. These two, the logical and the experiential, together make up the ideational component in the semantic system: that of meaning in the reflective mode. Within the former subcomponent, the relationships between processes and participants are expressed via the transitivity and voice networks. In the case of the latter, relations such as coordination, subordination and apposition are expressed. The second main component, the interpersonal, is language as interaction: it is meaning in the active mode. Here the semantic system expresses the speaker's intrusion in the speech event: his attitudes, evaluations and judgments; his expectations and demands; and the nature of the exchange as he is setting it up- the role that he is taking on himself in the communication process, and the role, or rather the role choice, that he is assigning to the hearer. This component is therefore both speaker-and hearer-oriented. Systemicists have accounted for this component through the system networks of mood of the clause. All discourse involves an ongoing simultaneous selection of meanings from both these components, which are mapped into a single output in the realization process. But there is also a third component, which we are calling the 'textual', whereby the meanings of the other two kinds take on relevance to some real context. Here the semantic system enables the speaker to structure meaning as text, organizing each element as a piece of information and relating it significantly to what has gone before. This component accounts for the thematic organization and information structure of the propositional content of the clause.
Furthermore, Halliday (1985) in later writings, according to Butler (1988a), represents phenomena concerned with illocutions in terms of three levels of system networks, correlated by a realizational relationship. The top level which he terms 'social context' is outside the grammar. The networks meant to model the structure of dialogue, are of two types: the 'role assignment' options, i.e. giving or demanding, and the 'commodity exchanged' options distinguishing the exchange of goods and services from that of information. The second level which is labelled 'speech function' is 'semantics' and thus regarded within grammar. Two types of networks are specified: the 'turn' options, i.e. initiating and responding acts, and the 'orientation' options opposing offer or statement to command or question. The third level of networks is grammatical, in the sense of syntactic, and consists of imperative, interrogative and declarative. According to Halliday, there are sets of congruent as well as incongruent realizational relationships between choices at the three levels.

However, Leech's (1983: 56) bone of contention with Halliday's theory concerns the integration of the three semantic components within grammar. Leech, in contrast, maintains the view that only

the ideational function belongs to grammar (semantics, syntax, morphology and phonology): language functioning as a means of conveying and interpreting experience of the world (conveying ideas to the hearer through a sense-sound mapping). The interpersonal function on the other hand, covers language functioning as an expression of one's attitudes and an influence upon the attitudes and behaviour of the hearer. Finally the textual function covers language functioning as a means of constructing a text, i.e. a spoken or written instantiation of language. The interpersonal and the textual functions belong to pragmatics.

Leech (58) further adds that as regards the ideational function,

Halliday presented an altogether more flexible concept of grammar, in which the interpersonal and textual functions are associated with non-discrete types of structure, which he calls 'prosodic' and 'periodic'. He has also drawn attention to a factor shared by the interpersonal and textual functions - namely, the fact that they each have a speaker-oriented and a hearer-oriented aspect. In this respect, Halliday seems to be moving closer to a conception of language in which the ideational component is grammatical in an orthodox sense (dealing in constituent
structures, rules and systems) as distinct from the interpersonal and textual components, which are more pragmatic in conception.

A further contentious issue with Halliday's view concerns the basic difference between pragmatics and his systemic theory. Systemic grammars, according to Butler (1988b, 85),

tend to concentrate on the sociological factors influencing language, whereas pragmatics brings in the more psychological and philosophical influences.

Although both fields, namely pragmatics and sociolinguistics apparently overlap (cf Levinson 1983, 27-30 for further details), pragmatics seems to lie somewhere between semantics and sociolinguistics. Thus the issue which remains to be tackled is how much pragmatics may benefit from Halliday's paradigmatic relations and the concept of choice. Halliday himself is not recognized as a pragmatian, yet his functional theory has a lot in common with the current pragmatic theories. For example although systemicists have recognized the incongruent realizations between form and content, they have paid very little attention to why the text producer often uses highly indirect codings and certain syntactic features, and how the receiver is able to decipher the text producer's goals. It is this area which the present research undertakes to investigate via the use of a new pragmatic theory slightly similar to Grice's pragmatic model within the interpersonal component of the systemic theory. The explanatory procedure of such a perspective is to use the concept of choice and the postulation of non-mutually exclusive interpersonal systems, i.e. +Def vs -Def, similar to those of the ideational component, and to show how pragmatic constraints impinge on the text producer's choices from such interpersonal systems.

A third contentious issue concerns how Halliday views semantics. Halliday (1985: 76, fn.) argues that

semantics has nothing to do with truth.
However, unlike Halliday’s conception, semantics in the present study is to be identified with truth-condition although

the grammar interacts with pragmatics largely via semantics (cf. Leech, 1983: 12),

Semantics in our theoretical and empirical pragmatic interpretation of emphatic and non-emphatic utterances in the present research presumably has not only a secondary role to play but also is applicable to utterances rather than sentences within the pragmatic theory of Arabic rhetoric.

A further legitimate contentious issue concerns the systemic standing of non-declarative clauses in systemic functional grammar. In his latest functional grammar version, Halliday (1985) unfortunately falls short of providing an ideational account of the functional structures of imperative and interrogative clauses on equal footing with that given to the declaratives. Halliday only illustrates the functional structures of the interpersonal and textual components superimposed on the imperatives and interrogatives. Whether Halliday’s use of the term “clause” as a superordinate is meant to imply that all types of clause can be accounted for ideationally, he falls short of providing a single illustration to demonstrate his implicit claim.

Recognizing that context exerts a determining influence on the language used, Hatim (Hatim and Mason, 1990) proposes a similar pragmatic interpretation of Halliday’s model but from a theory of register perspective on translation. Being a textlinguistic ally and aware of the intricacies of the socio-cultural elements in translation, Hatim offers three dimensions to text interpretation based primarily on the identification of the register membership of a text in terms of the three variables field, tenor, and mode in discourse processing. Together these variables set up a communicative transaction in the sense that they provide the basic conditions for communication to take place (53).
However, Hatim further argues that

the problem with register analysis is that the insights it affords into the communicative (ideational) dimension of context, are not themselves sufficient.

Thus, Hatim points out that

a second pragmatic (interpersonal) dimension of context can be distinguished which builds up into the analysis values relating to the ability to 'do things with words'.

Further to these two dimensions, Hatim adds a third dimension which he calls semiotic (textual), and treats a communicative item, including its pragmatic values, as a sign within a system of signs.

From such a scanty consideration of Hatim’s model, the model clearly bears some affinities with Leech’s pragmatic interpretation of Halliday’s systemic functional grammar particularly by treating the interpersonal function as pragmatic where Grice and Searle’s theories can be used to identify the intentionality of the text producer.

Having discussed the reasons, aims and the methodology of the present research, it is necessary now to introduce the lay-out of the whole thesis. The lay-out runs as follows:

Chapter one will be allocated to some of the preliminaries necessary for the topic of the present research. These include a brief account of Arabic grammatical theory based on the task of shedding some light on the importance of Mood and Case elements to Arabic. The suggestions of some Arab linguists to cancel the mood and case systems in the Arabic language have been dismissed as unjustifiable. The importance and relevance of Mood element to the present work stems from the fact that Mood element on the one hand, is correlated with the two new proposals concerning the most appropriate perspective to view Emphasis, and on the other, it is correlated with the new
pragmatic model for the analysis of utterances as speech acts. It will be shown how important the mood systems are to the interpretation of utterances in our critical survey of some of the Arabists and western-educated Arab linguists’ inadequate claims and conclusions which are more or less directly or indirectly relevant to the present research. The third section will focus on the classical structural clause types and how they are formally distinguished in Arabic grammar. The section will further provide a critical reference to classical Arabic schools’ typologies of clause to be followed by a typological discussion on the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic criteria postulated by western contemporary linguists for the identification of basic clauses in natural languages. The fourth section will be a sketchy survey of the basic concerns of Arabic rhetoric and how Emphasis is handled within the rhetoric branch of ‘Ilm al-Ma‘aannii. The fifth section will provide a review of literature.

Chapter two which will form the first theoretical prerequisite necessary for the present research presents the pragmatic model proposed for the analysis of Emphasis and the necessary typologies of constative and receiver. In section one, a critical discussion of the most prominent contemporary pragmatic models will be given. Section two will introduce a new pragmatic model to be applied in chapter five and six. Section three will discuss Arabic rhetoric theory and how it tackles the notion of appropriateness which will form a basic concept in our new model. The section will further introduce the congruent typologies of receiver and constative as envisaged by Arabic rhetoric. Section four will provide a detailed account of the incongruent typologies of receiver and constative listed in Arabic rhetoric. Section five will illustrate how Arabic rhetoric pragmatically accounts for certain syntactic features on the basis of the concept of choice and the conversational implicature involved. Section six provides a new functional clause typology of the FSP-variants based on a presuppositional account.
Chapter three which represents the second theoretical prerequisite introduces the two new proposals as to how Emphasis is best viewed. The consequences of the proposals will be discussed throughout the chapter and the subsequent chapters.

Chapter four will concentrate on the parameters associating Emphasis and requiring to be identified in any pragmatic interpretation of an emphatic utterance. These parameters include: Given/New; the Scope of Emphasis; Presupposition; Contrastiveness; and Exhaustiveness. The chapter also gives a brief discussion on Multiple Emphasis.

Chapter five focuses on the realizations of Emphasis proper in compliance with our new proposals, and how these realizations are to be analysed pragmatically in terms of our new theory.

Chapter six is to provide a very detailed account of Specificational Emphasis which will cover the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic considerations of S Emphasis in Arabic. The empirical analysis of S Emphasis will be given in the last section.

Chapter seven will highlight the findings and the conclusions reached by the present research.
CHAPTER ONE
ARABIC LINGUISTIC THEORIES

Arabic is a privileged language. It has lived for one millenium and a half essentially unchanged (Stetkeyvych, 1970:1).

1.1 ARABIC GRAMMATICAL THEORY

Arabic grammatical theory dates back as far as the eighth century A.D., and it has eventually crystallized into an autonomous discipline, manifesting a favourable formalistic approach to classical Arabic drawn mainly from the Qur’aan, the Prophet’s sayings, and classical poetry. In fact, during those early formative periods, two basic theoretical approaches to Arabic grammatical theory took their final shape at the hands of two classical schools, namely the Basran and the Kuufan. The basic characteristic, that divides the two streams, is that the former’s approach emphasizes the subservience of semantics to syntax, whereas the latter’s emphasizes the subservience of syntax to semantics. Their grammatical and semantic reasonings of linguistic issues in Arabic have consequently led to the provision of double and triple logical reasonings, which are so sophisticated and abstract that they have exceeded in delicacy most of their contemporary rivals in the field.

However, the question of why Arabic grammar has become predominantly formalistic is extremely important and interesting. Classical linguists observed that the local dialects which had started to appear at the time, lacked the use of case and mood inflections; a fact, which would not only have had severe disadvantages and repercussions particularly on the recitation of the Qur’aan in the light of the absolute necessity to pronounce such inflections with great clarity and carefulness but also engendered drastic changes in the language itself in terms of grammar, lexis, pronunciation, etc. As a result, Owens, (1988: 270, n.46), for example, recently notes that
the later linguists, who were very anxious to protect the Qur'an as well as Arabic from change, completely ignored the local dialects... Ibn Khaldun clearly admits that classical Arabic had become a written language which had to be learned as a foreign language by Arabic speakers of his day.

Similarly, Zubaydi (cf. ibid. 22), a traditional linguist, argue that

formal grammar was needed only when the classical language began to be corrupted by the influence of non-Arabic speakers after the spread of Islam. This is backed up by the belief that Arabic, the object of study of the grammarians, cannot change because this would imply that God's word changed (ibid).

Grammar had to preserve and give priority to correct syntax over semantics, and the most appropriate approach to this is

to take the surface forms and systematize them into a coherent descriptive account. The concern of grammar and pedagogy went hand in hand to preserve one specific linguistic variant (with a certain degree of variation allowed (Owens, 22-3)).

A second possible reason for such a move is that most classical linguists observed that any deliberate change in case and mood inflections of a given sentence will directly lead to significant change in meaning (cf. below). Classical Arabic has thus undergone only very insignificant minor lexical changes particularly in lexis.

Theoretically, Arabic grammar centres around the concept of class: a set of items possessing the same possibilities of realizing certain structural functions, e.g. subject, object, etc., in clause structure. It is also based on the notion of "slot and filler" to account for the use of functional elements such as subject, object, etc., and their formal realizations in the surface structure. Syntactically, these elements enter into dependency relationships based on the theory of governance, who whose aim is precisely to account for the distribution of inflectionality marks and how a grammatically affecting element called the governor, at different syntactic positions governs one or more clause elements called the governed, in some case and/or mood. The
theory avails itself heavily of the concepts of “Cause and Effect” in its provision of
more than one logical justification in order to illustrate how the function of inflectionality
is to mark the several semantic values which can affect an element by its insertion in the
clause structure. Being inflectional, Arabic seems to allow the possibility of assigning
more than one semantic value to a certain utterance by merely changing the case or mood
of certain elements (cf. below). Thus, in Arabic grammar, particularly by classical and
contemporary exponents of the Basran School, a variety of governing particles with
completely unrelated semantic values are lumped together by virtue of similarity in
governance; a fact which is intended to highlight the subservience of semantics to syntax
in the linguistic literature of this school. However, the picture is totally the opposite to
the Kuufan exponents, who believe syntax should be the one which is subservient to
semantics.

A second characteristic, which distinguishes the Basrans’ formalistic account
of Arabic grammar from the Kuufans’, is that the former normally has recourse to the
concept of analogy: a binding rule so powerful that it can explain, correct
and form derivations and neologisms, particularly in philology and grammar; whereas,
the Kuufans’ acceptance of such derivations and neologisms is essentially based on
what is sanctioned by common use. There are other delicate contentious
issues in Arabic grammar that provide essential and sophisticated distinctions between
the Basrans’ and Kuufans’ theoretical approaches (cf. Anbaarii).

Owing to the complications of double and triple logical explanations of the
occurrences of various syntactic issues, a new contemporary Arab linguistic school,
which appeared since the turn of the present century, has started to advocate the
Kuufan’s approach to grammatical theory and called for the pedagogical simplification
of Arabic grammar by cancelling the unnecessary double and triple logical
explanations in syntax. Arabic grammar, the school argues, has become too
complicated and abstract for the contemporary student to learn his native language
systems eagerly. Although the call for simplification is extremely necessary, at least at high school levels, the double and triple explanations of a huge number of linguistic issues have, in fact, enhanced rather than complicated Arabic grammatical theory. Suffice it to say that the formal account of Arabic grammar has not only helped provide several plausible explanations for a single linguistic issue but also protect the Qur’aan and classical Arabic from inevitable significant changes.

1.1.1 Mood Systems in Arabic

In order to show the importance of inflectionality to Arabic as well as Focus and Emphasis, it is useful to discuss the inflectionality of the imperfective briefly in Arabic. In actual communication people usually produce utterances, i.e. statements, questions, mands, etc., whereby the role of mood grammaticalization helps identify their functional force. Although our primary concern is to account for the realizations of Emphasis in declaratives, Mood element realizing mood features such as subjunctive, jussive, energetic, etc., can similarly express performative Emphasis in their respective clauses in certain contexts. The account for Mood element will thus serve to contribute not only to a speech acts analysis as it is widely recognized, but also to a micro-structures analysis of utterances by pinning down the range of meanings such as aspectuality, Emphasis, factuality, certainty, etc., attendant upon the use of mood features concerned. The range of such meanings can only be produced if the imperfective, whose meaning versatility is due to its inflectionality, is immediately preceded by the respective governing particle. Thus,

inflection and governance are thus distributed symmetrically relative to each other, and deviations from this pattern occur only under specific conditions (Owens, 1988: 68).

The accountability of the Mood element in Arabic grammar unfortunately falls short of being extended to cover clauses with a perfective lexical verb, which is uninflectional and thus lacks the mood potentiality available to its counterpart the imperfective. In order to overcome this lack, the Arabic language resorts to other
means such as the presence or absence of certain wh-elements, one of the derivatives of the defective verb كان, (be) etc., in the structure, which facilitate the realization of the Mood element of a limited number of mood categories such as declarative, imperative, interrogative, etc.

The Arabic language, Cantarino (1974, vol.1, 77-8) notes,

has developed four types of verbal moods restricted to the imperfective only. These are the indicative الرفع; subjunctive النصب; jussive الجزء; and energetic التأكيد. They are in fact, modal variations of that tense’s basic form represented by the indicative.

By modal variations, Cantarino means that, apart from the unqualified indicative and imperative, the occurrence of other moods such as jussive, energetic, etc., is consequent upon the use of a preceding governing particle. The crucial point relevant to Emphasis and the mood systems is, which of such variations is to represent the unmarked class, and which one to represent the marked class in Arabic. In this respect, Lyons (1968: 307) rightly argues that

mood is best defined in relation to an ‘unmarked’ class of sentences which express simple statements of facts, unqualified with respect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is saying. Simple declarative sentences of this kind are, strictly speaking non-modal, i.e. unmarked for mood. If, however, a particular language has a set of one or more grammatical devices for ‘marking’ sentences according to the speaker’s commitment with respect to the factual status of what he is saying (his emphatic certainty, his uncertainty or doubt, etc.), it is customary to refer to the ‘unmarked’ sentences also (by courtesy as it were) as being ‘in a certain mood’; and the traditional term for this ‘unmarked’ mood is indicative (or declarative) (cf. also Austin, 1962; Fillmore, 1968; and Palmer, 1986).

In Arabic, the distinction between the marked and unmarked class of sentences calls for some clarification as it does not seem as simple as one would have expected. Further to its being the unmarked representation of the epistemic system, the declarative mood can sometimes be modally qualified by a preceding particle
which, for example, only changes the time reference of its imperfective. In this case, the qualified declarative, though it retains its original mood feature, represents a marked variation of the unmarked version (cf. “qad”, /sa-/ and “sawfa” in chapter five).

Furthermore, the Mood element of the imperative in Arabic is similarly realized without being qualified by a preceding particle. Thus, following Palmer (1986, 30), the imperative will represent the unmarked variation of the jussive mood whose marked variations are members of the deontic system and sometimes the epistemic system in Arabic. As regards the subjunctive and the jussive moods as modally marked variations, both can be found in dependent and independent clauses alike.

In order to realize the Mood element in Arabic, the mood system networks of the imperfective, being realized at the verbal group rank, are delicately dependent on the simultaneous choices of the terms finite and imperfective from the systems of Finiteness and Tense respectively. The verbal group chooses from the mood systems between indicative or imperative. If indicative is chosen, the group makes a further choice between declarative and interrogative. If declarative is chosen, the group makes a third choice between qualified and unqualified declaratives. If qualified declarative is chosen, the group may choose between Emphasis proper, S Emphasis or De-emphasis. The unqualified declarative, by contrast, realizes the choice of unmarked Focus (cf. chapter two). Let us next discuss the mood systems in Arabic briefly.

1.1.1.1 The Indicative Mood

A verbal group which has chosen indicative makes a further selection between declarative and interrogative.

(i) The Declarative Mood

Morphologically, the declarative mood of the imperfective is realized when the imperfective form ends in /-u/ if the clause is verbal. If, however, the clause is nominal,
the imperfective may end either in /-u/ if the subject is singular, in /-na/ if the subject is plural or second person singular feminine, or in /-ni/ if the subject is dual.

By virtue of its syntactico-semantic structure, the declarative is conventionally used for a statement conveying the fact as being certain. It can further be used unconventionally with the appropriate intonation to express other types of indirect speech acts such as mandate, question, etc. (cf. the next section). It can be modified through the use of various particles to express emphatic future negation, S Emphasis, future action, past action, etc.

Furthermore, Arabic active and passive participles indicating transitory actions are to be treated as verbal forms, which express present continuous tense. In the following instance, the active participle accepts two types of vowel endings, namely the indicative-like ending /-u/ and the nunation ending /-un/. In both cases the clauses are semantically and almost grammatically the same but the clause containing the former ending differs in terms of its genitive complement object and its past time reference, i.e. epistemic. In contrast, the clause containing the latter differs in terms of its accusative complement object and future time reference, i.e. deontic.

Consider:

1. Anaa daarib-u Zayd-in
    I hit-ind. Zeid-gen

2. Anaa daarib-un Zayd-an
    I (am going to)-hit-un Zeid-acc.

Both variations clearly manifest modally aspectual differences of meaning. There are numerous examples of this sort in Arabic.

(ii) *The Interrogative Mood*

Although the interrogative mood of the imperfective is the same as the declarative, its Mood element is further realized by the presence of a wh-element and/or
yes/no-element assuming initial position in the structure. Functionally, interrogatives can be used unconventionally to express various types of indirect speech acts.

1.1.1.2 The Subjunctive Mood

Morphologically, the subjunctive mood of the imperfective is marked by 1. the presence of the vowel ending /-a/ if the subject is singular, and 2. the omission of the indicative mood suffixes, namely /-na/ if the subject is plural or a second person singular feminine, and /-ni/ if it is dual. Functionally, the subjunctive can be used to express not only negation, inclination and permission but also emphatic future negation if the imperfective is immediately preceded by the particle “lan” (cf. chapter five).

1.1.1.3 The Jussive and Imperative Moods

Although the jussive and imperative moods share the same signification and morphological ending, both differ in that the realization of the jussive Mood element is attendant upon the presence of a preceding governing particle. By contrast, the realization of the imperative, which classical grammarians do not treat as a mood, is consequent upon the absence of a preceding governing particle. Morphologically, they lack the endings characteristic of the indicative and subjunctive, i.e. the last consonant of both forms is pronounced without a vowel. If, however, their forms end in long vowel-like root sounds such as /-aa/, /-uu/ and /-ii/, then both forms are marked by omitting these three phonemes and replacing them with the vowels /-a/ /-u/ and /-i/ respectively.

Functionally, the imperative form, which is normally used to issue a direct mand, can further be used unconventionally to issue permission, exclamation, assertion, threat, etc. The jussive mood, on the other hand, realizes a variety of modal meanings which include indirect mand, negative mand, conditionals, past negation, etc.
1.1.1.4 The Energetic Mood

The fourth mood category, the energetic, is formed by adding the verbal suffixes /-an/ or /-anna/ to the jussive. Although both terminations are inherently emphatic, they seem to have become obsolete in MSA (cf. chapter five).

Like double and triple logical explanations, the usefulness of inflectionality particularly in language learning has been a long-standing contentious linguistic issue in traditional and contemporary Arabic linguistic literature. For example contemporaries such as Aniis (1975) and Bahbahaanii (1988), exponents of the contemporary school, seem to have persistently called for the abandonment of inflectionality in Arabic as it pedagogically complicates the learning and teaching of Arabic. They argue that if we need to teach our language soundly and effectively we have to simplify the way Arabic is taught in schools by dispensing with inflectionality. Although the claim may have a lot of truth in it, dispensing with inflectionality, I believe, does seem to lead to undesirable consequences to the language and the language systems alike if we just consider the following disadvantages of abandoning inflectionality:

1. Arabic will no longer enjoy its free word order; Ibn Khalduun, for example, rightly observed how

the VSO order of classical Arabic, where S and O have distinct case suffixes, has given way to SVO order in the dialects, where the case inflections are lost (cf. Owens, 270: fn. 46)

2. Arabic will lose the variety of meanings resulting from the use of mood and case systems. This has unwittingly been done by some Arab contemporary linguists such as Zayed (1984) and Abdel Hamid (1972) who seem to be unaware of the crucial contribution which the mood categories could have made to their analyses of modality in Arabic, and thus both provided examples some of which either wrongly assign or lack case and mood-markers (cf. chapter three). Although such categories may sometimes prove too difficult a task to master, their abandonment in language learning
will undoubtedly lead to oversimplification and eventual undesirable change of the language and its grammatical systems. To demonstrate the advantages of inflectionality in Arabic, consider the following co-ordinated clause complex cited in Bakir (1984:19), in which the imperfective of the second clause can realize three different mood categories. Consider:

لَن تَأكل السمك و تشرب اللبان.
*Laː taːkul ul-ssamaka waː tashrabu ilitation.*
*Donot eat-jus. fish-acc. and drink-ind yoghurt-acc.*

Here, the Mood element of the first clause realized by the imperfective “ta’kul”, (eat), is always jussive, whereas the Mood element of the second can realise the indicative mood as the example above shows, as well as the subjunctive and jussive moods. Accordingly, if it is indicative, the meaning is not to eat fish but you can drink yoghurt only. If it is subjunctive, namely “tashrab-a”, the meaning is not to do both actions together, or do either of them at a time. If, however, the imperfective concerned is jussive, namely “tashrab” as is the case with the imperfective of the first clause, the meaning of both clauses is not to do both actions at all. It follows that the call for abandoning inflectionality in Arabic cannot be justified in the guise of simplicity and unnecessity.

3. Arabic, as it is developing at the hands of some writers and journalists who are not fully familiar with Arabic grammar and rhetorical manipulation of the language, will contrive to find new ways of expression, possibly repetitive, and too simplistic in discourse processing. Simplistic use of Arabic which has already found its way into journalese has nowadays become characteristic of most of the current Arabic newspapers where grammarians are appointed especially to verify the possible grammatical mistakes found in news reports before they are printed. This has further been compounded by the fact that the majority of contemporary Arab linguists, Arabists, etc., have either wittingly or unwittingly selected their data from such newspapers in order to base their claims and conclusions on empirical analysis (cf. Williams, 1987).
Others, for example, provide neither an exhaustive nor a documented analysis in order to cite what classical linguists have to say about the linguistic areas of concern (cf. Abdul-Hamid, 1972; Koch, 1982; al-Sweel, 1983; Abu Mansour, 1986 and Williams, 1987). The unfortunate lack of exhaustive coverage owing to apparent unfamiliarity with the required information relevant to the areas investigated has produced unconvincing conclusions and inaccurate claims made about MSA. In order to demonstrate how inconclusive their claims are let us, for example, briefly check the validity of certain claims made by Koch (1982 & 1990) and Williams (1987) about Arabic.

Koch, motivated by compositions in English written by Arabic-speaking students in ESL writing classes, analyses the language and rhetoric of written expository discourses on “Arab Unity” in MSA. Koch alleges that there is a formal as well as rhetorical difference between argumentative discourse of Arabic sort and Western argumentation; in the former, presentation is likely to be the dominant argumentation; whereas proof is likely to be the dominant mode in the latter. Koch thus claims that

presentation [which is the way] to make a potentially available truth actually available to the hearer is the dominant mode in hierarchical societies such as the society of Nazi Germany. Argument by 'presentation' has its roots in the history of Arab society, in the ultimate, universal truths of the Qur'an and in hierarchical societies autocratically ruled by caliphs who were not only secular rulers but also the leaders of the faith, and, later and until very recently, by colonial powers. The Qur'an was revealed in Arabic, and the actual Arabic words of the text are as important as their message. Thus the Qur'an can not really be translated, though it is permissible to do so for the benefit of non-Arabs, and the language of the Qur'an has been almost completely preserved as the literary dialect of Arabic (191, 194-196).

However, Koch later concedes that

Ronald Reagan’s communicative skills could, for example, be characterized as largely presentational (1987: 208).
Based on extremely limited data, Koch’s attestation clearly lacks the following characteristics necessary for any scientific research:

1. her argument clearly suffers from blatant lack of objectivity, which is a cardinal feature of scientificness (Crystal, 1971: 99).

2. any collection of sentences (as in a corpus), no matter how large, presents only a partial picture (ibid.104).

3. the topic of the texts she analysed clearly reflect a desirable aim towards which the majority of Arabs have been struggling for in an area where deeds can not be permitted to match words. As a result, the text producers who often write on such a topic are bound to participate subjectively in the texts they produce. This, together with the partial unfamiliarity of most Arab writers including journalists with Arabic grammar and rhetoric, will inevitably lead to the use of excessive repetition, paraphrase, etc. in texts by merely resorting to new simplified ways of expressing their thoughts and ideas. The process is bound to reduce the language systems kept unchanged ever since the eighth century. Otherwise, the magnitude of our ability is indicated by the fact that there is an infinite number of sentences in any language which we can arrive at by manipulating bits (words, phrases, etc.), language makes infinite use of infinite means (ibid).

4. she further points out that she was motivated by compositions in English written by Arabic-speaking students in ESL writing classes. How can we ever reach sound judgements about Arabic or indeed any other languages if we analyse texts written in English by Arabic-speaking students? The students in this case are bound to digress from the main subject in writing or speaking owing to lack of relevant vocabulary, unfamiliarity with clause relations and typical English expressions.
relevant to the topic of the compositions concerned. For example, Schmidt (1978, 7),
according to Holmes (1982, 10), reports on the inability of many non-native speakers to
appropriately “hedge” their utterances in a variety of contexts. Holmes further
refers to Robberecht and Van Peteghem (1982, 35-6) who comment on the
difficulties which French and Dutch students face in learning to express modal meaning
appropriately in English. Students have “no feeling for” the nuances of modal verbs,
and that they do not use them as frequently as native speakers do in expressing

5. the subjective allusion of her comparison between the linguistic structures of Nazi
Germany society and those of the Arab and Muslim society are evidently
unlinguistic and the implications need no further comment.

6. her claim that “argument by presentation [as opposed to proof] has its deep roots in
the history of Arab society, in the ultimate, universal truths of the Qur’an and in
hierarchical societies autocratically ruled by caliphs who were not only secular rulers
but also the leaders of the faith”, is evidently unlinguistic too, and she does not even
provide one single example from the Qur’aan to justify such a claim. It has to be said
that the Qur’aan uses the argumentative method of attacking the opponent’s case at its
strongest. The result of such a method according to Karl Popper, is that

    no perceptible version of the defeated case is
    reconstructable in the light of the criticism (cf. Magee,

Therefore, Koch’s test is linguistically too inadequate to draw any sound conclusions.

Similarly, Williams (151-155), whose work is “A Comparison of the Textual
structures of Arabic and English Written Texts”, alleges that Ong’s characteristics of
orality are still present in Arabic to a degree not true of English. In order to verify
the validity of his claim, we need to know first what is meant by orality.

Orality and literacy are socially and cognitively anthropological notions used
to dichotomize societies into either oral or literate. By oral societies is meant those
societies whose culture and cultural values are communicated via spoken language not by written language. In contrast, literate societies are those whose culture and cultural values are communicated via written language. According to Levi-Strauss (1962); Goody (Goody & Watt: 1968), and Horton and Finnegan (1973), who are quoted in Frawley (1987, 33-5), oral cultures are 'savage' whereas written cultures are sophisticated. Being oral or literate, of course entails further characteristics used in this respect to dichotomize oral vs literate societies. Suffice it to say that a primary oral culture is a culture with no knowledge whatsoever of writing or even of the possibility of writing. Oral folk have no sense of a name as a tag, for they have no idea of a name as something that can be seen. By contrast, in a sophisticated culture,

written discourse develops a more elaborate and fixed grammar than oral discourse does because to provide meaning it is more dependent simply upon linguistic structure, since it lacks the normal full existential contexts which surround oral discourse and help determine meaning in oral discourse somewhat independently of grammar (Ong, 1982: 31, 33, 38).

Ong's characteristics of orality which Williams alleges to be still present in Arabic, are presented by Ong himself as suggestive, not exclusive or conclusive. Thus, according to Ong, in a primarily oral culture, thought and expression tend to be of the following sorts (31-77):

1. Additive rather than subordinative,
2. Aggregative rather than analytic,
3. Redundant and 'copious',
4. Conservative or traditionalist,
5. Close to the human lifeworld,
6. Agonistically toned,
7. Empathetic and participatory rather than objectively distanced,
8. Homeostatic,

However, believing that orality and literacy are gradient, non-discrete, interrelated notions at a certain point on the continuum, Frawley (1987) rightly counter-argues that
it is ridiculous to argue that there is some point where a culture or an individual becomes literate, as opposed to oral, or that at some point absolute Hyperliteracy which is a descriptive term for strategies individuals use to gain or organize knowledge from texts in relation to other texts, emerges (37-39). Thus, literacy [textuality] is but one intermediate stage in cultural development, somewhere between non-texts [orality] and intertexts [hyperliteracy; intertextuality]. The oral is never totally lost in the literate, and the literate is not totally literate. Literacy as something discrete is vitiates by the derivation of the written from the oral and by the presence of orality among those who have supposedly ‘achieved’ literacy. [Therefore], literacy is not a property of cultures but individuals.

Frawley, as a result, understands orality as a descriptive term for strategies which individuals use to gain or organize knowledge from a non-textual stand-point, while literacy is a descriptive term for strategies which individuals bring to bear to gain or organize textual knowledge. Frawley adds yet a third stage in the development of knowledge, viz. hyperliteracy (i.e. intertextuality).

Firstly, Frawley’s view seems more realistic and reasonable in attributing both concepts to individuals rather than cultures. The shift, I think, can be systemically justified in terms of Halliday’s notions of “actualisation” (performance), which represents the speaker and how it varies from one speaker to another depending on the degree of the speaker’s familiarity with his native language, its lexical items and its grammatical and rhetorical patternings, and of “potential” (competence), which refers to the language systems as a whole. Thus, the degree of (un)familiarity of one’s own language systems is bound to affect, positively or negatively, the actual ways the speaker grammatically and lexically encodes his text. The more familiar he is the more literate he becomes, and the less familiar he is the less literate he becomes. So it is not a question of oral, literate or hyperliterate culture.

Secondly, Ong himself admits that many modern cultures, including Arabic, have known writing for centuries; a fact which clearly contradicts Williams’ attribution of Ong’s suggestive characteristics of orality to Arabic.
Thirdly, one of Ong's claims concerning the fact that literate cultures have a fixed grammar is evidently true of Arabic grammar, which remained unchanged since the eighth century.

Fourthly, Williams has analysed the language of some journalists, who fall within the category specified above of those who are not fully familiar with Arabic grammar, let alone Arabic rhetoric.

Fifthly, Frawley's argument concerning the fact that "orality and literacy should be properties of individuals", suggests that Williams' claim suffers from theoretical inaccuracy and unconvincing conclusions.

It follows then that both Koch and Williams' works on repetition and textual cohesion respectively do not seem to have done justice to Arabic in terms of the linguistic and anthropological claims they made. Being a realization of textual cohesion as well as an interpersonal realization of the text producer's emphatic attitude towards what is being said, repetition has not been analysed by both linguists as to why the text producer uses it. It will be shown that we can reach sound judgements only if we contextualize the text producer's use of not only repetition but other attitudinal and textual expressions as well. The contextualization will eventually lead to the identification of the type of receiver to whom the utterance is to be addressed in actual communication. In other words, the text producer could avoid the use of repetition in the same context by flouting, for example, the submaxims concerned. He could further minimize the use of repetitious expressions if he wanted to. So we are talking about individuals not societies and their languages.

1.1.2 The Classical Typology of the Arabic Clause

Having touched upon several linguistic preliminaries of Arabic grammatical theory which are either directly or indirectly related to Focus and Emphasis, we need to clarify the everlasting dispute between the two traditional linguistic schools over the typologies they propose for the Nominal and Verbal clauses. The main concern of the
The present section is to demonstrate whether the Nominal clause should be a Topic-prominent clause or a variation of the Verbal clause, i.e., Subject-prominent. Before discussing that, it is useful firstly to give a sketch of the structural types of clause in Arabic.

Structurally, four types of clauses are identified in Arabic grammar. These are:

1. **Verbal Clause.** This proceeds from a lexical verb as in VSO and VOS orders, or proceeds from an object followed by a lexical verb as in OVS order.

2. **Nominal Clause.** This proceeds from the subject or the object followed by the subject then the verb as in SVO, SOV and OSV orders.

The word orders of the Verbal and Nominal clauses are lexically the same but differ from one another in terms of grammatical patterning. The verb of the Nominal clause always agrees with the Subject in gender, person and number, whereas the verb of the Verbal agrees with the Subject in gender only. As for their passive and intransitive counterparts, the above description is also applicable to them, except that the Goal of the passive becomes nominative since the omission of the Subject is obligatory in Arabic.

Furthermore, there is a further type of clauses which manifests an active or passive participle predicate expressing transitory actions i.e., present continuous tense. It may structurally be realized by SVO and SV orders (cf. the two examples given in the indicative mood above).

3. **Equational Clause.** This basically consists of a Topic and a non-verbal Comment, both of which normally take the nominative case if they are not premodified by a governing particle. The Topic is normally definite; If not, then the Comment must be definite, and in which case it takes initial position. Frequently, the Topic agrees with the Comment in gender and number; if the Comment is a static adjective showing colour, length, etc.; an active or passive participle denoting a permanent quality, or a profession etc. If, however, the Comment indicates an abstract
idea, nominal group denoting material, weight; adverb of time and place; prepositional phrase etc., the Topic does not agree with the Comment.

4. Initial-placement Clause. ألا استتفال. This manifests a Topic followed by an embedded clausal Comment as a predicate realizing a Verbal, Nominal or Equational clause co-referentially linked with the Topic through an explicit suffixal resumptive anaphor. The Topic must always be definite and Given, as it represents the entity the text producer chooses to talk about or forced by the receiver in a previous discourse. If an Initial-placement clause is to be premodified emphatically, the Topic may or may not be left out depending on the particles and what they must precede. Note that the term “Initial-placement” is used here in preference to the most widely used term “Left-dislocation” because of being more general.

Having specified the syntactic characteristics of Arabic clause types, it is necessary to refer to the traditional schools’ typologies of the Nominal and Verbal clauses first before demonstrating whether the Nominal clause is Topic-prominent or Subject-prominent.

1.1.2.1 The Bağrans Typology

According to this school, Arabic has two types of clauses: Verbal and Nominal. A Verbal clause is that which proceeds from a full lexical verb or an object immediately followed by a lexical verb. A Nominal clause, on the other hand, is that which proceeds from a nominal group and may or may not have a verbal predicate. The former is treated as a Subject-prominent type whereas the latter is treated as a Topic-prominent one. The reason for the Nominal to be Topic-prominent lies behind the fact that since the Subject is being governed nominatively by the verb, their sequence must reflect the sequence of Cause and Effect criterion as well, hence on no account must the Subject precede the lexical verb if it is to remain the Subject. If it precedes the verb, then it becomes a Topic representing the entity to be talked about. In order to uphold this criterion the Bagrans, therefore, assume a Subject implicitly expressed by the lexical verb. Thus, not only the Nominal but also the Equational
and the Initial-placement with a verbal- or non-verbal-predicate realizes Topic-prominent clauses in the Basran clause typology. In fact, treating the Nominal as Topic-prominent seems to follow from a rhetorical discourse processing criterion similar to Firbas’s CD, namely إِنْكَ تَبْتَدِئَ بِالْأَعْرَفَ (lit. proceed from what is most familiar) (Abuu Muusaa, 1979a: 279), used by traditional Arab rhetoricians to distinguish the pragmatic force of truth-conditionally identical utterances. A second possible reason is that the emphatic, negative, etc. particles which precede the Nominal differ from those that precede the Verbal.

1.1.2.2 The Kuufan Typology

The Kuufan typology, unlike the Basrans’, takes the syntactic functions of clause elements as a basis for its identification of clause types. The clause is either Verbal or Nominal; A Verbal clause is that whose predicate is a verb, whereas a Nominal is a clause whose predicate is not a verb. The Nominal, accordingly, subsumes only the Equational and the verbless initial-placement clauses. The Verbal, on the other hand, subsumes any clause with a full lexical verb, including the type which proceed from a nominal group as well as the initial-placement with a verbal predicate. The Kuufans assert that the Nominal clause with the verbal predicate (and this includes the initial-placement type with a verbal predicate too) is in fact Verbal, and the initially positioned Subject is not a Topic but a Subject fronted for Emphasis, and hence bearing New information. Furthermore, they reject the idea of an implicit Subject inferable from the verbal predicate which does not have an explicit suffixal resumptive anaphor.

Having discussed all necessary preliminaries for our attempt to determine whether the Nominal is Topic-prominent as the Basrans argue or Subject-prominent as the Kuufans argue, we need to resort to the typological model of languages in terms of sentence types set up by Li and Thompson (1976).
1.1.2.3 Li and Thompson's Model of Clause Typology

According to Li and Thompson (459-89), there are four basic types of languages:

(i) languages that are subject-prominent, e.g. "John hit Mary"; (ii) languages that are topic-prominent, e.g. "As for education, John prefers Bertrand Russell's ideas"; (iii) Languages that are both subject-prominent and topic-prominent; (iv) languages that are neither subject-prominent nor topic-prominent.

The typology is based on specifying the grammatical relations subject-predicate and topic-comment. We will comment on each characteristic of their typology with regard to the Nominal clause in order to see whether the Nominal clause is Subject-prominent or Topic-prominent. According to Li and Thompson, the following primary characteristics of Subject and Topic in natural languages can be postulated (459-89):

1. Subject can be definite or indefinite, whereas the Topic must be definite. The same can be true of the Nominal clause,

2. Subject is always selectionally related to some predicate in the sentence, whereas the Topic need not be, i.e. an argument of a predictive constituent. The Subject of the Nominal clause is selectionally related to some predicate,

3. Subject is determined by verb, e.g. predictable, whereas the Topic is not. The Subject of the Nominal clause is determined by the verb,

4. Subject can only be defined within the confines of the sentence, i.e. the Subject is always the argument of the verb, whereas the Topic is related to the structure of discourse. The Subject of the Nominal is always the argument of the verb,

5. Subject-verb agreement is obligatory in many languages, whereas the Topic-predicate agreement is very rare. In Arabic, the Subject of the Nominal clause agrees obligatorily with the verb in gender, person and number,

6. Subject is not necessarily confined to sentence-initial position, whereas the Topic must remain in sentence-initial position. This is in fact, true of the Subject of the Nominal as well,
7. Subject plays a prominent role in processes such as reflexivization, passivization, verb serialization and imperativization, whereas the Topic is not involved in such grammatical processes as it is syntactically independent of the rest of the sentence. This is also true of the Nominal clause in Arabic.

It follows from Li and Thompson's typology that the Nominal clause clearly shows almost total resemblance to Subject-prominent clauses rather than to Topic-prominent ones as the Bagrans argue; hence we can safely conclude that the Nominal is in fact a variation of the Verbal clause. However, it is worth mentioning that the traditional characterization of the Nominal, though formalistic, seems to be pragmatically motivated as the choice of the Nominal rather than the Verbal clause or vice versa would be contextually motivated (cf. chapter two).

We can conclude that both views seem to be true at least functionally. Since the initially positioned Subject of the Nominal clause must be Given in accordance with the Bagrans' view, it would be appealing to treat it not only as a Topic, but as an Actor or a Goal as well. In fact, this initially positioned nominal group is functionally both Topic and L Subject (Actor), because, as we saw above, if the Nominal clause is passivized this Topic and L Subject must be deleted, otherwise the clause is ungrammatical. Thus, it is not Topic only. In addition, the Bagrans have separated both functions from one another by confining the Actorhood and Goalhood to the Verbal clause only. In contrast, the Kuufans claim that it is a L Subject, i.e. Actor in the active clauses or Goal in the passive clauses, not a Topic, since it bears New information and is fronted for Emphasis. The Kuufan characterization is also true, but it distinguishes a different variation of the Verbal where the initially positioned nominal group is only a Subject not a Topic, as it represents New information (cf. our new functional clause typology in chapter two).
Having specified the new standing of the Nominal clause as Subject-prominent, it is equally necessary to enhance that by specifying whether the Nominal clause or the Verbal clause is basic. The distinction between the Verbal and the Nominal clauses given above will certainly help us identify the basic clause in Arabic.

1.1.2.4 The Basic Clause in Arabic

Since the Nominal clause as an FSP variation of the Verbal clause may function emphatically in argumentative contexts, it is necessary to clarify the second everlasting contention between the two traditional schools concerning the basic clause in Arabic. The distinction between the two types of clauses in terms of Subject-prominence vs Topic-prominence, simplicity vs complexity, indefiniteness and definiteness of the Subject vs definiteness of the Topic, does not seem adequate for specifying which one is basic. The Basrans believe the Nominal clause to be the basic sentence: a view shared by some Arabists as well (cf. Snow, 1965; Killean, 1966 and Lewkowicz, 1971). By contrast, the Kuufans as well as some contemporary scholars believe the Verbal to be the basic clause (cf. Makhzuumii, 1964; Bakir, 1980 & Saad, 1982).

In order to determine which type is basic, it is useful to resort to Keenan’s (1976) syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of basic clauses, as well as to some of Greenberg’s (1961) universals pertinent to SVO and SVO languages.

Syntactically, Keenan expects,

basic clauses will have the greatest privileges of occurrence: accept the greatest range of verbal and sentential modifiers and exhibit the greatest morphological and syntactic potential of the sentences in a language. Thus they will present the greatest range of tense, mood, aspect, mode, and voice distinctions. The basic clauses are roughly the simplest syntactically (309).

In Arabic, Verbal clauses accordingly occur predominately in interrogation, negation, exhortation, conditionals, subjunctive structures of subordinate
clauses when preceded by a modal, jussive structures, etc. It is thus clear that the occurrences of the Verbal and its syntactic and morphological potential in Arabic, are greater than the Nominal. To give just one example, in passivizing the Nominal clause, its Topic, according to the Basrans, is not selectionally related with the verb, thus it should be left untouched. However, if the Nominal is passivized, its Topic (L Subject) must be omitted, hence it is Subject-prominent rather than Topic-prominent. Even the passive counterpart of the Nominal can be called Nominal only if the Goal is fronted; a fact which is more complicated than the passivization of the Verbal. The Nominal, therefore, is treated not only as an FSP variant of the Verbal but also Subject-prominent.

Keenan also argues that

Semantically, basic clauses are primitive, declarative, affirmative and least informative (310).

As regards informativity, only the Verbal clause can have an indefinite Subject and object, hence be less informative. Conversely, the Subject of the Nominal must always be definite, hence be more informative than the Verbal version. Accordingly, the Verbal is the basic clause in this respect.

Keenan further argues that

Pragmatically, basic clauses are relatively free from presupposition (311).

Presuppositionally, the Verbal clause seems to be relatively free, whereas the Nominal is not free, as its Subject is already given co-textually or contextually. That is, the range of uses open to the Verbal is more than those for the Nominal.

Furthermore, Greenberg proposes a number of universals indicative of the type of word order language may predominantly show. The predominant type of word order is the one that occurs quite often, hence basic. Suffice it to say that his
universals no. three, nine, twelve and seventeen conspicuously demonstrate how Arabic is VSO language rather than SVO. It follows then that the Verbal clause is the basic and not the Nominal (cf. more on both types in chapter two).

To sum up: so far I have been arguing that in Arabic, the Nominal clause should be treated as a variant of the Verbal clause. Reference to Li and Thompson's typology of Subject-prominent and Topic-prominent clauses to establish the same difference between the Verbal and the Nominal has been conducted. The discussion has established that the Nominal is not a Topic-prominent clause as the Bagrans argue. The discussion further covered the identification of the basic clause in Arabic. The heterogeneous criteria referred to suggest that it is the Verbal rather than the Nominal clause which is the basic clause in Arabic. In the next section, a brief discussion on Arabic rhetoric will be attempted.

1.2 ARABIC RHETORIC THEORY

[One] of medieval rhetorical traditions [which] should not pass unnoticed is Arabic rhetoric. Kennedy (1980:194)

This section intends to provide a brief account of the traditional Arabic theory of rhetoric with special focusing on 'Ilm aL-Ma'aanii within which Emphasis receives a theoretically -and- empirically-based analysis. Such a focusing is necessary for the present study for four reasons. First, the account of the clause in Arabic rhetoric is essentially functional, hence complementary to syntax, i.e. rhetoric proceeds from where the syntax ends (Al-Jurjaanii cited in Hassaan, 1977: 382). Second, Emphasis has received within the theory a more theoretically-based analysis than is the case in Arabic formalistic grammar. Third, the typological models of constative and receiver representing an indispensable aspect of Arabic rhetoric theory will be adopted here but with further necessary modifications and extension. Four, methodologically the pragmatic analyses of utterances are, more or less, akin to, but more delicate than those of contemporary pragmatic theories. The rhetorical analysis of Emphasis and other
linguistic issues are approached from the stand-point of the receiver whose crucial communicative verbal and non-verbal interaction is presuppositionally and ideologically classified into a crucial typological model. The analysis of such issues is impressively illuminating and one could say that, for instance, the rhetorical theory of al-Jurjaanii's, an 11th century linguist,

achieved a degree of sophistication in the synchronic description of language that was to be unrivalled until the present century (Owens, 1988: 248).

It was al-Jurjaanii, for instance, who first discussed how the “choice” of one term or structure over a lexically and truth-conditionally similar but morphologically and grammatically different one could appropriately express not only the primary illocutionary act, i.e. the implicature, but also the precise true attitudinal implication of the text producer towards the proposition of his constative discourse as well as the receiver (cf. chapter two).

1.2.1 Classical Rhetoric Typology

The taxonomy of Arabic rhetoric, introduced first by as-Sakkaakii, a late 12th century Arab linguist who is still regarded by all contemporary Arab linguists the predecessor of current Arabic rhetoric, has eventually come to subsume three main branches. The first which is called ‘Ilm al-Ma'anii (lit. the Science of Meanings), studies the literal encoding of a given semantic configuration to be used either in isomorphic and/or non-isomorphic contexts. The second which is termed ‘Ilm al-Bayaan (the Science of Bayaan), studies the figurative encoding of a certain semantic configuration to be used predominantly in non-isomorphic contexts. The third which is called ‘Ilm- al-Badii‘ (the Science of Tropes), studies any ornamental manipulation of the form and/or content that may colour the above two encodings aesthetically. The first branch which is relevant to the present study, requires a detailed discrete account to be provided partly below and partly in the next chapter. It provides a theoretically as well as descriptively based pragmatic analysis of utterances in Arabic covering a wide range of
speech acts and syntactic features and how they are used isomorphically and non-isomorphically in situational contexts.

The second, i.e. Bayaan, however, is rhetorically defined as

the knowledge of encoding the same semantic configuration through different figurative means after taking into account the receiver’s verbal and/or non-verbal status.

In this respect, it is useful to note in passing that Butler (1989: 31) provides a similar definition of pragmatics saying that

pragmatics is largely about the relationships between different ways of saying things.

However, although both definitions appear to be similar, the definition of pragmatics to be adopted in the present research is so general that it covers not only figures of speech but also literally encoded utterances (cf. the next chapter). The definition of Bayaan above indicates that in the process of discourse processing the text producer should first take into account the contextual requirements which form the substantial aspect of ‘Ilm al Ma‘aanii as a first step, then the figurative encoding of the semantic configuration concerned as a second step. Thus, the difference between Bayaan and ‘Ilm al-Ma‘aanii is that the former, which studies topics such as Metaphor, Metonymy, Аллєкания; Synecdoche, آلھاز; Simile, التشبیه; Implicature, التمثيل, is primarily concerned with the figurative manipulation of content, whereas the latter is primarily concerned with the manipulation of utterance’s form, (i.e. meanings of syntactic features). It is worth recalling that in systemic linguistics, Halliday (1985: chapter 10) incorporates most figures of speech with his functional grammar as incongruent realizations the text producer may opt for in a given speech event.
Tropes, on the other hand, study the semantic and grammatical ornamentations, i.e. rhymed prose, structural parallelism, etc., accompanying the linguistic encodings of the other two branches of rhetoric, and thus highlighting the aesthetic aspects of utterance encoding.

Arguably, the topics of Bayaan and Tropes clearly have an interpersonal aspect of meaning which is strung throughout the clause as a continuous motif or colouring (Halliday, 1979: 66).

In addition, Arabic rhetorical theory of ‘Ilm al-Ma‘aanii, on the whole bears more pragmatic affinities to Grice (1975), Austin (1962) and Searle’s pragmatic theories. We will, therefore, continue using their terminology here and throughout the present study in order to reincarnate the important contribution Arabic rhetoric will undoubtedly make to modern textlinguistic analysis, and help pave the way for interested linguists to realize what Kennedy advocates in the quotation above.

Having touched upon the main concern of Arabic rhetoric, it is useful to discuss the functional theory of ‘Ilm al-Ma‘aanii which provides a typological and contextual analysis of utterances in Arabic.

1.2.1.1 ‘Ilm al-Ma‘aanii (Pragmatics of Syntax)

‘Ilm al-Ma‘aanii is basically concerned with the contextual study of the features of an utterance’s structure at the intra-clausal and inter-clausal levels in terms of informativity, contextual conformity, persuasiveness and intelligibility in order to help users of language avoid random contextual (non)conformity in their use of language. The study is channelled into two approaches: the study of, (i) the macro-structure of an utterance as a whole, and (ii) the formal features of the two bipartite micro-structures of an utterance as a predication. The analysis of both types involves specifying and
explicating the implicature, التعبيرية، together with the literal meaning، التعبيرية، of an utterance. Both aspects of utterance meaning conform synonymously with what is called in Arabic rhetoric “the Ta’riid” (implicature) and “Tagriih” (literalness) respectively. The utterances which are worthy of such an analysis according to as-Sakkaaii, should be those of the most eloquent speakers، الأخلاقاء، whose competence appears to be identical to Chomsky’s idealized speaker’s competence, i.e. idealization.

Both approaches are further distinguished through the use of two technical terms، كالام، (utterance) and، جملة، (predication) used to refer to the unit of study. The former is traditionally defined as

ٍهوَ اللفظ المركب المتعدد بالوضع العربي
فائزه يحسن السكوت عليها

Contemporary, Harris (1951: 14) defines “utterance” similarly as

any stretch of talk by one person, before and after which there is silence on the part of that person.

“Jumla,” by contrast, refers to a formal grammatical unit but which might be taken to be tantamount to predication، إسناد، (i.e. a proposition made up of an argument and a predicate), rather than a grammatical category, i.e. declarative, interrogative, etc. The term jumla is used only when reference to the pragmatic analysis of the micro-structural features of the proposition bipartition is made. The term kalaam, “utterance”, by contrast, is used when the features of the macro-structure of that utterance are pragmatically investigated. The first approach which takes up the utterance structure as a whole can be termed as “Speech Acts Analysis”. The second, on the other hand, which opts for the analysis of the syntactic features modifying the predication’s two basic micro-structures, can be termed as “Micro-structures Analysis”. The analysis of these syntactic features is conducted in conformity with the crucial contextual criterion,
Before discussing the main concern of the two approaches, it is equally necessary to discuss the utterances’ truth value theory provided by Arabic rhetoric before we move on to discuss the two approaches.

Typologically, the theory of truth-value specification in Arabic rhetoric involves assigning the values “true”, “false” or “neither true or false” to constatives rather than sentences as many linguists seem to believe, or utterances as is argued for example by Levinson (1983: 34). The theory was first introduced into rhetoric as a result of the emergence of a theological school named the al-Mu’tazila, which called for freedom of thought and later introduced speculative dogmatism into Islam. According to this theory, al-Jaahiz defines constatives in terms of their truth value into three basic classes. Two of such classes are either contingently true or false depending on their conformity with reality. That is, the constative is true if it corresponds to reality and belief, and it is not if it does not. The third class, on the other hand, which is taken to be neither true nor false and may thus be likened to Searle’s notion of sincerity and insincerity condition, subsumes four types:

1. constative that conforms with reality but with the belief that it does not,

أطابق المطلق للواقع مع الاعتقاد بأنه غير مطابق

2. constative that conforms with reality but without the involvement of any belief at all,

أطابق المطلق للواقع بدون اعتقاد أصلاً

3. constative that does not conform with reality but with the belief that it does,

أطابق غير المطلق للواقع مع الاعتقاد بأنه مطابق

4. constative that does not conform with reality but without the involvement of any belief at all.

أطابق غير المطلق للواقع بدون اعتقاد أصلاً

However, rhetoricians counter-argue that it does not seem necessary to have recourse to reality and/or belief in order to authenticate the veracity of the first two
classes of constatives because both are either contingently true (i.e. statement of the obvious) or impossibly true (i.e. contradiction). It will take us far afield if we provide illustrative instances. Let us next move on to discuss both pragmatic approaches.

(i) *Speech Acts Analysis*

Utterances, "كلام", according to this approach, are initially dichotomized into *Constative*, "خبر", and *Performative*, "إنشاء". Performative utterances are further sub-dichotomized into either *Directive* utterances, "طلب", or *Non-directive* utterances, "غير طلب". Directive performatives, which usually manifest the text producer’s attempts to get the receiver to do something, are defined as the type which requires the fulfilment of an action unavailable at the time of requirement. (my translation)

Directive acts, which subsume illocutionary acts such as mand، negative mand، question، desiderativeinand، requestive، the expressed، the desired، the optative، the exhortative، and vocative، can further be distinguished by the fact that sequentially the locutionary act always precedes the receiver’s response wanted or desired, hence directive. They represent the semantic correlates of the categories realized by the Mood element in clause structure, and are analysed in Arabic rhetoric in terms of the pragmatic functions they can relay in a given interaction.

By contrast, non-directive performatives, which subsume illocutionary acts such as Praise and Rebut، Oath structures، Declarations، Exclamatives، the use of “Rubba”، and amplificational “Kam”， indicate that their issuance is intended to occasion or correspond to a simultaneous change or happening in some state of affairs in the extralinguistic world. According to Arabic rhetoric
most of these non-directives were constatives then later became non-directives (cf. for example al-Jundii, n.d.: 36). (my translation)

The theory further claims that non-directive performatives are rhetorically insignificant and therefore were denied similar pragmatic analysis.

It is worth mentioning that the sub-dichotomization of performatives into directive and non-directive is a principal criterion distinguishing them from constatives. A second principal criterion evinces the fact that the truth value is a property of constatives only. The following listing represents the primary illocutionary acts of directive performatives accounted for elaborately in Arabic rhetoric in terms of speech acts analysis. These include:

1. Mand, which may express the primary illocutionary acts: permission, الدعاء ; warning, التحذير ; precative, الدعاء ; exclamations, التبعيب ; desiderative, الاعمال ; constative, الدعاء ; insult, التهديد ; reproach, التبكيت ; al-jundii, n.d.: 36).

2. Negative mand, which may relay the primary illocutionary acts: precative, الدعاء ; prohibition, التمتع ; pleading, التمتع ; discipline, الاعمال ; permission, الدعاء ; warning, التحذير ; threat, التهديد ; insult, الاعمال ; instruction, التمتع ; al-jundii, n.d.: 36).

3. Question, which may convey the primary illocutionary acts: insult, الاعمال ; exclamation, التمتع ; assertion, التمتع ; mand, احسن ; glorification, التمتع ; denial, الاعمال ; negative mand, الاعمال ; requestive, الدعاء ; exhortative, التمتع ; negation, الاعمال ; desiderative, الاعمال ; informativeness, الاعمال ; preceptive, الدعاء ; etc.

4. Vocative, which may convey illocutionary acts such as: lamentation, الدعاء ; exclamation, التمتع ; threat, التهديد ; precative, الدعاء ; regret, التمتع ; yearning, التمتع ; enticing, الدعاء ; remorse, الاعمال ; ridicule, الاعمال ; al-jundii, n.d.: 36).
Constatives, on the other hand, similarly receive a speech acts analysis by Arabic rhetoric after identifying the two congruent functions of their literal meaning if the literal meaning is communicatively intended. The first is called (relaying New information), and the second is called (relaying completely Given information intended to inform the receiver of the text producer's cognizance of p only). Constatives can further be used to produce incongruent illocutionary acts such as: weakness, desiderative, praise, denial, mand, negative mand, precative, exclamation, negation, glorification, promise, threat, etc.

(ii) Micro-Structure Analysis

The basic concern of this approach is the decomposition of a certain constative or performative sentence as a predication into its two basic constituents "the argument", and "the predicate" (or Subject-Predicate), and then the pragmatic analysis of how context may impinge upon syntax. The analysis focuses on illustrating how the syntactic features are used to modify both basic constituents in terms of definiteness vs indefiniteness, reiteration vs ellipsis, fronting vs postponement, S Emphasis, switch-reference, and modification vs non-modification, etc. The question frequently posed in this analysis is why a text producer opts for the definiteness of the Predicate, for example, when the context does not oblige him to do so. The choice would be as a result of the text producer's flouting of the contextual requirements of a given constative discourse. Both what is chosen and what could have been chosen are normally compared with each other as a step towards the identification of the intended meaning.

Furthermore, constatives are normally encoded in discourse processing by taking into account the receiver's long-term and immediate ideological verbal and/or non-verbal
statuses, i.e. مراعاة مقتضى الظاهر, (lit. what the norm presupposes). As a result, the identification of such contextual parameters associated with constatives has led to the identification of a five-type receiver model correlating congruently as well as incongruently with a second typological model of constatives. If the relationship between members of both typologies is one of isomorphism, it generates a generalized conversational implicature. If, however, the relationship is one of non-isomorphism, then the text producer’s issuance of a constative is based on flouting what the norm presupposes, الخروج عن مقتضى الظاهر, and hence the conversational implicatures generated are particularized.

As far as Emphasis is concerned, two members of the receiver’s typological model, namely sceptical and counter-presuppositional receivers, create the contexts in which the use of Emphasis is required. The text producer can additionally use Emphasis in contexts where it is not required. We shall be incorporating both models into a new pragmatic theory to be discussed extensively in the next chapter.

At the inter-clausal level, Arabic rhetoric also provides a similar analysis on topics such as: connectivity vs disconnectivity الصل والفصل, tautology vs brevity and conciseness الإيجاز والانطباق والمساواة, etc., which similarly receive a pragmatic analysis in rhetoric. It is worth mentioning that the way of analysis in this approach is by and large similar to Grice’s pragmatic interpretation.

1.2.2 New Typology for Arabic Rhetoric

We have noticed that the science of Bayaan, according to as-Sakkaakii, is the study of how a semantic configuration can be or is expressible through the use of figures of speech and how it is primarily concerned with the manipulation of utterance’s content. We also noticed above that ‘Ilm al-Ma’aanii is primarily concerned with the manipulation of utterance’s form. As for Trope, we further noticed how it is basically concerned with the aesthetic manipulation of utterance’s form and content in a given
context. What is thus required is to have a new typology of Arabic rhetoric highlighting the importance of form and content only rather than having a three-branch typology. The postulation of the new typology for Arabic rhetoric can be justified by equally postulating a consistently compatible pragmatic theory capable of accounting for not only utterance’s form and content alike but utterance’s aesthetic meanings as well by taking into account the semantic and grammatical ornamentations of Tropes. The new theory should be capable of accounting for almost all types of conversational implicature, i.e. Ta’riid, التعراض, in each of such basic divisions. It is worth mentioning that Ta’riid in Arabic rhetoric, according to Ibn uL-Athiir, is

الألفاظ الدال على الشيء من طريق المعنى
لا من طريق الوضع اللغوي ولا الجمالي.

the structure which refers to something by implicature not by what is actually said or through the use of figures of speech. (my translation)

Implicatures thus concern both the manipulation of utterance’s micro-and macroforms as well as utterance’s content. The new typology and the new pragmatic theory would thus show consistency, simplicity and coherence in identifying the intended implicature of any given utterance.

To conclude, we have been discussing as briefly as possible the traditional Arabic rhetorical theory which evidently bears greater affinities to modern pragmatic theories than one would imagine. It is intended to remind western educated Arab linguists in particular, who were apparently unaware of the contribution Arabic rhetoric might have made had they been keen enough to reincarnate Arabic rhetorical theory in a modernized style. In addition, a new typology for Arabic rhetoric is tentatively introduced. The new typology seems to be compatible with the new pragmatic theory to be presented in chapter two. Both the new typology and the new theory are intended to open the door for further researches on Arabic rhetoric. In the next section we will be discussing a review of Emphasis in Arabic as well as western linguistic literature.
1.3 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This section will be concerned with providing an outline of how traditional and contemporary Arabic formalistic and functional trends together with some Western contemporary trends approach Focus and Emphasis. The survey is to be organized in terms of these trends' linguistic theories. It would certainly be much more useful to highlight the affinities as well as the disparities between the linguists' theories within which the analysis of Focus and Emphasis is handled than to enlist individuals’ accounts. However, it should be stated that some of those theories are eclectic and the only prominent factor that sharply differentiates them is either being formalistic or functional. The review of these accounts will be conducted in this vein.

1.3.1 Focus and Emphasis Accounts

One of the striking issues in contemporary linguistic accounts of unmarked and marked Focus within their respective theories is that Focus is a hybrid linguistic phenomenon subsuming contextually different but truth-conditionally synonymous utterances. For example, Taglicht (1984:1) among many others, accordingly defines Focus as

\[
\text{a general term for the assignment of prominence by phonological and syntactic means.}
\]

Such a view appears to be a result of the applicability of the fundamental Saussurean principle of contrast, used to highlight differences between various possibilities of linguistic units such as word order. Accordingly, the elements of marked and unmarked structures being assigned prominence are, for example, simultaneously analysed in terms of Focus assignment. It would be, I believe, precarious to approach such an area without first bearing in mind where the possible boundary of unmarked Focus may be. Such caution is prerequisite and justified because many linguists have unwittingly stretched the notion of Focus as a technical term to designate not only the Focus of attention but also the Focus of the contrast, and the like. It seems that the
Saussurean principle of contrast has almost always inadvertently led linguists not only to start off with but also concentrate on unmarked Focus and move on towards marked Focus. It is only when you isolate and consequently subject the phenomenon of Emphasis proper and S-Emphasis to thorough and exhaustive investigation that you are in a better position to understand both notions against the background of unmarked Focus. The overlap of such a seemingly unsatisfactory treatment has prompted Grimes (1975: 323) and Dillon (1981: 101) among others, who were quoted in the introduction of the present work, to complain of the overlap and lack of theory that might have tightened Focus as a stylistic precept. Noticeably, the more varied the perspectives used to view and consequently refine linguistic issues such as Focus the more clear-cut analyses such issues eventually receive. This fact obviously calls for the refinement of hybrid terms such as Focus if it is not to be abandoned.

In addition, a second problematic area resulting from the overlap of such notions is the obscurity, if not superficiality, of identifying factors of context relevant to a given discourse. Almost all linguists talk about factors such as the participants and their social roles, the setting, the intent and the effect of communication, etc. (cf. Firth, 1950 and Hymes, 1967). Even Halliday’s theory of register does not seem to go further than providing a way to a sociological analysis of entering text from context.

I am not claiming that these factors should be rendered irrelevant. They are undoubtedly useful in any linguistic investigation. But they, particularly our specific contextual knowledge about the notion of receiver in its relation to the content and form of the utterance, are in need of further possible coherent refinement in order to determine their communicative relevance to one another (cf. chapter two). One way of identifying such a relationship is to study the means which natural languages use to express Emphasis. If we ask ourselves why do people use, for example, Emphasis?, the answer would be that Emphasis normally presupposes either scepticism or denial indicating that the receiver obviously either is too sceptical to accept, or holds a
different ideology from, the text producer's ideological view respectively. If I offer a Muslim a drink and I know Muslims do not drink alcohol, my offer becomes communicatively inappropriate unless I have other reasons to do so (cf. the next chapter). So I need to categorize my receiver in terms of long-term ideology and his immediate contextual ideological status so that our communication can run without undue interruptions. The receiver's ideological categorisation will consequently be extended to categorize constatives as well. It follows then that concentrating solely and extensively on unmarked Focus has unfortunately kept most linguists from realizing the crucial role of categorizing the receiver and constative in terms of utterance informativity and appropriateness.

In Arabic, by contrast, the case is quite different, particularly in rhetoric. Constatives drawn from the Qur'aan and classical poetry have come to be typologically analysed in terms of Non-emphasis (unmarked Focus), Emphasis proper, S Emphasis and De-emphasis. A non-emphatic utterance is one which wholly conveys new information and is called خبر إِبْتِدَأَئَي (discourse-initiating unit). Whereas, an emphatic utterance is one which contains emphatic markers predominantly preceding the prominent information. As a result, two basic receiver and constative typologies, which can be thought of as the cornerstone of Arabic textlinguistic analyses, have been eventually identified. It is these typologies, as we will see in the next chapter, which are required not only to enhance contemporary pragmatic theories but also to refine these vague contextual factors involved. It is these typologies which we need most if we are to save modern pragmatic theories from inevitable failure as well as to fill in the gap yet to be discovered between Arabic tradition and modern linguistics. However, before proceeding further, it is necessary to provide first a review of literature. First, we discuss how Focus and Emphasis are tackled in Arabic grammar and rhetoric, then move on to some western accounts of Focus and Emphasis.
1.3.1.1 Arabic Linguistics
1.3.1.1.1 Arabic Grammar

In Arabic, Emphasis is analysed as one of four types of realizations representing
the appositives in grammar. Within this type, two types of emphatic realizations are
syntactically identified. The first is the lexico-grammatical Emphasis, راكن, which analyses the lexico-grammatical reiteration of a clause or some
constituent. The second, on the other hand, is the semantic Emphasis, راكن
العالنوي, which studies the semantic reiteration of pronominal appositives such as
the emphatic reflexives, (i.e., نفسه himself; نفسك yourself, etc.); كلا both;
كل all (of), and the like immediately following the emphasized constituent. In order
for the latter to relay Emphasis, a co-referential pronoun of the preceding emphasized
element must be suffixed to these emphasizers themselves.

A second type of emphatic realization which similarly receives a morpho-
syntactic analysis in Arabic grammar is what is termed، المبالغة, “intensification”.
It is realized by

verbs, adjectives and quasi-adjectives which admit of
being strengthened in their meaning if they are generated
from certain patterns, and used as the grammarians say
لمدالة، to signify intensiveness, or لากد
المبالغة، to strengthen the idea of intensiveness.

A third type of realization, is manifested by the use of Oath structures، الغسر,
which can precede the clause to be emphasized. Oath structures themselves are believed
to be non-directive performatives used to precede either a constative or a second
performatives forming a conditional-like complex clause.

A fourth type of realization is represented by fronting and postponement، المتقدم و التأخير, which are treated sporadically in grammar. Grammatically, two
types of realizations are recognized, obligatory and optional depending on the morpho-
syntactic status of the fronted and postponed elements of structure (cf. chapter 6).
A fifth type of realization grammatically covered as a sub-type of Exception, 
الإِسْتِنَاثُ إِلَّا القِصْرُ, is Specificational Emphasis, Only one type of S Emphasis realization, namely Negation/Focusing, is extensively discussed within Exception.

Other types of emphatic realizations, particularly the particles and suffixes, are grouped sporadically in terms of their functions of governance only, though labelled by definition as emphasizers. It is obvious from such realizations that the grammatically-based treatment appears to lack adequacy, coherence and exhaustiveness let alone contextual considerations of Emphasis. All these realizations will be analysed pragmatically in compliance with the new proposals and the new pragmatic theory. The difference between the grammatical account of these realizations and the new pragmatic account to be proposed in the present research will be primarily contextual and intended to broaden our understanding of the phenomenon of Emphasis. It is evidently inadequate, as will be demonstrated, to conduct a solely syntactic account of Emphasis without specifying contexts whereby the text producer may either opt for or avoid the use of Emphasis.

(i) Al-Makhzuumii's Account

A more promising though very scanty account comes from Al-Makhzuumii (1964: 234-45), a contemporary linguist who is extremely critical of traditional grammar. He defines Emphasis as the way of making a linguistic unit prominent in order to occasion some impact on the mind of the receiver. He points out that Emphasis can be realized either through the presence of particles functioning as emphasizers, or the absence of particles, i.e. through other means such as word order, in the clause structure. Although his account is obviously rhetorically motivated, he unfortunately provides nothing more than a typology for the way Emphasis should be studied. The account could form the basis for an extensive research. His typology is more or less similar to the one to be introduced here which classifies emphasizers into lexical and grammatical features.
1.3.1.1.2 Arabic Functional Rhetoric
(i) Diib’s Account

A more comprehensive and detailed rhetorical account of Emphasis is provided by Diib (1984). In his book entitled “Styles of Emphasis in Arabic”, Diib attempts to cover Emphasis realizations in Arabic by merely lumping them together without any attempt to develop a theoretical framework that might have been more plausible. He only provides a detailed syntactic analysis together with numerous quotations drawn from prominent Arab traditionalists as to how they analysed such realizations. His supposedly semantico-pragmatic account clearly lacks the theoretical basis underlying the classical rhetoric typology of receivers and constatives. The analysis is clearly overridden by unnecessary syntactic explanations which could have been kept minimal. He even forgets or fails to highlight not only the rhetorical theory but also the rhetoric mechanism of utterance analysis which would have provided a more rigorous account. All in all his account is a mere collection of what traditional and contemporary linguists say about Emphasis in Arabic. However, the book could still be a first step for a researcher into the field.

1.3.1.2 Contemporary Western Linguistics
1.3.1.2.1 Functional Transformational Generative Grammar
(i) Werth’s Account

Working within a functional generative text-linguistic approach, Werth (1984) is concerned to chart the relationship between connectivity, contextuality and Emphasis, and to see how far this takes us in the explanation of linguistic theory in general.

Considering Emphasis as the mechanism responsible for the deployment of information to ensure connectivity in discourse, Werth argues that Emphasis is of two kinds: Prominence, for material which for some reason is made to stand out, and Non-prominence, for recessive material which includes ‘inert forms’ which do not take part in Emphasis, and Reduction. Reduction, which is an anaphoric operation, is associated with repeated semantic material when subsequently used with no special prominence,
but merely to keep the information in the 'current file'. Prominence, on the other hand, is classified into Accent and Contrast which are both very often conflated under the term Focus. Accent seems to be of two broad types: Information-accent and Attention-accent. The first of these provides for prominence on freshly-introduced semantic material, or, particularly in questions, for structural gaps where semantic material is not available. Attention accent, on the other hand, occurs in previously-occurring material (which would normally fall under Reduction) when for some reason it has to be re-accented. This may happen to renew the present relevance of some 'decaying' information, in which case Attention accent is presumably simply a special form of information-accent; it also then usually functions as a structural device for subdividing the discourse.

Additionally, according to Werth, when an item has Contrast, we must assume that there is a previous piece of information which in some way has a negative relationship with the contrasting item. Since, therefore, such items necessarily have an at least implicit connection with another piece of information in the discourse, they too, like reduced items, are fundamentally anaphoric. This shared property will be seen to have important implications.

However, Werth’s use of the term “Emphasis” as a mechanism deploying information to ensure connectivity is apparently unnecessarily overstretching. It seems “Emphasis”, to Werth, is no longer a term with a specific denotation labelling important or salient information. Using Emphasis to subsume not only prominence, but also non-prominence clearly violates the technical and the ordinary use of the term, and differs from his contemporaries’ use cited here. It is this misrepresentation of Emphasis and possibly of Focus that has caused such confusion and overlap in the area concerned. Emphasis should be used to cover only specific areas made prominent either syntactically or intonationally if we are to come to grips with the concept of Emphasis, and to formulate a possible theoretical framework for it.
1.3.1.2.2 Systemic Functional Grammar

(i) *Halliday’s Account*

Halliday’s (1985, 274-80) account of Focus and Emphasis within a systemic functional grammar is primarily intonational. He claims that spoken discourse takes the form of a sequence of Information Units realized by tone groups which are phonological constituents as well. An information unit is a process of interaction between what is already known or predictable and what is new or unpredictable. Hence the information unit is a structure made up of two functions, the New and the Given. Halliday further distinguishes between Unmarked Information Focus and Marked Information Focus. The former refers to the feature carrying the Tonic Prominence within the tone group which marks the New element of the clause structure; whereas the latter which represents one form of newness frequent in dialogue, refers to Given material accented for contrast.

However, Halliday’s account of unmarked and marked Focus seems no different from those who classified Focus as unmarked or marked. We will have to say more on his information and Focus accounts in chapter four, therefore it need not delay us further.

(ii) *Taglicht’s Account*

In having recourse to Halliday’s tripartite components of the systemic functional grammar, Taglicht accounts for Focus in some detail by first defining it as a general term for the assignment of prominence by phonological and syntactic means. The analysis which includes the scope of focusing devices covers the identification of, (i) the Focus marker, (ii) the Focus and (iii) the residue which is not assigned prominence by the marker. He further provides a preliminary list of the Focus markers that he subsequently deals with in some detail. The list includes the following:
a. the cleft construction, (It was JACK who...)  
b. the pseudo-cleft, (What they like is BEER.)  
c. the Wh-interrogative, (WHAT would you like?)  
d. the alternative interrogative, (Would... TEA OR COFFEE?)  
e. the comparative construction, (MARY sings better... JANE...)  
f. the focusing adverbs, (Only JOHN phoned.)  
g. the intonation nucleus, (He was HERE, He WAS here.), and  
h. marked word order, (HIS NAME she never found out.)

Systemically, Taglicht claims that the comparative construction, the particularizing adverbs, and the exclusive adverbs have ideational meaning. The prominence they give derives from the content represented. The interrogative focusing constructions have interpersonal meaning. The prominence they give derives from the speaker's intrusion from the expression of his communicative content. Intonation has textual meaning in that it serves to fit the sentence into its context by distinguishing between items presented as new and items as given information. Additive focusing is both ideational and textual in that it involves propositional content and creates text. The cleft has meaning of all three kinds. Ideational meaning is involved because the construction specifies its focus as unique with respect to the content of the residue. The interpersonal meaning consists of the selection of the focus as the target of the speaker's communicative intent. And clefting also has textual meaning, because its use, and the selection of its focal item, change the way a sentence coheres with the text of which it forms a part. Finally, marked theme is clearly associated with textual cohesion by virtue of its position in the clause.

It is obvious that Taglicht also uses the notion of Focus as a general term which subsumes unmarked Focus, Emphasis proper, and Contrast. Although his account is more comprehensive, he has failed not only to restrict the meaning of the term "Focus" but also to introduce a more contextually delicate account of the phenomena concerned. It is this over-stretching of the term that have undesirably maintained the overlap which incited linguists such as Grimes and Dillon to criticize the accounts that have failed to restrict the use of the term "Focus". My objection with Taglicht is his unrestricted use of the term "Focus" as well as his falling short of introducing a more delicate contextual
interpretation of the Focus phenomena. His account similarly fails to highlight the role of the receiver in connection with the content of the utterance analysed.

1.3.1.2.3 Dik’s Functional Grammar

(i) Dik’s Account

In accordance with his functional theory, Dik (1981), whose account has influenced the organization of the present research, is perhaps the only western linguist who is able to provide a fairly similar account of the typology of contrastive Focus functions to that of classical rhetoric. Dik defines Focus as what is relatively the most important or salient information in the given setting. He classifies constructions into unmarked Focus, Emphasis and Contrast. He further enhances his classification by providing the functions these classified constructions are likely to yield. These functions include the use of unmarked Focus to fill in an information gap, and the use of Contrast to expand, restrict, or replace wrong beliefs. Such a systematic classification of Contrast functions bears great resemblance to the typology of the same functions in Arabic rhetoric, although the area occupied by Emphasis proper is left vague in Dik’s account as well. This is noticeable from his typology of Focus function when he divides Focus into +Contrast and -Contrast. The latter, which is obviously tantamount to Unmarked Focus, is used to complete missing information. His typology of +Contrast functions, on the other hand, is not only precisely the same as those provided in S Emphasis, القصر in Arabic rhetoric but also apparently more comprehensive. These will be the topic of chapter four and six where his congruent functions of Contrast will be reduced by restricting them to three only. Dik also fails to provide typologies of constative and receiver in terms of informativity which could have enhanced his functional interpretation of Focus and Contrast.

In addition, Dik (44-6) claims that

informationally and syntactically, different sorts of Focus constructions may come out according to the different values that the Focus function may take along a number of parameters.
These parameters which he briefly touches upon include: Scope of the Focus; Emphasis or Contrast; New or Given; Exhaustive or not, Multiple Focus and different Focus types. Such parameters are undoubtedly important and crucial to the study of Emphasis. With further elaboration they will be taken up in some detail in chapter four. Dik’s account will further be referred to either critically or illustratively in order to explicate linguistic issues relevant to the study of Focus and Emphasis.

(ii) Moutaouawakil’s Account

Subjecting Arabic to Dik’s Functional grammar analysis, Moutaouawakil (1985) provides a useful account of Focus in Arabic. However, he fails not only to provide a more refined classification of Dik’s analysis of Focus and Emphasis but also to incorporate what Arabic rhetoric could have offered into his functional analysis of various issues in MSA. In fact, he claims that it is sufficient to distinguish between only two types of Focus in Arabic, viz. the Focus of New and the Focus of Contrast (28). As a result, he wrongly identifies particles such as ٠٠٠٠، “inna”, and، ٠٠٠٠٠٠٠، “qad”, with those used for Contrast (32). This is despite the fact that Dik (58) himself admits that Focus [Unmarked Focus and Emphasis proper] does not necessarily imply Contrast. This is the area which is left vague in both applications of Functional grammar in the investigation of the Focus phenomena in English, Arabic and other languages. He is also guilty of ignoring what classical Arabic rhetoric could have offered to enlighten his account, particularly in terms of the receiver and constative typologies. The difference between his account and the one of the present research in terms of delicacy will be realized as soon as our theoretical framework is introduced in chapters two and three.

1.3.1.2.4 The Prague School’s Functional Grammar

(i) Danes’s Account

Danes (1972: 227-8) whose extremely brief account is similar to Dik’s, classifies utterances conveying Emphasis into (1) emphatic utterances proper; (2) utterances with
Emphasis for contrast. In class (1) the emphatic feature characterizes the utterance as a whole, while in class (2) this feature is associated with one particular element of the utterance only.

The emphatic utterances proper are characterized by the inverse order on the contextual level, i.e. by the order Comment-Topic, and consequently, by the onset position of the intonational centre (this being located on the initial-stress unit of the utterance) on the suprasegmental phonological level, e.g. The TRAIN has come! (in contradistinction to 'normal' The train has COME).

Quoting Jones (1956, 277), Danes points out that the Emphasis for contrast is intended

to show that a word is contrasted with another (either implied or previously expressed), or that a word introduces a new and unexpected idea.

He further says that contrastive Emphasis may be rendered - according to circumstances - by a set of means: (a) word order, (b) a shift of the intonational centre from its neutral position, and (c) a specific phonological form of the intonation contour. It is clear that (b) and (c) are the most common in English.

Dane's account, though scanty, seems in part to come closer to the way Emphasis is classified in Arabic rhetoric. However, confining (1) to characterizing the utterance as a whole, and (2) to characterizing a particular element of the utterance, do not seem to be convincing because it is possible to have them the other way round too. Nevertheless, Danes's account and classification are plausible and useful. We will be using his term "Emphasis proper" in the present research to refer to the area of prominence that falls between unmarked Focus and Contrast.
To sum up, so far I have been highlighting some of the accounts that have fallen short of providing a tangible model of Focus and Emphasis. The highlight of such accounts was conducted in terms of their respective linguistic theories in order to show how the term “Focus” has been a hybrid term seeking restrictive redefinition.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL PREREQUISITES (I)

Being true and nonobvious, assertions usually must relate to the addressee. This aspect of relevance has been for the most part ignored by speech act theoreticians. (Pratt, 1977: 134)

2 THE PRAGMATICS OF FOCUS AND EMPHASIS

Having discussed various linguistic preliminaries directly or indirectly pertinent to the study of Emphasis in Arabic, the present chapter aims to elucidate four theoretical prerequisites for studying Focus and Emphasis pragmatically. These are: (i) the place of Focus and Emphasis in contemporary pragmatic models, (ii) the introduction of a new pragmatic theory for the analysis of not only Focus and Emphasis but also other syntactic features pragmatically constrained, (iii) the place of Emphasis in Arabic rhetoric theory by resurrecting for the first time the receiver and constative typologies indispensable for any pragmatic theory, and (iv) the introduction of a functional prosodic clause typology of the FSP-variants of a given Verbal clause in Arabic. (i), (ii) and (iii), as will be argued, are complementary to one another in that the typologies to be introduced in (iii) are essential to contemporary pragmatic theories. In (iv) the FSP-variants are intended to specify the relative borderline prosodically between emphatic and non-emphatic utterances.

2.1 CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATIC THEORIES AND EMPHASIS

The aim of this section is twofold, first to define the concept of pragmatics and then to attempt to pin-point critically the way Emphasis is analysed within current pragmatic theories as envisaged by prominent linguists, and second to propose an eclectic pragmatic model more feasible and straightforward for the analysis of Emphasis and Focus in particular and Halliday’s system-like options in general. In so doing, the objective is to direct the attention to an area which such linguists have predicted to be fertile and necessary for a linguistic theory but fall short of providing any illuminating illustrations. The area concerned covers the crux of Halliday’s system-like syntactic
features which al-Jurjaanii calls معاني النحو, (lit. the meanings of syntax), whose selection seems to be subject to pragmatic constraints reflected by the text producer’s choice of the more appropriate feature. Let us first acquaint ourselves with the definition of pragmatics to be adopted here, and then move on to discuss critically the pragmatic models used in the analysis of Focus and Emphasis.

2.1.1 Definition of Pragmatics

Apart from the truth-conditional aspect of utterance meaning, pragmatics in the present research is to embrace all other aspects of meaning including conventional implicature, presupposition, felicity conditions, generalized and particularized conversational implicatures, etc. Pragmatics as a linguistic field has unfortunately received several various definitions all of which, according to Levinson (1984: 6),

have deficiencies and difficulties of a sort that would equally hinder definitions of other fields.

Nevertheless, the most suitable but slightly modified definition which seems to suit the purposes of the present research is the one quoted in Levinson (24) and defines pragmatics as

the study of the ability of language users to pair sentences with the contexts in which they would be [more] appropriate.

Appropriateness here is crucial as it reflects the text producer’s choice of a certain form of utterance, and/or some constituent as being more appropriate than another. The definition shows that the ability to use more appropriate terms in a given context is part of the text producer’s communicative competence based on the correct application of the grammatical rules and vocabulary, the correct knowledge as to when and where to use his sentence, the ability to interpret written and spoken sentences within the total context in which they are used, etc. Our basic concern is to explain the reason the text producer opts for Focus, Emphasis proper, De-emphasis or S Emphasis
in isomorphic contexts, and Focus rather than Emphasis proper, De-emphasis rather than S Emphasis, etc., in non-isomorphic contexts. The choice clearly does not concern those terms such as case markers whose choices are not only obligatory, i.e. ideational, but also change the truth-conditional meaning of the utterance concerned, but those whose choices are optional, i.e. interpersonal. In other words, what is more appropriate from the text producer's point of view may or may not be appropriate from the receiver's point of view, hence the worthiness of Grice's strategies of observing and flouting the conversational maxims and their Co-operative Principle (cf. below). Let us next move on to question the contemporary pragmatic models.

2.1.2 Grice's Pragmatic Model

Grice (1975) in his pragmatic theory, attempts to explicate how it is possible for us to convey information without encoding or saying it in words. He calls such information implicatures conveyed by what is actually said. The inferences come in two varieties: conventional and non-conventional. Conventional implicatures include all non-truth-conditional aspects of what is said solely owing to the words or forms the clause contains. Non-conventional implicatures come in two varieties, conversational implicatures that involve the Cooperative Principle and its maxims and non-conversational implicatures calculable in context on the basis of the conventional meaning, knowledge of the context of utterance and background knowledge, but which depend crucially for their existence on non-conversational maxims that are aesthetic, social, or moral in character (47).

However, the latter two kinds of non-conventional implicatures, namely conversational and non-conversational, will be, following Sadock (1978:283), fused together due to the similarities between them, as will be shown in our discussion on the receiver and constative typologies. The fusion will particularly concern the involvement of the maxims that are polite and social which can implicitly or explicitly associate the
calculability of conversational implicature from what is actually said in our model of Focus and Emphasis assignment.

In order to induce a conversational implicature, Grice proposes a Co-operative Principle and its Conversational Maxims, which people know when identifying the implicature. All the receiver has to do is to work it out and identify the text producer’s would-be intentional message. Grice divides the maxims into four classes, namely the classes of Quality, Quantity, Relevance, and Manner, on the basis of which aspect of conversation they are concerned with. The first two classes are concerned with the content of utterances. Relevance is concerned with the way utterances are linked to the rest of the conversation. The class of manner takes care of the form of the utterance. The Co-operative Principle and the maxims are formulated as follows:

1. The Co-operative Principle (CP):
   Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

2. The maxims. These are:
   a. the maxim of Quality:
      Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
      (i) do not say what you believe to be false,
      (ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
   b. the maxim of Quantity:
      (i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange,
      (ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
   c. the maxim of Relevance:
      Make your contribution relevant.
   d. the maxim of Manner
      Be perspicuous, and specifically:
      (i) avoid obscurity,
      (ii) avoid ambiguity,
      (iii) be brief,
      (iv) be orderly

In an attempt to find some prima facie plausibility of regarding the definite description as carrying an implicature of a non-conventional and conversational kind, Grice (1981,189) further selects a Russelian expansion as being that for which such an expression as,
The king of France is bald,

is to be regarded as a definitional contraction for three complex and conjunctive assertions, i.e. A, B, and C. Each one of these can be false while both of the others are true. So, it would be natural, on the assumption that any one of them might be challengeable, to set them out separately and so make it easy for anyone who wanted to challenge them to do so. Grice accordingly proposes to add the following new submaxim of manner in order to agree that denial is a natural and suitable form of response to an assertion. It reads:

(v) Frame what ever you say in the form most suitable for any reply that would be regarded as appropriate or Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply.

To produce the definitional contraction would violate the new submaxim unless one could assume that the speaker thought he was within his rights, in that he did not consider that a distinct denial of A or of B would be appropriate (cf. Grice 1981, for a detailed discussion). It should be stated that the form appropriateness submaxim of manner seems to possess a powerful explanatory value partly because it is similar to the definition of pragmatics adopted here, and partly because it is to be rephrased in order to account for both form and content appropriateness in our new pragmatic theory.

Grice (1975:49) further shows how the link between the CP and the maxims, on the one hand, and the implicature on the other is worked out. A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfil a maxim by several ways which, include the following:

1. He may quietly and unostentatiously VIOLATE a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead.
2. He may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxims and of the CP.
3. He may be faced by a CLASH: he may be unable, for example, to fulfil the first maxim of Quantity without violating the second maxim of Quality.
4. He may overtly FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfil it.
The most important one of these is flouting as it can implicate overtly a conversational implicature.

As regards the type of implicatures, Grice (1975: 56) distinguishes between Particularized Implicature and Generalized Implicature. Particularized implicature concerns cases in which an implicature is carried by saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is NORMALLY carried by saying that p. Generalized implicature refers to an implicature carried by the use of a certain form of words in an utterance which would normally (in the ABSENCE of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature.

Having briefly sketched Grice's pragmatic theory, the question crying out to be asked is "How can Focus and Emphasis be accounted for in such a theory?" Instances are not only very scant but also confined to isolated intonational Focus and Emphasis, i.e. stress, as a conventional way for making a particular word prominent. In order to steer our argument without precariousness towards this chapter's objective we need to elaborate firstly, Grice's and secondly, some prominent linguists' pragmatic accounts of stress assignment consequent upon their models. Let us starts with Grice's account of intonational Focus and Emphasis.

Grice (1978:122), who assumes stress to be a conventional way, i.e. without any conventional significance, for marking a particular word prominent, argues that stress is one of the elements which help to generate implicatures.

Using the maxim of relevance to account for stress assignment, Grice slightly extends the maxim by making it apply not only to what is said, but to features of the
means used for saying what is said. This would entitle us to expect that an aspect of an utterance will have a purpose linked with what is currently being communicated unless, of course, its presence can be explained in some other way. Consider

A. Jones paid the bill.
B. JONES didn’t pay the bill; SMITH paid it.

Applying the maxim of relevance, Grice argues that this maxim requires that B’s remark should be relevant to something or other, and B, by speaking as he would speak in reply to a statement that Jones paid the bill, shows that he has such a statement in mind. If B just says Jones didn’t pay the bill, B speaks as if he were about to continue: B implicates that someone (other than Jones) paid the bill.

Grice’s account of contrastive stress assignment above hardly offers any significant pragmatic interpretation particularly if what is implicated, i.e. “Someone (other than Jones) paid the bill”, is actually said, i.e. “SMITH paid it” as the example shows. Although there are a lot of contextual occasions in which only the Rejection part of contrastiveness is mentioned as a result of flouting the maxim of being as informative as required, the predominant uses of contrastiveness normally involve mentioning either the Correction part only or the Correction part together with the Rejection part. In addition, Grice’s account neither explains whether the example above is used in an isomorphic or non-isomorphic context, nor what kind of immediate and long-term ideological statuses the receiver contextually manifests.

What matters to us here is the maxims and their power to interpret the more appropriate pairness of sentences with their appropriate contexts. The mechanism of maxims interpretation is clearly in need of re-regulation in order to account for both the form and the content of utterance on equal footing. In this respect, all Grice’s maxims of quality, quantity, the fifth submaxim of manner together with the residual ones will be included in the new model as they have indispensable roles to play unavailable to
them in the other pragmatic models. However, before that it is important to show, though briefly, how the maxims and their co-operative principle are accused of redundancy, vagueness and overlap of functions. I shall argue that it is not the maxims immense explanatory power, but their sole application to the utterance content that has brought such accusations and misunderstanding. However, this is not to say that Grice's maxims in their present status are fully correct because their applicability does indeed require some remodifications not only as far as Focus and Emphasis assignment is concerned but also other syntactic features forming system-like options attributable to Halliday's interpersonal component in systemic grammar. Realizing how redundant the maxims are, Sadock (1978: 285), rightly argues in this respect, that although

the extreme power of the system is in fact an unavoidable characteristic, it is perhaps possible to eliminate some of the redundancy in the maxims.

Similarly, Kempson (1975: 142. fn. 2), dismissing the maxim of manner as being of less importance than the others, opts instead for a new submaxim of relevance in order to be able to account for the relevance of form to the content and co-text of a given utterance (cf. next). In fact, the cases of ambiguity, obscurity, etc. accounted for by the first four submaxims of manner represent marginal issues which, compared with the huge linguistic area left unnoticed, would hardly ever contribute significantly to a unified pragmatic theory. All these four submaxims can arguably be accounted for by the fifth submaxim of form appropriateness which seems to possess a most powerful explanatory value indispensable to any pragmatic theory.

The maxim of quantity and its submaxims of uninformativity and overinformativity, crucial as they are, have not been investigated exhaustively in order to unfold their usefulness to any pragmatic model. Even the few widely known examples so far discussed are predominantly restricted to message-content. Thus, due to the absence of suitable examples that would have shown how crucial this maxim is,
most linguists seem to have focused on the submaxim of uninformativity in preference to overinformativity. Grice's (1975: 46) himself, remarks that

> to be overinformative is not a transgression of the co-operative principle but merely a waste of time. However, ... its effect will be secured by a later maxim of relevance.

Grice's remark clearly indicates the redundancy of the submaxim in question and how a maxim of relevance can be used as a replacement for not only this submaxim but also the other maxims as is clear from Levinson (1983) and Sperber and Wilson's (1986) accounts. As a result Kempson (1975: 162) for example, restricts her attention to the submaxim of uninformativity only, whereas Levinson concedes that

> exactly how the appropriate implicatures in these cases [the use of tautologies] are to be predicted remains quite unclear.

However, the over-informativity submaxim in the present research, is so important that when a text producer flouts it, i.e. tautologies, he actually flouts the submaxim in question not the co-operative principle or the relevance maxim. It will be shown in chapter six that not only synthetic propositions are emphasizable but analytic propositions as well. So as far as Emphasis is concerned, the submaxim of over-informativity will be assigned a special status as there are certain contexts of situation whereby the text producer has to use tautologies emphatically.

Similarly, linguists such as Levinson (106), seem to restrict the submaxim of uninformativity to cases which give rise to generalized implicatures only, and the submaxim of over-informativity to cases whereby only particularized implicatures are derived. Although Levinson is apparently impeccable in the case of over-informativity, he does not seem fully correct in the case of uninformativity. The text producer in certain contexts may choose to be blatantly uninformative rather than as informative as required for a conceivable reason. All the exemplifications Levinson provides, however, refer to the possibility that the text producer would be misleading not flouting
if he withheld the required information. He provides the following example (1984: 106):

A: How did Harry fare in court the other day?
B: Oh he got a fine.

Levinson here shows that if it later transpires that Harry got life sentence too, then B (if he knew this all along) would certainly be guilty of misleading A, for he has failed to provide all the information that might reasonably be required in the situation. However, the example can arguably be used in a situation whereby B’s response would be ironic if both A and B knew that B’s response was not true, and if Harry’s crime which is known to both A and B is punishable by a death sentence. Here the maxim which is normally used to account for ironies and is exploited here is the maxim of quality. In both instances, B’s responses are intended to mislead A, but in Levinson’s version it is an infringement of the first submaxim of quantity, and in my version it is an exploitation of the first submaxim of quality. Note that in both versions, B’s response can be seen not only as less informative but as false as well. This is just one single case where the maxims sometimes seem to overlap with one another.

The important thing here is the link between uninformativity and the form of certain clause elements. Thus, Grice (1975, 56) rightly talks about a possible generalized conversational implicature inferential from the use of a certain form of words [such as an indefinite noun] in an utterance. Grice (57) adds in this respect that in such cases

the implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific. This is a familiar implicature situation and is classifiable as a failure, for one reason or another, to fulfil the first maxim of quantity.

Although such a claim evidently demonstrates the possibility of the importance of form in implicatures derivation, Grice does not make it clear as to why the text
producer chooses to do so. It will be shown below that indefiniteness and definiteness as syntactic features are closely linked with utterance informativity, i.e. having interpersonal contribution, and consequently with cohesion, i.e. having textual contribution. That is, if the text producer uses an indefinite element to refer to a referent whose identity is retrievable from the context, he is being uninformative for a reason identifiable by the receiver, and being cohesive and coherent. See in this respect the example to be given below to back up our model.

Kempson (1975: 179-80), however, unlike Grice, accounts for the use of definite and indefinite noun phrases (cf. below) in terms of the maxim of relevance. She, in this respect, argues that

if the speaker uses a noun phrase whose syntactic and semantic specification is identical to that of an indefinite noun phrase except that it bears the feature [+Def] arbitrary assigned (by optional rule) at deep structure, he will be breaking this maxim of relation, [viz. Make the form of your utterance relevant to its content], unless he intends the use of this feature [+Def] to be relevant to the content of his utterance.

Although Kempson is not wrong to correlate the infringement of form with the maxim of relevance at a general level, the correlation between such an infringement and un informativity is arguably unavoidable at least at a lower specific level.

It follows from such different pragmatic interpretation that Grice’s maxims do indeed require to be disambiguated and simplified as much as possible in order to maintain their extreme power of interpretation. As Pratt’s quotation given in the beginning of this section implies, not only have speech act theoreticians but also Grice’s theory followers been guilty of ignoring the role of the receiver’s immediate status. The reformalization of the maxims and submaxims must incorporate the receiver’s role if we are to have a feasibly successful pragmatic model. Let us next turn to Kempson’s pragmatic account of stress assignment.
2.1.3 Kempson's Pragmatic Model

Recognizing the implicature consequent upon contrastive stress assignment as a generalized conversational one, Kempson (1975: 194-6) suggests two ways in which the derivation of this implicature could be induced. It can be calculated either by

a combination of the maxims of relation and quantity, or
by setting up a new maxim.

The first alternative, according to Kempson's reformulation, is problematic since the relevance maxim relates solely to the pragmatic and semantic content of the utterance and that of the preceding discourse. But stress is not part of the semantic or pragmatic content of the utterance and its relevance relates only to the utterance itself and/or not necessarily to the preceding discourse. Kempson further supposes that if we seek to demonstrate the conversational implicatures consequent upon stress assignment by deducing them from an assumption of the maintenance of the old maxims of relation and quantity, it could be done if we merely assume that stress is a conventional means of emphasis. Thus if a speaker says

*A MAN hit Mary,*

he knows the hearer will deduce that since stress is a conventional means of emphasising and since the speaker is committed to asserting the p concerned only if at least one of its conditions is not in the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse PUD (i.e. mutual knowledge), his emphasis will only be relevant to his utterance of p in question if he is seeking to draw the hearer's attention to one of these conditions. Since the hearer assumes that the speaker is obeying the maxim of relation, he therefore assumes that "man" corresponds to conditions (a set of conditions), one of which is not in the PUD he and the speaker share. Since moreover the speaker has not drawn his attention to any other part of the utterance, the hearer will further deduce that the speaker must be implying that that is the only part of the utterance which is not in the PUD. The hearer will therefore deduce that the speaker is implicating that the remainder of the utterance
does correspond to propositions in the PUD. The speaker will therefore be taken to be implicating that the hearer knows that someone hit Mary, and that the hearer knows that the speaker knows that someone hit Mary. Thus Kempson (195) concludes that this form of deduction is that

the maxim 'Be relevant' in its most general interpretation does not strictly speaking apply to the concept of relevance here. It is normally construed as the relation between utterance and event, or between utterance and utterance.

Kempson, however, further argues that if the utterance form is treated as relevant to the utterance interpretation (given that the choices range only over those options which do not alter the meaning) then

a plausible alternative is to maintain the maxim of relevance in its strict form, viz. “a relation of implicature does hold between two sentences S1 and S3 when S1 is used to implicate a sentence S2 which entails S3”, and to add a further maxim of relation “Make the form of your utterance relevant to its content”. With this second maxim the deduction of the implicature goes through exactly as before, but we have not reduced the predictive content of the other maxim of relation (160, 196).

From this it follows that Kempson’s two accounts which bear some similarities to Grice’s account of stress, seem right to account for contrastive stress through the maxims of quantity and relevance. However, apart from the important maxim of form relevance and its link with the optionality of certain syntactic features, Kempson too falls short of providing an illuminating pragmatic interpretation distinct from others’ approaches. The accounts not only fail to incorporate the important maxim of quality to account for contrastive stress assignment but also are restricted to the informativity maxim at the expense of explaining the purposes of using contrastive stress. We will
come back to Kempson’s maxim of relevance in our discussion on the model to be proposed.

2.1.4 Sperber and Wilson’s Pragmatic Model

In their dismissal of Grice’s model as less explicit, lacking explanation of explicit communication, and norms which communicators and audience must know for adequate communication but may be violated, SW (1981 & 1986) propose instead a cognitive theory of Relevance responsible for determining context, content and intended inferences, and seeking to explain how language users gain maxim information for minimum effort. It is based on the assumption that

the speaker tries to express the proposition which is the most relevant one possible to the hearer (1982:75).

Relevance is thus equivalent to acquisition of New information yielding contextual effects by altering the receiver’s cognitive environment via the use of induction and deduction based on the contextualization of the union of New and Given information. Cognitively relevance occurs when a new utterance U correlates with already known information K in context C relevant New information is inferred that could not be inferred from either K and C alone. SW (1986:162) further explain that,

the principle of relevance is a generalization about ostensive-inferential communication. Communicators and audience need no more know the principle to communicate than they need to know the principles of genetics to reproduce. Communicators do not “follow” the principle of relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted. It is not the general principle, but the fact that a particular presumption of relevance has been communicated by and about a particular act of communication, that the audience uses in inferential comprehension.

As regards Focus which SW treat as a purely functional notion with no role in the linguistic description of sentences, they have predicted the possible existence of a huge descriptive literature in the area manifesting a natural linkage between linguistic form and pragmatic interpretation. Their account offers to pursue such a natural linkage
by interpreting utterances’ contextual effects in terms of stylistic effects such as given and knew; presupposition and focus; presupposition and assertion, etc. They use the background/foreground distinction to account for the utterance information contextually processed. Background information is thus information that contributes only indirectly to relevance, by reducing the processing effort required; it need be neither Given nor presupposed. Foreground information on the other hand, is information that is relevant in its own right by having contextual effects; it need not be New. SW’s background/foreground distinction, however, differs from other stylistic bipartitions in that it has no role at all to play in linguistic theory, and in pragmatics it is simply a descriptive label used to distinguish two complementary and independently necessary aspects of the interpretation process. The distinction arises as automatic effects of the receiver’s tendency to maximise relevance, and of the text producer’s exploitation of that tendency. Thus stress placement, like other stylistic features, should therefore, be looked at in terms of processing effort (1986: 213).

As far as Focus is concerned, SW (1986: 204) accordingly argue that

given two utterances with the same linguistically determined truth conditions, [both] may differ in their contextual effects and in the processing effort they require, and this is the key to an explanatory theory of style.

Their aim is not to show how each possible Focus determines, for example, a Wh-question, and vice versa, but to provide some satisfactory explanation of why Focus should be so. They make use of what is called pragmatic presupposition to identify the focal constituent. However, consider how they account for the following example expressing emphatic repetition (219):

*I shall never, never smoke again.*

The interpersonal emphatic effect of repetition is reflected in the speaker’s degree of commitment to the propositional content of this utterance. The task of the hearer here is
thus to reconcile the fact that a certain expression has been repeated with the assumption that optimal relevance has been aimed at. So it would be consistent with the principle of relevance to assume that the speaker attaches a higher confirmation value to the assumption expressed than the hearer would otherwise have thought. Realising that her utterance will be sceptically received, she repeats the word “never”, the likely target of the scepticism, to convince the hearer that she means what she says. In other words, “never, never” is here similar in import to “definitely never”, and reflects the speaker’s degree of commitment to the assumption expressed. This strengthens the explication and all its contextual implications, thereby increasing the contextual effects of the utterance. What is important, however, is that the speaker must choose some form which can not but reveal her assumptions about the hearer’s contextual resources and processing abilities. (Compare their account of the utterance above with our account of emphatic repetition in chapter five).

From this brief discussion of SW’s relevance, the theory, however, seems to reflect the failure to reformalize a pragmatic model out of Grice’s theory, that would have accounted for literally and figuratively encoded cases in a more straightforward and consistent way. SW’s theory does not seem to have offered any illuminating account of unravelling drawable implicatures. Their argument against tackling any pragmatic interpretation in terms of special pragmatic conventions or interpretation rules similar to those of Grice’s, does not seem to be justified since notions such as flouting and observing are indispensable to any pragmatic theory. It will be shown that the text producer may choose to flout the form in which the message is presented, provided that he must make sure that there is a clue available for the receiver to identify indicating where and consequently why he chooses to flout the submaxims involved. Thus their theory would certainly have been more illuminating had it been used not only to re-employ Grice’s notions of Observing and Flouting but also to replace Grice’s Co-operative principle to be maintained in all cases of observing and/or flouting the residual maxims and submaxims.
The theory itself unfortunately suffers from several untenable gaps. For example, Haslett (1987: 136-7) counter-argues, in this respect, that the theory is a universal informational-processing principle and not a unique condition of relevance. Not only does the theory ignore the importance of goals in determining relevance, but also assign a passive role to the listener.

Unlike SW's theory of Relevance, the receiver in the present research will have a basic role to play in determining the goals of communication in isomorphic and non-isomorphic contexts. For further criticisms, see Haslett (1987), Smith (1982) and Wilks and Cunningham (1986).

As far as their account of Emphasis assignment is concerned, the theory fails to answer the question why does the text producer use repetition in the example above? It is not satisfactory to say that the use of repetition is to reflect the text producer's degree of commitment, and to strengthen the explication and all its contextual implications, thereby increasing the contextual effects of the utterance. Nor is it enough to say that the text producer must choose some form which reveals the text producer's assumptions about the receiver's contextual resources and processing abilities. These two crucial issues will be answered in this research.

2.2 A NEW PRAGMATIC MODEL

So far I have been discussing some of the flaws and inadequacies of the aforementioned pragmatic models whereby linguistic studies are preoccupied predominantly with the content of a mixture of figurative and literally encoded examples. Apart from Grice's isolated remark as to the considerable contribution of form to pragmatic theories, nothing significantly tangible has ever been crystallized in this regard, and utterance and constituent forms are thus left virtually unnoticed by most prominent pragmatic models. The flaws that tarnish these models have not only led to the obscurity and insufficiency of the explanatory power of such
models but also to the failure of realizing a systematically unified theory of pragmatics accounting for both utterance form and function. The problem is further compounded particularly in the case of Focus and Emphasis, by lack of appropriate examples that would have explained the important pragmatic contribution of utterance and constituent forms to implicatures calculability.

Another obvious reason for such flaws is the total absence of the receiver's role to whom the utterance is ultimately oriented in actual conversational exchange. That is, most of these models and other mutual knowledge theories as well have failed to classify the receiver systematically in terms of informativity and mutual knowledgeability based upon long-term and immediate ideological statuses. We will be showing how indispensable the receiver's roles are in the calculability of implicatural inferences in our typologies of receivers and constatives. Identifying the roles or types of receiver will consequently and naturally lead to the identification of utterance types in the area of Focus and Emphasis assignment. What is strikingly illuminating of both typologies is the text producer's choice to dispatch any of the utterance types which may conform either isomorphically or non-isomorphically with those of the receiver types in actual communication. Both typologies will undoubtedly form an essential part of the calculability of implicatures to be worked out in accordance with our model.

The model to be proposed is based on the assumption that there are pragmatic constraints on syntax attributable to conversational implicature. The assumption concerns Focus and Emphasis assignment in particular and other syntactic features in general. Linguists such as Kempson (1975), Levinson (1983), Sperber and Wilson (1986) have already predicted that this assumption would cover the huge area necessary for any pragmatic theory, but nothing has so far been materialized to formalize such a theory that can account favourably for form and content alike. Apart from such scattered remarks, the models these linguists introduce are still too inadequate to
characterize favourably a huge descriptive linguistic lore where the linkage between structure and function is yet to be accounted for.

The domain of the new model which inherits its validity primarily from Arabic rhetoric and secondarily from the explanatory mechanism of Grice's pragmatic model, Halliday's notion of choice and the aforementioned linguists' remarks, will accommodate both the natural and marked cases which are literally and figuratively encoded.

In Arabic rhetoric, the predecessor of linking the use of syntactic features with contextual constraints was al-Jurjaanii, who was the first to call these features, معاني النحو, (lit. the meanings of syntax) in his theory of النظم, (lit. the theory of embellishment). Most of his various examples given to demonstrate this assumption were later incorporated together to form what is now called 'Ilm al-LMa'aanii, which centres around the linkage between linguistic forms and pragmatics. The branch shows how at the clause level, i.e. speech acts, and constituent level, context can, on the basis of choosing what is more appropriate, influence structure.

The new pragmatic model to be proposed is eclectic, systematic, comprehensive and more plausible than any other models critically discussed above. The model is based essentially on the same pragmatic interpretation mechanism of Grice’s model but with the assignment of a greater role to the receiver's immediate ideological status in the calculability of implicature of a given utterance. I shall argue that what is required within the realm of Halliday's Interpersonal component is a three-level hierarchy comprising at the first level a pragmatic Principle subsuming two basic maxims at the second level, and as many submaxims as the number of the syntactic features concerned at the third level.

As regards the designation of the new Principle, none of the designations assigned to the principles and maxims of other pragmatic models seem to be suitable. I
therefore, suggest that the most appropriate term to designate the new Principle is “Appropriateness”. On the one hand, the term is compatible with the definition of pragmatics adopted above, and on the other, it is slightly similar to the term أُطَابِيْقة, used in the same way in Arabic rhetoric pragmatic analysis, and must be upheld in both cases of observing and flouting the submaxims concerned. The Principle of Appropriateness which, generally speaking, should be able to account for the appropriateness of an utterance or some constituent, is to be treated as a general guideline for more effectiveness and efficiency in discourse processing. The Principle of Appropriateness reads:

**Make your realization more appropriate for the receiver’s long-term and immediate ideological statuses which are relevant to the immediate context.**

As was mentioned above, the Principle of Appropriateness further encompasses two basic maxims at the second level of the hierarchy one concerns the form of utterance or some constituent, and the other concerns the content of utterance or some constituent. To designate both maxims I suggest that the most suitable term would be Halliday’s term of “Congruence”. Thus we may have (i) the Maxim of Form Congruence and (ii) the Maxim of Content Congruence whose observance and/or flouting will in general yield results in accord with upholding the main Principle of Appropriateness and the definition of pragmatics. These maxims are:

**The Maxim of Form Congruence**

**Make the form of your realization congruent with the receiver’s long-term and immediate ideological statuses and the immediate context.**

**The Maxim of Content Congruence**

**Make the content of your realization congruent with the receiver’s long-term and immediate ideological statuses and the immediate context.**
The maxim of form congruence actually resembles Grice’s fifth submaxim of manner, viz.:

**Frame whatever you say in the form most suitable for any reply that would be regarded as appropriate**

and similar to Kempson’s new submaxim of relevance, viz.:

**Make the form of your utterance relevant to its content.**

Postulating a further set of two basic maxims, the first for form congruence and the second for content congruence is crucial; form congruence would be capable of accounting for cases where the form of a given utterance or some constituent can either be used congruently or incongruently depending on the text producer’s judgement of which use is more appropriate. Almost all the Hallidayan system networks can be further accountable within the Interpersonal component through either the observance or exploitation of the maxims involved. The maxim is capable of lumping together all those cases of form congruence and incongruence resulting from observing and flouting utterance and constituent forms respectively. It will thus account not only for the natural, literal, unmarked and/or more frequent cases, but the unnatural, marked, and less frequent as well.

Content congruence, on the other hand, is to account not only for the content of literally encoded utterances, i.e. content relevance, some cases of overinformativity and possibly uninformativity, but also for the figurative content of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, etc.,

However, as was mentioned above, these two basic maxims are still too general to account for cases so diverse and specific that it would be impossible to account for them by just two general maxims. So at the third level of the hierarchy, each of such
basic maxims may further subsume as many submaxims as the number of the syntactic and semantic features language puts at our disposal. The submaxims would be capable of accounting for each choice the text producer makes from such specific syntactic or semantic features forming system-like networks within the Interpersonal component. Thus we may have submaxims of form congruence for the interpersonal systems of number, tense, aspect, finiteness, person (i.e. switch-reference), uninformativity (i.e. Grice’s first submaxim of quantity), the quality submaxims, utterance types, (i.e. speech acts), Focus, Emphasis and stress assignment, politeness, etc. However the interpersonal system networks differ from the those of the ideational in that they are not mutually exclusive because the missing information consequent upon the text producer’s free choice is contextually retrievable. Before proceeding to demonstrate the plausibility and advantages of our model it is necessary to analyse Halliday’s definition of the concept of Congruence first in order to check its suitability for our model.

Halliday’s definition of Congruence is extremely scanty and vague and almost identical to unmarkedness. From his scattered remarks on Congruence, Halliday (1985:321) uses it to refer to the fact that

to any metaphorical expression corresponds another, or perhaps more than one, that is “literal” or, CONGRUENT. In other words, for any given semantic configuration there is (at least) one congruent realization in the lexicogrammar.

Halliday, however, further argues that

this is not to say that the congruent realization is better, or that it is more frequent, or even that it functions as a norm; there are many instances where a metaphorical [incongruent] representation has become the norm.

It seems very hard to understand what Halliday has in mind concerning the definition of Congruence and whether or not it has contextual implications. If, however, it has, as it seems so, then Halliday uses “Incongruence” to correspond with Grice’s term “Flouting” used to characterize the choices of figures of speech as incongruent realizations rather than their respective congruent realizations. Thus
conceivably what is in Halliday’s mind seems the text producer’s flouting of the second maxim of content congruence in our new model. However, in the case of literal or congruent realizations, Halliday’s definition does not seem to go further than explicitly suggesting the observance of the maxim of content congruence of literally encoded realizations.

What seems unclear in Halliday’s sketchy account of “(In)congruence” is the area where we can have numerous instances characterisable as Incongruently literal realizations whereby the convention of a given context is unostentatiously infringed without transference into figurative meaning. In other words, the incongruent encoding of a given semantic configuration concerns the infringement of form convention not the content convention, which can only be calculated if the utterance concerned does not meet the requirements of what the receiver’s immediate and long-term ideological statuses contextually presuppose. Thus an utterance which meets such requirements, i.e. using Emphasis proper if the receiver’s ideological status is one of doubt, will be understood to be literally encoded and congruently used. The same utterance, on the other hand, can be treated as literally encoded but incongruently dispatched, if the receiver’s ideological status is one of denial or non-denial. In both cases, we have a single utterance flexible enough to be used congruently if the form is not infringed, or incongruently if the form is being infringed. Of course, the form infringement is calculable on the basis of specifically identifying the receiver’s immediate and long-term ideological statuses and the text producer’s ultimate choice of how to encode his utterance.

From this it follows that it is necessary in our pragmatic model to put Halliday’s concepts of Congruence and Incongruence on a par with Grice’s important notions of Observing and Flouting respectively; what is congruent represents the text producer’s observance of the maxims and submaxims in congruent contexts, and what is incongruent represents the text producer’s flouting of such maxims and submaxims in incongruent contexts. Halliday’s two concepts of congruence and incongruence must
thus be extended to accommodate those specific realizations of the newly introduced area pragmatically constrainable and systemically accountable within the Interpersonal component. These include the literal, realizations used Congruently and Incongruently, and all the non-literal realizations such as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, etc. as instances of content exploitation to be used incongruently. It is the former area that is evidently left unnoticed by other pragmatic models, and could have enhanced their pragmatic models theoretically had it been investigated carefully. A successful pragmatic account must therefore incorporate the areas occupied by most of Halliday’s ideational systems, i.e. syntactic features such as +Def vs -Def, Non-emphasis vs Emphasis etc., representing options pragmatically constrainable in their respective contextual situation. The use of the term “Congruence” to designate the two basic maxims constraining pairing sentences with contexts would thus be more appropriate than any other terms given in other models.

In order to show the importance of form and content congruence and incongruence in our model, consider the following hypothetical situation:

A has been invited to a formal party. Everybody is, accordingly expected to wear a formal lounge suit. A, however, chooses to wear informal [casual] clothes. A thus blatantly flouts the convention of formal parties.

The situation clearly shows how the form rather than the content can be flouted without damaging the text producer’s decision of the appropriateness of his informal clothes. If A, instead of going himself, decides to send a brother or sister to the party, then we have a case of content flouting, i.e. figures of speech. In both cases the floutings are incongruent and from A’s point of view are appropriate. If, on the other hand, A chooses not to go, then arguably he is opting out, which is still more appropriate from his point of view.
In Arabic, the equivalents of the notions of Congruence and Incongruence are used to designate the presence or absence of syntactic features in the surface structure of a sentence in grammar, and the contextual use of syntactic and semantic features of a given utterance in rhetoric. In grammar, the notions “basic” vs “non-basic” are used in the same as “unmarkedness” and “markedness” respectively. Both are used to characterize purely formal features representative of morphology, and syntax. For example, in Arabic grammar, indefiniteness is said to be always unmarked, basic, etc., as opposed to definiteness which is marked, non-basic, etc. (cf. Owens: 1988).

In rhetoric, however, non-basic and basic have also been used to characterize a syntactic or semantic feature chosen in a specific context to be either congruently or incongruently used and thus identical to the extension given to Halliday’s congruence and incongruence above. So what is unmarked may be congruent in a certain context, but incongruent in another. Similarly, what is marked may be congruent in a certain context but incongruent in another. The intersection of both cases in the area of form congruence and incongruence is very important and must be incorporated into any pragmatic theory. It should be said that the branch of 'Ilm al-Ma'aanii in Arabic rhetoric provides a pragmatic analysis similar but not as delicate and theoretically systematic as the pragmatic model tentatively proposed here. Such an account is absent in Halliday’s definition of both notions which, apart from content congruence and incongruence, seems to focus only on the observance or congruence of the literal encoding of a given semantic configuration.

In order to demonstrate the plausibility of our model, consider the following example said by a sergeant while he was on his knees after being badly beaten in a fight. The sergeant was previously renowned by his soldiers who stood watching their sergeant with a surprised expression on their faces, as being too tough to beat. The sergeant consequently shouts at them:
Haven't you seen a man on his knees? Scram.

What is interestingly relevant to our model is the indefinite noun phrase "a man" functioning as an object, which co-refers to the text producer himself. Formally, indefiniteness in Arabic grammar and possibly in other languages as well, is treated as the unmarked case. Functionally, however, it is impossible to say that the use of "a man" here is congruent, i.e. unmarked, because the referent is presently visible in the immediate situation. Neither can we say it is possible to substitute "a man" by "the man" since the latter does not co-refer to the text producer. It is "me" which is the congruent element that can replace the incongruent element "a man" in this particular context. It must be emphasized that in the example above the choice between definite and indefinite terms necessitates the maintenance of contextual co-referentiality. Furthermore, the text producer's optional choice of the indefinite element "a man" to co-refer to himself is a clear case of flouting of the form congruence of the element concerned in such a context. (cf. Kempson's aforementioned argument along the same vein). The optionality in similar cases must be maintained so that the pragmatic impingement on utterance form can evidently express the natural linkage between them.

Initially, by choosing -Def as more appropriate than +Def, the sergeant chooses to flout the specific submaxim of definiteness which reads:

**Use a definite expression if the referent is visibly present in the immediate situation.**

In fact, the sergeant, being beaten ashamedly before the eyes of his soldiers, flouts a number of submaxims, first by choosing the indefinite expression "a man" rather than "me" to refer to himself as a visibly present referent in the immediate situation, and second by his incongruent use of a rhetorical question to address presuppositionless receivers. In the former, he flouts the submaxim of being as informative as required by being less informative since the importance of the syntactic feature +Def becomes less
necessary owing to the visible presence of the referent concerned in the immediate situation. Interpreting the surprised expression on his soldiers' faces as inconsistent "non-verbal" sign with their previous beliefs concerning his being too tough to beat, the sergeant uses the indefinite element "a man" to implicate the message that he is like any other man who can sometimes be beaten, and that the soldiers should not have had that surprised expression on their faces. In other words, he has treated his soldiers' facial expression of surprise as an immediate non-verbal sign of counter-presupposition of his being beaten, because before the fight they recognized his unique toughness as a long-term ideology at least within the universe of their military environment. Their non-verbal counter-presupposition is further manifested by the sergeant's issuance of a rhetorical question containing the indefinite expression concerned, hence demoting them from receivers who shared the same long-term ideology with him, i.e. presuppositionless, to receivers who are as if counter-presuppositional of his defeat.

Suffice it to say at this stage that the new model would account very adequately for non-emphatic and emphatic constatives within the maxim of form congruence. More specifically, the submaxims that are relevant to account for Emphasis are the Emphasis, Quality, and Quantity submaxims. For example, when the veracity of his proposition is severely threatened, the text producer may choose either to observe or flout the submaxims of Focus, Emphasis proper, S Emphasis, etc. in order to uphold the submaxims of quality depending on the kind of receiver he has in mind, the kind of proposition his utterance conveys, and other contextual factors involved (cf. next section). However, Emphasis can similarly be used to accompany figures of speech, i.e. metaphor, synecdoche, etc., in the same way as in literally encoded cases. In accounting for such cases, both maxims of content and form congruence have to be taken into account when calculating the implicatures involved. The area is very interesting and constitutes a real challenge as a target for future studies.
As regards the types of conversational implicature, the new model would account for the same two types of Grice’s (1975) implicatures but with drastic modifications in order to incorporate the necessary inferences arising from taking into account the receiver and constative’s typologies. The connection between the submaxims and the conversational implicature can be realized when a text producer chooses either to observe the submaxims involved, thus producing a Generalized Conversational Implicature, or chooses to exploit the submaxims concerned, thus producing a Particularized Conversational Implicature. In the example above, by using the indefinite element “a man”, the sergeant flouts the submaxim of definiteness in order to implicate a particularized implicature which stands out in sharp contrast with what Grice (56) and Levinson (1983: 126) call a generalized conversational implicature in their analysis of cases such as ‘a/an X’. Our pragmatic model has unequivocally demonstrated the possibility of having particularized implicatures via form flouting as well.

Further to observing and flouting the submaxims, the connection between the submaxims and the intended implicature can also be realized by resorting to violation, opting out, or being faced by a clash. These cases can be calculated in the same way as Grice and other linguists do. The indispensable thing to remember is that the flouting of form congruence in particular is real and calculable on the basis of identifying a signal, be it formal or semantic, retrievable from the surface structure concerned to the effect that a submaxim(s) has been exploited. This claim too is in sharp contrast with Levinson’s (1983:127) claim concerning his treatment of implicatures that arises from observing the maxim of Relevance [as] particularized, since utterances are relevant only with respect to the particular topic or issue at hand.

However, the calculability of an implicature in accordance with our model can only be worked out if the receiver’s long-term and immediate ideological statuses communicatively expressed either verbally and non-verbally, or non-verbally, are
brought in and specifically identified as an essential catalyst. In fact without specifically classifying the receiver’s ideological status, our model will offer nothing novel.

So far we have only roughly explained how implicatures actually worked out. A general pattern for calculating an implicature can he formed on the basis of Grice’s definition of implicature quoted in Levinson (1983: 113) but with slight modification to suit our new model of implicature analysis. The pattern can be stated as follows:

Speaker’s saying that p conversationally implicates q if:
(i) S is presumed to choose either to observe the submaxims involved if the receiver’s communicative participation is both verbal and non-verbal, or to flout the submaxims involved if the receiver’s communicative participation is non-verbal only,
(ii) in order to maintain this assumption it must be supposed that S thinks that q
(iii) S must know that it is mutual knowledge that q must be supposed
(iv) S has done nothing to stop me, the receiver, thinking that q (v) therefore S intends me to think that q, and in saying that p has implicated q

Having discussed some of the essentials of our new model, it is now necessary to provide a preparatory account of the typologies of receivers and constatives on the basis of degrees of informativity to be specified prior to, or at the moment of actual communication. A detailed account will be provided in the next section.

Almost any communicative constative delivered intentionally by the text producer is expected to contain New information, i.e. as informative as required, and meaningful to the receiver. To quantify such meaningful messages requires the measurement of the informativity of a given proposition on a scale that would help to quantify the new intended information relayed in actual communication. So the apparently approximate informativity scale would have one extreme representing
constatives expressing higher informativity and the other representing constatives emitting lower informativity. Such a rough classification, however, clearly misses the point and leads nowhere but to maintain rather than solve the mystification this area has often been causing. The task of formalizing a more fruitful classification of the degrees of informativity has thus proven to be too complicated a challenge for contemporary linguists to tackle (cf. for example, Beaugrande and Dressler’s (1981) scale).

Further, Grice’s submaxims of quantity, namely uninformativity and overinformativity, which are operational at the third level of our model, can typologically occupy two extremes on the scale with informativity occupying a point on the centre. We have noticed above how the submaxim of overinformativity, which is accounted for in our model by the maxim of content congruence, has almost been ignored because of the absence of illuminating examples. In fact Grice (1975:46) himself believed that this submaxim is disputable and its effect would be secured by an adequately formulated maxim of relevance. Even those who discussed tautologies like Levinson (1983: 111), admit that

exactly how the appropriate implicatures in these [tautologies] are to be predicted remains quite unclear.

However, this essential submaxim of overinformativity, as will be shown, has a crucial role to play in certain aspects of talk exchange in which Focus and Emphasis are likely to coincide with tautologies (cf. below and chapter six).

The other quantity submaxim, namely uninformativity, being accounted for by the maxim of form congruence and possibly by content congruence as well, is used by most linguists to account for how the use of indefinite elements convey generalized implicatures only.
In Arabic rhetoric, the informativity of constative discourse is calculated on the basis of taking the constative literalness as a primary illocutionary act when delivered in congruent contexts. That is, if the literalness of a given constative is to represent the primary illocutionary act, the constative use in congruent contexts serves to yield two congruent functions:

(i) to inform the receiver of p as well as of the fact that the text producer knows that p as well; this is called 
(ii) to inform the receiver that the text producer knows that p as well; this is called 

Both functions which can further be called the “Principle of the Presumption of Ignorance” and the “Principle of the Presumption of Knowledge” respectively (cf. Strawson, 1964: 97), bear importantly on our choice of what we say. The former is concerned with the normal use of constatives to convey New information on the presumption of ignorance of the receiver. The latter, on the other hand, is concerned with the use of constatives to convey known information on the presumption of knowledge of the receiver. Further to these two congruent functions, the constative can further be used to yield directive illocutionary acts accounted for by our maxim of form congruence and its submaxims concerned. However, as far as informativity is concerned, only these two primary illocutionary acts above are closely relevant to the postulation of any possible informativity classification.

From this it follows that setting up an informativity scale for the functions of constatives must further involve the specification of the receiver’s long-term and immediate ideological statuses in relation to the proposition conveyed. So the question requiring to be asked is how does the receiver discover that he has the requisite mutual knowledge for understanding an utterance? Arabic rhetoric answers this question by setting up a typology of receiver in relation to the information communicated by constative discourse. Rhetoric takes the receiver’s immediate contextual status
motivating the text producer's issuance of constative discourse as the basis for identifying the relatively specific types of receiver.

Systemically, the Tenor of Discourse handles the receiver's contextual status by accounting for the personal relationships between the participants involved in a communicative context of situation, and whether or not they are socio-culturally and ideologically institutionalized. In other words, there is a broader background against which the constative has to be interpreted: its context of culture embracing social culture and long-term ideology of the parties engaged in actual communication. The relationship between the immediate context of situation and the background or mutual knowledge forms an interface between the two. Thus what prompts the text producer's issuance of constative discourse in certain specific contexts, is the fact that the receiver evidenced by his immediate contextual contribution to be interpreted against his long-term ideology, may say something or behave in a way which may be incongruent with his context of culture and long-term ideology. In other words, there are receivers who sometimes flout and even perhaps violate their own contexts of culture by showing new immediate statuses, or ideological extremism or inaction, etc., that may prompt the text producer's issuance of specific constative discourse relevant to such incongruent statuses. Or perhaps there are contexts in which a receiver sometimes expresses his new immediate status out of indifference, lack of seriousness and reluctance in relation to his own context of culture and long-term ideology. Thus specifying such cases as well as other cases which do not involve any incongruent speech or action, forms a crucial step towards establishing a more plausible informativity typology of receiver corresponding to a similar one of constative.

Accordingly, Arabic rhetoric argues that the relationship which the receiver's long-term and immediate statuses have with the proposition of the constative discourse can determine the types of receiver involved. If the purpose of constative discourse is to inform or convey new information, four types of receiver are likely to be
identified. If, however, the purpose of it is to inform the receiver that the text producer as well knows that \( p \), one type of receiver is likely to be identifiable. To elucidate that we need to use the term “Conceptualization” which is similar to what Stalnaker (1977) calls pragmatic presupposition to refer to the receiver’s status of having \( p \) in his mind without any belief in its truth or falsity. This status is prior to the text producer’s issuance of the constative involved. The specific identification runs as follows:

1. A receiver who has neither any prior Belief in, nor any conceptualization of \( p \), is categorized as Presuppositionless خالي اللمحة.
2. A receiver who does not have any prior Belief in \( p \) but has prior conceptualization of \( p \), is categorized as Information-seeking سائل.
3. A receiver who does not have any prior Belief in \( p \) but has sceptical conceptualization of the truth or falsity of \( p \), is categorized as Reconfirmation-seeking متردد.
4. A receiver who has a different Belief from \( p \), is categorized as Counter-presuppositional منكر.
5. A receiver who has a prior Belief in \( p \) is called Cognizant of \( p \) عالم.

The typology can further generate a typology of constatives in terms of informativity that corresponds isomorphically with these types of receivers in their respective contexts. The isomorphic relationship between the two typologies would clearly help establish two informativity scales along which the types of constative and receivers can be placed. More important is the fact that there is a non-isomorphic relationship between members of the two scales which yields further specific types of receivers and constatives depending on the text producer’s ultimate judgment in this regard and the receiver’s verbal and/or non-verbal communicative participation. Both types of scales and their relationship will be discussed in detail in the next section.

2.3 SPEECH ACTS THEORY

Before proceeding to the typologies of receiver and constative, it is necessary to outline the position of speech acts in our new model. It has been pointed out above that speech acts can be accounted for within the maxim of form congruence and the relevant
submaxims. According to Arabic rhetoric, constatives can be used to produce directive and non-directive performatives and vice versa. We have provided a listing of the incongruent uses of constatives and directive performatives in the previous chapter. Here we will turn next to an outline of speech acts theory since we need to use its basic dichotomy of utterances throughout the present research. In addition, there is a class of emphatic utterances such as vowing, which can either be constatives, i.e. representatives, or performatives, i.e. commissives.

In speech acts theory utterances are dichotomized into Constatives or Performatives. The former is an utterance which asserts something that is either true or false, whereas the latter is an utterance which performs an act. Performatives are further classified into explicit Performatives with a performative verb, and implicit Performatives without such a verb. It has also been argued that there is no real difference between Constatives and implicit Performatives (compare this dichotomy with Arabic rhetoric one).

Furthermore, Austin by virtue of the text producer’s utterance, differentiates between Locutionary Acts, Illocutionary Acts and Perlocutionary Acts. The first is the act of making an utterance conforming with the grammatical aspects, i.e. semantic, phonological, syntactic, etc. The second is an act which is performed in saying something such as promising, warning, etc. The third is an act of occasioning a specific effect on the receiver by means of the acts performed in saying something. What is worth emphasizing here is what later Searle (1975) calls the secondary and primary illocutionary acts in indirect speech acts. The former is identified as literal, whereas the latter as implicatural.

Developing Austin’s literature, Searle further claims that all illocutionary acts can be divisible into five basic classes. These are:
1. Representatives. These are constatives used to report an outside state of affairs. Their sincerity condition is Belief, i.e. the text producer must believe in p. Lies arise if a text producer intentionally violates this condition. Typical instances include: asserting, swearing (vowing; cf. commissives below).

2. Directives. These aim to make the receiver do something. Their sincerity condition is Want, i.e. the text producer must want the receiver to do something. Typical instances include: ordering, commanding, begging, imploring, questioning, etc.

3. Commissives. Their purpose is to commit the text producer to a future course of action. Their sincerity condition is Intention, i.e. the text producer must intend to do whatever he commits himself to doing. Typical instances include: promising, swearing (vowing; cf. representatives above), etc.

4. Expressives. Their purpose is to express the text producer’s psychological state, i.e. emotions, feelings, etc. The sincerity condition requires the text producer’s actual experience of such emotions. Typical instances include: apologizing, thanking, etc.

5. Declarations. Their purpose is to occasion a change in some state of affairs in the outside world. The class has no sincerity condition. Rather a successful performance of a declaration requires that the text producer should be specially appointed to perform the act in question, or that he should occupy a specific social position by virtue of which he is entitled to perform the act. Typical instances include naming, declaring a meeting, declaring a war, etc.

Associated with different illocutionary acts is the felicity conditions which are of four categories: Propositional Content Conditions, Preparatory Conditions, Sincerity Conditions, and Essential Conditions. The first specifies the semantic content of the proposition expressed in the performance of the illocutionary act. The second, which in many cases is a set of related conditions, specifies the status of the text producer vs the receiver, their interests, the physical ability to do things. The third has already been touched upon. These three conditions serve to regulate the text producer’s behaviour in a communicative act. And finally the fourth, which are constitutive rules, specifies what something counts as or constitutes, i.e. the essence of what the text producer actually does in his performance of the illocutionary acts. To clarify these conditions we can consider how emphatic assertions can be analysed in terms of speech acts theory.
Emphatic assertions can be classified in terms of speech acts as either representatives and/or expressives. Their felicity conditions may be as follows: Their propositional content condition is that the text producer emphatically asserts, denies, states, etc., $p$. Their preparatory condition may be that the text producer’s use of Emphasis signals that he has strong evidence for $p$. Their sincerity condition is that the text producer emphatically believes that $p$ is true. Their essential condition is that the utterance counts as an undertaking to the effect that $p$ is true.

As is pointed out above, swearing (vowing) is classified in terms of speech acts as either a representative or commissive act. In Arabic classical rhetoric, however, it is treated as either a non-directive performative which qualifies both constatives and performatives emphatically, or a constative while semantically indicates the text producer’s commitment to the veracity of $p$. However, if the illocutionary act of swearing can either be representative (constative) and commissive, then we could say that since swearing within the commissive class commits the text producer to the act of promising, swearing as a representative class commits the text producer to the truth value of the constative in the same way as his promise. Promise as a directive performative, for instance, has a socio-cultural signification and surely if it is used, it would be as commissive as swearing. However, both are emphatic realizations and commit the text producer in a way which is stronger than other realizations of Emphasis do.

From this we notice that as far as vowing is concerned, Emphasis can either be a representative or a commissive act. But this claim seems to be inadequate as, according to Abbaas (1985:152), both constatives and performatives almost share the use of Emphasis but with different values and purposes. In constatives, Emphasis is
used in an attempt to eliminate the receiver's scepticism and counter-presuppositions, whereas in performatives it is used to make sure that what might be unlikely to occur, does occur.

What is important in speech acts theory and in need of further investigation is the analysis of the successiveness of utterances of a given discourse in terms of their marked or unmarked speech acts arrangement. This question should be the subject of future studies.

To sum up: the section was introduced by a discussion of the merits and unfortunate flaws of some of the prominent contemporary pragmatic models in the field. Instead a new pragmatic theory which would have offered nothing novel without taking the typologies of receiver and constative into account, and is capable of accounting for form and content and how both can be employed in congruent and incongruent contexts, has been proposed. The pragmatic interpretation the model offers would certainly be full of insights, which are illuminating, comprehensive and more plausible than its current rivals in terms of implicature calculability.

2.4 ARABIC RHETORIC AND PRAGMatics

The field of discourse-initiating constative differs from that of information-seeking and counter-presupposition and each has its own formal encoding As-Sakkaakii (168).

(my translation)
Having finally provided the new pragmatic theory of Appropriateness, the present section will be allocated to discuss in detail (i) the Arabic rhetoric theory and the notion of appropriateness, (ii) the congruent typologies of receivers and constatives in terms of Focus and Emphasis, (iii) the incongruent typologies of receivers and constatives in terms of Focus and Emphasis, and (iv) a sample of Arabic rhetoric pragmatic analysis in order to show how context influences text. In (i), the discussion will attempt to unravel the way the Arabic rhetorical theory views and eventually identifies the receiver’s verbal and non-verbal communicative interaction, which prompts the text producer’s observance of the submaxims involved, and the receiver’s non-verbal communicative interaction, which prompts the text producer’s exploitation of the submaxims concerned. The former identification generates congruent typologies of receiver and constative, whereas the latter identification generates incongruent typologies of receiver and constative. Both typologies which are strangely reduced from thirteen to only six congruent and incongruent types of receiver and constative in most of classical and contemporary linguistic literature, are so crucial for pragmatic theories that they will demonstrate unequivocally how serious the flaws of contemporary pragmatic theories are. Apart from the present study, no serious attempt that I know of has ever been conducted to make use of the thirteen substantial types of receiver and constative in classical Arabic rhetoric, let alone contemporary rhetoric.

Before proceeding to the main concern of this section, it must be emphasized here that as far as the scope of Focus and Emphasis is concerned, two types of scope must be taken into account in our discussion of the congruent typologies of receiver and constative: the scope of Focus and Emphasis of (i) the proposition as a whole, and (ii) some constituent (cf. chapter 4). Taking the two types of scope into account in the present research, in fact, differs from the argument put forward in Arabic rhetoric; the scope of Focus and Emphasis analysed in rhetoric is confined to the proposition as a whole only, whereas the scope of some constituent is thus left, according to the majority of rhetoricians, to grammar. Unfortunately, no conclusive justification has
ever been given. However, for a possible comprehensive account, both types of scope will be taken into account in our discussion of the typologies of receivers and emphatic and non-emphatic constatives. Let us first move on to a more detailed discussion of Arabic rhetoric on appropriateness.

2.5 ARABIC RHETORIC THEORY AND APPROPRIATENESS

In Arabic rhetoric, all the definitions given to “Rhetoric” are similar in one way or another to those of “Pragmatics” cited in Levinson (1983). In one of these definitions, the term المطابقة, “Mutaabaqa”, (lit. conformity, or appropriateness), is used and “Rhetoric” is, accordingly, defined as

هِي مطابقة الكلام النصي مقتضى الحال
the appropriateness of an eloquent sentence for what the receiver’s contextual status presupposes.

(my translation)

The definition employs two important concepts closely related to the context of situation and the typologies of the receivers and constatives. In order to get to grips with how Arabic rhetoric characterizes the complex web of a context of situation presuppositionally and terminologically, it is necessary to unravel first what the above two concepts used in the definition implicate. We will be using Halliday’s (1985) notions of context of situation and context of culture to refer to the receiver’s immediate and long-term ideologies respectively. Note that attention must be drawn to the fact that using the term “appropriateness” rather than the exact equivalent, i.e. “Conformity”, in the definition above is not exactly the same as the Arabic term “Mutaabaqa”. However, both English terms can be the right equivalents as far as the new pragmatic theory is concerned, if we realize that inappropriateness and non-conformity of sentences in context would generate communication failure rather than flouting any of the submaxims.
The term, حال, “haal”, (contextual status, or the presupposer), refers to the receiver’s immediate contextual verbal and/or non-verbal communicative contributions acting as a motive for the encoding of an utterance, and presupposing the inclusion or exclusion of a specific syntactic feature in discourse. Both types of communicative contribution not only represent the context of situation as an immediate background against which the utterance has to be interpreted but are interfaced intertextually with the receiver’s context of culture, i.e., his ideological, institutional, social and cultural values, his communicative competence, social rank, etc. as well. In the preceding section, the receiver’s long-term and immediate contextual status was categorized into either (i) being presuppositionless of حال خلو الذهن , (ii) an information-seeker of حال الاستنبار , (iii) a reconfirmation-seeker of حال الشك , (iv) being cognizant of حال العلم , or (v) being counter-presuppositional of حال الإنكار . The statuses are basically expressed either verbally and non-verbally in the congruent typologies of receivers and constatives or non-verbally in the incongruent typologies of receiver and constative, and both represent the receiver’s immediate communicative expression of long-term ideology and socio-cultural values. In the case of the latter, the text producer demotes one type of receiver from his original status to a different one when the receiver’s immediate non-verbal communicative contribution does not follow from his long-term or original socio-cultural values, principles or ideologies. The inconsistency between the receiver’s immediate non-verbal communicative act and his original long-term values and ideologies is manifested by the receiver’s immediate non-verbal disregard, momentary disbelief, arrogance, lack of self-confidence or seriousness, etc., to communicate verbally as well. Accordingly, the concept of “Status” can either label the receiver’s immediate verbal and non-verbal communicative act, or his immediate non-verbal communicative act which is not consonant with his long-term values and principles.
To characterize the presuppositional relationship between what the receiver’s immediate status, i.e. presupposer, specified at the moment of the speech event, and the encoding of the utterance together with the use of the specific syntactic feature required, Arabic rhetoric uses the concept of ‘muqtadāa az-zaahir’, (lit. what the norms presuppose). The concept is used to regulate what is linguistically more and/or less appropriate for a certain context of situation within the pragmatic analysis of a given utterance. It thus embraces sets of norms, submaxims or conventions characterizing what the text producer should or should not do concerning the appropriate encoding of his utterance as a response to the receiver’s immediate status in a communicative speech event. The norms can either be observed, مراعاة مقتضى ظاهر حال المخاطب, in which case the text producer intends to produce what might be similar to a generalized implicature, or flouted مخروج عن مقتضى ظاهر حال المخاطب, in which case the text producer intends to produce what might be similar to a particularized implicature. For example, if the receiver’s status is counter-presuppositional, the text producer normally uses Specificational Emphasis in his respective utterance and vice versa. Arabic rhetoric, accordingly, postulates sets of conventions or submaxims in order to account for observing the norms and the flouting of such norms in actual communication. As far as Emphasis is concerned, the following submaxims are postulated:

1. If the receiver is presuppositionless, خالي الدهن, and information-seeker, سائل, do not emphasize your constative.
2. If the receiver is sceptical, متردد, he is quite likely to disagree without seeking reconfirmation, use Emphasis rather than Non-emphasis.
3. (i) If the receiver is mistakenly counter-presuppositional, له ظن على خلاف, use Emphasis in your constative, and (ii) Increase the use of emphasizers in accordance with the increase in the degree of the receiver’s counter-presupposition منكر.

Noticeably, these submaxims are intended to classify the types of constatives and receivers in terms of Focus and Emphasis on the one hand, and of the receiver’s statuses concerned on the other. Similar regulative submaxims must be postulated when
other syntactic features such as +Def vs -Def, switch-reference, repetition vs ellipsis, etc., are analysed in 'Ilm al-Ma'aanii.

It is worth mentioning in passing that the observance of the submaxims, as Sakkaakii (d. 626 A. H., 171) notes, is termed in Arabic rhetoric the “Tagrih”, (literalness) and the flouting of the same maxims is termed “Ta’riid”, (metonymy, implicature) within the rhetorical branch of Bayaan, which, as was alluded earlier, encompasses only figures of speech. However, “Ta’riid” was later rightly distinguished from metonymy by the majority of classical rhetoricians and used instead to refer to the flouting of the submaxims in literally encoded utterances. The subtle distinction between the implicature of metonymy and the implicature derived from flouting the literally encoded utterances perhaps forms a further reason for the confusion which some contemporary linguists particularly in the area of Focus and Emphasis seem to have been through.

Furthermore, the concept of “haal” seems to have three more essential contextual implications which clearly influence what is being said and how it is being said. Firstly, the receiver’s communicative verbal and/or non-verbal expression of his values, or perhaps his change from one status or contextual contribution to another indicates a temporal characteristic of the context involved. Secondly, the receiver’s communicative status may further imply the receiver’s presuppositional reference to the preceding co-text which may motivate the occurrence of such statuses at the moment of speech. Thirdly, the receiver’s contextual status or presupposer may also imply a location, مَستَعْمَام, for the context of situation in which a discourse is communicated.

The other term is سَمَتْضِيَ الطَّالِ (lit. what the status presupposes, or the presupposed), which refers to the utterance itself together with the inclusion or exclusion of those syntactic features expressing Emphasis, definiteness, etc., whose use is prompted by the receiver’s contextual statuses. For example, if the receiver’s status presupposes the use of Emphasis, then the text producer either observes or flouts such a contextual exigency depending on the kind of communicative signal emitted by
the receiver. In both cases, the utterance itself together with the inclusion or exclusion of the syntactic feature required is called the presupposed, i.e. response, which, being the final appropriate product, seems to be on a par with what the concept of "appropriateness", الإعتبار المناسب, refers to. That is, the presupposed is deemed rhetorically appropriate for the receiver's immediate communicative status including the setting of the context of situation.

In Arabic rhetoric, "Appropriateness" itself is defined as

الأمر الذي يعتبره المتحكماً مناسبًا علـم الأصابـب.

[The encoding of a constative in a certain way] which the text producer deems to be appropriate for the receiver's immediate contextual status [in a communicative interaction]. (my translation)

Contemporarily, appropriateness of a text is defined, according to De Beaugrande & Dressler (1981), as

the agreement between its setting and the ways in which the standards of textuality, i.e. intentionality, situationality, etc. are upheld (11). The principle of appropriateness mediates between efficiency and effectiveness in order to indicate the proper balance between the conventional and the unconventional in each situation (34).

Appropriateness can further be defined in terms of Searle's felicity conditions, Grice's maxims, (cf. Pratt: 1977), and Halliday's register theory. Similarly, Traugott (1973) notes that

genres and subgenres can to a great extent be defined as systems of appropriateness conditions.

Having discussed the essential notions necessary for our model, let us turn now to a more detailed account of the delicate contexts in which marked Focus, Emphasis proper, Specificational Emphasis and De-emphasis are congruently and incongruently used.
2.6 THE CONTEXTUAL Typology OF FOCUS AND EMPHASIS

As was alluded in the previous chapter, two basic types of Emphasis are theoretically identified within the two typological models of constative and receiver. However, Emphasis is also associated with directive performatives which do not seem to have been given a similar typological analysis by Arabic rhetoric. Reference to emphatic performatives will occur only when relevant to the main concern of the present research. Instances of emphatic directives will later be discussed when we first elucidate their place in line of our two proposals in the next chapter.

Emphasis is viewed and accordingly analysed by the majority of classical rhetoricians from a receiver’s point of view. Qualitatively, the analysis of Focus and Emphasis reached its culmination because the question of the inimitability of Qur’anic style and the literary style of classical poetry represented empirical data for all traditional rhetoricians and grammarians. Consequently, numerous grammatical and rhetorical issues had been identified, and eventually rhetoricians succeeded in establishing impressive systematic typologies of constative and receiver in accord with contextual rhetoric theory. Let us take each of such appropriateness notions in turn.

2.6.1 The Congruent Typologies of Receiver and Constative

In conjunction with the contextual observance, two essential models are crystallized, namely the typologies of constative and receiver. Members of both contextual models correlate isomorphically with each other at the contextual observance dimension. In other words, the identification of a type of constative leads to, or is conducted in compliance with the identification of a corresponding type of receiver in terms of Focus and Emphasis. In both types of identification, an inferential implicature pertinent to the context of situation concerned is derivable. The typological identification of both the receiver and the constative runs as follows:

1. If the receiver’s immediate status is presuppositionless or non-cognizant of p, خلاق الذهن, the norm is to use, خبر إبتدائي, (Discourse- initiating
constative) to inform him of $p$. The term $\text{constative}$, (discourse-initiating) indicates the receiver’s lack of a prior Belief in, or a prior conceptualization of $p$. The discourse-initiating constative, accordingly, bears completely New information and is likely to be initiated under the text producer’s principle of the presumption of ignorance on the part of the receiver (cf. Strawson: 1964). If the receiver, however, requests such New information, the occurrence of a certain state of affairs which the constative is to communicate may be minimally presupposed by the receiver. In this respect, Lyons (1977:503) claims that

in any question that we might put relating to the components or circumstances of a situation, there is something that is presupposed and something in focus. For example in asking "What happened?", we presuppose, minimally, that some event or process occurred.

Constatives of this type are normally syntactically identified with Verbal clauses that have the basic word order, i.e. (VSO), whose Subject, object and possibly a locative element can accordingly be indefinite. Thus, informationally, discourse-initiating constatives with indefinite elements are expected to be the least informative units since they, as Deyes (1978: 317) notes, lack

grammatical indication of communicative dynamism [two indefinite elements]

The use of indefinite elements in discourse-initial constatives possibly indicates that the information conveyed does not seem to concern both interlocutors, or the receiver only. This type is not covered by the Arab rhetoricians’ principle of discourse processing, namely $\text{إِذْ نَبَدَتُ بالآخِر}$, (proceed from what is most familiar) (cf. chapter one and the next section), because the receiver is incapable of identifying the referents of the indefinite elements of the constative concerned. If he can, then what is definite and/or Given should be placed initially in order to be identified by the receiver. If, for example, elements such as the Subject and object are definite and New, then the normal place of the Subject and the object is post-verbal.
Consequently, the basic word order used to convey wholly new information and to be placed discourse-initially may or may not contain definite referents, and the scope of such a constative is the whole proposition.

However, information-giving is not restricted to discourse-initial constatives only; information can further be transmitted by a range of constatives conveying partially new information relayed in response to information-seeking wh-and-yes/no-questions. In such cases, in which at least one element is contextually Given, the pragmatic presupposition of the receiver aims to identify a value for a variable. The receiver does not show any prior Belief in $p$ although he conceptualizes the incomplete proposition which the text producer derives from the receiver's question as a pragmatic presupposition such as "$X$ took something", "someone took $X$", etc. By such questions, the receiver wishes to identify the identity of the missing value before having the whole proposition as a Belief. The receiver is accordingly, called an information-seeker and/or information-receiver, and the constative an information-giver. Constatives of this sort can not be representatives of discourse-initial type because they differ in terms of contextual functions, i.e. Focus location, the quantity of information relayed and the text producer's ultimate presumption. However, both types are generally similar in terms of giving and completing missing information required by the receiver.

Pragmatically, the use of unmarked Focus in both types of constative as a feature of the means used for saying what is said, or a conventional device of highlighting (cf. Grice, 1978: 122), or making a whole proposition or some constituent prominent, a generalized implicature is derivable in compliance with our model if the text producer observes the submaxims of giving as much information as required and believing what one asserts at the levels of what is said and what is implicated.
2. If the receiver is sceptical of the veracity or falsity of p, i.e. reconfirmation-seeking, it is preferable to use Emphasis proper, i.e. Reconfirmation Emphasis, in your response to the receiver's scepticism. His scepticism presupposes not only his prior conceptualization of p but also his momentary disbelief in the veracity and falsity of p without further reconfirmation. He therefore, reformulates the proposition as a question tinged with slight disbelief requiring further reconfirmation. As a result, the text producer aiming to counter the receiver's unexpected scepticism, preferably uses only one emphasizer, i.e. Emphasis proper, in his response in order to express his strong positive or negative attitudinal commitment towards his proposition. The use of one emphasizer is similar, for example, to the use of emphasizing subjuncts such as "certainly", "sure", "surely", "indeed", etc., in response to sceptical questions. Consider the following example cited in Quirk et al. (1990: 179):

A. Are you willing to help?
B. Certainly.

In Arabic rhetoric, the use of Emphasis proper is not obligatory, but certainly preferable in such sceptical circumstances. It bears some affinities with the use of some tag questions seeking reconfirmation or reassertion of something the text producer is not quite sure about. The receiver's reconfirmation-seeking question can be introduced into discourse by "Is it true that ...?", and the like.

It must be said that although this type is likely to involve the adjacency pairs of question/answer, it clearly differs from the type of information seeking in one important aspect; the receiver's scepticism concomitant with the reconfirmation-seeking type is linguistically and/or extra-linguistically observable from the receiver's reconfirmation-seeking question.
Pragmatically, although resorting to Emphasis proper is preferable, the text producer's emphatic or non-emphatic reply may be treated as observing the second and the first submaxims of Emphasis and quality respectively. Using emphatic replies may further implicate the text producer's slight surprise at the receiver's sceptical reconfirmation-seeking question. If, for example, B in the example above repeats A's question as a constative evidentially emphasized by "certainly", he will observe the second submaxim of quality but flout the submaxim of over-informativity; he then implies his slight exasperation, impoliteness, etc., regarding the receiver's scepticism.

Typologically, since this type involves the question/answer adjacency pair, emphasers that are likely to be used are of two sub-types: those that put the predication as a whole in Emphasis and those that put some constituent in Emphasis. The former realizes Reconfirmative Predicational Emphasis, and the latter realizes Reconfirmative Constituent Emphasis. Let us discuss each of them in some detail.

(i) Reconfirmative Predicational Emphasis. This sub-type refers to the emphasizing of the veracity and/or falsity of the whole proposition by inserting syntactic emphasers before the whole proposition or before or after the lexical verb of the proposition concerned. In the latter case, the Emphasis placed upon the truth value of the predication is a polar Emphasis which is a specific type of Predication Emphasis (cf. Dik, 1981:53). In MSA, the emphasers used to put the whole proposition in emphatic Focus are either particles, prefixes, pre-verbal morphemes, or suffixes. Particles used to emphasize the whole proposition include the use of "inna", before Nominal and Equational clauses, and "kaana", before Equational clauses. Prefixes include the use of /la-/ and /s-/ etc., and pre-verbal morphemes include the use of "sawfa", "qad", etc. In the case of suffixes, they include the use of the two emphatics /-an/ and /-anna/.
Similarly, the truth value of a proposition can be emphasized by repeating its lexical verb as a case of polar Emphasis (cf. chapter five).

(ii) Reconfirmative Constituent Emphasis. This refers to the emphasizing of some constituent of a given constative in response to the receiver’s reconfirmation-seeking question- “Is it true that ...?”. Emphasizers used to exercise such a function in MSA include prefixes such as /la-/ , repetition of an element other than the lexical verb, etc. (cf. chapter five).

3. If the receiver is counter-presuppositional of p, منكر , use S Emphasis in accordance with the degree of such counter-presupposition. The specificationally emphasized constative is accordingly called, الابتزاز الإعلاني, “Counter-presuppositional Constative” . This type refers to those constatives which convey information, beliefs etc., counter-presuppositional to those harboured by the receiver and communicatively exchanged in a certain argumentative context. So typologically, both can be termed as counter-presuppositional, منكر and إنكار , . The reason is that by observing the submaxims concerned, the text producer encodes his constative emphatically in an attempt to replace, select, or restrict the receiver’s wrong counter-presupposition. The linguistic encoding of such constatives normally involves rejecting the incorrect information and consequently providing the correct information. Both processes are properties of S Emphasis, قصر , which, if used to restrict قصر قلب , to replace قصر إنفراد , or to select تعين , specifies a correct value for a presupposed variable after having identified the receiver’s specific pragmatic counter-presupposition. If first hand evidence is not available to invalidate the receiver’s counter-presupposition, the text producer should increase the number of his emphasers if the receiver’s degree of denial increases in momentum. In other words, using multiple Emphasis as a realization of S Emphasis whose scope is likely to be the
whole proposition, occurs in contexts of argumentative counter-presuppositions whereby the receiver has different beliefs from \( p \) (cf. chapter four).

As for the interlocutors' beliefs, two basic types of receiver's counter-presuppositions can be identified, the first is, \( \text{خطأ} \) \( \text{على خلاف} \), "mistaken belief", and the second is, \( \text{مكر} \), "self-assured counter-presupposition". The former refers to the receiver's transitory counter-presupposition as being mistakenly adhered to and with no obvious perseverance, whereas the latter shows the receiver's strong perseverance and determination to defend his counter-presuppositional beliefs. The more the receiver is persevering with his counter-presupposition and different beliefs the more the text producer has to have recourse to more emphatic markers in discourse if he is to replace, restrict or select the receiver's incorrect pragmatic presupposition successfully. Conscious adherence to one's beliefs is clearly characteristic of the latter only, i.e. self-assured.

As far as the scope of S Emphasis is concerned, two types are recognized in terms of each of the two types of belief. If the receiver's belief or pragmatic presupposition is mistaken, we may have such beliefs that concern either the scope of the predication as a whole or the scope of some constituent. If the receiver's belief is self-assured or counter-presuppositional, we may similarly have such beliefs that concern either the scope of the predication as a whole or the scope of some constituent. Let us discuss each type of such beliefs together with its relevant scopes of Emphasis.

A. Mistaken Counter-presuppositional Receiver, \( \text{خطأ} \) \( \text{على خلاف} \). This type categorizes the receiver as expressing mistaken beliefs or counter-presuppositions different from what the text producer's proposition expresses. The receiver's mistaken belief operates either upon the predication as a whole or some constituent. Thus we may have:

(i) Counter-presuppositional Predication Emphasis, \( \text{تأكيد حكم} \). This involves emphasizing the veracity or falsity of the communicated
proposition by normally placing an emphatic marker before or after the lexical verb, or before the whole proposition. The realizations that are likely to be employed to correct such mistaken beliefs are likely to be very rare to find. However, in MSA, the particle, َّن،“inna,” al-Jurjaanii notes, is normally used before the Nominal and Equational clauses to correct a mistaken predication as a whole. Other possible realizations in MSA are likely to include the use of oath structures introducing a constative discourse, the repetition of the same predication, the repetition of the lexical verb, etc. of a given clause. It should be stated that if the lexical verb is emphasized we may have either Emphasis of predication or Emphasis of some constituent. The former which can be termed polar Emphasis indicates that the rejected lexical verb is the negative counterpart of the emphasized one such as “give” vs “do not give”. The latter on the other hand, concerns rejecting the incorrect non-negative counterpart of the emphasized verb such as sleep vs eat (cf. the following type).

(ii) Counter-presuppositional Constituent Emphasis. This involves the use of S Emphasis by specifying some constituent as the correct candidate for a given variable. All instances of S Emphasis to be discussed in detail in chapter six, are suitable candidates for this type of scope.

B. Self-Assured Counter-presuppositional Receiver, ﻣﻨـﻛﺮ. This type of receiver expresses intentional counter-presuppositions self-assuredly tinged with determination and perseverance. As such, this type, which may either concern the predication as a whole or some constituent, will call for the use of more emphasizers in actual communicative exchange. So we can have:

(i) Counter-presuppositional Predicational Emphasis. The function of this type whose scope is the whole predication is to emphasize the verity
or falsity of the whole proposition. The functions that are likely to be relayed by this type are to either restrict, select from or replace the receiver’s wrong pragmatic presupposition (cf. the example of multiple Emphasis in chapter four).

(ii) Counter-presuppositional Constituent Emphasis. This refers to the use of S Emphasis whose function is to emphasize some constituent of the predication in order to counter the receiver’s counter-presupposition (cf. chapter 6).

It follows then that the typology of constatives to be dispatched congruently in compliance with the text producer’s observance of the pertinent submaxims is crucial and integral to any pragmatic theory. It is this type of typology which all pragmatic theories and models lack and eventually fall short of presenting more consistent pragmatic models. The typologies above will not only enhance our pragmatic analysis but illuminate any pragmatic model intended to account plausibly for Focus and Emphasis realizations. For example, following our model, the pragmatic analysis for the derivation of a generalized conversational implicature via the use of S Emphasis runs as follows. By virtue of the receiver’s counter-presuppositional verbal and non-verbal participation in a communicative interaction, the text producer faces the task of replacing, selecting or restricting the receiver’s wrong belief by saying p; the text producer chooses to observe the third submaxim of Emphasis by using S Emphasis as a means of evidentially backing up the veracity of his constative, i.e. observing the second submaxim of quality as well, intended to counter the receiver’s wrong belief; in order for the text producer to say p and be observing the pertinent submaxims and the principle of appropriateness, the text producer must think that q; the text producer must know that it is mutual knowledge that q must be supposed if the text producer is to be taken to be maintaining the appropriateness principle; the text producer has done nothing to stop the receiver thinking that p; therefore the text producer intends the receiver to think that q, and in saying that p has implicated q.
Thus, the use of Emphasis in general is intended to preserve the constative veracity, i.e. have evidence, by choosing to observe the third submaxim of Emphasis. In so doing, he also observes the maxim of form congruence by dispatching an S emphatic constative in which the emphasizers as syntactic features, signal such a congruence with the receiver's immediate contextual status. In such circumstances, when the text producer emphatically asserts something, the generalized conversational implicature derivable is that he implicates that he not only believes it but has sufficient evidence as well.

Furthermore, there are other contexts whereby the text producer expresses his inner emotions and feelings emphatically. The issuance of such expressive constatives which is not in compliance with the receiver's immediate status, reflects his own positive or negative feelings towards a certain state of affairs. The field of discourse of using such an expressive language may well be self-praise, lamentation, precative, promise, ideological assertion, etc., which represent argumentative contexts in which the text producer would use Emphasis proper or S Emphasis to show, for example, how wrong his old beliefs were.

To sum up: so far I have been elaborately discussing the pragmatic theory of Arabic rhetoric; the place of the notion of appropriateness in such a theory; the typology of constatives in terms of Focus and Emphasis, and the typology of receivers in terms of their immediate contextual statuses. Each member of the constative typology is dispatched in congruence with a respective member of the receiver typology in a highly specific congruent context in which a generalized conversational implicature can be generated. It has been shown how such an implicature is worked out in accordance with the model proposed in the preceding section.
2.6.2 Incongruent Typologies of Receiver and Constative

The aim of this section is to discuss the incongruent typologies of receivers and constatives consequent upon the text producer's choice to flout the maxim of form congruence by flouting the pertinent submaxims of Focus and Emphasis, quality and quantity. It should be stated at this point that the syntactic emphasizers to be pragmatically analysed in chapters five and six, are just one special means language puts at our disposal in order to maintain the submaxims of quality in general and the second submaxim of quality in particular. Thus the maintenance of the submaxims of Focus and Emphasis is meant to observe the second submaxim of quality. i.e. have evidence, although the flouting of such submaxims is also meant to uphold the veracity of the propositional content of the constative. The flouting which concerns the use of constatives in incongruent contexts, is intended to implicate a particularized conversational implicature derivable from the incongruent presence or absence of the emphasizers in the constative concerned. Thus, typologically, if members of the previous congruent typology of constative are used in incongruent contexts, a further six types of constative addressing six type of receiver will consequently be identified. The total number of the congruent and incongruent typologies thus becomes nine types of constative addressing nine types of receiver.

Psychologically, the incongruent typologies executed by flouting the submaxims of Emphasis conspicuously signal a negative shift in the text producer's attitude because of the receiver's undesirable current status inconsistent with both interlocutors' long-term socio-cultural values, ideologies, beliefs, etc. However, that is not to say that both incongruent typologies necessarily indicate affinities of the interlocutors' long-term beliefs, ideologies, values, etc. The shift may well occur even if the text producer possesses quite distinct socio-cultural and ideological values and backgrounds from those of the receiver. More specifically, the text producer who may possess a distinct long-term ideology, may demote the receiver to a different status depending on how evaluatively he views the proposition expressing his belief. The
attitudinal shift might thus on the whole implicate slight exasperation, impoliteness, blame, warning, insult, disregard, etc., traceable syntactically and/or intonationally in incongruent contexts.

Furthermore, the use of Emphasis may further reflect the text producer’s strong or weak personality with relation to the receiver’s own long-term beliefs and the state of affairs the constative concerned conveys. Empirically, the under-use of emphasizers, i.e. too many floutings in incongruent contexts, may underlie self-confidence and possibly arrogance and disregard of the receiver’s values or beliefs. Thus the more self-confident the text producer is the less emphasizers he is likely to use. Such excessive floutings, which are likely to be conscious, seem to reveal not only self-confidence, impoliteness, and disregard but how authoritative he is as well. Conversely, excessive use of emphasizers which is likely to be done unconsciously, may signal lack of self-confidence, phobia, lack of self-esteem, etc. The latter thus, truthful though the text producer may be, can not be analysed empirically since it apparently underlies not only linguistic incompetence by using Emphasis in the wrong contexts of situation but also a defensive strategy; we can not treat our receivers as counter-presuppositional or even sceptical all the time.

In Arabic rhetoric, the text producer’s negative attitudinal shift is observable not only from flouting the submaxims of Emphasis but also from the term, تنزييل, (lit. demotion), used to designate the process of assigning a different status to the receiver consequent upon his being only non-verbally inconsistent with his original or long-term beliefs. For example, if a receiver who is a Muslim, does not put his faith into practice, i.e. non-verbal signal, the text producer who may be a Muslim too and practises his faith, may demote the receiver’s long-term status, i.e. being a Muslim, to as if he were a non-Muslim. The constative whose veracity is expected to be believed theoretically by the receiver as well, i.e. mutually known, may accordingly be dispatched emphatically, hence flouting the submaxims of being as informative as
required and Emphasis concerned. By using tautologies, a further type of receiver mentioned only casually together with the other congruent types in the preceding section, can be specified. Earlier it has been argued that not only can synthetic but also analytic propositions such as tautologies and universal truths which are expected to be unchallengeable and mutually known, be used to relay important communicative messages. If, however, the participants share the same ideology, the text producer’s constative may convey a mutually known synthetic proposition. In this sense, tautologies may further include synthetic propositions mutually known and identifiable from the text producer’s ideology and values his constative may express.

Accordingly, a receiver who has a previous belief in p, is categorized as being Cognizant of p. The type shows a close affinity with one of the two basic purposes discussed above and in chapter one which constatives produce in congruent contexts. It was said there that constatives are used (i) congruently to inform the receiver of p which is New، الفائدة الخضر، and (ii) congruently to inform the receiver that the text producer too knows of p، لا لم يلم الفائد. The latter which is a clear case of entailment of the former but not vice versa, refers to the purpose associated with tautologies of both types on the one hand, and with the submaxim of over-informativity on the other. In fact, there are two specific types of receiver involved in contexts whereby tautologies are communicated; the first is a receiver who has a previous belief in p, but does not know that the text producer knows of p as well, and the second is a receiver who knows that the text producer too knows of p, i.e. full mutual knowledge. In both cases the text producer flouts the submaxim of over-informativity for a simple reason; if one believes that p is true, it follows then that one should put p in practice. If one does not put p in practice, i.e. inconsistency of one’s current status with one’s long-term beliefs, then one should be communicatively treated as if non-cognizant of p at least in the second specific type of receiver. The process of demoting the receiver from being cognizant of p to being as if non-cognizant of p is termed جمهيل (Decognizance), in Arabic rhetoric and it too clearly carries negative implications.
indicating the text producer’s attitudinal shift towards the receiver. Thus, in compliance with the receiver’s decognizance, tautologies may be used to address four incongruent types of receiver; (i) a receiver who is cognizant of p may be demoted to a status of being presuppositionless or non-cognizant of p, (ii) a receiver who is cognizant of p, may be demoted to a status of being a reconfirmation-seeker, (iii) a receiver who is cognizant of p, may be demoted to a status of being counter-presuppositional of p, and finally (iv) a counter-presuppositional receiver who is non-cognizant of p may be demoted to being as if cognizant of p. As far as (i), (ii) and (iii) are concerned, smoking, for example, which is scientifically proven to be the cause of many serious diseases, presupposes that one should give it up. If the receiver who does not give it up, suffers from a serious disease, the text producer is prompted to advise him to give it up. The advice may be encoded non-empatically or emphatically depending on how serious the disease is, the receiver’s relation to the text producer, etc. This and similar issues obviously motivate the text producer’s choice to decognize the receiver from being cognizant to as if non-cognizant of p. It is these types that motivate the use of tautologies in the contexts concerned in which the receiver is demoted to a different status observable from his contextual non-verbal participation.

It is worth mentioning in this respect that Pratt (1977: 134-5, fn. 10), criticizing Searle for stating only a single sincerity condition for assertions, namely, “speaker believes that p”, points out that

making an assertion which one supposes to be of no interest to the hearer counts as a form of insincerity.

Pratt, however, who further criticizes speech acts theorists for not relating assertions to the addressee in her quotation at the outset of this chapter, fails to recognize the intentionality of mutually known constatives and wrongly judges them as of no interest to the receiver. We have just argued that a text producer may have to choose to decognize a receiver who is cognizant of p, by demoting him to four different statuses whereby diverse particularized conversational implicatures are likely to be
implied. The demotion, تنوير, or decognizance, تجهيل, is thus contextually motivated and from the text producer's point of view, is fully justified, hence appropriate. Pratt's claim, therefore, is apparently inaccurate since the conveyance of conversational implicatures is a form of sincerity.

Further to the previous nine types, the four new types of receiver resulting from the text producer's decognizance of the receiver, or from treating the proposition as being mutually known, will make the total number of receiver types thirteen which presuppose a similar number of constatives as far as Non-emphasis, Emphasis proper, De-emphasis and S Emphasis are concerned. In fact the number according to the congruent and incongruent typologies of the four types of receiver should be sixteen. However, three types, Arabic rhetoric argues, were rendered meaningless, hence the remaining number is only thirteen, three of which were discussed in the previous section and the remaining ones are to be discussed shortly. It must be admitted that the incongruent typologies are unfortunately ignored by the majority of classical and contemporary rhetoricians who only discuss the three congruent typologies discussed in detail in the preceding section and three incongruent typologies to be discussed together with the remaining ones below. As far as I am aware, the only works available to me are written by as-Sayyid (n.d.) and Khafaajii (ed. 1949) who only provide a list of the ten types of demotion.

Before moving on to the incongruent typologies, it must also be stated that these types of demotion are not the sole types of demotion and decognizance discussed in Arabic rhetoric; in fact, there are various types of demotion that concern areas other than Focus and Emphasis. It will lead us far afield if we attempt to provide a list of such demotions. Let us then turn to the incongruent typologies.
As-Sayyid argues that the demotion of the receiver leads to the identification of at least twelve incongruent types of receiver addressed by a similar number of constatives. The identification occurs as follows:

1. A receiver who is cognizant of p may be demoted to a presuppositionless receiver, تنزييل العالم بفائدة الخبر منزلة خالي الذهن. The demotion is opted for when the receiver’s contextual non-verbal action as a contextual sign, does not match his real long-term beliefs and ideology. Two types of receiver are identified within this category. The first is a receiver who has a previous belief in p but does not know that the text producer knows p as well. The second is a receiver who has a previous belief in p and knows that the text producer knows that p as well. The former refers to the context where the receiver is attempting, for example, to conceal the proposition of being a smoker which obviously the text producer already knows of. This may prompt the text producer to decognize the receiver by dispatching his constative non-emphatically to inform the receiver that he [the text producer] knows of p as well. The particularized conversational implicature derivable in this particular context is that the receiver should not conceal what p conveys.

In the case of the latter, however, it refers to a context where the receiver was expected by both interlocutors to give up smoking. When that does not occur, the text producer may be prompted to say, for example, “You are smoking”, etc. non-emphatically in order to implicate that the receiver should give up smoking, etc. The implicature may thus be a piece of advice if the receiver is a friend but a warning if the receiver is a son, a younger brother, etc. Similarly, the text producer does not normally ask the receiver a question whose answer is obvious to both interlocutors. The pragmatic function of such a question is to implicate that the text producer seeks more information about what is obvious to both of them. For example, if the text producer knows that the receiver has a book, and the receiver knows that the text producer
knows that, the text producer may ask the question (What is that in your hand?). The infringement here involves the submaxim of asking direct questions.

2. A receiver who is cognizant of \( p \) may be demoted to a reconfirmation-seeker, علائم اللغة متزلجة المترددة. The demotion prompts the text producer to use Emphasis proper in encoding his mutually known constative to be dispatched in a context in which the receiver seems to have non-verbally infringed a previous promise, instructions, etc, not to do otherwise. The non-verbal infringement may be out of forgetfulness or even incapability of keeping his previous promise. For example, if the text producer who may be a teacher, has a lazy student, he may be prompted to address the student emphatically that laziness will certainly lead to failure. The receiver in such a context does not doubt the veracity of the constative as he obviously did not make any previous progress in his attempts to stop being lazy. The use of Emphasis proper perhaps indicates the text producer’s apprehension and care with regard to the student’s welfare and interest. In other contexts, using Emphasis proper in compliance with this decognizance may signal the text producer’s slight exasperation or blame. However, the use of Emphasis proper here as a result of infringing the first submaxim of Emphasis “do not use Emphasis to address a presuppositionless receiver” is not intended to uphold the veracity of the proposition communicated since the receiver is not sceptical of \( p \). Rather the effect of using Emphasis would certainly reflect the text producer’s concern to help the receiver stop being lazy.

3. A receiver who is cognizant of \( p \) can be demoted to a counter-presuppositional one, علائم اللغة متزلجة المترددة. The receiver’s decognizance is prompted by the fact that the receiver has given a non-verbal signal which may be deliberately “self-assured”, and/or forgetfully “mistaken”, and is inconsistent with his own long-term beliefs. Realizing that the receiver’s contextual non-verbal signal is counter-presupposing \( p \) whose veracity is in fact mutually known, the text producer demotes the receiver from being cognizant of \( p \) to being counter-presuppositional of \( p \). If the
receiver's non-verbal signal, from the text producer point of view, occurs deliberately, his intention in a certain context may be to belittle or disparage the veracity of the text producer's belief in the p concerned. Conversely, in order to repudiate such an insulting signal, the text producer chooses to demote him to being counter-presuppositional of p. The text producer's constative consequent upon such a demotion or decognizance will be contrastively emphatic though tautological. For example, Arabic rhetoric cites a poetic verse about Shaqiq, i.e. the receiver, who approached the battle zone without wielding his sword claiming invincibility. Of course, he knew that the enemy, i.e. the text producer, did have the warriors who could challenge and may eventually beat him. But he pretended otherwise in order to give the enemy, for example, the impression that he was fearless of death, that he would win any duel easily, that the enemy did not have true warriors, etc. In consequence, the poetic verse uses S Emphasis to express the proposition that "they did have tougher warriors". The use of S Emphasis here evidently was intended to redress Shaqiq's flagrant disregard and arrogance. The use thus illustrates the third context in which S Emphasis can be used (cf. chapter six). As regards the submaxim of quality and its relation with this type of demotion, it seems that using S Emphasis is intended to give strong evidence of the veracity of p, although the text producer and Shaqiq know that p is true. However, Shaqiq's immediate status indicates that he was unconcerned about the consequences of his pretension, and hence prompted the text producer's use of S Emphasis.

4. A receiver who is non-cognizant and counter-presuppositional of p may be demoted to being as if cognizant of p. The demotion here concerns presenting a synthetic proposition modified with S Emphasis, as if it were analytic, known and unchallengeable. The S emphazizer normally used for this occasion is , , "innamaa", (only), whose conventional function is to introduce propositions expected to be unchallengeable. However, "innamaa" can further be employed unconventionally by presenting a synthetic proposition as if it were analytic in order to imply that the receiver should not have counter-presupposed its veracity and

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should have known that \( p \) is true in the first place. The counter-presupposition of the
text producer thus becomes almost unimportant although the proposition is modified by
means of S Emphasis. That is, since the text producer presents his challengeable
proposition as if it were known through the use of “innamaa”, he implies that the
receiver should not have counter-presupposed it. Similarly, consider for example the
use of “only” in (I was only joking.), in which the text producer presents his
proposition as something the receiver should have known to be true, and thus should
not have been irritated.

Pragmatically, although the text producer here observes the third submaxim of
Emphasis by using “innamaa” in order to address a counter-presuppositional receiver,
he flouts the submaxim that concerns the conventional use of “innamaa” by using it to
present a challengeable proposition as if factual, known, etc., hence truthful.

5. A receiver who is presuppositionless of \( p \) may be demoted to a reconfirmation
seeker, تبذير خالى الذهن منزلة المتردد. This demotion concerns a receiver
who gives a non-verbal sceptical gesture of being a reconfirmation-seeker such as
casting a look interpretable as sceptical, placing one’s hand on one’s forehead, etc., in
an information-giving context. For example, in Arabic rhetoric, one of the constatives
used to illustrate the demotion is a Qur’aanic verse (XI,37) whereby the prophet Noah
asks God to forgive his people who do not believe in his message. God instead orders
him to make an Ark and stop asking forgiveness for his people. Being unexpectedly
ordered to make the Ark, Noah probably looked non-verbally unsure as to whether or
not his people were doomed to death. The concluding constative which explains the
reason for making the Ark, conveys the emphatic proposition that ‘they shall be
drowned’. Thus Noah is demoted from being a presuppositionless receiver sharing the
same ideology with God’s message to being reconfirmation-seeking. Consider:
Similarly, the use of instructive discourse may sometimes end up with an emphatic conclusion if the previous information of the instructive discourse has given rise to the receiver’s sceptical non-verbal action. The kind of co-text which seems to be a reason for the demotion, normally represents directive performatives such as the imperative, negative imperative, etc. Other reasons for such a demotion leading to the use of Emphasis proper may include the importance and unexpectedness of the information expressed, the receiver’s inattentiveness, or indifference.

Pragmatically, the incongruent use of Emphasis proper seems to indicate not only the text producer’s strong intention to uphold the veracity of his proposition even if both interlocutors share the same beliefs and ideology as the example above shows but his slight attitudinal irritation as well.

6. A receiver who is presuppositionless of p may be demoted to a counter-presuppositional one. In our congruent typologies, it was stated that a receiver who is presuppositionless of p may prompt the text producer to dispatch a discourse-initial constative under the presumption of ignorance on the part of the receiver (cf. Strawson, 1964). Such types of constative which are clearly non-emphatic and completely convey New information are used particularly in narrative discourse. However, in argumentative discourse the picture is quite different from that of narrative discourse. According to al-Jurjaanii, an S emphatic structure introduced with the S emphatic particle “innamaa” can function discourse-initially if the proposition expressed is not expected to be challenged by the receiver (cf. chapter six). In English, on the other hand, Prince (1978) shows that it-cleft may be used non-contrastively as discourse-initial. Similarly, Declerk (1984) shows how pseudo-cleft as well may be used as discourse-initiating units. Using such types of
constative as discourse-initial to relay completely New information emphatically is not only to demote a presuppositionless receiver of p to a receiver who is as if counter-presuppositional of that p but to indicate that the context of his discourse is one of argumentative genre as well. These kinds of constatives are termed truth-conditionally exhaustive S Emphasis in our typology of S Emphasis realizations in chapter six. They do not involve any specific contrastiveness presupposed from the preceding context and co-text. Rather contrastiveness seems to be involved within the whole context of discourse in which such types of constatives can be used discourse-initially (cf. chapter six).

7. A receiver who is a reconfirmation seeker of p may be demoted to being presuppositionless of p, ِتنزيل المتردد منزولة خالي الدهن. According to this demotion, the text producer may choose to use a non-emphatic constative to address a reconfirmation-seeking receiver by flouting the second submaxim of Emphasis and the second submaxim of quality to implicate not only his slight disregard towards his sceptical receiver but the fact that the receiver should not have become sceptical of p as well. The receiver’s communicative participation expressing his contextual scepticism may be marked verbally and/or non-verbally in such a context. For example, in response to a sceptical yes/no question, the text producer may choose to say either “Yes” or “No”, instead of “Certainly” or “Certainly not”.

8. A receiver who is an information-seeker of p may be demoted to being counter-presuppositional of p, ِتنزيل السائل منزولة المنكر. Normally, when a receiver asks for New information, the text producer, in response, should use either a discourse-initial constative or other types of information-giving constatives if the discourse is other than argumentation. If, however, the discourse is one of argumentation, then the text producer may choose to use, according to az-Zamallakaan (1974: 184-5), an S emphatic constative voicing his dissatisfaction with the proposition of his constative (for further illustrations see the subsection on
Negation/Focusing in chapter six). Using S Emphasis in such a context is meant to demote the receiver whose question might have expected other than what p expresses, to being counter-presuppositional although the receiver does not show any specific non-verbal clues justifying the demotion. The only possible explanation for the demotion is as follows. For example, on being asked “How many people gave you one-pound notes?”, the text producer who is apparently a beggar and detects that the receiver’s question may implicate that perhaps a lot of people must have given one-pounds notes, may choose to use S Emphasis in his reply, (Only you gave me a one-pound note). The use of S Emphasis which is undoubtedly non-contrastive, implies that what the text producer has been given until the moment of speech does not match the interlocutors’ expectations, hence the necessity of S Emphasis.

Pragmatically, the text producer flouts the first submaxim of Emphasis by choosing to use S Emphasis, and flouts the first submaxim of quality by using Emphasis in order to uphold the veracity of his proposition. Both floutings are meant to produce evidence which contradicts the interlocutors’ expectations concerning the possibility that the text producer might have been given a lot of one-pound notes by many people.

9. A receiver who is counter-presuppositional of p, is demoted to being presuppositionless, تنزيل المنكر منزلة خالي الذهن. The text producer accordingly encodes his constative non-emphatically because he believes that the propositional content of the constative, at least from his point of view, is too close to, if not, factual propositions to be packaged emphatically. Obviously, the packaging is intended to express strong evaluation of the propositional content itself through blatant disregard of the receiver’s counter-presuppositional beliefs and ideology by infringing the third submaxim of Emphasis. That is, the text producer may believe that his proposition is factual and in need of no Emphasis at all. According to the text producer’s beliefs, there are numerous signs and evidence indicative of the factuality of
his proposition that requires no further verification or authentication. It is this type which expresses total disregard of the importance of the receiver's counter-presuppositions and consequently downgrades his communicative contribution. However his proposition, one must say, is not the same as self-evident statements or statements of the obvious, but presented as such.

Pragmatically, the text producer flouts the third submaxim of Emphasis and automatically flouts the second submaxim of quality since he fails to provide evidence to back up the veracity of his proposition. The context strongly calls for the use of S Emphasis to counter the receiver's wrong or mistaken denial.

10. A receiver who is counter-presuppositional of p, may be demoted to a confirmation seeker, تَنْزِيلُ المَنْكَرُ منْزِلَةَ المَسْرُدَد. The demotion here aims at (i) upgrading the proposition in question, and (ii) giving the receiver's counter-presupposition slight importance in the context concerned. Using Emphasis proper rather than S Emphasis may indicate the fact that, from the text producer's view, the synthetic proposition involved is not only presented as unchallengeable but without being specificationally emphasized as well. For example, if the proposition "there is certainty life after death", is said to a counter-presuppositional receiver, the text producer has chosen to use Emphasis proper rather than S Emphasis in order to upgrade it by not using S Emphasis, and not to ignore the receiver's denial by using Emphasis proper.

Pragmatically, the text producer in such a demotion flouts both the third submaxim of Emphasis and the second submaxim of quality in order to implicate that the text producer believes his proposition is true enough for the receiver to believe as well.

So far I have been discussing the incongruent types of receiver and constative realized on the basis of flouting the submaxims concerned in certain communicative
interactions. Noticeably, each constative used congruently can further be used incongruently to address different receivers in different contexts of situation in which other contextual and psychological factors seem to be involved. As far as S Emphasis is concerned, in both typologies there are only six occasions where the text producer can use S Emphasis. These are: type no. 3 in the congruent typology of observing the third submaxim, and types no. 3, 4, 6 and 7, in the incongruent typologies above.

In addition, there is a further type discussed immediately following the congruent typologies, and whereby the text producer himself may challenge his previous inner beliefs and values in certain expressive text types. The use of S Emphasis to express his strong emotional feeling towards the proposition in question indicates not only how wrong or mistaken his previous beliefs were but unexpected dissatisfaction as well. In consequence, we have so far six specific contexts of situation in which S Emphasis is likely to be used. Having specified such contexts, it is necessary to highlight the typology of mutual knowledge as it too involves further implications pertinent to Focus and Emphasis.

2.6.3 The Typology of Mutual knowledge

As mentioned above, two specific types of receiver are identifiable in terms of mutual knowledge; a receiver who is cognizant of p but does not know that the text producer is cognizant of p as well, and a receiver who knows of p and also knows that the text producer is cognizant of p. The latter type can not be further classified since knowing that the text producer knows p, does not seem to presuppose the receiver’s scepticism or counter-presupposition. The text producer’s knowledge is likely to be challengeable only if the receiver is apparently unaware of the text producer’s cognizance of p. The text producer’s knowledge of the proposition must also be tantamount to his belief in p, i.e. self-assured belief, if he is to use Emphasis to repudiate the receiver’s rejection.
It is worth noting in this respect that Lyons (1977) and Halliday (1985) argue that using expressions such as "I know that p", "I am certain that p", etc., would weaken the text producer's commitment towards his proposition. In fact their claim is possible if and only if the text producer's knowledge of p rather than the veracity of p is being challenged. The use of such expressions accordingly commits the text producer to the factuality of his knowledge of p. In this respect, as-Sayyid (n.d.) argues that emphasizing one's knowledge of p, increases one's commitment towards one's knowledge of p, rather than the veracity of p which becomes a secondary matter with relation to the main purpose of communication.

The typology of mutual knowledge consequent upon challenging and unchallenging the text producer's knowledge of p is based on the receiver's acceptance, scepticism, or counter-presupposition of such a knowledge. Thus there are three types of receiver classified in terms of mutual knowledge; these are:

1. If the receiver accepts the text producer's knowledge of p, then the sole purpose of this type is to inform the receiver that the text producer knows of p as well. The text producer merely offers his tautological constative congruently without any emphatic expression used to ascertain his knowledge of p.

2. If the receiver is so sceptical of the text producer's cognizance of p, the text producer should emphasize his knowledge of p rather than p itself in such an incongruent context. The receiver is likely to use expressions such as "I doubt that you know that" "I do not think you know that p", etc. Conversely, the text producer should use emphatic expressions such as "I am certain that p", "I know that p", etc. in order to counter the receivers scepticism. The use of Emphasis is clearly in compliance with the second submaxim of Emphasis.
3. If the receiver counter-presupposes the text producer's cognizance of p, the text producer should use S Emphasis in this incongruent context in order to prove the validity of his knowledge of p. The expressions that are likely to be used by the text producer may be "I swear I know that...", S Emphasis formulas whereby the verb "know" realizes the variable and the pronoun co-referrential to the text producer realizes the value, etc. The use of S Emphasis in such a context illustrates the seventh specific situation in which contrastive Emphasis must be used.

It should be stated that although dispatching the last two types of tautologies are incongruent, the use of Emphasis to emphasize the knowledge of these tautologies is congruent with the receiver's immediate contextual statuses. In effect, the flouting concerns the constative as a whole in being tautological, whereas the use of Emphasis is based on observing the submaxims of Emphasis concerned.

Furthermore, it seems possible to argue that the text producer may choose to flout the submaxims of Focus and Emphasis whereby a further typology of tautologies may be derivable on the basis of the receiver's challenge of the text producer's knowledge of p. The use of Emphasis in such a typology is conducted in compliance with flouting the submaxims of Emphasis concerned. However, it will lead us far afield even if we provide a sketchy account of these floutings. Suffice it to say that these floutings seem to be tantamount to the other incongruent typologies of constative and receiver classified in terms of Focus and Emphasis. These types of tautologies may form a preliminary step towards more comprehensive future researches.

To sum up: I have been discussing extensively the incongruent typologies of receiver and constative resulting from the text producer's flouting of the submaxims of Emphasis, quality and quantity. Ten types of constative addressing ten types of receiver
have further been illustratively identified in specific contexts whereby each of such types clearly provides a pragmatic account for the use of Focus and/or Emphasis. It has been argued throughout this chapter that it is these congruent and incongruent typologies which contemporary pragmatic models require most if we are to provide a plausible pragmatic account encompassing the natural and marked constatives. What is extremely difficult to identify in such typologies is the de-emphatic constatives used in highly subtle contexts. However, a de-emphatic constative will be given a pragmatic account in terms of the new model in chapter five. In the next section, a sample of how linguistic features are pragmatically analysed in Arabic rhetoric will be given.

2.6.4 A Sample of Arabic Rhetorical Analysis

The aim of this section is to sketch out how Arabic rhetoric accounts for certain linguistic issues through the employment of the concept of choice to demonstrate the impingement of pragmatic constraints upon syntax. The account is similar to what Butler (1988: 97) has predicted concerning the task of pragmatics to explain the relationship between different ways of expressing things, and between these different ways and the factors conditioning the text producer’s choices. As far as I am aware, al-Jurjaanii (re-ed., 1983, 181) was the first to demonstrate the pragmatic factors conditioning our syntactic choices in classical rhetoric. Let us first specify the levels at which such choices are possible.

In his brief account of تفاضل العبارات, (lit. Preferentiality of Clauses), az-Zamalkaanii (re-ed. 1974, 300) claims that preferential choices between two synonymous structures may occur at three linguistic levels:

1. at the lexical content level by interpreting the pragmatic force of the two synonymous items involved and consequently deciding which one in a given context
would be more effective and appropriate than the other (cf. also az-Zamakhsharii, re-

2. at the positional level by changing the positions of certain elements within the
structure in a given context, and

3. at the formal level by explaining how the syntactic function of a given item is more
appropriate than the same item but with a different syntactic function. (Compare, for
example, the use of a given item whose use can realize the syntactic functions
“specification”, التمییز, or “apposition”, البديل, in the same clause). The choice
is based on interpreting the pragmatic force of the syntactic functions of the same item
and consequently deciding which one would fill the slot in the structure concerned.
Similarly, the account covers the use of those syntactic features such as +Def vs -Def,
whereby a comparison between two morphologically different but semantically similar
items is pragmatically interpreted. The account at this level further covers two
synonymous items which realize the same syntactic function in the structure but differ
in grammatical patterning. For instance, in Arabic, both the Verbal and the Nominal
clauses, according to al-Juýaanii (ed., 1983: 181), can be used to realize the clause
circumstantial element. He demonstrates how two structures having not only the same
syntactic function but also the same cognitive meaning, differ pragmatically from each
other in the context specified. Consider:

آنانا و الشمس قد طلعت

1. Ataanaa wa 'l-shamsu qad tala'ar. (SV)
   (he)came to us when the sun had risen,

and

آنانا وقد طلعت الشمس

2. Ataanaa wa qad tala'ati l-shamsu (VS)
   (he)came to us when had risen the sun.

The circumstantial element of the first clause is realized by a Nominal clause,
and that of the second is realized by its Verbal counterpart. The two complex clauses
are lexically identical and convey the same cognitive meaning, viz. "He came to us when the sun had risen". Pragmatically, however, there is a very subtle difference between the two occurrences of the Nominal and Verbal clauses. The use of the Nominal in the first example is intended to convey the text producer's slight dissatisfaction at the Actor's lateness, hence being slightly reproachful. In other words, the implicature derivable from the first is a deontic statement, i.e. "he should have come earlier". By contrast, the latter whose circumstantial element is realized by a Verbal clause, merely conveys a narrative event indicated by its sense. Thus the preferential choice of either induces pragmatic consequences unavailable in the other and vice versa.

The difference between the two must be taken into account if both are to be translated into English. To preserve the text producer's attitudinal dissatisfaction at the lateness of the Subject, the most suitable English counterpart for the first example is to make the main clause negative, i.e. he did not come to us, and to use "until" immediately before the circumstantial clause. In fact, such a use of "until" has been recently analysed by Karttunen (1974: 284-97), who identifies the lateness of the Subject in such a structure as a pragmatic presupposition. Thus the most suitable rendering is:

*He did not come to us until the sun had risen.*

As regards the second example, however, it merely reports the event concerned. Consider:

*He came to us when the sun had risen.*

Similarly, compare the following negative counterparts of the above instances respectively. The implicature derivable from the first is that the Subject came too early. Consider:
3. Ataa wa 'l-shamsu lam tālā'  
(he) came before the sun had not risen, 

and 

4. Ataa wa 'lam tālā' -al-shamsu ba'du.  
(he) came when had not risen—just the sun—nom yet. 

Furthermore, as-Sakkaakii (re-ed., 1983: 419) in his classical compendium of Arabic rhetoric provides a pragmatic analysis of a Qur'aanic text (xi,44), whereby he investigates how (i) the choices of the syntactic features, and (ii) the sequential choices of speech acts from an 'Ilm al-Ma'aanii perspective are pragmatically motivated. Consider: 

(And it was said: "O earth, swallow up thy water; and, O heaven, abate!" And the water subsided, and the matter ended, and the Ark settled on Mount of Juddi:, and it was said, "Away with the evildoing people." )

-wa qiila yaa 'ardu ibla'i ma'a'aki  
And it-was-said,"O earth! swallow up thy water

-wa yaa samaa'u iqla'ii wa ghiida 'l-ma'u and O heaven, abate!" And was-subsided the water

-wa qudiya 'l-amru, wa 'stawat 'alaq and was-ended the-matter, and (the Ark)settled on

-'l-Juddiyyi, wa qiila bu'dan  
Mount Juudii, and it-was-said: 'Away-with 

-li'l-qawmi 'l-zaalimiina. the people the-evildoing!'.
The text evinces the story of Noah's flood, and what happened afterwards. In his account, as-Sakkaakii uses the formula, "...was chosen rather than...because...", to expound the purposes of choosing each element of the text. The analysis runs as follows: The vocative interjection "yaa" was chosen for being more frequent in Arabic; it denotes the remoteness of the personified objects addressed and that the context is one of exaltation and greatness display. The elements: "ارد", (earth), "سماء", (heaven), "يبلع", (swallow up), "غلاء", (abate), and "غباد", (subsided), were chosen rather than their morphologically longer synonyms and derivations for brevity. The element "ماء", (thy water), is not made plural in order not to enumerate the personified objects in a context of power display. The Goal "ماء", (thy water), which could have been left out, is mentioned following the verb "يبلع", (swallow up), in order to specify the thing to be swallowed. The elliptical emphatic imperative form, "بعدن", (away with), which is the cognate object used to qualify the ellipted verb was chosen for brevity and to indicate that the evildoing people do deserve God's chastisement. As-Sakkaakii further identifies each sentence in terms of illocutionary acts and explains their marked and unmarked sequence.

To sum up: I have been illustrating how Arabic rhetoric pragmatically accounts for various stretches of linguistic units. The illustration was intended to explain the sophistication of Arabic rhetoric analysis and how pragmatics conditions the factors affecting our syntactic choices. In the next section, a new presuppositional typology of the Arabic clause based on prosodic analysis will be presented.

2.7 FUNCTIONAL CLAUSE TYPOLOGY IN ARABIC

The aim of this section is to expound how FSP-variants of the Arabic clause differ in the place of their information Focus by elucidating the influence which the verbal and situational contexts have on FSP. More specifically, the discussion involves setting up a new FSP-typology of the Arabic clause by taking into account Chafe's (1976:43) four possible combinations: indefinite and New, definite and New, definite
and Given, and indefinite and Given. The FSP-variants will accordingly be typologically distributed over two basic clause classes postulated by Bolinger (1952) and Firbas (1952, 1979). The classes should be able to account systematically for the FSP-variants of a given clause on the basis of maximal or minimal conveyance of New information. The prosodic typology to be given shortly is compatible with the typologies of constative and receiver given above. In so doing, reference to the verbal and contextual factors such as Mathesius’s three principles affecting the disposition of word order (19-75), and Jackendoff’s Presupposition-Focus parameter (1972), will be made.

The FSP typology is intended to specify phonologically the contextual environments calling for the use of Focus and Emphasis, and is in an attempt to demonstrate the possible FSP distinction between the Verbal and Nominal clauses. Only once you investigate this area very closely by starting with establishing the tenuous boundary of Emphasis proper and S Emphasis can you eventually manage to reach some understanding of the cause of the confusion surrounding the use of the superordinate term “Focus”.

Admittedly, intonation in classical Arabic linguistics is virtually unknown. Although classical linguists have succeeded in providing a yet unrivalled theory of rhetoric, they have failed to formalize a tangible phonological analysis of utterances plausible enough to account for not only emphatic but also non-emphatic cases. Recently, however, al-Anii, a contemporary phonologist, has managed to propose a phonological model, of which I will avail myself to identify the utterance types in spoken MSA in terms of pitch levels. Al-Anii (1970: 90-1), arguing that the distribution of primary and secondary stresses does not necessarily coincide with the highest pitched syllables, identifies four relative levels of intonational pitch system. These are:

/1/ low; /2/-mid; /3/-high, and /4/-extra high. The latter though extremely limited, is found in emotional
utterances. In declaratives, the frequencies start with pitch level /2/ running through the utterance until the final syllable where it drops suddenly to /1/. This /2-2-1/ pattern is referred to as sustaining falling. A declarative may also start with level /1/ when the utterance begins with a prefix or functional word. The /2-3-1/ pattern also occurs in declaratives but it is less common than the /2-2-1/. Pitch level /3/ appears as peaks when certain syllables are emphasised more than others.

Before proceeding to the main concern of this section, we also need to sketch out Mathesius's (1975: 154-6) three principles, namely the grammatical, the rhythmic, and the FSP, responsible for determining the disposition of word order. The grammatical principle is concerned with how the position of a particular sentence element is determined by its grammatical function, i.e. by its being the Subject, predicate, object, etc., and occupying its normal position in the structure unless this arrangement is hampered by the operation of another word order principle such as Emphasis. The rhythmic principle is concerned with the position of the object and how it depends on whether it is expressed by a pronoun or by a noun group. And finally the FSP principle accounts for the fact that utterances are merely composed of two parts, known-unknown; If known information precedes, then we have an objective word order. If, on the other hand, unknown information precedes, then we have a subjective word order. The principle that would determine the subjective word order is also called the emotional or emphatic principle. It is worth noting in passing that Mathesius's principle of objective word order is tantamount to the Arabic rhetoric discourse processing principle and Firbas's CD.

Having provided the necessary factors for setting up a functional typology of utterances in spoken Arabic, we are in a position to elucidate the model for utterance typology postulated by Bolinger and Firbas. The model, of course, is not complete largely because the area of Emphasis proper is left vague in contemporary linguistics. The model functionally assigns utterances to two classes: First Instance class and Second Instance class. The former, first introduced by Firbas (1952 & 1979),
subsumes two levels: the basic instance level and the ordinary instance level. All discourse-initiating and non-emphatic clauses, e.g. unmarked Focus types, are representatives of these two levels respectively.

The latter class, by contrast, which was first introduced by Bolinger (1952), subsumes one level accounting for contrastive Focus only (cf. also Firbas, 1979 and Svaboda and Materna, 1987: 191-205). However, according to Dik (1981: 58, cf. also Danes, 1972: 227; Abu Muusaa 1979, 191 and Arabic rhetoric literature),

Focus [Emphasis Proper] does not necessarily imply Contrast.

Accordingly, a further level accounting for Emphasis proper needs to be added to Bolinger's second instance level. Both levels will be termed: the Emphatic instance level and the Specificational instance level. The former subsumes instances with emphatic clauses which do not imply contrast while the latter subsumes instances which do. Utterances, as a result, can be distributed on the basis of having either unmarked, emphatic, or Specificational Foci along these four levels. The scope of unmarked, emphatic and specificational foci must also be taken into account in such a functional clause distribution. Reference to the structural typology of Arabic clauses established in chapter 1, i.e. Verbal, Nominal, Equational and Initial-placement, will be made here. It is worth noting that the second instance class can also be used to encompass all utterances that are syntactically marked for Emphasis proper and S Emphasis to be discussed in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. Note that the underlined elements of the illustrations to be given below represent New information, and those in capital letters and underlined represent the intonational centre. The prominent syllable of the focused constituent will not be solely capitalized as it is too precarious to do so as far as the present research is concerned. Let us now turn to the main concern of this section.
2.7.1 First Instance Class

First instance class subsumes two levels, namely the basic instance level and the ordinary instance level, usable to account for unmarked Focus utterances. Let us start with the first.

2.7.1.1 The Basic Instance Level

We speak of a sentence at the Basic Instance Level if all its elements bear out New information. All discourse-initiating units whose intonation pattern is /2-2-1/, are accounted for by this level. Structurally, clauses representing the basic instance level can either be Verbal, Nominal, or Equational, bearing in mind that definite and indefinite elements, (cf. Chafe, 1976 and cf. chapter 4), always convey New information. In order to systematize our argument, let us take up each of these types of clause structure in turn.

The FSP-variants of the Verbal clause representing this level are several. The first is a variant with no grammatical indication of CD (Deyes, 1978: 317) whatsoever, because of its indefinite Subject and object. Recall that the basic clause is rightly regarded the least informative unit in discourse (cf. Keenan’s criteria in chapter 1.2). However, Firbas’s (1979: 35) claim that

indefinite elements carry the highest degree of CD.

is obviously at variance with Keenan’s impeccable claim. It is highly unlikely that we can recognize indefinite elements as carriers of the highest degree of CD. In fact, it is the definite elements which should be recognized as the highest carriers of CD, if and only if they express New information.

Variants, at this level, are likely to be dispatched in response to a question such as “What happened?” (cf. Lyons, 1977: 503), involving the minimal presupposition that something occurred. Being least informative, the basic clause may indicate that the
state of affairs referred to is of no concern of both participants, or the receiver only. It is very unlikely, however, that it will be dispatched in compliance with Strawson’s (1964) principle of the presumption of ignorance; a presumption obliging the text producer to be informative. Although the whole variant bears New information, the Focus of the intonational centre falls on the last element. Consider:

1. **SARAQA RAJULUN BAYTAN (VSO)**
   Robbed *a-man-nom a-HOUSE-acc*
   *(A man robbe a HOUSE.)*

The use of such a variant may further indicate the text producer’s infringement of the submaxim of being as informative as required (i.e. uninformative). Yet it can represent a discourse-initiating unit, particularly in fiction and narration, whereby the identity of the indefinite elements will subsequently be established in a possible world. The disposition of the clause elements conforms with Mathesius’s grammatical principle.

The second possible FSP-variant of the Verbal clause which is empirically valid as a reply to “What happened?” is a discourse-initiating unit with a definite Subject only. The identity of the Subject must, accordingly, be retrievable either exophorically such as common nouns, or from the receiver’s encyclopaedic knowledge such as proper nouns. Consider:

2. **SARAQA 'L-RAJULU BAYTAN. (VSO)**
   Robbed *the-man-nom a-HOUSE-acc.*
   *(The man robbe a HOUSE.)*

The disposition of its word order is similarly congruent with the grammatical principle, and is restricted to certain text types such as narration. However, the word order of this variant may further be Nominal by interpolating the definite Subject in initial position, i.e. SVO, to conform with the FSP objective word order principle. The principle can be upheld either by placing what is definite and New, or what is introduced in the previous discourse in initial position. The Nominal variant in this case seems to be clearly restricted to certain text types such as argumentation. Consider:
The third FSP-variant as a discourse-initiating unit is a Verbal variant with a definite object only. The definite object must thus precede the Subject in compliance with the FSP objective principle. It does not seem plausible to say that the disposition of this variant word order, i.e. VOS, is in compliance with the FSP principle of subjective word order allocated for S Emphasis, because it can not only be a response to the question "What happened?", but also occurs fairly frequently as an obligatory word order disposition in compliance with the rhythmic principle if the object is an anaphoric pronoun suffixed to the main lexical verb (cf. next section). Consider:

4. **SARAQA 'L-BAYTA RAJULUN. (VOS)**
   robust the-house-acc a-MAN.
   (A man robbed the HOUSE.)

The fourth variant is a discourse-initiating unit with definite Subject and object used in response to "What happened?". The disposition of its word order is more likely to have a Nominal FSP-variant, since it is necessary to proceed from what is more familiar to the less familiar at this basic instance level. In both alternatives, the conformity with the FSP objective word order principle is achieved. Both differ from each other in terms of the text type in which they are likely to be used. The intonational centre falls on the last elements of both occurrences. Consider:

5. **SARAQA 'R-RAJULU 'L-BAYTA (VSO)**
   Robbed the-man-nom the-HOUSE-acc.
   (The man robbed the HOUSE.)

and

6. **AR-RAJULU SARAQA 'L-BAYTA (SVO)**
   The-man-nom robbed the-HOUSE-acc.
   (The man robbed the HOUSE)

It follows from this presuppositional account then that the Verbal clause may yield six FSP-variants representing the basic instance level. Two of such variants can
be Nominal provided that the text type in which they are likely to be possible candidates is taken into account.

It is worth recalling that the Subject of the Nominal can either be Given according to the Baaran view, or New fronted for Emphasis according to the Kuufan view. Both views preclude the possibility of using it at this basic instance level although Arabic grammar argues that the initial element of the Nominal which, according to these schools' views respectively, is either مثبتاٰ, G-Subject, or فاعل, Actor, must be definite. It is not stated whether or not definiteness entails Givenness. The FSP-variants above, however, show unequivocally the insufficiency for a context-dependent definite element to assume initial position.

Further, the use of the two Nominal variants as discourse-initial is congruent with the Baaran scholars' claim regarding the basicness of the Nominal. Although those scholars rightly imply the possibility of using the Nominal as discourse-initial because of its being considered basic, the above illustrations conclude that Keenan's least informativity criterion characteristic of basic clauses is the ultimate arbitrator. Therefore, having a definite Subject in initial position, the Nominal becomes more informative than its Verbal rival which can contain indefinite Subject and object concurrently.

Colloquially, however, the Nominal can be used to convey wholly New information, particularly in Jordan (cf. El-Yasin, 1985) and Iraq. However, the colloquial dialects which in the past had the tendency to favour the Nominal in daily communication (cf. Ibn Kalduun's claim in chapter 1), were rejected and consequently the grammar was formed on the basis of the language of the Qur'aan.
The Equational, on the other hand, seems to convey wholly New information to be used as a discourse-initiating unit in response to the question “What happened?” if it contains an attributive predicate. It is equally possible to use it in answer to a polar question introduced by the particle, “hal” (Is, Are, Am), whose scope is the whole proposition. In compliance with the objective word order principle, the definite constituent of an Equational in both contexts must take initial position at the basic instance level. Consider:

\[ \text{Hal Ahmadu Tawiilun? } \]
\[ \text{Is Ahmed-nom tall-nom? (Is Ahmed tall?) } \]

The obvious reply seems to assert the whole proposition as in

\[ -\text{AHMADU TAWIILUN } \]
\[ -\text{AHMED-nom. TALL-nom. (Ahmed is TALL.) } \]

Further, if the Equational Predicate is a definite locative and the G Subject is indefinite, the linearity of the Equational normal word order must obligatorily be reversed indicating compliance with the FSP objective word order principle. Consider:

\[ -\text{FII 'L-DAARI AF'AA in the-house a-snake. (A SNAKE is in the house) } \]

2.7.1.2 The Ordinary Instance Level

We speak of a clause at the ordinary instance level if the clause contains at least one Given element. The distinction between the variants of a given clause at this level concerns the number of Given elements they have. In our typology of constatives above, all constatives used to supply the receiver with required information, are assignable to this level. The principle determining the linearity of their word order is either the FSP objective word order operating at a larger scale, or the rhythmic principle operating at a lesser scale. Intonationally, the pitch system assignable to the structure of variants at this level seems to be /1-2-1/. 
It is useful to mention in passing that there are a few cases such as, 
أُهْنَىٰ مُوسِىٌ عمِيٌّ , (insulted Muusaa my uncle) whereby the Subjects and objects are not case-marked, hence lacking the potentiality of free displacement. The only principle influencing the disposition of these cases is the grammatical, since any word order change results in a sense change.

Furthermore, if a variant of a Verbal clause contains a Given pronominal object suffixed to the lexical verb, the word order which will be in compliance with the rhythmic principle, is obligatorily VOS. The disposition occurs in two specific contexts: firstly, when the Subject and the verb bear out New information, and secondly, when only the Subject carries New information. In both contexts, the variants are the FSP representatives for an Initial-placement clause, since the pronominal object operates as a resumptive pronoun co-referential with the ellipted Topic. Consider:

('Alii) ِّSAA‘ADAHU ِAHMADU. (VOS).
Ali helped-him-acc Ahmed-nom
(Ali, AHMED HELPED him.)

Similarly, the third case, where the rhythmical principle constrains the disposition of word order, concerns the suffixation of a possessive pronoun co-referential with the object, to the Subject. The resultant word order which will be ungrammatical if rendered otherwise, will be (VOS). The use of the pronominal suffix is intended to avoid the explicit repetition of the object immediately after the Subject. The Subject must, accordingly, be carrying New Information. Consider:

Zaara ِّl-mariida ِABUUHU. (VOS).
Visited-(he) the-patient-acc FATHER(his)-nom
(The patient was visited by his FATHER.)

It is worth noting in this respect that the preferable English version for this Arabic active variation is the passive. Now let us move on to the analysis of the Verbal FSP-variants. We will continue using the Question/answer technique to account
presuppositionally for the context-dependent and context-independent elements at this level. Consider the following question which presupposes the Givenness of one element:

-\textit{Man saraqa maadh?}?
  (Who robbed what?)

Taking definiteness and/or indefiniteness of the Subject and object into account, four FSP-variants containing a Given lexical verb are possible responses to the question above. In these possibilities, the word order determined by the FSP objective word order principle, is VSO. The pragmatic presupposition induced from such a question is: \textit{"someone robbed something"}. The first possibility is to have a Verbal variant with an indefinite Subject and object dispatchable in a possible world. Consider:

7. \textit{Saraqa RAJULUN BAYTAN.} (VSO)
  Robbed a-man-nom a-HOUSE-acc.
  (A man robbed a HOUSE.)

In such a variant, the FSP principle of objective word order places the lexical verb carrying Given information in initial position. It will be ungrammatical at this ordinary level to front any indefinite element. The positions of the Subject and object is in conformity with the grammatical principle as well. The use of indefiniteness above is to indicate that the referents of the elements concerned do not concern the receiver or both interlocutors.

The second possibility is a variation whose object is definite and carries New information. Accordingly, the object must positionally take precedence over the indefinite Subject in the structure. The word order of this variant, which is VOS, is linearized in compliance with the objective word order principle. Consider:

8. \textit{Saraqa 'L-BAYTA RAJULUN.} (VOS)
  Robbed the-house-acc a-MAN-nom.
  (A MAN robbed the house.)
The third possibility is to have a variation with a definite Subject and indefinite object which both communicate New information. The Subject thus precedes the indefinite object positionally in the structure because of being identifiable. Being definite, the Subject could have been fronted, had the lexical verb been carrying New information. Note that in order to demonstrate various possibilities of definiteness, the common noun used in the examples above to realize the Subject, will be substituted with a proper noun in the following examples. Consider:

Robbed Ahmed-nom a-HOUSE-acc.
(Ahmed robbed a HOUSE.)

Here, being definite and New, it is not possible at this level to front the Subject and consequently have a Nominal variant. If, however, it is fronted, then the disposition of the structure elements would be determined by the FSP subjective word order principle.

And finally, the fourth variation is to have a response whose Subject and object are definite and express New information. Similarly, it is not possible to front either of them at this particular level without any interruption by the FSP subjective word order principle. In effect, the elements of the structure are disposed in accord with the FSP objective word order principle by placing what is given and presupposed first. Consider:

10. Saraqa AHMADU ‘L-BAYTA. (VSO).
Robbed Ahmed-nom the-HOUSE-acc.
(Ahmed robbed the HOUSE.)

Furthermore, in a slightly different context, when the question presupposes that (X did something), two responses are constructable on the basis of the object’s definiteness and indefiniteness. In both responses whose word order will be SVO, the lexical verb and the object bear out New information. The structure of both Nominal variants show some functional affinities with that of Initial-placement clause type except
no explicit resumptive pronoun is involved in the former. In the following question, the presupposition is: “Ahmed did something”. Consider:

- Maaddhaa fa’ala Ahmd?  
  (What did Ahmed do?)

The first possible response, whose information structure is distributed in conjunction with the FSP objective word order principle, contains an indefinite object carrying New information. The Subject, which is Given and presupposed from the preceding question, is thus elliptical. Note that elliptical elements functioning as Topics are enclosed with brackets. Consider:

11. Ahmdu SARAQA BAYTAN. (VSO)  
   Ahmed-nom robbed a-HOUSE-acc.  
   (Ahmed robbed a HOUSE.)

The second possible response may be with a definite object. Consider:

12. Ahmdu SARAQA ’L-BAYTA. (VSO)  
   Ahmed-nom robbed the-HOUSE-acc.  
   (Ahmed robbed the HOUSE.)

However, if the question presupposes that the object is already specified by being definite and Given, two possible FSP-variants are constructable as responses. Both variants, which share the same disposition of elements, informational distribution, and resumptive suffixal pronoun attached to the verb, differ in having either a definite or indefinite Subject. The two responses may thus be considered as the FSP-variants of an Initial-placement clause. Consequently, all variants exemplifying Initial-placement type may be assignable to this level. The informational distribution shows conformity with the FSP principle of objective word order. Consider:

- Maaddhaa hašala lil-bayta?  
  (What happened to the house?)

The responses ought to be precisely a variant of Initial-placement clause type which requires topicalizing the Given object, i.e. Topic. The type could also be labelled as a
Verbal variant since the Subject does not precede the lexical verb. The following two variants could be used to translate passive clauses from the target language requiring mentioning the Goal specified in the preceding discourse. Consider:

13. Al-bayta SARAQAHU AHMADU. (O.VOS)
   The-house robbed-it-acc AHMED-nom.
   (The house, AHMED robbed it.)

   The second possible variant contains an indefinite object realizable by a common noun. Consider:

14. Al-baytu SARAQAHU RAJULUN. (O.V(O)S)
   The-house-nom robbed-it-acc a-MAN-nom.
   (The house, a MAN robbed it.)

   The Focus of these two FSP-variants falls on the whole predicate. The intonational centre, however, is located on the Subject.

   In a different context, the question used may presuppose the Givenness of the verb and the indefinite object. It thus requires the specification of the missing information realized by the Subject. The pragmatic presupposition of the question concerned is (someone robbed a/the house). Consider:

   -Man saraqa baytan? من سرق بيتًا؟
   (Who robbed a house?)

   If the response contains an indefinite Subject as well, we may have,

15. Saraqa baytan RAJULUN. (VOS)
   robbed a-house-acc a-MAN-nom.
   (A MAN robbed a house.)

   The word order of this variant is in conformity with the FSP objective word order principle by placing Given material realized by the verb and the indefinite object first. However, the variant seems to be rare largely because of the rare occurrence of the less frequent word order VOS with combinations such as indefiniteness and Givenness, and
indefiniteness and Newness characterizing the object and Subject in the structure above respectively.

However, if the response used contains a definite Subject, the FSP objective word order principle will render the variant ungrammatical because definite elements must always precede indefinite ones in Arabic. That is, the indefinite object, though Given, must not be placed before the definite Subject, which bears out New information. This is the grammatical indication of the FSP principle involved. If, however, the word order complies with FSP principle and places the definite Subject which carries New information before the indefinite object which carries Given information, the disposition would be in compliance with the FSP subjective not objective word order principle, i.e. realizing Emphasis proper. In order to avoid this clumsy situation and provide a possible answer Arabic has to have recourse to the predicational Pseudo-cleft. Accordingly, the presupposed elements, i.e. the verb followed by the indefinite object, are placed in initial position preceded by a relative pronoun such as "the one who", and the definite Subject at the end. This seems the only possible way to uphold the FSP objective word order principle (cf. pseudo-cleft in chapter six). Consider:

16. Al-ladhii saraqa baytan AHMADU. (S, VOS)
The-one-who robbed a-house-acc AHMED-nom
(The one who robbed a house is AHMED)

Furthermore, if the question above contains a definite object, i.e. "who robbed the house?", the response whose word order would be VOS, is likely to comply with the FSP objective word order principle. Consider:

17. Saraqa 'l-bayta AHMADU. (VOS)
Robbed the-house-acc AHMED-nom.
(AHMED robbed the house.)
The informational disposition of this variant is in congruence with the FSP objective word order principle. If, however, the definite Subject which carries New information is initially positioned, then the word order would be disposed in conformity with the FSP subjective word order principle realizing S Emphasis.

In a different situation, whereby the element probed is either a definite or indefinite object, the applicability of the FSP principle runs smoothly. The presupposition of this situation is (Ahmed robbed something). Consider:

- Maadhaa Saraqa Ahnmu? Iý Le
(What did Ahmed rob?)

The response to this question may be:

18. Saraqa Ahnmu BAYTAN. (VSO)
Robbed Ahmed-nom a-HOUSE-acc.
(Ahmed robbed a HOUSE.)

If the object probed is definite, we may get the following:

19. Saraqa Ahnmu 'l-BAYTA. (VSO)
Robbed Ahmed-nom the-HOUSE-acc.
(Ahmed robbed the HOUSE.)

In both responses above the applicability of the FSP principle is achieved by placing what is Given first.

Further to the contexts above, a question probing the verb can be used in a specific context whereby the presupposition would be (Ahmed did something to the house). Consider:

- Maadhaa fa'ala Ahnmu li 'l-bayta?
(What did Ahmed do to the house?)

The most likely response would be:
This response represents a Nominal FSP-Variant of the Verbal clause, i.e. SVO. It is similar to the variations of the Initial-placement clause type in having its Given information realized by the Subject introduced in the preceding discourse. The rhythmical principle may seem to hamper the full applicability of the FSP objective word order principle. That is, the replacement of the object "to the house" by a pronominal suffix appended to the verb is meant to uphold the rhythmical principle.

It should be stated that all FSP-variants consequent upon the use of other Wh-elements, whereby the presuppositions become more specific and consequently the range of their uses becomes less, can be assigned to the ordinary instance level.

As regards the Equational, both attributive and identifying Equational, whose G Subject or predicate can be probed, are similarly possible candidates assignable to this level. One of the rules that prescriptively determines the disposition of the Equational basic elements at the ordinary instance level is that one of its basic constituents must be definite. The second obligation is that definite elements must, at this level, occupy initial position in the structure. In both cases, the Equational FSP variants can be accounted for not only by the basic instance level but by the ordinary instance level as well. The natural and marked linearity of the Equational FSP-variants can occur at this level if either of its basic constituents is definite and Given. However, the marked linearity, here, indicates the grammatical and functional influence the principle of objective word order has on the information disposition superimposed on the structure. The use of these variations as responses intended to supply missing information will, therefore, be in compliance with the FSP objective word order principle. Consider the following question probing the Subject which may be a proper or common noun:

- Mani 'it-tawiilu?  
*Who is the tall person?*
In compliance with the FSP objective word order principle, the normal response to this question will require placing the element carrying Given information first. Consider:

\[ \text{Al-tawiliu A\text{HMADU}.} \]
\[ \text{The-tall-nom A\text{HMED-nom.}} \]
\[ (\text{The tall is A\text{HMED}}) \]

Similarly, if the predicate which may be a definite adjective is probed, as in

\[ \text{Ayyuhum A\text{hmadu?}} \]
\[ (\text{Which one is A\text{hmed?}}) \]

the natural response will be

\[ \text{A\text{hmadu t-TAWILIU}} \]
\[ \text{Ahmed-nom the-TALL-nom.} \]
\[ (\text{Ahmed is the TALL PERSON}) \]

Both variations are in conformity with the FSP principle determining the usual linearity of the Equational clause at this level. However, at the emphatic levels to be discussed next, the preceding two variations can further be used to convey Emphasis.

In conclusion, so far I have been trying to set up new functional typology accounting phonologically for the Arabic clause. The typology of the basic and ordinary instance levels has been intended to show presuppositionally that the Nominal clause is, in fact, an FSP-variant of the Verbal clause. It has also demonstrated that it is the Verbal clause which is basic. The above two levels account for constatives which are discourse-initiating and information-giving.

### 2.7.2 Second Instance Class

As is stated above, the second instance class is to subsume two levels: the Emphatic Instance Level and the Specificational Instance Level. The former will subsume those clauses that are used to relay Emphasis proper in contexts of reassurance giving. The latter, on the other hand, will be used to account for those
clauses that are used to produce S Emphasis in contexts of correcting the receiver’s beliefs and assumptions. Both levels account for clauses that are maximally context-dependent and used in highly restricted contexts. Based solely on phonological exemplifications, the FSP subjective word order principle is the main determinant in choosing the appropriate word order variation if the scope of Emphasis is one of the constituents. In our discussion on the basic and ordinary instance levels above, reference to when and how the FSP subjective word order principle is operational is made in passing. Let us take up each of such levels in turn.

2.7.2.1 The Emphatic Instance Level

At the emphatic instance level, clauses expressing Emphasis proper are normally used not only to alleviate the receiver’s scepticism but also to reconfirm the veracity of the proposition communicated. The receiver’s scepticism may either be formulated as a request for reconfirmation or presupposed from a previous context. In spoken Arabic, the request may contain the formula “Is it true...?” and the like, which clearly underlines the receiver’s doubts and scepticism about the veracity of the proposition transmitted. Consider:

هل صحيح أن أحمد سرق البيت؟
Hal sahihun anna Ahmada sarqa 'l-bayta?
Is it true that Ahmed-acc robbed the-house-acc.?
(Is true that Ahmed robbed the house?)

Here the receiver’s scepticism concerns the whole proposition and seeks further reconfirmation from the text producer. So we can have the following response whose structure prosodically receives pitch system /2-3/:

نعم أحمد سرق البيت.
21. NA'AM, AHMADUN SARAQA 'l-BAYTA.
Yes, Ahmed-nom robbed the-house-acc.
(YES, AHMED ROBBED THE HOUSE.)
The response clearly prosodically shows the text producer’s slight attitudinal irritation for being asked to reconfirm what he has just said. The FSP principle of subjective word order does not seem to have any role here, because the whole clause conveys New information, hence no emphatic fronting is permitted. Perhaps, only the grammatical principle keeps the same word order as it occurred in the preceding question.

However, if the interrogative particle (A), is used in reconfirmation-seeking requests, i.e. “Is it + the element probed + . . . ?” the receiver's scepticism will concern only the element probed rather than the whole proposition. In consequence, the element probed which could be the Subject, object, etc., must be interpolated immediately following the yes/no element of the question concerned. Consider:

- A AHMADU saraqa baytan 'l-bayta ? 
  Was-it AHMED robbed a-house/the-house ?
  (Was it AHMED who robbed a-the house?)

The most likely response is either to repeat the probed Subject or the whole variation emphatically. The disposition of the variant elements concerned depends on the element probed which has to be removed from its normal position in the structure, and placed immediately after the yes/no element. Consider the following variant representing the kuufan scholars' version of the Nominal:

22. Na'am Ahmaju saraqa baytan 'l-bayta.
  Yes, AHMED-nom robbed a-house/the-house-acc.
  (Yes, AHMED robbed a-the house.)

Putting the Subject in initial position as a consequence of being probed, would be interpreted, according to the kuufans, as fronting for Emphasis proper.
If, on the other hand, the receiver's scepticism focuses on the verb, the verbal element probed must be removed and placed immediately after the yes/no element. In response, the verbal element which in this case, carries New information, remains in initial position indicating the influence exerted by the FSP principle of subjective word order on the structure. Positionally, the elements realizing the Subject and object and carrying Given information are placed immediately following the emphasized verb. The pragmatic presupposition, in this case, would be: (the receiver is not sure whether or not Ahmed did ROB the house). Consider:

23. SARAQA Ahmad \textsuperscript{'}I-bayta. 
\textit{ROBBED Ahmed-nom the-house-acc.}
(Ahmed ROBBED the house.)

Prosodically, the structure of the above variation may be assigned pitch system /3-2-1/.

Furthermore, if the receiver's scepticism concerns the object, the object must be removed and initially placed, preceded by the yes/no element. Three possible responses can be envisaged in this context, depending on the definiteness and indefiniteness of the probed element. If the object is definite, then it seems possible to place it either in initial position, i.e., OVS, or immediately after the verb and before the Subject, i.e., VOS. In both cases, the object displacement does not seem to induce other than Emphasis proper, although the former displacement is controversial in Arabic rhetoric. Consider the latter possibility:

24. Saraqa \textsuperscript{'}I-BAYTA Ahmadu. 
\textit{Robbed the-HOUSE-acc Ahmed-nom.}
(Ahmed robbed the HOUSE)

Here, the disposition of the structure elements which complies with the FSP principle of subjective word order, is identical to al-Jurjaanii's (re-ed. 1983: 80) constative:

\textit{Qatala \textsuperscript{'}I-KHAARIIYYA Zaydun.}
\textit{Killed the-outlaw-acc Zeid-nom.}
(The OUTLAW ZEID Killed.)
If, however, the object is indefinite and placed initially, i.e. OVS, it would not realize Emphasis proper, but S Emphasis. Although the variation is similarly controversial in Arabic rhetoric, the majority rightly recognize it as a realization of S Emphasis. The other possible responses which are grammatically correct, may place the indefinite object at the very end of the structure, i.e. VSO, or immediately after the Subject in a Nominal variation. In both positions, it may prosodically be assigned pitch system /1-3-1/. However, these two particular FSP-variants do require to be empirically demonstrated.

As regards the Equational, the attributive type with an indefinite predicate may be used to emphasize- the Subject which is the focus of the receiver’s scepticism. Accordingly, the emphatic intonational centre, which falls on the Subject, may be used to relay Emphasis proper.

2.7.2.2 The Specificational Instance Level

At the outset, a clause which is assigned to the S instance level, may have its whole proposition or one of its constituents stand in contrast with another specified in the preceding context. It should be stated that in Arabic rhetoric all the cases of fronting intuitively identified, serve to realize both Emphasis proper and S Emphasis depending on the specificity of the context (cf. for example Bergstraesser: 1981, 86). Almost all clause elements have the potentiality of being fronted for S Emphasis irrespective of definiteness and indefiniteness at this level. Prosodically, the pitch system assignable to the structure of such variants may be /4-2-1/. Restricting ourselves to the fronting of the three basic elements; the Subject, verb and object, we may have the following candidates:

25. **AHMADU** saraqa ' l-bayta.(SVO).  
AHMED-nom robbed the-house.
(AHMED robbed the house not Ali)

26. **SARAOA** ' l-bayta Ahmadi. (VOS)
ROBBED the-house-acc Ahmed-nom.
(Ahmed ROBBED the house.)
Admittedly, the intonational analysis is so precarious here that we are likely to reach unconvincing conclusion. However, being a native speaker of Arabic, I let my intuition play a part in deciding which type of word order is possible particularly in the emphatic cases.

In the case of the Equational, it can be used contrastively provided that either the Subject alone or both of its basic constituents, is/are definite. The contrastive element may or may not be fronted. We will be discussing these types in chapter six.

2.8 Summary

In the present chapter, I have been discussing the place of Emphasis critically in contemporary pragmatic theories and classical Arabic literature. Further, a new alternative pragmatic theory for Focus and Emphasis, proved to be more extensive, systematic, plausible and expedient in accounting for not only Focus and Emphasis but also other syntactic features subject to contextual influence, has been argued throughout the chapter. According to the new theory, the use of Focus, Emphasis proper, De-emphasis and S Emphasis can be accounted for pragmatically in accord with the submaxims of Emphasis, Quality and Quantity. The theory has also demonstrated the possibility of using one single utterance being emphatic or not in three and sometimes four highly specific contexts depending on the text producer's congruent or incongruent use. The important point made is that there is in part a natural linkage between marked and unmarked syntactic features and pragmatic interpretation attributable to conversational implicatures. In the fourth section of the present chapter, the typologies of receiver and constative representing the cornerstone in an pragmatic interpretation of a given contextualized utterance were extensively discussed. Finally, an exhaustive prosodic clause typology based on an intuitively presuppositional account was introduced. The typology aims to provide a suggestive claim that the Nominal
clause should be considered as a variant of the Verbal clause. The next chapter will be witnessing out two new proposals as to the most appropriate perspective of analysing Emphasis.
CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL PREREQUISITE (2)

3 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EMPHASIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, almost all basic theoretical preliminaries necessary for a pragmatic analysis of Emphasis have been discussed. The present chapter, which should be regarded as complementary to the preceding ones, will be focusing on the introduction of the two new proposals concerning the most appropriate perspective Emphasis should be put in in natural languages in general and in Arabic in particular.

Having demonstrated the natural linkage between utterance form and pragmatic interpretation through the introduction of a new pragmatic model and the receiver and constative typologies, we are in a position now to take up the concept of Emphasis and subject it to a new theoretical perspective. Two new proposals concerning the most appropriate perspectives Emphasis should be put in will be introduced presently. The chapter will focus mainly on the basic issues that are consequent upon the introduction of the two proposals.

However, before providing the two new proposals, it is worth noting that the inadequacies and confusion characteristic of contemporary studies on Focus and Emphasis have not been wholly unjustified. For example, prominent linguists such as Lyons (1977, 595) and Halliday (1985, 340) argue that the use of "I know...", "I am certain..." and the like, to emphasize one's transmitted proposition, involves a weakening of the speaker's commitment to the veracity of that utterance proposition.

Evidently, these claims, though partly correct, do seem to be either misunderstood or too ambiguous to be understood by those who attempted unsuccessfully to account for Focus and Emphasis (cf. below).
A further reason for such inadequacies, which was critically discussed in the preceding chapter, is clearly attributable to the way Focus and contrastive stress are pragmatically tackled by Grice, Kempson, Sperber and Wilson, to name just a few. Needless to say these vague accounts have similarly kept most of those linguists wondering whether to use the maxim of quantity, relevance, manner or quality to account for Focus and Emphasis.

Furthermore, most contemporary functional studies on Focus and Emphasis have paid special attention to the intonational realizations of Focus and Emphasis at the expense of their syntactic realizations. Only two syntactic realizations of S Emphasis, namely the it-cleft and the pseudo-cleft, have so far been widely researched, though not exhaustively enough to provide us with all the intricacies that are yet to be identified. Others, such as “only” as a carrier of S Emphasis, requiring serious attention, are paraphrastically used to expound the exhaustiveness implicature derivable from the it-cleft and the pseudo-cleft sentences (but cf. Taglicht, 1984). Levinson (1983: 107), on the other hand uses “only” to gloss the generalized conversational implicature drawn from the maxim of Quantity.

Having sketched out some of the reasons for the inadequacies of the accounts of Emphasis, we are now in a position to introduce why Emphasis should be viewed from a different perspective before providing our new proposals.

3.2 EMPHASIS AND ATTITUDE

Generally speaking, language as a linguistic communicative instrument used to exchange ideas, information, etc., is further used as a carrier of our personal emotions and attitudes manifesting connotative implications mapped onto the propositional content of the message. Attitude, according to Katz (1960: 168), is

the predisposition of the individual to evaluate some symbol or object or aspect of his world in a favourable or
unfavourable manner. Opinion is the verbal expression of attitude, but attitudes can also be expressed in non-verbal behaviour. Attitudes include both the affective, or feeling core of liking or disliking, and the cognitive, or belief elements which describe the object of the attitude, its characteristics, and its relation to other objects. All attitudes thus include beliefs, but not all beliefs are attitudes. When specific attitudes are organized into a hierarchical structure, they comprise value system.

Communicatively, the text producer's attitude detectable in terms of the connotative implications concomitant with the propositional content, is normally expected to show his precise attitudinal stance towards the receiver. Each of these implications involve the favourable or unfavourable evaluation of the proposition on the one hand, and the proposition against the receiver's contextual long-term and immediate ideological stance, on the other. For example, it was shown in the preceding chapter, that the text producer can clearly leave his attitudinal fingerprints linguistically mapped onto the propositional content by dispatching the utterance concerned either congruently or incongruently. On a different scale, the text producer may decognize his receiver, who is actually cognizant of p, largely for attitudinal reasons. The demotion and decognizance evidently evince the text producer's positive evaluation of the proposition, and simultaneously his negative evaluation of the receiver's non-verbal communicative contribution to the speech event. It should be realized that the identification of the demotion type is contingent not only upon the specification of the presence or absence of the emphatic features in the structure, but also on the receiver's long-term beliefs and immediate ideological status with relation to the utterance proposition. The use of certain lexico-grammatical elements conveying strong or weak connotative meanings, will certainly give us a clue to the text producer's precise attitude directed towards his material as well as the receiver. Thus, the demotion relatively underlies, for example, the text producer's slight or strong emotional irritation, exasperation, rebuke, etc. identifiable through the applicability of our pragmatic model suggested in chapter two.
However, attitude conveyance may further be implicitly encoded in the message structure, projecting both types of evaluation. For example, a text producer may choose to demote his counter-presuppositional receiver to a presuppositionless one, thus signalling self-confidence in the veracity of his proposition and arrogance towards his receiver, etc. The recognition of the demotion, is, in this case, based on the absence of the relevant emphasizers, whose use was expected by the receiver. The contrastive context of the utterance concerned is thus very hard to detect without prior specification of the wider contextual and co-textual factors involved.

Furthermore, in spoken language, people can similarly express their positive or negative, strong or weak attitudes through tone of voice, which plays a similar role in unravelling the precise intention of our utterance. In written language, however, tone, which can be realized by lexico-grammatical elements placeable on a continuum, seems to represent two extremes: the upper extreme having an upgrading effect and the lower extreme having a downgrading effect. Between the two extremes we can get various degrees of upgrading and downgrading nuances. Emphasis is thus involved in both extremes, revealing the two basic types of tone, (i) upgrading the text producer’s own ideology and views, which, at the same time, implicitly downgrades the receiver’s beliefs and ideological status, and (ii) downgrading the opponent’s views and beliefs, which, at the same time, implicitly upgrades the text producer’s own beliefs and values.

Emphasis, on the other hand, not only reveals the text producer’s strong certainty and commitment towards the possible validity of his proposition but also indicates how sure or confident he is with regard to the veracity of the proposition expressed.

It should be recalled that the use of Emphasis in language has not only a contextual motive but also a psychological one. For example, people who lack self-
confidence have the tendency to use more emphasizers than those who do not. This does not seem to indicate that the former is more certain than the latter. In fact, the over-use of Emphasis may well be indicating truthfulness and strong commitments. A second possible reason is that any lack of self confidence seems to prompt the text producer to over-use Emphasis by unconsciously demoting his receiver almost always from being presuppositionless, or reconfirmation-seeking to being counter-presuppositional. The unintended demotion thus seems to underpin not only a defensive strategy, but also a misconstruction of the suitable contexts for the use of Emphasis. The over-use may further be completely unnecessary from the receiver's point of view if the interlocutors' social relation discloses mutual trust. Ultimately, it is a matter of judging the right context, the field of-discourse and the tenor of discourse that would decide whether or not the use of Emphasis is unnecessary or otherwise.

In the case of the latter type, the tendency to avoid using Emphasis is clearly an indicator of strong self-confidence. For example, demoting a counter-presuppositional receiver to a presuppositionless one is meant to be out of disregard, which simultaneously implies self-confidence. So this strategy, unlike the former type, is likely to express assertiveness tinged with slight arrogance. Contextually, a self-confident text producer is thus most likely to know the occasions whereby Emphasis should be mobilized from his communicative competence. However, it has to be said that the motivation of a confident text producer to avoid Emphasis in a context requiring Emphasis, seems to be primarily psychologically prompted, since avoidance would certainly indicate that the text producer is not so keen to obtain instant persuasion: this does not preclude the possibility of his ultimate aim to achieve at least minimal persuasion through showing self-confidence in the veracity of the proposition expressed. If, however, a self-confident text producer uses Emphasis, it would certainly be both psychologically as well as contextually motivated, because the use of Emphasis
would signal the text producer's concern and eagerness to achieve the receiver's instant agreement and persuasion.

3.3 THE FIRST PROPOSAL

Systemically, the use of Emphasis mainly realizes an interpersonal function, conspicuously reflected by the text producer's personal attitude strung throughout the clause structure. The interpersonal function accounts for two specific sub-components, viz. the interpersonal and the personal. The former accounts for how the text producer maintains social relationships in terms of influencing the behaviour of others and in getting things performed through the use of direct and indirect speech acts accounted for through the system of Mood. The latter, on the other hand, accounts for the text producer's personal attitude which contributes to the utterance meaning through the system of Modality, and to his comment on the utterance content through the use of style and attitudinal disjuncts.

Being largely concerned with the text producer's attitude towards his message and degree of certainty and commitment, Emphasis, I propose, should be treated as a specific realization of Modality in Arabic and possibly in natural languages. Thus, unlike systemic grammar, Emphasizers, following Quirk et al. (1972: 507-20), are to be treated as attitudinal adjuncts to be subsumed in the present research within Modality. Both Emphasis and modality are not only concerned with epistemic opinions and attitudes but with actions as well. Admittedly, the new proposal is not fully unprecedented, as there are sporadic claims expressing dissatisfaction with the types of particles treated as expressions of modality. For example, Holmes (1988: 49) complains in her account of "of course" as an emphatic marker, that neither Perkins (1983) nor Hubler (1983) mention it in their analysis of English modal lexical devices.
The realizational relationship between Modality and Emphasis indicates that the use of Emphasis would generate greater certainty than that of unmarked propositions. In fact, the certainty relayed by the use of Emphasis, from the text producer’s point of view, is intended to bring his synthetic proposition evaluatively closer to analytic or self-evident ones. As was shown in our incongruent typology in chapter two, even analytic propositions can be modally emphasized on certain occasions whereby the receiver’s non-verbal behaviour is incompatible with the analytic proposition expressed and with his long-term ideological values and beliefs.

However, it is worth noting in this respect that Lyons (1977: 595) and Halliday (1985: 340) argue that using expressions like “I am certain”, “certainly”, and the like would weaken the validity of the constative proposition. It was pointed out in chapter two, that both views would be correct if and only if the knowledge of p, not p itself, is being challenged in a particular context. In effect, both linguists seem to confuse the attitudinal adjuncts such as “certainly”, “be certain” and the like, used to emphasize the veracity of p and the knowledge of p. These attitudinal modals can be used either (i) to emphasize that p is certain or certainly occurred, and (ii) to emphasize the text producer’s certain knowledge of p whereby p itself becomes almost irrelevant to the communication intent. We may thus talk about (i) proposition certainty and (ii) knowledge certainty, which both are liable to be challenged by the receiver in discourse. The two types of certainty, though differing in terms of the material emphasized and consequently the communicative aim, can be studied as notions realized by the use of emphasizers as modals. Thus, the certainty expressions used, according to Lyons and Halliday, to weaken the veracity of the proposition conveyed, refer to knowledge certainty not proposition certainty. In fact, their claim seems to have caused some linguists who studied modality, to leave both types of certainty unspecified. For example, Palmer (1986: 87) claims that
[as regards declaratives], it is belief rather than knowledge which is usually to be assumed.

No further specification of both types has been advanced by Palmer. In addition, Holmes, (1988: 54) similarly, criticizing Halliday for his claim

we only say we are certain when we are not (340),

counter-argues that

speakers often assert their confidence in the validity of a proposition not because they themselves regard it as uncertain and in need of validation, but rather to reassure a real or even putative, doubting addressee.

Palmer, (1986: 28-9), too, disagreeing with Lyons’ claim that there is no epistemically stronger statement than a categorical assertion and that the fact of introducing “must”, “necessarily”, “certainly”, etc., into the utterance has the effect of making our commitment to the factuality of the proposition explicitly dependent upon our perhaps limited knowledge, similarly counter-argues that

this seems not wholly true because] “certainly” is often used to emphasize the commitment over and above what would be indicated by a simple declarative.

Palmer (87) provides the following example in which expressions of the speaker’s commitment such as “certainly” do not necessarily weaken the proposition:

A. John is at home.
B. I do not think so.
A. Oh yes he certainly is.

The example evidently refers to proposition certainty, and hence is stronger than that of an unmarked constative.

Palmer further adds that
the form typically used for the declarative is used in many languages in clauses where it does not indicate any kind of commitment by the speaker. It is used in subordinate sentences where the main verb clearly indicates that the speaker does not accept the proposition: (I wonder if John is coming). This is equally found with languages with mood where the indicative is used.

Palmer, unlike Lyons, correctly concludes that

the declarative is not the strongest epistemically, but may, perhaps, be epistemically unmarked, the expression of a proposition with no direct indication of its epistemic status. Rather, it simply 'presents' the proposition for the hearer, generally for acceptance.

Although Palmer's claim is presumably correct if the non-modalized declaratives are congruently used, it falls short of referring to the incongruent use of the same declaratives, i.e. de-modalized, illustrated in our typologies in chapter two.

However, both Holmes's argument and Palmer's example rightly illustrate the fact that emphatic constative propositions, contrary to Halliday and Lyons's argument, are stronger than unmarked ones. Hence emphatic assertions should not be placed on a par with those expressing epistemically hypothetical necessity and possibility such as "must" and "may" (cf. below). However, the constatives and mutual knowledge typologies which specify both constatives in terms of beliefs and knowledge of p, given in chapter two, would, in this respect, be essentially setting things right. The new proposal, on the other hand, will certainly help us both understand the notion of certainty, and view Emphasis through an attitudinal perspective rather than a purely linguistic one.

3.4 THE SECOND PROPOSAL

The second proposal concerns the actual role Emphasis plays to link the validity of the constative proposition to the text producer's reliability. The question to be taken into account in this respect is why do we use or rely on Emphasis? We have seen in our
critical reference to some prominent linguists' pragmatic analysis of contrastive stress how they use the wrong maxims to account for not only contrastive stress assignment but some other controversial linguistic cases as well.

Contrary to these accounts, I would like to propose that the most appropriate perspective suitable for Emphasis is to treat it as a specific realization of evidential modality. In other words, there is an inherent correlation between Emphasis and evidentiality if Emphasis is used in contexts which presuppose the receiver's existential scepticism or counter-presupposition. Pragmatically, the use of Emphasis as such can be accounted for straightforwardly through the submaxims of quality as well as the submaxims of Emphasis concerned. As far as I am aware, I have not come across a single example of Emphasis accounted for through the submaxims of quality. For example, the first submaxim of quality, though correct, is used by those linguists to account predominantly for cases of ironies and sarcastic remarks (cf. for example, Grice, 1975: 53 and 1978: 123-5, and Levinson, 1983: 109). According to our model, however, some cases of ironies and the like can be treated as a consequence of exploiting the maxim of content congruence by flouting the submaxim of quality concerned and the submaxim of being as informative as required; if a mutually known proposition is specificationally emphasized, the implicatural inference derivable represents the opposite of the actual proposition expressed; being tautological infringes the maxim of content congruence, and emphasizing tautologies specificationally infringes the first submaxim of Emphasis by demoting a receiver who is cognizant of \( p \) to being non-cognizant of \( p \) (cf. the use of “innamaa”, (only) in chapter 6).

Thus, to answer the question above, people, in contexts of scepticism and counter-presupposition, should be able to produce evidence that is likely to help put their views vigorously. There are several types of evidential means, namely sensory, quotative and emphatic evidentials, which people can have at their disposal in order to
warrant the veracity of their propositions. For example, the choice of using Emphasis in such controversial contexts may be due to the irrelevancy or absence of the other two. Or perhaps people opt for Emphasis in order to conceal the identity of the source of their information. Sometimes, people may use Emphasis together with a quotative evidential to modalize a single constative used in actual exchange of information and ideas (cf. multiple Emphasis in chapter 4).

In order to demonstrate the inherent correlation between Emphasis and evidentiality which is to be used in contexts of denial, consider the following use of Emphasis. For example, oath, being the strongest emphatic realization of certainty used to emphasize synthetic propositions, is always employed as evidence to signal the degree of commitment toward the validity of our proposition in a given verbal communication. Judicially, it is a generally known fact that court discourses always commence by swearing eye-witnesses to the truth of their testimony in order for their possibly sensory or quotative evidence to be true. In other words, “swearing”, (i.e. Oath), is used as evidence for the validity of the eye-witnesses’ discourses whose source of information may be based on sensory or quotative evidence. Using Emphasis as such clearly shows the right perspective in which Emphasis should be put particularly if it is conjoined with other types of evidentiality, on the one hand, and with the second submaxim of quality, on the other.

Modally, the relationship between modality and evidentiality is one of realization in Palmer’s epistemic modality system. Evidentiality realizes a sub-system of epistemic modality which expresses the certainty of the proposition concerned. However, Emphasis as a discrete evidential epistemic realization is not included in Palmer’s system, which recognizes sensory and quotative realizations of evidentiality only. In order to show the place of Emphasis within the epistemic system let us move on to discuss Palmer and Halliday’s accounts of Modality first.
3.5 PALMER'S ACCOUNT OF MODALITY

According to Palmer, modality in English falls into three kinds: Epistemic, Deontic and Dynamic. Epistemic modality is classified into two sub-systems: Judgement and Evidentials. The former is further sub-classified into Inference and Confidence. Inference subsumes Assumptive and Speculative judgements, and Confidence subsumes Deductive judgement. By contrast, Evidentials are classified into Sensory and Quotative modals. The following figure roughly represents Palmer's epistemic modality system (95):

Figure 1. Epistemic Modality Typological System

Epistemic-Modality

- Judgement- [Confidence Deductive]
- [Inference-Assumptive Speculative]
- Evidentials
  - Sensory
  - Quotative

Palmer provides a typology, whereby wh-interrogatives, emphatic affirmation and counter assertion are treated as a matter of discourse. However, he admits that emphatic affirmation and counter assertion may be treated as a kind of strong epistemic modality expressing complete confidence in, or knowledge of, what is being said (92).

Similarly, with the interrogatives, Palmer (30-1) admits that

the interrogative may or may not fall formally, within a system of epistemic modality (92).

In Arabic, the interrogative formally shares the same mood as the declarative if it only contains an imperfective in the structure. In Arabic rhetoric, however, the interrogative shares the functional characteristic of being futuristically directive with other types of deontic modality such as imperative, desiderative, etc. However, the present research will not make any attempt to decide whether the interrogative is
epistemic, discoursal or deontic, although a fairly detailed discussion on rhetorical questions in Arabic will be provided in chapter five. It must be emphasized that not only the declarative can be emphatically modalized, but the interrogative, imperative, etc. as well (cf. below).

As regards confidence, some linguists seem to associate confidence with the epistemic “must” (cf. Coates, 1983); a fact which is yet another inconclusive consequence of Halliday and Lyons’ claims with regard to the lesser certainty of the use of the term “certainly” and the like. Others rightly argue that confidence expressed by the epistemic “must” is weaker (i.e. less assured) than that expressed by unmarked, or unmodalized constatives. (cf. Huddleston, 1988: 78-9). In consequence, it would certainly be confusing to use the notion of confidence to label what modals such as “must” express. Of course, confidence is a matter of degree, but in its common sense, confidence should be associated with non-modalized constatives, i.e. Lyons’s categorical assertion, and those evidentially modalized. Confidence expressed by the latter is to be treated in the present research as stronger than that of the former. (cf. below).

3.6. HALLIDAY’S ACCOUNT OF MODALITY

Systemically, Halliday (1985: 340) defines modality as

representing the speaker’s angle, either on the validity of the assertion or on the rights or wrongs of the proposal; in its congruent form, it is an adjunct to a proposition rather than a proposition in its own right.

Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between “yes” and “no” - i.e. the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity. What this implies more specifically will depend on the underlying speech function of the clause. (1) If the clause is an “information” clause (a proposition, congruently realized as indicative), this means either (i) “either yes or no”, i.e. “maybe”; or (ii) “both yes or no”, i.e. “sometimes”; in
other words, either probability or usuality. (2) If the clause is a “goods-&-services” clause (a proposal, which has no real congruent form in the grammar, but by default we can characterize as imperative), it means either (i) “is wanted to”, related to a command, or (ii) “wants to”, related to an offer; in other words, either obligation or inclination. The first type is referred to as Modalization and the second type as Modulation (335).

A third type which, Halliday strictly argues,

is not a kind of modality (since it is not an intermediate degree of polarity), though closely related to, is “potentiality”, i.e. Palmer’s dynamic. [But] since grammatically it belongs with modality, we can treat it as a further distinct type; and recognize subjective orientation (implicit only), realized as “can”, and objective orientation, with the implicit realized as “is able to” and the explicit realized as “it is possible (for...)” (339)

Our bone of contention with Halliday’s claim concerns “must” certainty, and the area between “yes” and “no”, which represents modality. Halliday is extremely vague as to whether the “yes” area refers only to synthetic or analytic propositions or both. According to Lyons (1977: 787), propositions are divided into

propositions that are contingently true or false, (synthetic propositions), and propositions that are either necessarily true in all possible worlds, analytic propositions or tautologies, or necessarily false, contradictions.

In Palmer’s account of modality both types of propositions seem to have been left vague too. Earlier we argued that analytic propositions can similarly be emphatically modalized in a given context, and must therefore, be accounted for in any modality system (cf. below).

3.7 MODALITY AND OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES

The notion of “possible world” is central to any study of modality. According to Priore: 1957 cited in Perkins, 1983: 7), the notion
subsumes the status of a particular world, real or imagined, at different points in time. The actual world itself represents just one of an infinite set of possible worlds.

Perkins explains (10) that

if I believe that "Acupuncture cures acne" is true relative to my set of personal beliefs. It may not be true according to the tenet of western medical science, but that is another matter. Similarly in deontic modality, if I am summoned to appear in court on account of some misdemeanour, according to British law my appearance cannot but occur. I may choose to flaunt the law and stay at home, but this does not alter the fact that relative to the laws of the country I 'must' appear.

Ideologically, Modality is a fertile area through which the text producer's ideology can be voiced. The ideological plane, Fowler (1986: 131-4), points out, may be manifested (i) directly, indicating his/her judgements and beliefs via modal structures: modality is the grammar of explicit comment by which people express their degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition and their views on the desirability or otherwise of the states of affairs referred to, and (ii) indirectly, through the use of transitivity, circumlocutions, personal pronouns, deictic words, lexical classification, reference, etc.

Subjectivity too is normally associated with modality. According to Lyons (1982: 102), subjectivity refers to

the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent's expression of himself and of his own attitudes and beliefs.

As such, subjectivity indicates the text producer's degree of involvement or intrusion in his utterance and the speech event through the use of emphatic evidentiality such as oath formulations which are qualitatively stronger than the residual emphatic modals. It can thus be argued that the more certain you sound the more subjective you become towards your proposition and receiver. Similarly, contrastive Emphasis
indicates stronger subjectivity than that of Emphasis proper. By contrast, deductive and speculative epistemic modality indicate less subjectivity than unmarked utterances, which in turn indicate less subjectivity than Evidential epistemic utterances.

To conclude, I have been discussing the most appropriate ways of analysing Emphasis in Arabic and indeed in other natural languages. Two new proposals have been advanced through which Emphasis is put in completely new perspectives. Thus, Emphasis can be treated as the text producer's evidence for the reliability of his information and for his strong commitment to the effect of the certainty of his proposition. Emphasis arguably is truly reminiscent of Searle's Promises and commissives in speech acts theory, whereby the text producer commits himself to future actions, while in the case of relying on Emphasis and other evidentiary realizations he commits himself to the truth of his propositions. Not only has a brief reference to two contemporary accounts of modality been made but to several other issues related to the analysis of modality as well.

3.8 MODALITY IN ARABIC

This section will mainly be concerned with sketching out a comprehensive typology for modality in Arabic in general, and the place of Emphasis as a realization of evidential epistemic modality in particular. First a brief word on the standing of modality in classical and contemporary Arabic linguistics is in order.

Modality as an independent grammatical topic seems to be alien to Arabic grammar, and most modals have therefore been given a sporadic treatment by being scattered over sharply unrelated topics on the basis of sharing the same syntactic governance force. Treated as such, modality is thus one of the many casualties that had to be sacrificed at the hands of the formal grammar. However, in philosophy, modality has in fact received a much broader and systematic logical treatment, which is
Unfortunately too sophisticated to be highlighted briefly here. (cf. for example as-Sakkaakii, re-ed. 1983: 455-8). In rhetoric, most of the realizations of epistemic and deontic modality characterized as constatives and directive performatives respectively, are analysed in terms of direct and indirect speech acts. Linguists such as Qudaama (re-ed. 1982: 45-6) among others, have dropped sporadic hints to the effect that

an affirmative and/or negative constative can be either necessarily true, such as “Fire burns”, necessarily false, such as “Snow burns”, or possibly true, or probably true, such as “Zayd stood up”. (my translation)

Al-Juzjaanii (re-ed. 1983: 88) in turn provides a very interesting remark concerning the use of rhetorical questions to invalidate the text producer’s disputable claims of ability, future actions and of epistemic possibility. He thus argues that

إذا و إن كنا نشعر الاستعفاء في مثل هذا بالإنكار، فإن الذي هو محض العين أتاه ليتنبه الساعِ و ليس بحاجة إلى نفسه، فيجعل و يرتدع و يعي بالحوار، إما لأنه قد أدعى الأعدة على فعل لا يقدر عليه، فإذا ضيده قبل له: فافعل، ففيضمه ذلك. وإما لأنه هم بأن يفعل ما لا يستجوب فعله، فإذا رفع عليه متى بيدهم، و عرف أنفسهم. و أما لأنه جوز و يوجد أمر لا يوجد مثله، فإذا ضيده على قبضه و بعى على تعنته و فليل له: فارنه في موضوع و في حال و أقم شاهدا على أنه كان في وقت.

(...even if we have characterized this type of interrogation [rhetorical questions] in terms of denial, the intended meaning would be (i) to correct the receiver’s blatantly false claim to be able to do X; if he insisted, then he should be told to prove it, (ii) to re-direct the receiver who is about to do something wrong; if he is challenged, he may realize his mistake and consequently abstain from doing it, or (iii) correct the receiver’s false claim that something possibly exists; if he insisted, he should be reproached by being told to provide sensory evidence or an eyewitness account of such a possibility.)

(my translation)

It is worth noting from such a quotation that al-Juzjaanii seems to interpret the provision of, and request for evidence as a possible way of reproaching our interlocutor under these circumstances provided in the quotation above. This may well be true if the
requested evidence is intended to inform the text producer that his utterance neither conforms with reality nor with belief, while the provision of the evidence requested under these circumstances is intended to inform the receiver that the text producer’s utterance does conform with reality and/or belief.

Contemporarily, on the other hand, the only two studies available to me, that claim to tackle modality satisfactorily in MSA, are Abdel-Hamid’s (1972) and Zayed’s (1983). Unfortunately, none of these studies has been adequately comprehensive, let alone accurate. Abdel-Hamid, adopting a Transfer Grammar approach, accounts for a range of modals by attempting to identify Arabic modals as equivalents to their English modal counterparts. Unfortunately, his account is not only far from being accurate but falls short of highlighting the importance of moods as well. Consider the following example in which he uses a wrong deductive modal, viz. ‘laa budda”, (must be), as the Arabic counterpart of “will” which expresses assumptive modality in English:

أَعْتَقِدْ أَنَّ هَذَا لَا بُدُّ هُوُ الْمَفتَحِ.
A’taqidu, anna haadhaa laa budda huwa ’l-miftaahu.
(I)-think, that this must be it the-key.
This, I think, will be the key.

Similarly, Zayed, who provides a pragmatic account of modality in Arabic, limits himself to only eight modals, four modal verbs and four modal particles. The restriction is unfortunate, however, as it is bound to suffer from lack of exhaustiveness and consequently accuracy. Having been contemporarily uncharted, modality in Arabic seems 80 precarious that any account would certainly be inaccurate if it is not comprehensive. A second serious gap is that Zayed too, falls short of discussing the mood systems in Arabic and the correlation they have with modality. It was pointed out in chapter one that, apart from the indicative mood, the remaining moods are in fact modal variations of that tense’s basic form represented by the indicative. In addition, Zayed’s third mistake, which is unfortunately quoted by Palmer (1986: 61), is that he
wrongly uses the modal “rubbamaa”, (may or might), to express epistemic necessity with the perfective, whereas its correct meaning sanctioned by common use is epistemic possibility with the perfective and the imperfective. Palmer, accordingly points out that the form used to mean “may”, “rubbamaa”, with the imperfect tense [as in 1] can mean “must” with the perfect [ in 2]. Consider:

1. rubbamaa ybatasa Zaydun
   may smile Zeid
   Zeid may smile

2. rubbamaa’ btasama Zaydun
   must smiled Zeid
   Zeid must have smiled

Using “rubbamaa” with the perfective to express epistemic necessity in 2 clearly misrepresents the correct use of the sanctioned meaning of the modal. Thus the correct rendering of the modal in 2, is “may have” or “might have”, Not “must have”.

Regrettably, the present research focuses only on realizations of Emphasis as a means of evidential modality in Arabic. The most important point to remember, however, is that in any account of linguistic issues in Arabic, reference must be made to classical linguistic literature if the account is intended to be thorough and exhaustive. As far as am I am aware, the majority of western-educated Arab linguists seem to have forgotten this fact, which has consequently led to the superficiality of their coverage and the conclusions they reached. For example, the two preceding studies have been completely unaware of the two rhetorical topics, namely Exhortative, التحضيض , and Requestive, الالعرض , which are not only closely related to deontic modality, but are used to express less politeness and politeness respectively in MSA and in the Iraqi dialect as well. Let us turn next to our general account of modality in Arabic.

Modality in systemic grammar is defined by (Halliday, 1970: 335) as
a form of participation by the speaker into the speech event. Through modality, the speaker associates with the thesis an indication of its status and validity in his own judgment; he intrudes, and takes up a position.

Systemically, the modality systems, which concern the text producer’s assessment of the truth of his message, depend on the text producer’s choice of the term declarative from the mood systems. Having chosen the term declarative, the clause makes another choice from the modality systems between modality neutral and modality assessed. If modality assessed is selected, the clause may choose Emphasis proper S Emphasis or De-emphasis if the term emphatic evidentials is chosen from the systems of evidential epistemic. If, however, modality neutral is chosen, the clause may choose unmarked Focus.

Typologically, following Palmer’s (1979,1986) typology of modality, modality can similarly be classified in Arabic into three basic categories: (i) Epistemic, (ii) Deontic and (iii) Dynamic.

3.8.1 Epistemic Modality

Epistemic modality can be defined as the text producer’s assessment of his utterance proposition by qualifying them explicitly or implicitly as possible, probable, necessary, evidential, etc. The definition obviously has been extended to cover the text producer’s implicit modal qualification of his utterance in conjunction with some of the demotions of the incongruent typology of constative provided in chapter two. The demotions concern three specific occasions: firstly, by demoting a receiver from being counter-presuppositional to being presuppositionless; secondly, by demoting a receiver from being reconfirmation-seeking to being presuppositionless, and thirdly, by demoting a receiver from being cognizant of p to being presuppositionless. The three demotions are likely to induce the use of three de-modalized constatives, i.e. implicitly modalized, contextually distinguishable from neutral non-modalized constatives. The third demotion, on the other hand, clearly requires the involvement of analytic
propositions as de-modalized constatives in any epistemic modality system. As was illustrated in our incongruent typologies, tautologies can further be explicitly modally emphasized if the receiver is demoted to a different status in certain specific contexts.

In this respect, Givon (1982, 24), in his propositional typology of modalities, argues that at the bottom of propositional/sentential modalities lies the implicit contract between speaker and hearer, a contract specifying three types of propositions:

(i) propositions which are to be taken for granted, via the force of diverse conventions, as unchallengeable by the hearer and thus requiring no evidentiary justification by the speaker,

(ii) propositions that are asserted with relative confidence, are open to challenge by the hearer and thus require - or admit - evidentiary justifications; and finally

(iii) propositions that are asserted with doubts, as hypotheses, and are thus beneath both challenge and evidentiary substantiation. They are, in terms of the implicit communicative contract, "not worth the trouble".

In his commentary on Givon's propositional typology, Palmer (1986:53) argues that

type (i) refers to declaratives, (ii) and (iii) to evidentials and judgments respectively.

However, as far as type (i) is concerned, it is not clear whether Palmer's declaratives are meant to express analytic or synthetic propositions. Treating unchallengeable propositions as declaratives, Palmer does not seem to be consistent with his claim concerning the fact that the declarative is not the strongest epistemically (28-9). Probably, such vagueness may yet be another consequence of Lyons's shaky claim whereby

there is no epistemically stronger statement than a categorical assertion [unmarked Focus] (1977:809).
In the present research, declaratives expressing analytic propositions will be treated as modally marked in the sense that they are either explicitly or implicitly modalized for Emphasis; dispatching tautologies in a speech event is meant to flout the submaxim of being as informative as required by decognizing a receiver, who is already cognizant of p, hence modally qualified.

With regards to the distribution of epistemic propositions along the certainty scale, analytic propositions, which express absolute certainty, occupy a point at the top of the scale, i.e. Givon’s type (i); next below is situated evidential synthetic propositions, which express slightly less certainty than analytic propositions, i.e. Givon’s type (ii); next below on the centre of the scale, unmodalized synthetic propositions, which express slightly less certainty than evidentials, are to be placed. At a point below unmodalized synthetic propositions lie hypothetical propositions, which express certainty with doubts, as hypotheses, i.e. Givon’s Type (iii); on the lowest extreme of the scale, contradictions, which are false in all possible worlds, are to be placed. Thus we may have the following certainty scale illustrated in figure 2 below.

Consider:
The scale clearly shows that the higher we go up the scale the stronger the certainty of the communicated proposition becomes. The increase in certainty degree is concurrent with the increase of the text producer’s degree of commitment towards, and confidence in the veracity of his utterance proposition.

In the case of implicitly modalized synthetic propositions, they can be construed from the text producer’s point of view as unchallengeable. In effect, when the text producer conveys an unmodalized synthetic proposition in a context requiring a modalized one, he may do so in the sense that his proposition should be taken is too unchallengeable to be emphatically modalized. The text producer simply presents his implicitly modalized constative as so evaluatively truthful that it does not require any emphatic evidentials. This, as we referred to sporadically in this chapter, will account for a great number of messages delivered in contexts that require modalized propositions, which are in reality challengeable.

Moreover, in conjunction with the certainty scale, Epistemic modality may subsume the following types of propositions:

(i) analytic propositions, which express absolute certainty, and are implicitly or explicitly emphasized to be used incongruently,

(ii) evidential propositions, which subsume sensory, emphatic and quotative evidentials; emphatic evidentials will further be sub-classified into Emphasis proper, which will be discussed in chapter five, and S Emphasis to be discussed in chapter six. A discussion on Evidentiality in Arabic will be provided in chapter five.

(iii) unmarked synthetic propositions, which are non-modalized statements,
Hypothetical judgments, which cover Speculative, Assumptive and Deductive judgment; in Arabic, hypothetical propositions make use of a number of modal particles and modal verbs together with their derivations in order to express speculative, assumptive and deductive judgment. The uses of the modal verbs and their derivations in the clause structure, bear so much syntagmatic resemblance with one another that they can be systematically described with great simplicity. Unfortunately, it will be beyond the limits set up for the present research to provide a brief account of the use of such verbs and their derivations. (v) propositions, which are necessarily false in all possible worlds.

To conclude: I have been discussing some essential issues relevant to Modality in Arabic and to the aim of the present research. The account covered an outline of how modality in Arabic is analysed by classical and contemporary linguists, and the certainty scale necessary for Emphasis and other types of epistemic propositions. However, the discussion did not include specifying the precise place of Emphasis within the sub-system of evidentiality as it will be provided in chapter five.

3.8.2 Deontic Modality

This section is an attempt to show briefly the relation which Emphasis seems to have with the realizations of deontic modality as well as to highlight two realizations of deontic modality, namely requestive and exhortative, in Arabic. In the case of the former, it must be recalled that not only constatives can be modally emphasized but directive performatives as well. In the case of the latter, both topics, which have been left unnoticed, show how Arabic uses directive utterances to communicate polite and slightly less polite requests respectively.

Deontic modality is basically concerned with the necessity and possibility of non-factual future actions yet to be performed by the receiver or the text producer himself.
ry and possible actions, which are characterized as directive and subjective, associated with the text producer’s will, intention, want and desire to have formed. Thus, deontic modality, in its wider sense, include those types of what are characterized by Jespersen (1924: 320) as “containing an element of timer, 1986: 96) such as Jussive, Compulsive, Obligative, Advisory, Precative, ive, Promissive, Optative, Desiderative, Intentional, etc. Apart from the active, directive performatives represent the basic realizations of deontic modality.

As regards Emphasis, the question to be asked should be: Are there any sceptical or counter-directive actions on the part of the receiver which motivate the text to issue re-directive deontic utterances? And if so, how can a text producer be certain about non-factual future actions that he is willing to use Emphasis in order to make sure that the desired actions will be fulfilled? Willett (1988: 52) in this respect, tentatively argues that evidentiality is apparently confined to epistemic modality only. The picture is clear enough to establish the fact that evidential distinctions are part of the marking of epistemic modality, even though evidentials as such are seldom explicitly mentioned in the theoretical treatments of modality.

However, unlike Willett’s argument, it was pointed out, in our congruent and incongruent typologies of constatives and receivers, that the receiver’s verbal and/or non-verbal contextual contribution prompts the text producer to use a constative to be dispatched either congruently or incongruently. Similarly, the text producer may, for a reason, use a non-emphatic performative rather than a constative to re-direct the receiver towards fulfilling a certain course of desirable actions. It is perfectly possible to point out, for example, that people sometimes have the tendency to flout the agreed norms of a specific situation, instructions, etc., which prompt the use of certain types of deontic utterances. Sometimes, they issue an emphatic directive utterance to express strong commitment towards making sure of the fulfilment of the action concerned. In other
contexts, Emphasis may well be used to show our strong desire to see the receiver fulfil the action, whose effects are beneficial to the receiver himself.

Furthermore, in Arabic rhetoric, Abbaas (1985: 152) argues that

in performatives we do not use Emphasis if the action desired is likely to happen. If, however, it is unlikely, then Emphasis can be used to minimize such unlikelihood. (my translation)

In classical rhetoric, al-Jurjaanii (149-50), unlike Willett, argues, along the same vein, that

Counter-directivity may concern futuristic actions. (my translation)

Al-Jurjaanii’s claim has been contextually illustrated in his quotation given in the preceding section, which explains the use of rhetorical questions to counter-argue a preceding deontic utterance. Al-Jurjaanii (1983: 96) further demonstrates that commissive performatives can be dispatched emphatically by the text producer when the receiver, who had sought, for example, help, was let down by other friends. Consider:

\begin{verbatim}
ANAA u’qika. I give-you. (I will give you.)
\end{verbatim}

Al-Jurjaanii explains that using the pronoun “I” with extra intonation would make this commissive utterance a realization of Emphasis proper to be used for eliminating the receiver’s scepticism. Similarly, we can use the same example contrastively as a counter-directive in a situation where the receiver does not seem to find help. Consider:

\begin{verbatim}
A qiyaaman wa qad qa’ada ’l-naasu? Mustn’t you stand up while everybody is sitting?
\end{verbatim}
The element “qiyaaman”, (standing), functioning as a cognate adverbial, is normally used to express the Range of the main lexical verb in constatives and performatives. It can further be used incongruently in elliptical, as in this example, or non-elliptical in interrogatives to implicate an emotionally strong indirect mand. Using interrogatives to produce indirect speech acts as the example above which can be used by a father addressing his son in a ritual situation, where everybody should sit down, is termed by Sadock (1970) “Whimperative”. The implicature of this interrogative is to order as well as to reproach the receiver for flouting the norms of that situation, i.e counter-directive. Accordingly, the above example can be interpreted deontically, i.e. obligation, as (you must not keep standing up while everybody is sitting).

Furthermore, in speech acts theory, a commissive can be thought of as a realization of evidential deontic, signalling the text producer’s genuine intentionality to perform his promise. However, the performance of the action required can be non-emphatically stated if the text producer possesses some authority.

There are contexts, in which the text producer may use Emphasis as evidence for true feelings and emotions. For example, Quirk et al. (1985, 833) note that

a positive imperative can be made more persuasive or insistent by adding “do” (with nuclear tone) before the verb. “Do” reinforces the positive sense of the imperative, as in: Do have some more tea.

Quirk et al. (1985: 1414) treat

the persuasive “Do” in imperatives as a means of giving a unit purely emotive Emphasis.

In addition, if it is possible to use Emphasis in deontic modality as evidential, as is obvious by now, what about the other types of evidentiality, namely, Quotative and Sensory Evidentials. The latter seems to be linguistically possible if the text producer intends to see to the fulfilment of the action stated personally. Thus he may be able to
say that "I will see to it" which means he will make sure that a certain course of action will be performed.

Quotative deontic modality, on the other hand, can grammatically be realized either as direct or indirect speech, i.e. reported speech. Both types of realization can be evidentially modalized by quoting the source of deontic utterances. Consider the following reported direct mand, whose original tone and spirit can be preserved:

Al-amiiru yaquuIu ‘shaqua ‘l-a’daa’ a sahqan.  
The-prince says crush the-enemy severely!  
(The prince says, “Crush the enemy severely”!

The same mand can be reported indirectly. Consider:

Al-amiiru ya’murukum an tashqua ‘l-a’daa’ a sahqan  
The-prince orders-you to crush the-enemy severely.  
(The prince orders you to crush the enemy severely.)

Both illustrations clearly express the prince’s emotionally strong order grammatically realized by the imperative mood in the first, and the complementizer “an” (that) and the subjunctive mood of the imperfective in the second. The directives further make use of the Range “sahqan”, (severe crushing), whose function is to modally emphasize the Range of the order (cf. chapter 5). In both cases, the the source of authority, who is socially of a higher rank, is eligible to issue orders.

It follows then that emphatic evidentials can be used to modalize deontic utterances in order to express various attitudinal nuances concomitant with the actual directive performatives. It can also be said in advance, for example, that some of the S emphasizers can further be used to emphatically modify directive performatives.

Having very briefly touched upon some of the realizations of evidential deontic modality, let us turn next to the two important directive performatives used to express politeness in Arabic.
3.8.2.1 The Requestive and the Exhortative

Relevant to any study of deontic modality as directive performatives are the requestive and the exhortative directive, which both have unfortunately suffered from being left unnoticed by some contemporary linguists. To relay maximal and minimal politeness in Arabic, the two directives mobilize a range of interrogative particles prefixed to the negative particle, “laa”, (not), to express different shades of deontic meanings. However, the deontic modal verbs together with their derivations, which can similarly be used to express politeness in requestive utterances, are observationally used more predominantly than those particles in MSA for one simple reason; pedagogically, the particles of both topics have not been highlighted enough in contemporary Arabic grammar and rhetoric. In fact, the modal verbs and their derivations are used in classical Arabic rhetoric as explanatory paraphrases to simplify and elucidate the meanings of those particles.

Both the requestive and the exhortative are distinctive ways of performing requests and exhortations not only in MSA but in Iraqi dialects as well. Systemically, the functional tenor of the former is to request very politely, while the functional tenor of the latter is to exhort. The personal tenor of the former, on the other hand, is being formal, whereas the personal tenor of the latter is being informal. Both types of acts can normally be used to address a second person singular, dual, or plural. They can also be used to address a first or third person singular.

3.8.2.1.1 Requestive Acts

A requestive act is defined as:

طلب الشيء بلين و رفيق و تهذيب.
A polite and gentle way used to request something.

(Al-Juraanii argues that requestives are semantically close to desiderative, in that the text producer politely requests the receiver to do something.
possibly desirable to both interlocutors. In effect he wishes the receiver to consider the advantages of the action expressed by his request. Polite requests, which indicate that the text producer does not have the authority to enforce compliance, should be differentiated from suggestions, which normally show the text producer’s slight care. Requestives can, in addition, socially be made from a situation of subordinancy, whereby they become closer to pleas, though it is not necessarily so.

Realizationally, Arabic uses the modals, لَا, "الا"; أَمَا, "amaa", and, "law", which always introduce a Verbal clause functioning as a polite requestive utterance. Structurally, the imperfective of the Verbal clause preceded by these modals, remains indicative because the modals, Arabic grammar argues, do not have any governing power. Hence requestive utterances may provide a grammatical explanation of their closeness to interrogatives rather than imperatives. Similarly, as-Sakkaakii (153) argues that

requestive acts are structurally similar to interrogatives but functionally requestives.

Consider the following example from Cantarino (1974: 139, vol. i):

قلْنَا لَا تبكِينَ عَلَى أُهْلِ بَيْتِكَ؟
Quinna alaa tabkiyanna 'alaa ahli bayliki
(They said, ‘Why not! cry-you for your-relatives)
or
(They said, “Why do you not cry for your relatives?”)

It must be stated that requestive utterances are so complicated that it is even impossible to rely on any translation suggested for them. It is thus important to distinguish between pleas, suggestions, requests, hints, etc. before the provision of any possible translation from and into Arabic. The above scanty account is meant to be a first step towards further studies that may pin down the distinctions between such acts.
3.8.2.1.2 Exhortative Acts

Exhortative is defined as, طلب الشيء بخش و تأكيم و إراعة.

an emphatic and persistent way used to ask for something. (my translation)

The sense of urgency expressed by exhortatives, apparently brings them closer to, or perhaps they can be thought of as demands, which do not indicate any institutionalized power over the receiver, as is the case with imperatives.

The modals used to introduce an exhortative act in MSA are: لولا “lawlaa”; Lawmaa”; Alla “allaa”; هلما “hallaa”, and, alam. The first two are composed of a conditional element prefixed to a negative element, while the last three are composed of a yes/no interrogative element prefixed to a negative element. The inclusion of the negative element in these modals suggests that they functionally show many affinities to rhetorical questions.

Exhortative modals are used to precede either an imperfective or perfective in the clause structure. Only in the case of the former, the modals yield exhortation or demand for future actions. Consider:

Lawlaa tajtahidu لولا ختهد ؟
Won’t (you)-work-hard-ind.
(Won’t you work hard?) or (Shouldn’t you work hard?)

If, by contrast, the modals precede a perfective, the meaning will convey reproach or blame for failure to carry out desirable past actions. In this case, they become similar to rhetorical questions in implicating a “should have...” statement. Consider the following example drawn from Cantarino (1974:141, vol.i):

Hallaa tashabbahtu anaa biwaalidi Hallaا تشبهت آنا بوالدي ؟
Why-not-should to-be-like-ind I my father.
(Why didn’t I try to be like my father?)
Similarly, the translation of exhortative acts requires carefulness and accuracy as it is too precarious to try to find the right rendering without prior understanding of both structures in both languages.

To sum up: I have been discussing several types of deontic modality in Arabic. It has been shown that our proposals concerning the treatment of Emphasis as a realization of evidential modality can be extended to cover deontic modality as well. It has also been shown that the two important deontic realizations, namely the requestive and the exhortative acts, which are ignored by some contemporary Arab linguists, should be given a proper account within modality in Arabic.

3.8.3 Dynamic Modality

Dynamic modality is concerned with two subtypes: (i) the ability or volition of the subject of the sentence and (ii) modality neutral (circumstantial) indicating what is possible or necessary in the circumstances. What is the main concern of the present section is to see whether or not emphatic evidentials can be used to modalize dynamic utterances as well.

In our commentary on al-Jurjaanii's quotation given in our discussion on modality in Arabic above, it was pointed out that rhetorical questions can be used to repudiate what looked like our interlocutor's modally dynamic false claim expressing ability to do X, and how if he insisted upon such a false claim, he was told to prove it. The situation obviously requires the use of Emphasis to qualify dynamic utterances modally particularly the use of S emphasizers such as rhetorical questions, to repudiate contrastively false claims of ability to do X. In this respect, Palmer (1990: 95, 2nd. ed), who argues that

"Could" occurs where there is a meaning of "nothing but", "no-one else", "only" even though there is formally no negative present.
provides the following examples:

1. One moment I seem to be everything to him, and then all he could think of was this child.
2. The crowd of 50,000 could only leave the ground shaking their heads in silent disbelief.
3. She was the only one who could help.

Palmer explains that

there appears thus to be a Focus of attention on the modality, whereas in the examples where 'could' would not be used the focus of attention is more on the actuality itself.

Palmer (91) further argues that

as far as negating the event of a dynamic utterance is concerned, it is perhaps possible to negate the event by using emphatic "not".

Consider:

We can NOT go.

It is thus clear from these examples that some dynamic utterances can be modalized emphatically as well, and accordingly used in contexts requiring Emphasis proper or S Emphasis. There are certain situations, whereby dynamic modals can be used in the presupposed part of a constative expressing S Emphasis (cf. chapter 6). However, it seems very difficult to envisage a situation in which sensory and quotative evidentials can similarly be of use to dynamic modality except when the receiver challenges the text producer to prove his "ability" to carry out what his dynamic utterance may indicate. Unfortunately, the present research concentrates solely on epistemic modality, and we, therefore, have to skip from this section to the main concern of the present research.
3.9 SUMMARY

The present chapter has been focusing on two important issues, the introduction of two new proposals as to how Emphasis should be viewed, and the consequences of the proposals. It has been shown that Emphasis is best treated as a realization of evidential modality indicating the veracity of the text producer's utterance. The chapter also outlined the possibility of using Emphasis to modally qualify deontic and dynamic utterances. The chapter included a section highlighting two important directive performatives expressing politeness in MSA. In the next chapter, the parameters, accompanying the use of Emphasis, and required to be identified in any functional analysis of Emphasis, will be discussed.
CHAPTER FOUR

4. PARAMETERS OF EMPHATIC EVIDENTIALITY

The present chapter investigates the parameters, whose association with the use of Emphasis yield diverse syntactic and informational structures. These parameters, which include: Given/New; Exhaustiveness; Contrastiveness; Scope of the Emphasis; Presupposition; Emphasis Functions, are so important that any functional analysis of Emphasis necessitates the identification of each of such parameters. Before taking up each of these parameters a word on Multiple Emphasis is in order.

4.1 MULTIPLE EMPHASIS

By Multiple Emphasis we mean the possibility of putting more than one constituent in extra prominence per predication. In our functional typology of the Arabic clause in chapter two, it was illustrated that it is possible to assign unmarked multiple Foci to more than one constituent within a single predication at the ordinary instance level. It is also possible to use more than one lexical and/or grammatical emphatic modal in order to assign extra prominence to the salient and important constituents per predication in written language. Intonationally, the text producer can similarly use Emphasis to assign extra prominence to more than one constituent per clause.

Typologically, Multiple Emphasis is normally associated with S Emphasis in contexts characterized by presuppositional and ideological confrontation. Dik (1981: 47) and Taglicht (1984: 67), in this respect, discuss multiple Focus [Emphasis] in relation to it-clefts, as its use clearly presupposes the receiver’s mistaken and/or intentional counter-presupposition derivable from the preceding discourse. For example, it is possible to use “only” immediately before the emphasized constituent of an it-cleft. Similarly, in Arabic, the word order of a clause preceded by “innamaa” (only), can be changed markedly. Each of these emphasizers are normally used discretely to yield S Emphasis (cf. chapter 6). In order to illustrate how the use of more than one emphaser increases per predication, consider the following piece of dialogue drawn from the
Qur’aan (xxxvi, 13-6), which clearly motivated all classical rhetoricians to build on it in their accounts of Focus and Emphasis. The dialogue is between the messengers of God, i.e. the Envoys, as the text producer, and the idolaters as the receiver. It is a very clear example of how we eventually end up with the use of multiple Emphasis in confrontational dialogues.

The Analysis

The dialogue is an argumentative discourse on the Envoys’ attempt to convert the idolaters to the new religion. The discourse starts with a thesis cited in no. 3 to be
argued through in no. 6 and no. 10. More specifically, the thesis is argued through at three conversational stages, i.e. the first is reported and the subsequent ones represent actual conversation.

At the initial stage the Envoys with a message to convert the idolaters are likely to expect the receivers to be presuppositionless or information-seeking. So the thesis though not verbally explicit in clause no.3, is obviously non-emphatic as it is realized as indirect speech. Similarly, in no. 4, we are told that the receivers had already rejected the message presented as a discourse-initiating unit through the use of indirect speech. We have to bear in mind that the Envoys did not seem to expect to receive an outright refutation as is reported in no. 4. In no. 5, it is reported that a third Envoy was sent to strengthen the first two; the Envoys apparently did not take the idolaters' rejection in no. 4 as deep-rooted or as a strong counter-presupposition. In other words, had the Envoys realized that the idolaters' rejection was strongly held, they would have given up. Since this is not so, then their rejection could only be interpreted as something like "We do not think that...", indicating their unwillingness to question the thesis.

At the second stage, the same thesis, realized this time as direct speech, is predicationally emphasized by the use of the modal “inna” fused with the 1st person plural “we” in no. 6 in order to confront the idolaters' “do not-think-so” presuppositional status retrievable from the previous stage.

It is worth noting that most Arab rhetoricians believe the Nominal clause in no. 6, to be emphatic. However, such a belief does seem to be inaccurate for two reasons: first, the use of Nominal clauses in argumentation is more common than Verbal clauses, and second, the modal “inna” always precedes Nominal and Equational clauses. Thus the only new information in no. 6 is the addition of one emphaser marking the strong attitude and commitment of the Envoys towards what they are saying. Using only one emphaser, therefore, means that the Envoys treated the idolaters, i.e. the receivers, as

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re-confirmation-seeking. But the receivers’ confrontation becomes truly contrastive as clauses no. 7, 8 and 9 show successively. In clauses no. 7 and 9, we have a combination of two emphasizers viz. the Negation/Focusing formula, whereas in no. 8 we have the negative “...min” (at all, any).

What is more important concerning the idolaters’ contrastive statements is the negative tone intended not only to rebut but also to downgrade the truthfulness of the Envoys thesis. Such a tone can clearly be identified if we realize that the idolaters are talking contrastively about mutually known information in clause no. 7, i.e. “you are not but mortals like us”. This particular example, dispatched by the idolaters, i.e. the receivers, clearly shows how analytic propositions can be communicatively used in argumentative contexts. Accordingly, the idolaters have flouted the submaxim of being as informative as required by demoting the Envoys’ cognizance of p to as if being decognizant of p, namely “their being mortals”. The Envoys do not counter-presuppose the fact that they are mortals. However, when they claim to be the Messengers of God, the idolaters think that a messenger of God is expected to be immortal, hence the contrastive use of a mutually known proposition intended to remind the Envoys of such a fact. We will be referring to this example in our discussion on the use of analytic propositions in chapter six.

At the third stage, however, the Envoys use multiple Emphasis to emphasize the whole predication of clause no. 10 by having recourse to the evidential expression, viz. “God knows” as the source of their information, and two further emphatic emphasizers, i.e. “inna” placed immediately after the evidential expression and /la−/ prefixed to the predicate (cf. chapter 5). Clause no. 10 is thus a typical example illustrating the use of multiple Emphasis per predication and how the number of emphasizers increases along with the increase of the receiver’s counter-presupposition.
Informationally, clause no. 10 expresses the same proposition, i.e. the Messengers being sent unto the idolaters, reported indirectly in clauses no. 2 and 3, and directly in clause no. 6. The use of multiple Emphasis to relay contrastiveness is dispatched in compliance with the third submaxim of Emphasis although the analytic proposition conveyed is used incongruently by flouting the submaxim of quantity involved.

So far I have been discussing how the use of more than one emphasizers per predication develops in confrontational situations. What is interesting in the discourse above is the use of analytic and synthetic propositions emphatically, and how the discourse eventually enabled Arab rhetoricians to identify the three basic types of receivers and constatives discussed elaborately in chapter two. What is also of interest in the use of multiple Emphasis is the recognition of various types of emphasizers employed within one predication.

4.2 PARAMETERS OF EMPHASIS

Any use of Emphasis, whether Emphasis proper or specificational Emphasis is likely to involve some parameters whose presence may yield different emphatic structures syntactically and informationally. Reference to such parameters in any functional analysis of Emphasis is crucial in order to specify the role or contribution of each parameter to the specification of the type of Emphasis provided in our congruent and incongruent typologies of receivers and constatives. We will start with the Given/New parameter and its relation to Focus and Emphasis first.

4.2.1 Given/New and Emphasis

In any functional analysis of Emphasis, the question to be raised in terms of the Given/New parameter is: does Emphasis present information which is New and/or Given to the receiver? Undoubtedly the relevance of informational theory to the study of
Emphasis is very closely linked, and various widely familiar studies and papers on Focus have demonstrated how informational theory interacts with Focus and Emphasis.

Before attempting to answer the question above, it should be said that an enormous literature is available on the Given/New informational theory. Some studies treat Given information as synonymous with presupposition in that

Given is information [the speaker] believes the listener already knows and accepts as true and New is information [the speaker] believes the listener does not yet know (Clark & Haviland, 1977: 4).

Others including the present research, apply

Givenness to sentence constituents including their component lexical items and to combinations of these; but it can also apply to whole sentences when these are embedded (Allerton, 1978: 151).

Discrepancies concerning which elements are to be identified as Given and which as New are as contentious among contemporary textlinguists as their respective linguistic trends' theories. There are, however, a number of sporadic insights which seem more promising in helping to solve the problems that have given rise to such discrepancies. Yet again it would lead us far afield if we attempt to discuss these controversial issues. However, restricting our discussion to the way such a theory should be analysed with reference to Halliday’s Given/New theory and that of the Prague school with whom we share some of the views will be more useful. Suffice it to say that, according to Prince (1981: 226), for example,

what is old (Given) for Kuno (1972) is not necessarily Given for Halliday (1967),

and what is Given for Allerton (1978: 166) e.g. what is immediately observable or past experience is New for Chafe (1976). However, since the approach adopted here is systemic, it is necessary to refer critically to Halliday’s informational theory, which intonationally segments the clause structure into a Given/New dichotomy.
According to Halliday, whose account differs noticeably from Firbas and Chafe and many others, information structure forms one of three components characterizing thematic structure within the textual component. The information structure segments spoken discourse into a sequence of information units that are realized by tone groups. An information unit is a process of interaction between what is already known, recoverable or predictable and what is new, non-recoverable, or unpredictable. The unmarked position of these units is that what is Given precedes what is New. What is treated as recoverable may be so because it has been mentioned before, cited in the situation or something that is not around at all but the speaker wants to present as Given for rhetorical purposes. By contrast, what is treated non-recoverable may be something that has not been mentioned or is unexpected, whether previously mentioned or not. Thus, Halliday's Focus, according to Szwedek (1986: 37), carries New information, New not in the sense that it can not have been previously mentioned, but in the sense that the speaker presents it as being New, textually (and situationally) non-derivable information (Halliday: 1967: 205).

The elements bearing out the tonic prominence are obligatorily New, whereas the residual elements convey either New or Given information depending on whether or not they fall within the domain of Focus. Thus, one information unit will be co-extensive with one clause; a single clause may be mapped into two or more information units; or a single information unit into two or more clauses. As a result, Halliday sees the information unit as an informational (phonological) constituent in its own right which, though it is very closely interconnected with the grammatical constituent of the clause, does not correspond exactly to any unit in the clause grammar. This means that Halliday's information structure orders the text independently of its construction in terms of sentences, clauses etc., into informational units on the basis of the Given/New dichotomy.
However, Halliday’s account of information theory is contentious as linguists such as Bolinger (1972) and Crystal (1975), according to Allerton (1978, 134), demonstrated that

prediction of nucleus placement needs to refer to semantic-cum-situational factors as well as syntactic (cf. Szwedek’s criticism, 1986:36-9).

To illustrate how contentious Halliday’s theory of information is, let us resort to Fronek’s critique of Halliday’s Given/New theory.

Fronek (1983: 316) initially confirms that

the segmentation of discourse on the basis of intonation undoubtedly signals some morphological, syntactic and informational oppositions.

Fronek (1983: 315), then shows how anaphorical or referential items can be either Given or New depending on whether or not they are focal. Consider:

(i) //I don’t like him//

Here “him” will be Given if the tonic prominence is on “like”. If the clause is unmarked, the clause constitutes one tone group with the tonic on “like” (tone 1), not on “him” because anaphors are inherently Given and the assignment of the information Focus to elements other than the last lexical elements indicates that the structure is informationally marked. If contrastive Emphasis is put on “him”, it carries the contrastive tonic (tone 1) and is classified as New. In addition, if “him” is clause initial, it is usually marked by tone 4 and it constitutes a separate tone group and informational unit, the remainder having the tonic (tone 1) on “like”. Or when “him” is fronted for contrast, it will carry tone 1. In both latter cases it will be deemed New. In all cases, “him” is anaphorical thus recoverable. From this it follows then that Halliday’s textual and situational recoverability criterion is of limited theoretical value.
Relevant to Halliday’s informational theory is the second component of thematic structure, namely “thematization”, which is realized sequentially in the clause and independently of the preceding discourse. Generally speaking, it represents the way the elements of the ideational component are organized as a message. It consists of two basic elements: Theme and Rheme. The Theme is the element, which the text producer selects as the point of departure for his message. Whatever follows the Theme element represents the Rheme element.

The definition clearly represents only one possible characteristic of Theme. The other characteristic, which is discounted by Halliday, is the concept of “aboutness”. Thus, Halliday’s characterization of Theme as the point of departure, Fries (1983: 117) notes, is not advanced as a language universal, but rather is a claim about English.

Halliday’s restrictive definition of Theme is unfortunate and does not seem to have been relevant to what Mathesius explicitly stated, according to Firbas (1987), that the point of departure was not necessarily always identical with the Theme (140), [and] it is not the beginning of the sentence, but the foundation-laying element of the lowest degree of CD. It is this element that in regard to the development of the communication constitutes the point of departure. The foundation-laying, i.e. thematic, elements undoubtedly express what the sentence is to be about. It may coincide with the first element of the sentence, but not necessarily so (145).

Along the same vein, Gundel (1977 cited in Kies, 1988: 55) rightly argues that it is ridiculous to characterize a sentence like (Probably he will be home tomorrow) as speaking about “probably” or “probability”.

Similarly, the thematizability of “Did” in polar interrogatives, according to Szwedek (1986: 38), is hardly acceptable.
Furthermore, both thematization and informational structures are closely related in that the text producer will choose the Theme from within what is Given and locate the Focus somewhere within the Rheme. Both structures, however, are not the same. The Theme is what I, the speaker, choose to take as my point of departure as an entity being talked about. The Given is what you, the listener, already know about or have accessible to . Theme + Rheme is speaker-oriented, while Given + New is listener-oriented. But both are speaker-selected.

Halliday’s version of FSP thus depends on sequential linearization of clause elements, which can not be made applicable to an inflectional language such as Arabic. (cf. more below). In order to move on carefully towards the aim of the present section, let us turn next to the Prague scholars’ views of FSP.

Based on heterogeneous principles such as syntactic, semantic, intonational and contextual, the Prague scholars’ view of FSP is best represented by Firbas’s notion of Communicative Dynamism (CD), which according to Firbas (1979: 30-1),

is a quality displayed by communication in its development of the information to be conveyed and consisting in advancing this development. [And] by the degree of CD carried by a sentence element, is the extent to which the sentence element contributes to the further development of the communication.

As regards Theme, Firbas (1987), argues that

the Theme is not invariably linked with the beginning of the sentence. Known (context-dependent) information is always thematic, but the Theme does not exclusively convey such information. It may also express New (context-independent) information. But no matter whether context-dependent or context-independent, the information conveyed by the Theme will always carry the lowest degree(s) of CD within the sentence. This means that the information conveyed by the Theme contributes least to the further development of communication within the sentence. The sentence as an utterance points to what has preceded on the one hand, and is oriented towards the
fulfilment of the immediately relevant communicative purpose on the other.

From this it follows that Firbas, unlike Halliday, identifies two essential characteristics of Theme, viz. the aboutness and context-dependence features. Only the former is constantly present, while the latter is occasionally absent. However, both are associated with the lowest degrees of CD within a sentence. FSP is thus regarded as an outcome of the distribution of degrees of CD over sentence elements. For example, elements derivable from the preceding verbal context, such as anaphoric pronouns, are context dependent. The situational context co-operates in rendering elements context dependent in the absence of preceding verbal context. Thus in (Have you seen that?) occurring as an immediate reaction, with no preceding verbal context, to some conspicuous transient extra-linguistic phenomenon, “you” and “that” will unmistakably appear as context dependent. But even here, the speaker’s immediate concern may decide otherwise. If used cataphorically, selecting out a phenomenon for the hearer’s special attention and pointing to it, “that” will be context independent, entailing a change in its prosodic feature. (1979:32).

Further, although Chafe (1976: 33) rightly deems the definition of CD vague, it should be said that What is interesting about Firbas’s CD account is the provision of the notion of narrow scene, which renders an element, expressing a notion derivable from the preceding verbal context, context-independent. If Firbas’s narrow scene is linked with the text producer’s immediate communicative concern, it may carry the Goal of the Subject of the utterance concerned (cf. below).

In Arabic grammar and rhetoric, classical linguists used the notions of “musnad ilayhi” (lit. a thing upon which something leans, i.e. argument), and “musnad” (lit. a thing which leans upon something else, i.e. predicate) to represent the basic bipartition of the predication of a given sentence. The former realizes the following constant ideational functions: the Actor; the Goal of a passive clause; the G-Subject of the
Equational; the first object of verbs like “think”, عَمَلَ, with a valency of three elements and the like, and the second object of verbs like “show”, يَعَرِّف, and the like with a valency of four elements. It is noteworthy that these ideational functions can be looked at as the foundation-laying elements which their respective de-contextualized sentences are to be about. The latter, by contrast, realizes the following constant ideational functions: the Process of both the active or passive Verbal clause; the Attribute (predicate) of the Equational, the second object of verbs like “think”; and the third object of verbs like “show”.

Obviously, the identification of both basic parts of a given clause is conducted at the predicational, i.e. propositional, level not the contextual one, since (i) these ideational functions are syntactically identified, (ii) the notion of “aboutness” is constantly present in the former, and (iii) there are two more notions used to identify informationally the two basic parts of an utterance in a given context, viz. “muhaddath ‘anhu”, (lit. the entity talked about, Theme) and “hadiith”, (lit. news, Rheme, cf. below). At the predicational level, the aboutness of a de-contextualized sentence can be accounted for through the use of “definiteness” as one of the basic grammatical indications of “aboutness”. In almost all cases, definite elements must precede indefinite ones if they are to be used at the basic instance and ordinary instance levels. Arabic at this formal level thus follows a strict principle of sentence constituents arrangement, which is in harmony with Firbas’s CD grammatical indication and the Arabic rhetorical principle of proceeding from what is most familiar to the receiver.

However, both principles as it is clear from Firbas’s view above and Abuu Muusaa’s (1979:279) view of the application of the Arabic rhetorical principle, are applied to contextualized utterances, whereby a contextual level is postulated for Givenness different from that of definiteness. At this contextual level, Given elements normally precede New elements at the ordinary instance level. However, that is not to say that both differ sharply from one another, for
definiteness and Givenness often go together [anaphorically and cataphorically] (Chafe, 1976: 42). [However], we have noun groups that may be indefinite and new: definite and new: definite and given and [less common] indefinite and given (ibid.43).

In our FSP-typology of the Arabic clause in chapter two, the possible occurrences of these four combinations were empirically demonstrated.

Therefore, it could be argued that CD are apparently applicable to definiteness/indefiniteness as well as Given/New dichotomies. For example, Halliday seems to identify Given/New with definite/indefinite when he points out that Given + New is listener-oriented. Whereas az-Zamakhsharii (n.d. vol. 1, 86) claims in this respect that it is

التعريفة والنكرة بالنسبة للمخاطب
definiteness and indefiniteness [which] are receiver-oriented. (my translation)

At the contextual level, az-Zamakhsharii further shows how the predicate of an Equational, represents the entity “talked about”, محدث عنه by being definite and the G-Subject is the Rheme، حديث، by being indefinite. The word order is, of course, reversed because, as far as the Equational is concerned, a definite predicate must always precede an indefinite G-Subject. He argues, that at the structural level، في اللوق، the entity representing the “talked about”, is the indefinite G-Subject, whereas at the contextual level، في المعنى، the “talked about” entity is assigned to the definite predicate. Consider:

Tahta ra’sii sarjun  غُنْتِ رأسِي سُرْجَ.  
under head-my a-saddle-nom.
(A saddle is under my head)

He explains that what is really talked about is the presence of the possessive pronoun which refers to the text producer himself and thus makes the predicate definite.
As is clear from his analysis, az-Zamakhsharii seems to associate the aboutness feature with what is definite in order for an entity to function as Theme. He also differentiates between two types of "aboutness", one at the structural level and the other at the contextual level. This perhaps is the reason why some contemporary linguists have confused both levels.

Az-Zamakhsharii further adds that if the definite predicate is an adverb of place or a prepositional phrase, it must be fronted if the Subject is indefinite, because:

(i) if the definite predicate follows an indefinite G Subject, it has the potentiality to become a qualifier, which, in this case, will render the clause incomplete, and

(ii) linguists detest proceeding from what is indefinite although it is possible in case of S Emphasis.

Additionally, as far as indefiniteness is concerned, az-Zamakhsharii (86) argues that in Arabic it is uninformative to issue an Equational, or a Verbal with indefinite elements, because indefiniteness alone will not be receiver-oriented. The issuance will evidently flout the text producer's intention to provide the receiver with informative news. Az-Zamakhsharii's sharply differs from Firbas's (1979:35) claim concerning the fact that

the indefinite article signals novelty of information, and hence context independence and a rise in CD. The definite article never signals a rise in CD

Firbas's first argument concerning the use of indefinite elements to convey novel information seems shaky, since indefinite elements whether Given or New, do not comply with the text producer's intent of intentional informativity (cf. Keenan's criterion of informativity in chapter 1.2). Further, it does not seem possible to associate the lowest degree of CD with definite elements conveying New information, although his notion of narrow scene seems to determine otherwise. The definite article is mainly used
to help us identify the co-referent through the preceding verbal context or the situational context or through past experience. And to identify a particular co-referent in this way is to draw the receiver's attention to receive more information concerning that entity about which we have already been keeping a historical record in our minds. Definiteness is thus used because the text producer assumes that we have already been keeping such a historical record, which can be likened to a biography, ready to receive more new information about what the entity "talked about" did, has done, will do, etc., or what happened to that entity. In a word, we are in need of bringing in the ideational case roles the participants may assume in a given interaction.

Moreover, it does not seem consistent to have an element which is Given because it is situationally or contextually recoverable, since there are cases where anaphors, for example, are contrastively emphasized. Even locations, which are cataphoric should be treated as New in terms of being the location of a particular state of affairs. It would seem reasonably justified to say that it is definiteness, i.e. identifying the identity of the referent, not Givenness that can be achieved from what is situationally visible or present and from previous mentioning. What is New is the roles of the identified entity in a given state of affairs. Consider somebody who is informing me of the fact that "My brother has bought a car", in which case the referent 'my brother' obviously represents part of the historical record I happen to keep for people whom I know, hence it is identifiable. What is New is his role, i.e. as an Actor in a particular state of affairs. Even if a different referent is visible situationally whom I can identify, he would be conveying a new role if he/she takes part in a certain state of affairs. There are a few linguists who conspicuously draw attention to keeping the level of definiteness/indefiniteness and Given/New separate, and emphasize taking the case roles more seriously when assessing the Givenness and Newness of entities. Among these are Danes (1974), Comrie (1981), Burton-Roberts (1985), Chafe (1976) as well as most Arab rhetoricians. Let us see how the first three linguists state their views.
Danes (1974:111) points out that
what is new, even if it is mentioned in the preceding context, is the connexion of that element into which it has been put. By connexion, [Danes means] not only the rather trivial fact that a word may occur in different collocations or other phrases (i.e. in different multiverbal denominating units), but also, and foremost, the position (or function) of the given element in the communicative structure of the utterance.

Similarly, Comrie (1981: 59), attributing the confusion surrounding Given and New to the distinction between relational properties (topic/ focus) and inherent properties (definiteness /indefiniteness) of noun phrases, avoids this potential confusion by rightly keeping the two properties separate. For example, in answer to "what did you see?", the focus may be either definite or indefinite, (I saw the/a dog). If definite, the receiver is likely to identify the referent. If, however, the focus is indefinite, this identification can not be made. Comrie further points out that what is new of the focus entity being definite or indefinite is the precise relation of this entity to the action of my seeing.

Burton-Roberts (1985: 290) too, questions the fact that in

Matilda kicked Max and then HE kicked HER.

if the items in the second clause are Given, what are we to make of the accent (or contrast) on “he” and “her”?

He proceeds,

I do not believe the naturalness of the prosody of this example can be captured without extending the notion of "Given" to include in its application the grammatical function of a given item.

From this it follows that using definiteness is intended to help the receiver to create a co-referential link, be it anaphoric or cataphoric, with the historical records, so
to speak, the receiver may have in his mind about the referents in question in order to make sense of what is being communicated. Through this link the receiver would determine the degree of informativity of the utterance elements. Thus, unlike Firbas's CD, for example the definite Subject may or may not carry the lowest degree of CD depending on the ideational roles the referent plays in successive utterances.

In response to the question posed above, the use of Emphasis proper is normally to assert emphatically New information expressed by some constituent or the whole proposition of an utterance. As was stated in chapter two, the receiver's conceptualization of the text producer's doubtful proposition before reformulating it as a reconfirmation-seeking question, does not seem to indicate the Givenness of the entity emphasized, since what is New is the relation of the entity concerned, i.e. its case role, to the action concerned. As regards S Emphasis, the contrastively emphasized constituent, which may be recoverable from the preceding context, bears out New information indicated by the case role it has in the action concerned.

As regards the relationship modality has with Focus [and Emphasis], Svoboda and Materna (1987: 196) rightly argue that

any natural sentence (finite or non-finite) contains an explicit information Focus and either explicit or implicit modal indication. Both these items are always context-independent [New].

This claim has indeed a lot of truth in it. Recall the discourse in our discussion on multiple Emphasis above, where three utterances expressing the same proposition, differ only in terms of the number of emphatic modals used. In other words, modality can represent the comment, whereas the proposition itself can represent the topic (cf. Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989). However, it is not clear from both claims whether or not the modal indication will bear out New information if it falls within the presupposed section of let us say, a contrastive utterance. What is clear is that if a modal falls within the
presupposed part of the utterance in contrastive propositions, the modal meaning under contrastive Focus may be carried out by a second modal such as "only". (cf. the examples of dynamic modality).

To sum up: I have been clarifying very briefly some of the intricacies surrounding the dichotomies Givenness vs Newness and definiteness vs indefiniteness. The aim is to demonstrate that the recoverability of an element from the preceding context or the immediate situation is not enough for Givenness. It is the case roles that should be taken into account in determining what is Given from what is New.

4.2.2 Exhaustiveness and Emphasis

The second parameter relevant to the contexts of S Emphasis is the so-called exhaustiveness or uniqueness implicature. In this respect, the question to be asked is: is the information conveyed intended to be truth-conditionally or hyperbolically exhaustive of the emphatically focused constituent? Before attempting to answer the question, it is useful to state what is meant by exhaustiveness.

Contemporarily, linguists of different trends are in disagreement as to what type of implicational inference exhaustiveness is. The implicature, which is unfortunately one person's conventional implicature (cf. Halvorsen, 1978), is somebody else's entailment (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 1979 and Atlas & Levinson, 1981), and yet a third person's generalized implicature (cf. Horn, 1980). It is not the intention of the present research to provide any reference to these accounts in order to demonstrate the validity of one account over the other two. This would lead us far afield. However, in compliance with our congruent and incongruent typologies of receiver and constative, exhaustiveness will be treated as a generalized implicature if the constative carrying S Emphasis is congruently dispatched, and a particularized implicature if the same constative is incongruently dispatched. The definition to be given to exhaustiveness will be slightly similar to Horn's (132) but with the appropriate modification concerning taking the
congruent and incongruent typologies of receivers and constatives into account. What is going to be said below forms a preliminary step towards a detailed discussion in chapter six.

Exhaustiveness as a generalized conversational implicature is defined as a pragmatic assumption naturally (as opposed to conventionally) arising from focusing or exhaustive listing constructions used in congruent contexts, and as a particularized conversational implicature, it is defined as a pragmatic assumption naturally arising from exhaustive listing constructions used in incongruent contexts.

The specificationally focused constituent normally represents the exhaustive listing of the candidates, which satisfy the cleft clause. That is, such candidates given in context realize, following Jackendoff (1972: 245), a presuppositional set of values, which when substituted for the focusing constituent yield a true proposition. The presuppositional set is more or less similar to what Halvorsen (33) calls the restricted universe of discourse, when he argues that

the exhaustiveness implicature must be understood with respect to a restricted universe of discourse.

In Arabic rhetoric, however, what is exclusively specified is classified into either (i) truth-conditionally exhaustive, or (ii) hyperbolically exhaustive. The former, which can be likened to the uniqueness of definite noun groups (cf. Kempson, 1975), does not involve any presuppositional set. Consider the following utterance, which conforms with reality and belief, i.e. an analytic proposition:

*It was the EGYPTIANS who built the pyramids.*

The exhaustiveness implicature is that (the Egyptians were the only people who built the pyramids). No presuppositional set can be envisaged here, as it is only true if the Egyptians were the only people who built the pyramids.
The other type of S Emphasis which may be called hyperbolically exhaustive SE indicates that the rejected values of the presuppositional set may be demoted as non-existent. Thus, hyperbolical exhaustiveness does seem to require a presuppositional set, which would have either a vast range of members, say for example in a given country, or a small range of members. In both ranges, the rejected members are demoted as non-existent in contrast with the focused constituent.

It should be stated that exhaustiveness implicature accompanies not only the congruent and incongruent use of S Emphasis but the incongruent use of Emphasis proper and unmarked Focus in S emphatic contexts as well.

4.2.3 Contrastiveness and Emphasis

The question that needs to be raised with regard to this parameter is: does Emphasis merely emphasize a certain constituent of a clause structure or does it contrast it with candidates of a given presuppositional set? In the latter case, is the constituent with which contrast is established explicitly or implicitly mentioned? And semantically, is the constituent with which contrast is established in opposition to the contrasting constituent or not?

At the outset, it should be stated that

if Contrast is used in the restricted sense with respect to an opposition between X and Y, then it follows that Focus [Emphasis] does not necessarily imply Contrast: speakers can emphatically assert X without opposing it to an explicitly given or presupposed Y. On the other hand, Contrast will necessary imply Focus [Emphasis] (Dik, 1981: 58; cf. also Abuu Muusaa, 1979: 191; Danes, 1972: 227 and Hannay, 1983: 210).

Adopting the restricted sense of Contrast, the present research treats Emphasis as either Emphasis proper, used to merely emphasize a certain constituent or a whole predication, or S Emphasis, used to contrastively emphasize a certain constituent or a
whole predication and contrast it with members of a given presuppositional set. It must be stated that contrastiveness is not only associated with S Emphasis used in congruent and incongruent contexts but with Emphasis proper and unmarked Focus used in incongruent contexts as well.

In answer to the second question, the constituent with which contrast is established may either be implicitly or explicitly mentioned in the presuppositional set of a given clause. In the following Example the correct constituent and the rejected one are explicitly mentioned:

\textit{Ana\aa\ MUDARRISUN laa WAZIIRUN. I a-teacher-nom not a-minister-nom. (I am a TEACHER not a MINISTER.)}

However, in the following example the rejected constituent is implicitly understood from the preceding discourse.

\textit{Innamaa anaa MUDARRISUN. I a-teacher-nom. (I am only a TEACHER.)}

In answer to the last question, the constituent with which contrast is established need not necessarily be semantically in opposition to the focusing constituent or predication.

\textbf{4.2.4 Scope of the Emphasis}

In discussing Emphasis, the question to be asked is: does Emphasis concern the predication as a whole (or its truth value), or only a certain constituent of the predication? So we may have (i) Predicational Emphasis and (ii) Constituent Emphasis.

Predicational Emphasis may further differ if the predication is either emphatically asserted or contrastively asserted. In this respect, predicational Emphasis, according to Dik (53),

\textit{is the positive counterpart of what is usually called sentence negation.}
Consider, for example, the use of the negation emphasizer “lan”, (will/shall never) to contrastively emphasize what has already been emphatically asserted by the use of the verbal emphasizing prefix /sa-/: 

1. *Sa-yadhhabu.*  
   *Will-(he)-GO-ind. (He will GO.)*

2. *Lan YADHHABA.*  
   *Never (he-will)-GO-sub. (He will NEVER GO.)*

Similarly, the use of “inna” before the predication of a given clause, according to most classical and contemporary rhetoricians, yields predicational Emphasis, which concerns the truth value, i.e true or false, of the whole proposition emphasized or contrastively emphasized.

Constituent Emphasis, on the other hand, refers to emphasizing either of the basic parts of a given clause. Constituent Emphasis can similarly yield Emphasis proper or contrastive Emphasis of some constituent. Emphasis proper is basically used to reassure the receiver, whereas contrastive Emphasis is used first to reject either implicitly or explicitly a specific constituent and correct it by focusing on the right one.

### 4.2.5 Presupposition and Emphasis

Similarly, in providing an account for Emphasis, the question to be asked is: does the use of Emphasis proper and S Emphasis involve any presupposition? If it does, should it be identical to that of unmarked Focus? First let us define what is meant by presupposition.

Following Allerton (1978:151), presupposition, as a conventional implicature in Grice’s terminology, is applicable to propositions which have the capacity of being true or false. When a proposition is presupposed, it is assumed to be true. Put differently, presupposing the truth of a proposition means that that proposition has taken place or
was taken for granted when the text producer encoded his utterance. Presupposition thus concerns the relationship that underlies a communicative act in which the text producer and receiver take part by encoding their contextual contribution on the basis of presupposing what the other has just said or what kind of beliefs the other has. We will be focusing only on pragmatic presupposition in terms of its relevance to the study of Focus and Emphasis.

In our functional typology of the Arabic clause, a presuppositional account through the use of adjacency pairs like question and answer to identify Focus and Emphasis was provided in chapter two. However, we did not specify the types of pragmatic presupposition in our classification of the FSP-variants at the Specificational Instance level. These types of pragmatic presupposition will be specified presently.

S Emphasis normally involves more specific pragmatic presuppositions than Emphasis proper and unmarked Focus. In fact, the range of contexts available to the use of S Emphasis are much more limited than those of unmarked Focus and Emphasis proper. Unfortunately, some contemporary linguists, who analyse it-clefts, provide pragmatic presuppositions, which can be identified with those designed for unmarked Focus. Consider:

*Mary ate a PIZZA.*

Here, if the utterance is unmarked, the utterance pragmatically presupposes that Mary ate something. If, however, the same focused constituent is emphatically asserted, it would still presuppose that Mary ate something. Similarly, if the text producer uses an it-cleft formulation to communicate the same proposition as in

*It was a pizza that Mary ate,*

it would presuppose that *Mary ate something.*
Thus, if the three utterances, which differ in terms of Emphasis and Focus, induce the same pragmatic presupposition, natural languages can dispense with Emphasis proper and S Emphasis. The conclusion seems to explain yet another reason for the unsatisfactory results of those accounts, which were supposed to have tackled Emphasis and S Emphasis pragmatically.

However, natural languages cannot dispense with Emphasis, particularly in argumentative discourses, to the extent that any functional analysis of Emphasis must be accompanied by the identification of the pragmatic presupposition indicating the specific factors prompting the use of Emphasis proper or S Emphasis. It is, obvious, therefore, that when a text producer adds Emphasis proper or S Emphasis to the encoding of his utterance, he must have presupposed the scepticism, opposition, denial, etc., as well as the pragmatic assumptions of the receiver's utterance. Otherwise, our efforts to formalize a consistent pragmatic account of Emphasis would be deemed a failure. To illustrate this point we will use the same cleft example given above to specify the exact presuppositions of the contexts, whereby the cleft has to be chosen.

S Emphasis in Arabic specifies three crucial functions representing the aims of using S Emphasis, namely, to replace, to restrict or to select mistaken or counter-presuppositional beliefs. Thus,

*It was a PIZZA that Mary ate,*

(i) may either presuppose that

*Mary ate a cheeseburger,*

(ii) it may presuppose that

*Mary ate a pizza and a cheeseburger,*

(iii) or it may presuppose that
Mary ate either a pizza or a cheeseburger.

These are the three essential pragmatic presuppositions, which specify the specific contexts of S Emphasis in the present research. The crucial issue which will not be tackled here, is how to identify the pragmatic presupposition of Emphasis proper and unmarked Focus in contexts requiring the use of S Emphasis.

4.2.6 Functions of Emphasis

The question to be raised in this regard is: is the emphasized element meant to fill in, to reassure the validity of, to restrict, to replace or to select a specified piece of information in the mind of the receiver?

Dik (1981), who provides a functional typology of Focus functions, dichotomizes such functions into -Contrast and +Contrast. If -Contrast is involved, then the Focus information can be seen as “filling in” a gap in the pragmatic information of the addressee (Completive Focus). This is the function of our constative typology in chapter two whereby discourse-initiating units and units conveying partially New information play a role. In other words, this category represents the basic and ordinary instance levels of clause typology introduced in chapter two whereby the receiver is treated as presuppositionless or information-seeking. Consider the following example provided by Dik for completive Focus:

A. What did John Buy?
B. John bought COFFEE.

To Dik, if there is Contrast, the Contrast established can either hold between the Focus information and a specific presupposition, or it can be determined by construction-internal factors, without any specific presupposition being involved. If a specific presupposition is involved, the Focus information can be selected from an antecedently presupposed set (-Corrective), as in:

A. Did John buy coffee or rice?
B. He bought COFFEE.

The Selective Focus here, Dik argues, is not contrastive as it is not corrective because A's presupposition is not incorrect: it has to be specified rather than corrected. However, according to Dik (62), Selective Focus may further involve +Contrast when it explicitly or implicitly excludes the other presupposed value(s) as the correct value for x, as in:

A. He bought COFFEE, not RICE.

If a specific presupposition is involved it can be meant to bring about some modification in the pragmatic information of the addressee (+Corrective), which is either Replacing Focus, Expanding Focus or Restricting Focus. Consider:

(i) Replacing Focus:

A. John went to London.
B. No, he didn't go to LONDON, he went to NEW YORK.

(ii) Expanding Focus:

B. John not only bought COFFEE, he also bought RICE.

(iii) Restricting Focus:

A. John bought coffee and rice.
B. No, he only bought COFFEE.

Dik further adds a fifth function of +Contrast, namely Parallel Focus in which a speaker contrasts two pieces of information juxtaposed adjacently within one linguistic expression, as in:

JOHN bought a BIKE, but PETER a CAR.

The Focused items here do not necessarily reject or correct anything in the pragmatic information of the addressee, although Parallel Focus construction may be used in a presuppositional context, as in:
A. I know that John and Peter bought a Volkswagen and a Toyota. But who bought what?
B. JOHN bought a TOYOTA, and PETER a VOLKSWAGEN.

Dik argues that Focus function in such a case is not occasioned by relations between the speaker’s assertion and the addressee’s presuppositions, but by the relationships of contrast internal to the predication proper. Compare Parallel Focus with antithetical structural parallelism in chapter five.

However, from this account we can detect some sort of affinity between Selective Focus represented by the first example above and Parallel Focus in the sense that both presuppose an unspecified set of values and do not involve any rejection and correction characteristic of S Emphasis. As regards the second example of Selective Focus, it clearly realizes S Emphasis, since it involves selecting the correct value from the presuppositional set. As a result, only three functions, namely Selective, Restrictive, and Replacive S Emphasis consequent upon the use of S Emphasis involve contrastiveness. The restriction on these functions which are in accord with those specified for S Emphasis in Arabic rhetoric, is necessary and justifiable, since they reflect an implicit or explicit rejection of an incorrect value and an explicit introduction of a correct one. The utterances cover, of course, modalized and demodalized ones used in contrastive contexts. In the latter, i.e. modally unmarked cases, the context as well as the text type seem to be the ultimate arbitrator in identifying the utterance as a realization of S Emphasis.

However, there are certain specific contexts, in which the use of S Emphasis does not seem to indicate any explicit or implicit rejection of a value wrongly specified in the preceding discourse. Such realizations can thus be used as either discourse-initiating or information-giving units. The use of S Emphasizers is intended to counter-presuppose both interlocutors’ expectation implicitly induced from the preceding
discourse. We will say more on such functions in our detailed discussion on S Emphasis in chapter six.

As regards Emphasis proper, it is basically used to reassure a sceptical receiver.

It should be stated that these functions of S Emphasis are normally identified on the basis of dispatching their respective constatives in congruent contexts. The same functions can further be identified on the basis of using the same constatives in incongruent contexts.

4.3 SUMMARY

We have been discussing a variety of linguistic issues that require to be analysed if the analysis of Focus and Emphasis is functional. At the outset of the present chapter, it was shown how the phenomenon of multiple Emphasis in argumentative dialogue and conversational confrontation develops. The last sections were allocated to a discussion of the parameters that are likely to produce different emphatic structures.
CHAPTER FIVE

5 EVIDENTIAL MODALITY IN ARABIC

Having provided all the necessary preliminaries concerning the most appropriate approach to study Emphasis, this and the following chapter will elaborate on the place of Emphasis within the evidentiality system as well as the realizations of S emphatic modals in MSA. The lay-out of this chapter is as follows. The first section will be allocated to an introductory discussion on evidentiality in natural languages in general and Arabic in particular. The remaining sections will be focusing on the evidential realizations in line with the sub-typology of evidentiality mentioned in passing in chapter three.

5.1 EVIDENTIALITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES

As was pointed out in chapter three, evidentiality should not be confined to cover epistemic modality only as is suggested by Lyons (1977), Givon (1982), Chafe (1986), Palmer (1986) and Willett (1988) among others. This is because, Willett (1988:52), for example, notes that

there is not yet a definitive understanding concerning exactly which part of the modal system the 'evidential' should refer to.

Evidentiality should also be used to cover some specific deontic as well as dynamic utterances. To give some more obvious examples, commissive acts are usually made evidentially to the effect that the use of the verb “promise” to commit the text producer to carry out his promise is enough to treat the verb as an evidential marker. It is perfectly possible to commit yourself evidentially to what you are saying and to carry out what you are capable of doing concerning future actions. This claim should be understood alongside al-Jurjaanii’s claim concerning the fact that denial can concern future events as well (cf. chapter three). The same thing can be said about mands when the text producer issues authoritative orders. A further example of the use of evidential deontic
modals is the use of “shall” in legal documents intended emphatically to enforce the fulfillment of what is agreed upon. The use of an oath to introduce certain types of deontically directive performatives to indicate the text producer’s commitment to fulfill the action his utterance expresses is similar. It must be repeated that the use of Emphasis in deontic modality is thus intended to make sure that what seems unlikely to occur may be made likely if Emphasis is resorted to. Consequently, we may have a further subsystem of evidential deontic modality similar to that of epistemic modality. In addition, the same argument may well be true of the dynamic modality, although no substantiation will be further pursued here.

Furthermore, in contemporary western linguistics, Evidentiality is used in the broad sense to refer to

marking epistemology, coding the speaker’s attitude towards his knowledge of a situation, and in the narrow sense to marking the source of such knowledge (Chafe, 1986)

Willett, who adopts Chafe’s narrow sense of evidentiality, i.e “information source”, and who refers to Givon (1982) and Bybee (1985) points out that

the primary evidential parameter expressed in natural language is that of “direct evidence” vs “indirect evidence”; that is, whether the source of the speaker’s information is of a primary or a secondary nature. Within this distinction, languages tend to differentiate three general kinds of evidence: two main types of “indirect evidence”, viz. (i) evidence via verbal report (Reported) and (ii) evidence upon which an inference is based (Inferring), and “direct evidence” which is (iii) (Attested).

Being a recent comer to linguistics, evidentiality unfortunately has not yet been subjected to a pragmatic analysis which would account for the purposes of producing evidence in a specific communicative act. Most studies concentrate on it as a grammatical category, whose realizations yet to be demarcated. Pragmatically, however, whatever
has been said so far on Emphasis is applicable to other types of evidentiality. Earlier it was shown how the use of Emphasis is meant to observe the submaxims of Emphasis and the second submaxim of quality, namely "have evidence".

Phonologically, most linguists, who studied evidentiality (cf. Chafe, 1986) do not seem to have paid attention to Halliday’s sketchy account of the link between the information unit realizing the interpersonal function, “Tone”, with certainty and uncertainty. In other words the only evidential realizations scanned by these linguists are only grammatical and lexical and their syntactic functions as markers of evidentiality. Halliday (1985:281) explains that

the choice of “tone” realizes the semantic values of Key by the Tone Contour in which falling pitch conveys certainty and rising pitch uncertainty (for Halliday’s examples cf. p. 284).

Consequently, certainty as an expression of evidential modality can further be realized prosodically.

5.2 EVIDENTIALITY IN ARABIC

Evidentiality as a grammatical category has not fully received as much attention as other categories established in Arabic grammar. The only linguistic realizations that have received an extensive grammatical investigation are a group of verbs termed “the verbs of absolute certainty and doubt”, أفعال الازين و الشك, or as termed collectively either “the verb ‘think’ and its sisters” ظن و أخواتها, or “the verbs of heart”. أفعال الاملوب (cf. below).

Lexicographically and philosophically, evidentiality, كفائي (التحقيق), Kafawii (1975, 322, vol.ii) points out, is classified in terms of certainty into “definitive evidential”, دليل قطعي, and “hypothetical evidential”,
Unfortunately, no illustrative exemplifications are provided to elucidate what is meant by such types of evidentiality.

In classical Arabic literature, Qudaama (1982: 18-42) argues that knowledge acquisition is realized through (i) Sensory evidence such as visual, auditory, other senses, etc., and what is self-evident, and (ii) Deduction. Deduction realizes knowledge via two basic evidentials, 1. Syllogism, التباس, and 2. Proposition, التصدق. The latter conveys a. absolute certainty, أليفة, i.e. self-evident, or, b. belief, الخبر. Absolute certainty propositions may be Quotative, الخبر الالتفاضة أو التواتر, be it an expert testimony, prophets’ news, or news of peoples from other countries. Belief, by contrast, is the proposition brought about by one or two men which can not be verified through syllogistic deduction nor quotativeness and thus is challengeable. Qudaama further adds that there is a third way of obtaining knowledge, namely hypothetical inference.

Furthermore, Qudaama classifies types of Propositions into three general categories in which beliefs and hypothetical inferences are fused to form a challengeable category:

A. Self-evident Propositions, which include those acquired by being self-evident, syllogism, quotativeness, expert testimony and prophets’ news which cannot be challenged,

B. Challengeable Propositions requiring evidentiality, and which include beliefs and hypothetical inferences, and

C. Contradictions which are inherently false.

Note that Qudaama’s B category is reminiscent of Givon’s (ii) and (iii) propositions, i.e.
challengeable and hypothetical propositions given in chapter three. It is only Qudaama’s category of belief and Givon’s challengeable propositions that evidently require the use of Emphasis in confrontational situations. However, it has been pointed out sporadically that even self-evident propositions may sometimes be emphasized for contextual reasons. (cf. chapter 6).

Additionally, according to al-Jurjaanii’s quotation in chapter three, which reads: (iii) “if the text producer claims that p is possible which in fact is controversial”, the receiver seems to demand reproachfully the text producer’s evidence that p is possibly true”. What is remarkably significant in this claim is the calling for evidence as a way of reproaching the text producer for flouting or violating the maxim of quality. So any call for evidence may be interpreted as the receiver’s expression of rudeness if he does not believe in what the text producer’s proposition expresses. The reproach manifested by the receiver’s demand for evidence shows of course the receiver’s negative attitude towards the text producer’s shaky proposition. This particular interpretation similarly concerns the use of Emphasis as an evidential realization of the text producer’s certainty when the receiver is either reconfirmation-seeking or counter-presuppositional or in accordance with the demoting treatments.

5.3 DEFINITION OF EVIDENTIALITY

Having briefly outlined how evidentiality is viewed by both Arabic traditional and contemporary linguistics, a word on what is meant by evidentiality in conjunction with our two proposals in the present research is in order.

Following Anderson (1986: 274-5), evidentiality is defined as

(i) Evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that claim, whether direct evidence plus observation (no inference
needed) evidence plus inference
inference (evidence unspecified)
reasoned expectation from logic and other facts
and whether the evidence is auditory, or visual,
etc.

(ii) Evidentials are not themselves the main
predication of the clause, but are rather a
specification added to a factual claim ABOUT
SOMETHING ELSE.
(iii) Evidentials have the indication of evidence
as in (i) as their primary meaning, not only as a
pragmatic inference.
(iv) Morphologically, evidentials are
inflections, clitics, or other free syntactic
elements (not compounds or derivational
forms).

As far as Emphasis is concerned, we may add to this definition that Emphasis
can also be realized lexically, prosodically and by intensificational means which may
involve ideational and interpersonal consequences. In the present research only lexico-
grammatical realizations are to be investigated in some detail. And the emphatic
evidentials should be understood as expressions of their primary meaning stated in (i).

According to this definition and our new proposals, evidentiality in Arabic can
similarly be realized either as sensory, Emphatic, quotative and/or hypothetical
evidentials. This scalar arrangement should not be taken as strict in terms of strong or
weak certainty, particularly in the case of Emphasis and sensory evidentials, since as we
saw previously, oath, for example, is always a prerequisite for a judicial sensory,
quotative or even hypothetical testimony. Oath as such would seem to occupy the
nearest point on the scale to analytic or self-evident propositions. Other emphatic
realizations, however, would seem to be either on the same point of sensory evidentials
or lower. It can also be argued that the use of Emphasis indicates that the text producer’s
evidence maybe either (i) sensory evidential, i.e. direct experience, (ii) quotative
evidential, i.e. indirect experience, or (iii) inferential evidential, i.e. deductive or
inductive etc., but for a reason he does not wish to disclose that source of information.
Or, as we saw in multiple Emphasis, the Envoys had recourse to “God knows” as an
expression conveying a highly authoritative source of information indicating the veracity of their factual claim. This expression together with other emphatic means are used in contrastive contexts to realize an S Emphasis in the example analysed in chapter three.

Moreover, both realizations of emphatic evidentiality, namely Emphasis proper and S Emphasis, may be binary and heterogeneous. For example, Emphasis proper may further be used in contexts which normally require the congruent use of either S Emphasis or unmarked Focus. Therefore, grouping the realizations of each function discretely would not be as practical as one would expect. Rather the grouping will be on the basis of giving priority to the predominant function of each realization. To extricate ourselves from this enigmatic issue we will be clarifying the difference if any realization has the potentiality to realizes Emphasis proper or S Emphasis or both.

In accordance with the contextual typologies of receiver and constative, a constative can either be Non-modalized, i.e. unmarked Focus; emphatically Demodalized, or emphatically Modalized. Let us take up the last two types in turn.

5.4 DEMODALIZATION

The question needing to be asked here is why the text producer chooses not to emphasize his proposition in a context presupposing the use of emphatic modalization, be it Emphasis proper or S Emphasis.

In our incongruent typologies of constative and receiver, the text producer may use a demodalized synthetic proposition when he demotes a re-confirmation-seeking or counter-presuppositional receiver to a presuppositionless one by flouting the second submaxim of quality and the second and third submaxims of Emphasis respectively. He may further use demodalization when he demotes a cognizant receiver of p to a
presuppositionless receiver by means of flouting the submaxim of being as informative as required. Due to the absence of the respective emphatic evidentials, the only possible way to interpret such a demodalization pragmatically and truth-conditionally is to contextualize the constative concerned in an attempt to identify the text producer's intention to disregard the receiver's point of view.

Initially, both analytic and synthetic propositions, according to the incongruent typologies of constative and receiver, can presumably be used communicatively without any modalization in contexts which require the use of Emphasis. However, the contexts which require the use of non-modalized, modalized and demodalized synthetic propositions are far more greater than those of analytic propositions. It must be stated that whether the demodalized constative is meant to reassure a sceptical receiver or restrict, select or replace wrong information, the demotion involved here occurs only when a non-verbal communicative message prior to the encoding of the constative is contextually available. If, however, the receiver interacts in a certain situation both verbally and non-verbally, the text producer's insincerity is likely to arise if he does not use Emphasis congruently in argumentative contexts. For example, if a President delivers a political speech devoid of Emphasis in a summit conference where he is expected to confirm his principles and values in which all the summiteers are committed to, he is quite likely to be insincere. Unfortunately, this point will not be pursued further as it will lead us far a field.

Ideologically, people usually tend to overrate their own ideological values and beliefs to the extent that such ideologies are given their utmost heightening value that may scale them on the same point where analytic propositions are scaled. To believe in the veracity of any ideology is to equate it with analytic propositions, hence the more you adhere to your ideology the more you promote it to those of self-evident
propositions, and eventually express it verbally and non-verbally. In other words, the
text producer in such cases, presents his demodalized synthetic proposition as
conforming with not only his beliefs but also with reality. This is clearly shows how the
need to use Emphasis seems to disappear, since the text producer tends to think that his
synthetic propositions underlying his ideology and beliefs are in fact self-evident.

A further factor which is likely to influence the use of both Emphasis and De-
emphasis in incongruent contexts, is the text producer’s self-confidence. Thus, the
more confident the text producer feels about the veracity of his propositions the more
demodalized utterances he is likely to use. Another factor which would help us expect
the use of, and eventually be able to identify demodalized utterances is the text type.
More specifically, argumentative discourses tend to favour the use of not only
modalization but demodalization as well. Consider the following demodalized synthetic
constative:

الإشتراعية تبني مجتمعا سليماً
Al-ishtiraakiyyatu tabnii mujtama’an saliiman.
the-socialism-nom builds a-society-acc healthy-acc.
(Socialism builds up a healthy society.)

Here the use of demodalization may be due to the fact that the text producer’s adherence
to the factuality of this synthetic proposition coupled with strong self-confidence is so
strong that he is unlikely to satisfy the receiver’s expectations to see the use of
Emphasis. In other words, the text producer seems to feel that not only his synthetic
proposition is analytic enough to avoid the use of Emphasis, but also the receiver should
not have doubted or counter-presupposed the veracity of it in the first place. This clearly
shows how and why the text producer disregards the receiver’s point of view by means
of promoting the veracity of his proposition evaluatively to a self-evident one.
5.5 MODALIZATION

As far as evidential modality is concerned, Modalized constatives can functionally be classified into:

1. Evidentiality Proper, and
2. Specificational evidentiality.

Evidentiality Proper may be realized by:

(i) Sensory Evidentials
(ii) Emphasis Proper, and
(iii) Quotative Evidentials.

The realizations of Emphasis proper which are lexico-grammatical include:

a. Repetition
b. Emphatic Adverbials
c. Oath
d. Emphatic Particles
e. Rhetorical Questions

S Evidentiality can be realized by:

(i) Sensory Evidentials
(ii) Specificational Emphasis
(iii) Quotative Evidentials

The possible realizations of S Emphasis may include:

a. The Reflexives
b. Use of “Inna” together with /la-

As is indicated in chapter one, the present research is mainly concerned with the lexico-grammatical realizations of Emphasis in Arabic. Nevertheless, it would seem extremely useful to provide first a brief account for some other means of evidential realizations such as “the verbs of certainty and doubt”, characteristic of Arabic as an inflectional language, then we move on to discuss the emphatic evidentials in some
Verbs of absolute certainty and doubt are bi-transitive verbs with a valency of two nominal groups, i.e. the Subject and the object, and an attributive. The object and the attributive which are accusatively marked and realize the complement of these verbs are the basic constituents of an Equational that-clause which may or may not be introduced by the complementizer “anna” (that). The verbs may also be followed by a Nominal that-clause, provided that the Nominal is introduced by the same complementizer, viz. “anna” (that). Similarly, the verbs of doubt and absolute certainty may further precede a Verbal that-clause provided that the Verbal is introduced by another complementizer, namely “an” (that).

Semantically, the verbs of absolute certainty normally express a decisive belief of certainty, i.e. strong assertion, based on the fact that no other evidence is available to him indicating otherwise. These verbs include “ra’aa”, (found); “‘alima”, (knew); “wajada”, (found out); “daraa”, (knew); “ta’allam”, (imp. realize or know), etc. In contrast, the verbs of doubt such as “zanna”, (thought); “hasiba”, (thought); “za‘ama”, (thought); “‘adda”, (reckoned), etc., usually express the availability of two inferential possibilities either of which would be possible, i.e. weak assertion.

The precise signification of these verbs depends on which of the two complementizers is to be used, and how both are to mark the evidential and/or non-factual meanings of the complement realized by an Equational, Nominal or Verbal clause. That is, if the Nominal that-clause functioning as a complement is introduced by “anna”, “anna” would indicate the factuality of the statement it introduces whether its lexical verb is a perfective or imperfective. If the lexical verb of the Nominal is an imperfective, the imperfective will further mark the evidential meaning of the that-clause by being put in the indicative mood even if we use a verb of doubt. Consider the
following use of “zanantu” as a verb of doubt:

\[
\text{Zanantu anna 'l-walada yal'abu.} \\
\text{Thought-I that the-boy-acc plays-ind.} \\
\text{(I knew that the boy plays/will play/played/had played.)}
\]

Since the complementizer “anna” marks what follows as factual in Arabic, the verb of doubt here is suggestively translated into “knew” in an attempt to convey the factuality of the that-statement. In other words, the certainty the example above expresses is synonymous with the certainty expressed by using a verb of certainty to introduce the Nominal that-clause functioning as a complement. Consider:

\[
\text{‘Alimtu anna 'l-walada yal'abu.} \\
\text{Knew-I that the-boy-acc play-ind.} \\
\text{(I knew that the boy plays/will play/played/had played.)}
\]

If, however, a verb of doubt is followed by the second complementizer “an”, which in turn obligatorily requires a subsequent Verbal complement with an imperfective, two possible modal meanings depending on the mood of the imperfective in the complement would ensue. (i) It would express certainty, if the imperfective is being put in the indicative as in

\[
\text{Zanantu an yaqomu Zaydun.} \\
\text{Thought-(I) that stand-ind Zeid-nom.} \\
\text{(I knew that Zeid stands up/will stand up/is standing up/stood up.)}
\]

which is equivalent to,

\[
\text{‘Alimtu an yaqomu Zaydun.} \\
\text{Knew-(I) that stand-ind Zeid-nom.} \\
\text{(I knew that Zeid stands up/is standing up/will stand/is stood up.)}
\]

in which the verb of certainty, “knew that...”, is used. It should be mentioned in passing that az-Zajjaajii (1984: 197-8), argues that if the complementizer “an” is used immediately after a verb of certainty, “an” should be regarded as a contracted form of the complementizer “anna” which always introduces a factual complement.
(ii) it would express doubt and non-factuality if the imperfective is being put in the subjunctive mood. Consider:

\[\text{Zanantu an yaquwma Zaydun.} \]

\[\text{Believed(-l) that stand-sub Zeid-nom} \]

\[\text{(I believed that Zeid would stand up.)} \]

So far I have been discussing the consequences of treating all types of emphasisers in Arabic as realizations of Evidential modality. The discussion also briefly referred to how other types of evidentiality such as quotative, deduction, etc., are classically studied by some prominent linguists. Next we will turn our attention to the evidential realizations of Emphasis proper. Some of the exemplifications given previously and to be given below are drawn from the Qur’aan together with their interpretations by Arberry (1983) and Ali, A. Y. (1946)

5.6 REALIZATIONS OF EMPHASIS PROPER

5.6.1 Repetition

One of the most widely investigated linguistic realizations of emphatic evidentiality in both written and spoken MSA is repetition. As a componential device of message transmission, repetition clearly contributes to text development and texture creating a map of ties relating similar lexical co-occurrence throughout the text to each other in order to create a meaningful communicative piece of text. As a result, the repetition componential function evidently expresses textually an intrinsic or perhaps obligatory function with which the texture of text can dispense. In this sense, however, repetition should not be sided with those evidentials realizing Emphasis as a primarily interpersonal function, because Emphasis is an Optional intra-clausal evidential added to the main predication of the clause in order to realize how committed and certain the text producer is with regard to his factual claim. Hence the primary function of emphatic
repetition is interpersonal, which may further have textual implications attendant upon text development. Being an interpersonal and emotive modal device, an optional repetition element usually indicates not only its social role to influence others by marking the text producer's strong commitment to the truth of his message but also a functional closeness to that of evidential modals whose primary function is jointly to express the text producer's own attitude towards his message.

A second observable difference between interpersonal and textual repetition is that an optional repetition element is bound to influence negatively the degree of text informativity. In other words, an optional repetition element may be used whenever the text producer's persuasive reasoning or other evidential becomes no longer effective and persuasive. An obligatory repetition element, by contrast, does not have such an informativity reducing influence, hence less contributory to Emphasis production in argumentative discourse.

A third significant difference between interpersonal and textual repetition is that optional repetition, in a sense, can represent a choice between ellipsis vs optional repetition to be employed in congruent and/or incongruent contexts. If the context does or does not require the use of emphatic repetition or ellipsis, the text producer may or may not observe the submaxims of Emphasis and ellipsis depending on the receiver's immediate and long-term communicative ideologies and values.

Viewing repetition as an optional element within the texture of a text is consistent with the definition of evidentiality, to the effect that the choice to use or to avoid Emphasis does not change the main predication of the clause concerned.

Typologically, repetition as an interpersonal element operational on (i) intrasentential and (ii) inter-sentential levels, can be analysed on the basis of repetition of
form, i.e. lexico-grammatical, and repetition of function, i.e. experiential, or both. The first two types of repetition are based on the textual

    techniques in which forms recur with somewhat different content or content recurs with different forms. (Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981: 57).

The third type of repetition, on the other hand, may be based on the simultaneous repetition of form and content in a given discourse.

Emphatic repetition is defined as

    any kind of repetition that reinforces or draws extra attention to a concept, be it a single item, a phrase, or some larger unit of speech, for purposes of [reassurance] and contrast, or in order to impart some emotive connotation to what is repeated (Persson, 1974: 50).

The attitudes or emotions intensificationally expressed via repetition may qualitatively vary in terms of receiver’s type and constative’s type along the two dimensions of observing or flouting the respective submaxims postulated in our pragmatic model.

Realizationally, emphatic repetition can be either lexico-grammatical, synonymous, cognate adverbial, structural parallelism, paraphrase, and intensification. Let us discuss each of these in turn.

5.6.1.1 Lexico-grammatical Repetition

Lexico-grammatical repetition، آلناكيد اللفظي، as a sub-type of emphatic realizations forming appositives in Arabic, involves the exact asyndetical repetition of some constituent emphasized, i.e constituent Emphasis, or the whole clause emphasized, i.e. predicational Emphasis, for not more than three times. The repetition which affects almost all clause constituents covers the same grammatical and lexical patternings of a constituent or clause structure. Its function seems to be to eliminate
scepticism by reassuring the receiver of the truth of the proposition communicated. However, it may further be used to express contrastiveness at a later stage in a confrontational situation. This type of repetition is too obvious to exemplify illustratively.

5.6.1.2 Synonymous Repetition

Synonymous repetition, التأكيد المعنوي, forming the second sub-type of emphatic realizations of appositives, occurs when the use of certain pronominal appositives must immediately follow the emphasized nominal group which must always be definite. A second necessary criterion for such pronominals to produce Emphasis is that a pronoun co-referential with the definite emphasized nominal group must further be suffixed to them. Prosodically, these emphasizers receive extra intonation to mark their predominant use for Emphasis proper and possibly for contrastiveness as well. Morphologically, these emphasizers which can be used to realize epistemic, deontic and dynamic utterances, take the same case marking as the emphasized, be it indicative, accusative or genitive.

Two types of modal realizations are identified, emphatic reflexivizers and emphatic totalizers. The former which include: نفس, (self), and عين, “ayn”, (self), represent a group of reflexivizers functioning as identificational or specificational emphasizers. These must agree in gender, number and person with the definite nominal group they co-referentially emphasize. Their inflections, in addition, can have the prepositional prefix /bi-, which changes the emphasizers’ case endings into genitive no matter what case ending the preceding emphasized element has. However, it must be treated positionally as either nominative, accusative or genitive depending on the grammatical function of the emphasized in the clause structure. Consider:

\[
\text{Jaa' a Zaydun nafsahu} \quad \text{نافساه} \\
\text{Come-(he) Zeid-nom self-nom-him.} \quad \text{:came-(he) Zeid-nom self-nom-him.}
\]
(Zeid himself came.)

Jaa'a Zaydun bi-nafs i hu.
(Came-(he) Zeid-nom by-self-gen-him.
(Zeid himself came.)

The latter which include two of totality, viz. كل, “kull”, (all) and, جميع ,
“jamii”, (all), and two of duality viz. كل , “kilaa”, (both-masc.); كلتاا ,
(both-fem.), represent a group of emphasers expressing “totality”, i.e. total
applicability of the proposition expressed on the members of the group, and those
expressing total “duality”. These must agree with the preceding emphasized in gender
and person as well. Consider:

Dhahaba 'l-qawmu kulluhum.
(All of the people went.)

5.6.1.3 Cognate Adverbial

The cognate adverbial is

the element specifying the Range or the scope of the
process (Halliday, 1985:134).

Range” is a nominal group, which is always accusatively case-marked and is
normally cognate to the verb, the verbal noun, or active and passive participles in
clauses. Some nominal groups which realize certain processes need not be cognate to the
element whose Range they specify. However, cognateness is predominantly a necessary
feature in MSA as well as Classical Arabic.

Functionally, Range may either qualitatively intensifies the process if it is
undefined, specifies the kind of process if it is defined, or specifies the number of
processes that take place. The indefiniteness of the Range in the first function denotes
the unlimited nature of the intensificational occurrence underlying the process of the
clause concerned. This is the only function whereby Range seems to produce Emphasis
in epistemic, deontic and dynamic clauses alike in MSA. In addition, the Range can further express the attitudinal meaning of the quality of how the process takes place.

Consider:

\[ \text{Darabnuhu} \quad \text{darban}. \]
\[ \text{Hit-(I)-him} \quad \text{hitting}. \]
\[ \text{Process-Actor Range:process} \]
\[ (\text{I hit him severely}) \]

Here the clause is epistemic, expressing content repetition through the use of the Range element “\( \text{darban} \)”. The example can be likened to the structure \((\text{They sucked us dry})\) in English in which the adjective “\( \text{dry} \)” emphasizes the duration of the process. The scope of Emphasis is the truth value of the whole proposition through emphasizing the intensification of the process. So it is a predicational Emphasis, which may be employed predominantly in reconfirmation-seeking situations. Thus the use of the Range as an evidential modal indicates that the process not only has simply taken place but also with intensity.

The same thing can be said if the above example is one of deontic modality, i.e. positive and negative imperative. Sometimes the verb in the imperative is elliptical for swiftness, owing to lack of time in directive imperatives, leaving the Range to express what the whole imperative clause would have conveyed.

In the case of interrogatives, the verb is obligatorily elliptical if the Range is placed next to the yes/no interrogative particle، \( \text{ئَلَّافَ هَمْ زَا} \). In this case, the conversational implicature derivable is a deontic statement used for rebuke (cf. deontic modality in chapter 3).

There is a group of Range adverbials in Arabic normally used elliptically and indicating the text producer's emphasis on the ellipted verb they modify. Such elements, which can be used without the lexical verb they modify, include حُقَّا، “\( \text{haqqan} \)”,

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5.6.1.4 Structural Parallelism

Structural parallelism (SP) in Arabic rhetoric is viewed as an ornamental figure of speech strung throughout the clause structure largely for rhetorical reasons. It is empirically claimed that SP is a characteristic feature of poetry typically requiring rhythm, rhyme and prosodic patterns strictly adhered to in poetry versing. Beeston (1970) suggests that, for example,

rhymed prose, السجع, which is a very highly-flown style, could be called poetry within the ancient Semitic definition, although it is not "poetry", (shi’r) for an Arab, because shi’r has developed a well-defined prosodic structure based on a pattern of contrast between the syllabic structures CV and CVC (112-3).

In literary and political discourses, for example, SP, because of the formal symmetries of the clauses paralleled, can realize a cohesive tie between two or more adjacent clauses. The cohesive tie may further be

re-inforced by lexical equivalence and implications of semantic relationship (usually of contrast) (Quirk et al., 1972: 308).

SP basically contributes to the aesthetic aspect characteristic of certain rhetorical argumentative discourses used in certain contexts in which the text producer intends to

elicit admiration for the eloquence and exert a powerful ethical appeal (Corbett, 1966: 425).

In addition, SP can be used to relay Emphasis through the repetitive use of form or content or both in adjacent constituents or clauses. Thus SP is one linguistic way language makes available of

infusing vehemence and passion into spoken words,
while more particularly when it is combined with the argumentative passages it not only persuades the hearer but actually makes him its slave (ibid.).

SP is linguistically realized at different levels involving two or more morphemes, nominal groups, verbal groups, adverbial groups, prepositional phrases, or clauses syndetically or asyndetically juxtaposed because of their either total or partial formal symmetries. SP, being a primarily formal ornamentation, can be identified at almost all levels of the clause surface structure. Thus it may be realized syntactically, morphologically, lexically, metrically, etc.

1 Notional Relations of Structural Parallelism

Despite the fact that in SP primacy is given to form rather than content, various notional relations can further the formal affinities of parallelistic structures in discourse. In Arabic rhetoric some thirty notional ornamentations, العربية المتعالية, representing highly specific shades of meaning between adjacent clauses of SP, have been eventually identified. It will surely be too digressive to attempt to illustrate all of such relations in the present research. However, Leech (1969,67) notes that every parallelism sets up a relation of equivalence...the connection is, broadly speaking, either of similarity or contrast.

Other well recognized types of such relations may include climaxing and/or synthetical notional relations which indicate that the last structure is built on a completion or climax of the preceding structure(s). Both will be termed here “Synthetical Parallelism”. Thus, there are three widely recognized notional relations of SP, namely antithetical, synonymous and synthetical. Let us turn to each one of these next.

a. Antithetical Parallelism

In parallel structures the notional relation may be one of contrast, which may formally be expressed either explicitly by using certain adversative connectors, or
implicitly. Antithetical parallelism seems to be similar to that expressed by Specificational Emphasis, to the effect that it involves two or more structures projecting “rejection” and “correction” relation (cf. Dik’s example of parallel Focus given in our discussion on the parameter “functions of the Emphasis” in chapter 4). The only difference is that antithesis is occasioned by the internal relations between the contrasted pairs, whereas S Emphasis is occasioned by having the correct and incorrect values specifically linked to the receiver’s presupposition. Further, antithetical parallelism does not necessarily reject and correct anything related to the receiver’s beliefs and assumptions. Consider the following Qur’anic verse (IX,81), which expresses two antithetical actions by the same Subject. Consider:

فليضحروا قليلاً و ليبكوا كثيراً
(Therefore let them laugh little, much will they have to weep.)

b. Synonymous Parallelism

This type which refers to the synonymous relation that ties parallelistic structures, may be realized at the lexical level as in:

أَنْتَابَ ضَعْمَ فُحَمّ.
(A huge and bulky book)

c. Synthetical Parallelism

This indicates that the completion of a proposition or thought of the first structure takes place in the subsequent structure. Consider the following example:

إِرتِفَاعُ الاختِلاطُ بَاقِتِحَامِ الاختِلاطٍ.
(Considerable stature is obtainable through one’s exposure to perils.)

2 Rhetorical Functions of Structural Parallelism

Foremost among the significant regulative principles regarding the intent of a communicative act is appropriateness which mediates between effectiveness and
efficiency of the act concerned. For a text to be effective it necessarily depends on its leaving a strong impression and creating favourable conditions for attaining a goal (Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981: 11).

To realize effectiveness, the text producer has at his disposal numerous rhetorical devices in language such as SP, which is a way of aesthetic manipulation of language and which additionally expresses the text producer's attitudinal meaning in a negotiating social interaction. SP is believed to relay functional intent such as symmetry, clarity, climaxing, foregrounding and Emphasis. Only the last two functions will be briefly sketched out.

Foregrounding, i.e. unmarked Focus, is a procedure of putting an element in prominence in order for it to be interpreted by measuring it against the background of the expected pattern (Leech, 1969: 57).

Structural Parallelism thus consists in the introduction of extra regularities, not irregularities, into language (ibid, 62).

These extra regularities are intended to put the elements of SP in a foregrounding patterning and thus putting Focus on a message either synonymously, antithetically, etc., in such a way as to bring about the receiver's attention to the central issue communicated. In other words, the notional relations brought about by the parallelistic structures are intended to shed some light on a particular point from notionally different perspectives.

As for Emphasis, SP sometimes highlights a message by viewing it from different linguistic perspectives, i.e. antithesis, paraphrase, etc., hence putting it into Focus. But when such perspectives are linguistically moulded symmetrically, the
highlight is further emphasized by form repetition. That is, SP realizes Emphasis partly by Focus and partly by form and sometimes content repetition. Consequently, the emphatic nature, weak though it may be, contributes as a useful component of a persuasive style to impelling or stirring the receiver's emotions in the direction of the text producer's prime intent. In this respect, Leech (1969: 67) points out that

SP is very often connected with rhetorical Emphasis and memorability.

SP is very well researched in Arabic rhetoric, and what has been so far said is only the tip of the iceberg. However, the relation SP has with Emphasis is clear enough.

5.6.1.5 Paraphrase

Paraphrase is defined as

the recurrence of content with a change of expression
(Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981: 58).

Paraphrase is studied in Arabic rhetoric as \( \text{ةَطَنُب} \) (lit. prolixity), which accounts primarily for the purposes of paraphrase in a given discourse. Paraphrase is closely linked on the one hand with synonymy, i.e. true- or near-synonymy, and on the other with stylistic variations, because

the conception of style rests upon the notion of synonymy and paraphrase, [both of which are concerned with] the sameness of meaning [but] can be studied from different perspectives. In semantics, emphasis is on sameness of meaning, whereas in stylistics it is on differences of expression (Hendricks, 1976: 173).

Further, although paraphrase tends in a sense to be tautological, at a closer investigation, it reveals certain important implications concerning the nuances the text producer would like to bring to light. In this respect, Longacre (1983: 114) concludes that
on some intermediate level, paraphrase is needed because it emerges at different places [i.e. in a cause and effect relation] in the surface structure of languages- and even within the same language.

This is not to claim that using paraphrase is necessary for the grammaticality of the message encoded. On the contrary, for paraphrase to be an emphatic realization, it must be characteristically elliptical, i.e. optional, when used to provide in an explanatory manner the same information as the antecedent. The relation between the antecedent and the paraphrastic expression is one of sense rather than reference that concerns the internal sense relations within the clause in question.

Textual paraphrase, on the other hand,

typically refers to a meta-linguistic commentary on a text, a matter of a supplement to a text rather than a stylistic alternative to it (Hendricks, 1976: 32)

Detecting paraphrase can be achievable on the basis of the criteria of

(i) changeability in all contexts and (ii) identity in both truth-conditional and emotive import. (cf. Lyons, 1968: 448)

As is clear, this concerns total synonymy only, which is one of the long-standing issues that divides traditional and contemporary linguists. Both criteria, however, can be utilized in measuring paraphrase within the clause and textual boundary.

Functionally, paraphrase could be accounted for in terms of Grice's pragmatic interpretation by either observing or flouting the respective submaxims of Emphasis in order to uphold and/or flout the second submaxim of quality in congruent and incongruent contexts respectively. When the text producer detects a suspicious receiver regarding the quality of the information communicated, he may choose to use repetition in congruent contexts. Being emphatically repetitious, however, is different from being too informative by providing further specific details in order to imply that the text
producer knows of p. Thus, being too informative, which may indicate evidential implications and involve flouting the submaxim of being as informative as required, may involve the use of certain types of paraphrase.

Typologically, at least seven varieties of paraphrase which account for the text producer’s intent are recognized in Arabic rhetoric. In English, on the other hand, seven varieties of paraphrase, according to Longacre, 1983: 114-24), are identified. We will be using some of his terminology in enlisting paraphrase varieties in Arabic rhetoric. Paraphrastic varieties can be classified as follows:

1 *Generic-Specific Paraphrase.*

This involves providing a more specific lexical element(s) (i.e. information), in the second occurrence than in the first. The specific information, though paraphrastic, must be syndetically coordinated with the antecedent via 'and'. The provision of such information is intended to highlight the importance of the specific information to the general sense of the first clause. Consider the following Qur’aanic verse (II, 238):

(Guard strictly your prayers, especially the Middle prayer; ...)

2 *Specific-Generic Paraphrase.*

This refers to the employment of a generic lexical element(s), i.e. information, following more specific lexical elements representing the antecedent. The reason for the use of this type of paraphrase is to generalize, together with highlighting the importance of what is specific. No examples are necessary as it is clear from the above example.

3 *Disambiguation Paraphrase.*

This paraphrastic occurrence intends to disambiguate the antecedent conveying general or ambiguous information. Consider the following example cited in the Qur’aan
(XXVI, 133):

إِنْ تُفْقَرُوا إِلَّا أَنْ تُسْكَمِلنَّ مَا تَعْلُمُونَ، أَمْدُكُمْ بِالْأَمْعَامِ وَبِبَنِينِ وَجَنَّاتٍ وَعيُونٍ.

(... and fear Him who has succoured you with what you know, succoured you with flocks and sons, gardens and fountains.)

4 Equivalence Paraphrase. التذبذب

This refers to the repetition of the exact content with different wording. Consider the following verse from the Qur’aan (XVII, 81);

وَقَالَ جَاءَ اللَّهُ وَزَهَقَ الْبَاطِلُ إِنَّ الْبَاطِلَ كَانَ زَهَوْفاً.

(The truth has come, and falsehood has vanished away; for falsehood is always bound to vanish.)

5 Corrective Paraphrase. الاحتراس

This refers to the use of paraphrase for preventing any possible misinterpretation of the antecedent. Consider the following Qur’aanic verse (XVI,97):

مَنْ أَعَمَّ صَلَاةَ ذِكْرِهِ أو أَنْفِشَتْ وَهُوَ مَوْضُوعٌ فَلْنَحْبِيَّةُ

(And whoever does a righteous deed, be it male or female, believing, we shall assuredly give him to live a goodly life.)

The antecedent “righteous deeds” does not suffice, as one should also be a true believer.

6 Appositional Paraphrase. الاعتراض

This refers to the insertion of a phrase or clause in a clause structure or between two adjacently juxtaposed clauses for Emphasis, glorification, etc. Appositional realizations are too obvious to provide further illustrations.
7 Repetitive Paraphrase

This refers to the exact repetition of the preceding phrase or clause for Emphasis. We have discussed this as a realization of lexico-grammatical repetition above.

Modally, paraphrase is yet another way of conveying evidential implications which seems to be employed predominantly with a re-confirmation seeking receiver.

5.6.1.6 Intensification

Intensification, "mubalagha", (hyperbole), is defined as an exaggerated description that may reach its utmost heightening or lowering effect which is either impossible or unlikely but not infinite. (my translation)

As such, intensification concerns the experiential meaning of the clause elements which in addition has interpersonal meaning expressing the text producer’s certainty towards his proposition. It may be treated as a means of content repetition, indicating that the proposition did not stop at an initial stage but went on farther than that. Hyperbole is the incongruent use of exaggerated terms for the purpose of expressing Emphasis and attitudinal emotions. It is closely related to imagery and metaphor, which would highlight the aesthetic aspect of what is expressed (cf. next chapter).

Intensification can further be realized either lexically by using special verbs, adjectives, quasi-adjectives, superlatives, adverbs, etc., indicating that an action is performed with great violence, repeatedly, temporally and/or qualitatively extensively, or clausally by special structures such as a type of S Emphasis, synonymous repetition, or other hyperbolic linguistic means.

Typologically, intensification, according to al-Qazwiinii (62, vol. 6), is of three types:
To distinguish between these types, traditional rhetoricians established two criteria based on whether or not a state of affairs is imaginably and/or habitually possible. Thus “tabliigh” is characterized as being both imaginably and habitually possible. The second is characterized as being only imaginably possible. The third, by contrast, is characterized as being neither imaginably nor habitually possible.

Quirk et al. (1990: 142-3) account for intensifying adjectives by postulating a trichotomy whereby such adjectives are classified into

a. Emphasizers, which have a heightening or lowering effect on the noun they modify
b. amplifiers, which scale upwards from assumed norm, and
c. downtoners, which have a lowering effect, usually scaling downwards from an assumed norm.

Their account is clearly dissimilar to Arab traditionalists’ as it focuses only on lexical realizations of intensification in English clause structures. Consider the following example (Corbett, 1965: 444):

*His eloquence would split the rocks.*

The example implies that his eloquence is so effective that it would persuade even those who are extremely stubborn. Literally, it is neither imaginably nor habitually possible, i.e. a realization of “ghuluw”. Similarly, consider the following Qur’aanic verse (VII, 40) which demonstrates a disproportionate way of expressing deontic modality, i.e. commissive:

ولا يدخلون الجنة حتى يبلج الحمل في سم الخياط.

-*wa laa yadhuluuna 'l-jannata hattaa and not they-enter-ind Paradise-acc until

-yalija 'l-jamalu fii samnu 'l-khayyaati
pass the-camel through the-eye-of-the-needle
(nor they will enter Paradise until the camel passes through the eye of the needle.)

This example too is a realization of “ghuluw” as it is neither imaginably nor habitually possible. Both examples show that intensification is also a linguistic means with evidential implications by using disproportionate expressions that can be analysed in terms of implicature. The use of intensification in the examples above is meant to flout the maxim of content congruence in congruent contexts in which the text producer observes the submaxims of Emphasis and Quality, or in incongruent contexts in which he further flouts the submaxims of Emphasis and quality concerned. Thus, intensification as an Emphatic realization expresses the text producer’s strong emotional adherence and commitment to the certainty of the proposition of his utterance.

5.6.2 Emphatic Adverbials

There is a group of certain adverbs which if used seems to yield Emphasis proper. The most common of these are: قط “qattu”, (ever) and أبداً “abadan”.

1. “Qattu”, (ever, at all, or never)

This is an emphatic adverb which is normally used to assert the negative aspect of an epistemic statement with a perfective. Its normal syntactic position is after the object or the lexical verb if no object is present. Consider:

\[\text{maa kadhabtu qattu.} \]  
\[\text{not lied-I ever.} \]  
\[\text{(I never ever lied, or, I did not lie at all.)} \]

It can similarly be used in interrogatives where it is placed in the same position. The interrogative must be about a past state of affairs as well. Consider:

\[\text{hal ra'aytu qattu?} \]  
\[\text{Did saw-you-him ever?} \]  
\[\text{(Did you ever see him?)} \]

In both usages, “qattu” emphatically re-enforces the lexical verb in terms of negativity in
statements and interrogativity in questions. Its being used as an evidential indicating the text producer's emotional commitment and certainty of his statement is clear. Contextually, "qattu" seems to be used to address re-confirmation seeking as well as counter-presuppositional receivers.

2. "Abadan", (ever, at all)

This is an adverb used to emphasize the positive or negative imperfective referring to futuristic commitment. It takes the same syntactic position as "qattu". Consider:

\[
\text{lan usaafira abadan. Taf I ji L., p I 4.; J}
\]
\[
\text{never I-travel-sub ever. (I will never ever travel.)}
\]

Here, this example, in which two emphatic modals are being used, seems to be employed to address a counter-presuppositional receiver. The use of both evidentials commits the text producer to the fulfilment of his future action in the same way as commissives. If "abadan" is used with a non-emphatic negative device such as : \(\neg\), "lāa", (will not), it seems to be appropriate for a re-confirmation seeking receiver.

5.6.3 Oath Structure

As was pointed out earlier, the oath is treated as a non-directive performative which can evidentially modify a subsequent constative or a further directive performative, i.e. question, request, promise, etc. However, oath or swearing in speech acts theory is treated, as we saw in chapter two, as either a representative or a commissive act. This is similar to what is argued in Arabic grammar concerning the fact that oath structures themselves can either be realized by a performative or constative utterance. Additionally, it was clearly stated with regard to our two new proposals that oath may be taken as the strongest type of emphatic evidential realization used to indicate absolute certainty of what is being expressed.
Oath may be defined as

a solemn avowal, with God or somebody venerated as a witness, that one is speaking the truth, will carry out something intended, etc. (Grambs, 1985: 253)

It is a means of committing the text producer towards what is linguistically conveyed in epistemic modality, and a means of laying obligation to fulfil a certain state of affairs in the future in deontic modality. It is commonly realized by elliptical prepositional phrases such as, بالله، والله، تالله، (by God), and occasionally a full clause such as, أقسم بالله، (I swear by God) and the like, which both indicate the factuality of the utterance verb they emphatically modalize.

Syntagmatically, the normal place of oath expressions is as presentative structures used immediately before a constative or performative utterance they modify modally. However, its expressions can parenthetically be inserted, among others, between (i) the G Subject and the predicate, (ii) the relative pronoun and the remaining relative clause, (iii) the verb and the L Subject and (iv) the verb and the object.

Oath structures, i.e. the emphizer, normally modify a positive or negative constative or performative, i.e. the emphasized, on the basis of the following conditions:

a. an Equational affirmative clause initiating with the emphatic prefix /la-/ (indeed), or “inna”, (indeed), or both by placing “inna”, initially and /la-/ prefixed to the predicate. Consider:

wa ilaahi inna Ahmada la-dhakiyyun

(by God indeed Ahmed-acc very-clever-nom)

(By God Ahmed is indeed very clever.)

b. a Verbal affirmative clause with a perfective. This requires the use of “laqad”, (did indeed), preceding the perfective. Consider:
billaahi laqad saafara Ahmadu.

*(By God Ahmed has indeed travelled.)*

But if the clause is with an imperfective, the imperfective takes both the energetic form by having the suffix /-an/ or /-anna/, and the prefix /la-/ simultaneously. Consider:

wa 'llaahi la-u&irnannaka.

*(By God I shall reward you.)*

Admittedly, this is a very scanty account of oath structures in Arabic, as it will certainly take us beyond the limits set up for the present research to provide a detailed account. However, the account above captures the basic points pertinent to oath structures as an emphatic realization.

### 5.6.4 Emphatic Particles

In Arabic, there is a group of particles, prefixes and suffixes, language uses to relay emphatic evidentiality, indicating the text producer’s strong commitment and certainty towards his proposition. Some of them are solely used to relay Emphasis, others have, in addition to their emphatic function, a basic meaning such as negation, time reference, etc. Let us discuss them in turn.

1. **Lan**, (will never)

   “Lan” is a negative particle which is always used to precede a subjunctive imperfective in order to emphatically negate future action. Using this discourse-oriented evidential indicates that the text producer emphatically undertakes to enforce the abstention from doing future actions. Its use is clearly subjectively deontic and parallel to commissive acts whether the text producer is or is not the Subject. It also indicates that the source of authority is the text producer himself. The scope of evidentiality which this modal clausally exerts is predicational since it has the verb in its scope.
“Lan”, if used alone in the clause structure, seems to convey a very strong deontic negation which accordingly can be used either to reassure a reconfirmation seeking receiver, or to counter-presuppose a counter-presuppositional receiver. The abstention does not seem to imply temporariness. Consider:

\[ \text{Lan naqbala 'l-dayma.} \]
\[ \text{لن نقبل الضيم.} \]
\[ \text{never we-submit-sub oppression-acc.} \]
\[ \text{(We shall never submit to oppression.)} \]
\[ \text{(Cowan, 1958:93)} \]

2. /Sa-/ and Sawfa, (shall and will),

/Sa-/ and “Sawfa” are modals, indicating positive future commitment. The latter, according to as-Sayyyuṭi, (1984: 262 vol. ii), is a modal expressing future tentativeness, by inserting it before the imperfective, and it can only be emphatic if the emphatic modal /la-/ is prefixed to it, i.e. “la-sawfa”, (certainly). Consider the following example drawn from Cantarino (1974: 77. vol.i):

\[ \text{Falasawfa nuqaddimu lahaa} \]
\[ \text{Certainly-will we-give-ind. for-her} \]
\[ -waliimatan laa tansaahaa. \]
\[ a-banquet not she-forget-it \]
\[ (We shall (will certainly) give her a banquet that she will not forget) \]

The other modal, /sa-/, which is always prefixed to the indicative imperfective, expresses an undertaking to fulfil future judgment. It represents the positive counterpart of “Lan”, (shall never), and is thus used to emphasize what the verb expresses particularly in threats and commissives. Being a preverbal prefix, /sa-/ has the whole event in its scope, i.e. predicational Emphasis. Consider:

\[ \text{Sa-usaa'iduka.} \]
\[ \text{Shall-(will certainly)-I-help-ind.-you.} \]
\[ (I shall help you) \]
3. /-an/ and /-anna/

The modals /-an/ and /-anna/ are emphatic suffixes which are always appended to the imperfective under certain constraints and freely to the non-modalized imperative form. Appending both suffixes to the two verbal forms under certain morphological conditions realizes the energetic mood primarily associated with indirect mandate. It is unnecessary to illustrate such morphological conditioning here, as the focus is on the pragmatic function of these emphatic particles. As for their emphatic force, it has been argued in Arabic grammar that /-an/ is emphatically weaker than /-anna/.

Both suffixal evidentials are usable either optionally, thus emphatic, or obligatorily, thus non-emphatic. Both evidentials can optionally be appended to the imperfective if the imperfective denotes directivity such as, positive and negative mandate, question, exhortative, requestive, desiderative, etc. They can further be appended to a non-modalized imperative form without any syntactic preconditions. The time reference of the imperfective becomes futuristic.

Both evidentials whose scope would be the whole utterance, predicational emphasis, and possibly some constituent, indicate emotional and intensificational emphasis. Their meaning depends on whether the type of utterance, in which they are used, is constative or directive performative. For example in direct mandate if either suffix is used, it may indicate the text producer's slight irritation. To translate this type of mandate into English it would be appropriate to bring in the subject realized by the second person pronoun. Consider:

\[\text{udrus-anna!} \text{ مدرسُسن!} \]
\[(\text{you)-study!} \text{ (You STUDY!) or (You all STUDY)}\]

In this example, two possibilities ensue from the use of the emphatic suffix /-anna/, the first is that it may be used to address a second person singular, and the second is that it
may further be used to address a second person plural Subject depending on the context in which it will be used. If the Subject is plural then the meaning may be non-contrastive and admonitory. But the meaning of the same example may be contrastive by singling out one person or a group of persons from among several persons or groups.

4. Qad, قد, (have)

Syntactically, “qad” is always placed immediately before the perfective and the indicative imperfective. In the case of the former, “qad” epistemically expresses an evidential implication to the effect that a certain near past state of affairs has already occurred, i.e. evidential. Its use would be similar to the past perfect in English. Consider:

Qad sami’tu sawtan.  
Have heard-I a-voice.  
(I have heard a voice.)

In the case of the latter, however, “qad” conveys epistemic possibility, i.e. speculative, equivalent to what “may” or “might” expresses epistemically in English.

The scope of “qad” in the clause structure seems to be the truth value of the whole proposition, i.e. predicational Emphasis. Functionally, it may be used as an emphaser to meet a reconfirmation seeking receiver’s scepticism depending on the situation.

There is one interesting modal use of “qad” if it is placed immediately before a certain perfective group of verbs, which express futuristic promise and threat. Consider the following example from the Qu’a’an (XXIII. 1):

Qad aflaha ‘l-mu’muunun ‘l-ladhiina hum  
Have prospered the-believers who they
The example shows the incongruent modal use of the perfective “aflaha” (prospered), to refer to a future state of affairs. It follows from this that

\[
\text{tense would be a specific kind of modality} \\
\text{(Lyons, 1977, 820)}
\]

and imply evidential implications, which may not, however, be directly observed. That is, the perfective “aflaha”, which gives rise to a very serious translation problem, must be understood to convey a commissive act which is further emphatically enhanced by the presence of “qad” as an evidential modal indicating that something has already happened. This factual certainty is deictically intended to refer to future action rather than past action. Pragmatically, the use of “qad” here appears to be in conformity with the submaxim of Emphasis concerned in order to uphold the second submaxim of quality. The use of the perfective rather than the congruent imperfective obviously flouts the respective submaxim of tense in order to observe the same submaxim of quality. The verse denotes that God’s promise to reward the believers, which is yet to occur, has already occurred, hence God’s promise shall certainly occur. “Qad”, can additionally receive the emphatic modal prefix /la-/. Consider:

\[
La-qad \quad ataa \quad Ahmadyd \\
\text{certainly-has came Ahmed.} \\
\text{(Ahmed has certainly come.)}
\]

5. /La-/, (indeed, truly)

The modal /la-/, (indeed), is an emphatic prefix which has been given various designations owing to the heterogeneous functions it performs in different clause
structures and structural positions. What such types of /la-/ have in common is to produce Emphasis and intensification in certain syntactic positions when they are prefixed to:

a. the G Subject of the Equational clause,

La-anta rajulun kariimun.  
indeed-you a-man-nom generous-nom.  
(It is YOU who is a generous man.)

b. the predicate of the Equational if it is initially positioned as in

La-kaatibun ‘aziimun anta.  
indeed-litterateur-nom great-nom you.  
(You are indeed a great litterateur.)

c. the predicate of the Nominal, i.e. realized by an imperfective, and/or Equational if both are preceded by the subjunct disjunct “inna”. (cf. the example on multiple Emphasis in chapter four,

d. the imperfective predicate of a Nominal clause which must be introduced by a negative expression such as “maa kaana” or “laml yakun” (would not have...). Consider the following Qur'aanic verse (IV, 137):

Lam yakun al-laahu li-yaghfira Lahum.  
Not would God-nom (HE)-forgive-sub them  
(God would never have forgiven them.)

Note that the meaning of this example is not to be understood as referring to a particular past event. In fact, if we take the intent of the utterance it would be habitually volitional indicating that God does not forgive those who did, do, or will not believe in Him. So the translation here is extremely suggestive, and
e. the pronoun of separation

\[
\text{\textit{inna ihsaanaka ilaam 'l-fuqara'i}}
\]
Actually, help-your for the-poor

\[
\text{\textit{la-huwa ajallu 'amalin taquumu bihi}}
\]
indeed-it most-respectable deed (you)-do it
(Actually, your help for the poor is indeed the most respectable deed)

6. Kaana, \( \text{\textit{kan}} \), (was, were)

"Kaana" is one of the defective verbs in MSA indicating past time reference only, and it normally initiates Nominal and Equational clauses but may be interpolated immediately before the predicate of both clause structures. The logical and grammatical Subjects of both clauses remain nominatively case-marked whereas their residues become accusatively case-marked. Its sole linguistic functions is to deictically identify the time reference of the proposition conveyed. However, there are examples which evidently show that "kaana" as a past time deictic can sometimes be used NOT as a simple past time deictic but as a timeless one. This only occurs when the proposition is self-evident, and "kaana" emphasizes the time reference which started in the remote past and has been going on. So "kaana" accordingly may be used as equivalent to "...always have been...", or simply to "always" as a timeless duration emphazizer. Consider this example from the Qur’aan (XVII, 81):

\[
\text{-quI jaa'a 'l-\text{\textit{haqqu wa-zahaqa 'l-baatilu,}}}
\]
say came-(he) the truth and vanished the falsehood,

\[
\text{-inna 'l-baatila kaana zahuuqaa.}
\]
surely the-falsehood has-always-been vanishing.
(\textit{The truth has come, and falsehood has vanished away; surely falsehood is ever certain to vanish.})
7. **Inna**, (truly, certainly)

"Inna" ُنَّا, (indeed, assuredly, etc.), as a certainty modal subjunct yields an evidential implication when it initiates Nominal and Equational clauses. The word order of the clauses introduced by "inna" whose Subject takes the accusative and the predicate the nominative, is strictly Subject followed by a predicate except when the Subject is indefinite and the predicate is either an adverb of place or a prepositional phrase; in this case the definite predicate precedes the indefinite Subject with their cases retained.

"Inna" can be used to modalize positive and negative statements, and yes/no questions, yielding Predicational Emphasis.

In certain specific syntactic environments, "inna" functions as an optional complementizer which seems to exercise its emphatic function by marking what follows as factual. Morphologically, if "inna" precedes a Nominal with an imperfective, the imperfective remains in the indicative mood, thus marking the factuality of the statement it precedes. Using "inna" as an optional complementizer in such cases is due to the syntactic constraints that preclude the possibility of using either of the other two complementizers, ُنَّ، "an", and, ُنَّ، "anna", (that), in Arabic. Thus "inna" is used:

a. to initiate a Nominal and Equational clause,

b. after verbs of reporting such as قَالَ, "qaala", (said)

c. after the expression of oath,

d. to initiate both types of clauses if the subjunct emphaser /la-/ is prefixed to their predicates,

e. after an imperative form which precedes a constative utterance,

f. after a vocative expression,

g. after ُثُمَّ, "thumma", (then)

h. after ُعِندَ, "idh", (when)

i. after ُهَتَّى, "hattaa", (even)
after 41, “Alaa”, (now surely, truly) as in

Truely, youth does not last forever. 

(Wright, 1985: vol. ii, 310)

k. possibly after حقاً, “haqqan” (truly). Consider the following drawn from Cantarino (1975: 249, vol. ii):

حقاً إن العلم بحر لا ساحل له.

Truly, knowledge is a sea without a shore.

l. as a “yes” response indicating emphatic agreement similar to the use of “indeed” and “certainly”, in English. Consider:

A. لعن الله ناقة حملتني اليلد.
B. إن و راكبه

A. God curse the camel that has brought me to you.
B. indeed, and its rider.

Although all such syntactic specifications for the use of “inna” are useful, it is less certain as to how one should explicate its use as an independent emphatic subjunct. Diib (1984: 188), for example, regards “inna” as an interjection particle, i.e. a presentative “look” indicating a deictically presentative use. However, despite the fact that this argument seems true of a vestigial function of “inna” investigated by medieval grammarians, it seems contextually and co-textually untenable and unconvincing.

Functionally, it is a mystery as to whether “inna” is a predicational or constituent emphazizer. And even if it was a constituent emphazizer, it would be very hard to decide without empirical observations whether “inna” will have the Subject or the predicate in its scope. Most classical rhetoricians confirm the predicational emphazatic function of “inna” because, as was pointed out in chapter two, their studies are restricted to the analysis of predicational Emphasis only. Al-Jurjaanii (227-9) provides some interesting pragmatic explanations of the emphazic use of “inna”. He claims that:
1. "inna" is often used to precede a statement expressing information that is unlikely to be accepted instantly, i.e. differs from the norm or what is generally expected to be the case. Consider:

\[
\text{inna asbaaba 'l-najaahi ma'a 'l-ya'si}
\]
\[
\text{Do the-reasons the-success with the-dejection.}
\]
\[
\text{(The reasons of success do ensue from despair)}
\]

2. "inna" is sometimes used to introduce a statement expressing a proposition indicating that the receiver has allegedly, or appears to have, behaviourally shown that he harbours counter-presuppositions which would be either mistaken or self-assured, though it may not be the case from the point of view of the receiver. The text producer accordingly can use "inna" not only to contrast what the receiver may have thought or shown but also to be derisive. The only example al-Juzjaanii gives and is discussed in our incongruent typologies of constative and receiver, is about a warrior called “Shaqiq” who came to fight without unsheathing his sword. The enemy may believe that Shaqiq appears to harbour counter-presuppositions to the effect that his unsheathing the sword is interpreted by the enemy as a sign of degrading his enemy’s capability to defend themselves. This situation prompts his enemy to use “inna” and say:

\[
\text{...inna banii 'ammika flihim rimaahun.}
\]
\[
\text{...(your fellow cousins (or We) DO have weapons.)}
\]

3. "inna" is occasionally used to signal that the statement it precedes expresses information differing from what has been expected by the text producer himself. Consider the following instance from the Qur’aan (III.36) in which the receiver, God, is already aware of what the statement expresses:
5.6.5 Rhetorical Questions

A rhetorical question, الاتسهام المجاري, is interrogative in structure but has the force of a strong assertion (Quirk et al., 1985: 825).

By conveying strong assertions, rhetorical questions are attitudinally and modally emphatic evidentials indicating the text producer's strong adherence or commitment to the veracity of what is implicitly asserted. Their manifest evidentiality seems to be either sensory or quotative by presupposing the receiver's answer in advance. In other words, the text producer bases his rhetorical question on some factual experience directly or indirectly involving not only himself but the receiver as well. This characteristic feature is the crux of rhetorical questions.

Rhetorical questions are clearly a blunt way of reproaching the receiver by either reminding him of past direct or indirect evidence or by eliciting his agreement by imposing on him shared evidence of past experience. Rhetorical questions express the text producer's emotional and attitudinal reaction towards his receiver because of the latter's unexpected or contrastive communicative act prompting the use of rhetorical questions. This only occurs when the receiver counter-behaves or counter-presupposes previously shared knowledge, instructions, opinions, social status and suppositions, hence the contrastiveness of rhetorical questions. As for speech acts realizations, rhetorical questions which Sadock (1974) calls “Queclarative”, represent just one type of indirect speech acts.

Phonologically, rhetorical Questions are associated with a distinctive intonation.
playing a considerable role in rendering them rhetorical.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, interrogatives in Arabic are treated here as functionally expressing deontic statement. Recall our example issued by the sergeant, who was defeated in a boxing fight by a newly appointed sergeant. The example is repeated here for convenience:

*Haven't you seen a man on his knees? Scram!*

The text producer here uses a rhetorical question to address his soldiers who happen to share the same long-term ideology, i.e. the recognition of the text producer's toughness as being true, with the text producer. However, when he was defeated, the soldiers looked at him with a surprised expression on their faces, i.e. the receiver's non-verbal communicative expression of counter-presupposition. He, accordingly, issues a rhetorical question, whereby he demotes them from being presuppositionless to being counter-presuppositional. The implicature intended is clear.

Rhetorical questions in Arabic can functionally be dichotomized into two basic types, Assertive and Counter-presuppositional.

5.6.5.1 Assertive Rhetorical Questions (ARQ)

ARQ can further be subdivided into a. Directive and b. Non-directive.

a. Directive RQ

A Directive RQ is defined in Arabic rhetoric as *(إِلَّا ذَٰلِكَ الْعِبَادَةُ الْخَاطِئَةُ)* (lit. to force proof on the receiver), and is either a positive or negative interrogative aiming to elicit the receiver's communicative agreement on evidential basis. Being structurally and functionally interrogative, a Directive RQ requires the receiver's immediate communicative answer. Structurally, Directive RQ's are usually initiated with
the constituent polar interrogative modal, "A", which is either immediately followed by a negative suffix such as, ليس, "laysa", (is not..., etc.) or لم, "lam", (did not...), or not followed by any negative suffix. Consider the following Qur’anic verse (XCV. 8):

"Isn’t God the justest of judges?"

Alaysa 'llaahu bi-ahkand Thaakimiina?
(Is not God the most just of judges?)

Other types of Directive RQ’s which are not negative and functionally similar to the negative ones are those that can be likened to tag questions in English, such as:

You did that to me, didn’t you?

Quirk et al. (1985: 1478) assert in this respect that the tag question, so common in the most informal speech, is strictly similar to the rhetorical question in its communicative effect, since it essentially seeks confirmation of what the speaker has explicitly assumed (by the preceding declarative) to be agreed truth.

Compare the following Qur’anic verse (XXI, 62):

"арт thou the one who did this with our gods, O Abraham?"

-A antafa’alza haadhaa
Did you did-(you) this

-bi-aalihatinaa yaa Ibraahimu?
with-gods-our O Abraham?
(Art thou the one who did this with our gods, O Abraham)

b. Non-directive RQ

Non-directive RQ’s are structurally interrogatives but functionally epistemic re-assertions expressing previously agreed-upon propositions. Non-directive RQ’s whose
communicative purposes are not to elicit the receiver’s immediate answer, since the answer is known to both participants beforehand, normally use the same interrogative polar device, i.e. “A”, (did/have) which is predominantly followed by the negative suffix, لام، “lam”, (not...). Consider:

أَلَمْ نرَيَكَ فِي نَا وَلِيدًا؟

Alam nurabbika fiinaa waliidan
Did not we-raise-thee amongst-us a-child-acc
(Did (Have) we not raise(d) thee amongst us as a child? )

This type is similar to negative rhetorical questions mentioned in Quirk et al. (1985:826). Consider:

Haven’t you got anything better to DO? {Surely you have...}

5.6.5.2 Counter-presuppositional RQ

الإِسْتِفْهَامِ الإِلَـنْسَاَرِي

One of the most important indirect speech acts which interrogatives may relay is counter-presupposition, الإِلَـنْسَاَرِي. This act differs from that of re-assertive RQ in that the latter intends to re-assert what the RQ conveys, or elicit the receiver’s agreement upon what has been considered agreed truth. The former, by contrast, is aimed either to falsify what the receiver has previously claimed, or to reproach the receiver for what he has done in the recent past or what he intends to do in the future which was/will be counter-presuppositional to agreed truth. Structurally, Counter-presuppositional RQ’s are interrogative, but functionally re-assertive.

Typologically, this type is sub-classified into a. Falsificational Rhetorical Question and b. Reproachful Rhetorical Questions, both of which clearly express contrastive information.
a. **Falsificational RQ**

The structure of this type is realizable by either having a perfective to falsify a claim of a past state of affairs and/or an imperfective to falsify a claim of a present or future state of affairs. In both cases the verbal groups may or may not immediately follow the interrogative modal, which is again, "A".

By using a perfective, it functionally implies a negative re-assertion of the receiver’s claim, i.e. it did not occur, or it was not so. Consider:

أقلت إني هادنت أعدائي؟

- A qulta innanii haadantu
  did said-(you) that-I had-made-I-a-truce

- a 'daa'ii?
  with enemy-my
(Did you say I had a truce with my enemy?)

If an imperfective is used, whether or not immediately following the interrogative device, Falsificational RQ implies the negative re-assertion of the receiver’s claim, i.e. “this will not (never) or should not occur or be...”. It should be stated that as far as the scope of Falsificational RQ’s is concerned, FRQ’s may be either some constituent which in this case must be put next to the interrogative device, or the predication as a whole whose verbal group must be inserted next to the interrogative device. A negative device may occasionally be used depending on the situation in which this sub-type of RQ is to be used. If it is employed, then this type would be very close to the Non-directive RQ above. Consider the following example from the Qur’aan (XIV,10):

A fii ‘I-laahi shakkun ?

is in God-gen-pred doubt-nom-subj
(Is there any doubt about God?)
b. Reproachful Rhetorical Questions

The structure of this sub-type which can also be about a past, present or future state of affairs, is realized respectively by the presence of a perfective or imperfective in the clause structure. Equational clauses can similarly be rhetorically questioned. In addition to the use of the above interrogative particle, “kayfa”, (how) can similarly be used to produce Reproachful RQ’s in certain specific situations. Consider the following verse from the Qur’aan containing an imperfective (II, 28):

كيف تكنرون بالله؟

_kayfa takfuruna bi’llaahi ... ?_
_How you-disbelieve in-God-gen_
_(How could you disbelieve in God...?)_

The implicit meaning is not only to reproach but also to tell them that they should not disbelieve in God. In the case of having a perfective, consider the following verse from the Qur’aan (VII, 22):

لَمْ أُنْهِكَمَا عَنْ تَلْكَمَا الشَّجَرَةِ؟

-_Alam anhakumaa_
_did-not (I)-prohibit-you-both_

-_‘an tilkumaa ‘I-shajarati,...?_
_from that the-tree_
_(Did I not prohibit you from that tree,...?)_

The implicature of the example above is a deontic statement, viz. “you should not have done that”, which clearly implies reproach as well.

Clearly, some of the RQ’s are very difficult to interpret as such, particularly if a negative device is not present in the structure. In this case, both the context and co-text must be taken into account in order to interpret them as RQ’s. In addition, as far as
Counter-presuppositional RQ’s are concerned, we need to answer the question why the text producer chooses to express his negative re-assertion via RQ rather than using explicit negative re-assertion. Using RQ’s indicates that the text producer chooses the indirect act of falsifying a counter-claim or behaviour, impolite though it may be in this case, by conveying normally invalidating evidential information used not only to counter-argue but also to express the text producer’s emotional and attitudinal exasperation or impatience. Recall al-Jurjaanii’s claim of how demanding evidence implies being reproachful. A second point may be that RQ’s realize an assertive strategy indicating the text producer’s absolute certainty and confidence in what is being expressed.

Explicit negative re-assertion, by contrast, merely expresses a direct act of a defensive strategy without appealing to evidential information.

5.7 SUMMARY

To sum up: I have been discussing the evidential realizations of Emphasis proper whose contextual functions may overlap with those of contrastive evidentiality in so many situations that it would be impossible to demarcate their realizational boundary. It must be said that the present research puts its special focus on S Emphasis only, which will be occupying us in the next chapter. So the above discussion accounting for Emphasis proper has not been as exhaustive as may be expected in such a research. Time and space have their unwelcome impact on stretching the limits of this research any further.
6 SPECIFICATIONAL EMPHASIS IN ARABIC

Having discussed the possible syntactic linguistic realizations of Emphasis proper, the objective of the present chapter is to provide an elaborate account of \( S \) Emphasis in Arabic. The coverage will not only be critical of Arabic rhetoric and contemporary linguists’ accounts of \( S \) Emphasis but empirical as well. It must be admitted, though, that Arab rhetoricians’ accounts exceed to a great extent most contemporary western linguists’ accounts, not only in delicacy but in demarcating its possible frontier. Only Dik (1981) has so far provided us with a wider but unmarked typology of contrast functions, which is an unfortunate consequence of the territories of contrast overlapping with those of unmarked Focus. However, in the present research, \( SE \) will be used in a relatively more restricted sense than that used by Dik and many other linguists, and extra specific situations for the utility of \( SE \) together with its incongruent functions will be provided.

Terminologically, the term “Specificational Emphasis” is preferred here because “Contrastive” seems functionally misleading, specially when it is used to cover exhaustiveness, i.e., uniqueness, as well. Undeniably, contrastiveness presupposes exhaustiveness even when the presuppositional set representing the legitimate candidates for the value is conspicuously limited, as is discussed by the majority of linguists. However, “Contrastive Emphasis” does seem to be too specific to catch the comprehensive picture of \( S \) Emphasis which involves additional cases whereby exhaustiveness does not seem to presuppose contrastiveness particularly if no presuppositional set is involved in the discourse universe concerned.

Evidentially, \( SE \) expresses a very strong ideological conviction, whereby the text producer must have sufficient evidence that \( q \) is not true but \( p \) is. Resorting to \( SE \)
clearly indicates that had the text producer not had strong convincing evidence, which may be first hand evidence, i.e. sensory, or second hand evidence, i.e. quotative, belief, etc., underlying his self-assured conviction, he would have opted for a less emphatic constative discourse. On engaging in a social communication, people sometimes tend to withhold the source of their information by simply adhering to the emphatic proposition their utterance expresses firmly together with leaving their positive or negative emotional fingerprints on the utterance. SE thus reflects decisiveness, determination coupled with the text producer's firm attitude towards the veracity of the proposition his constative expresses. This is obvious if we consider any of the two types of restriction underlying utterances realizing contrastiveness in particular (cf. below).

In addition to being a realization of evidential modality expressing epistemic certainty, S Emphasis can further be used to relay deontic certainty which commits the text producer to future action. We will be providing only a few realizations without any due consideration for fear of digression. One such obvious type discussed earlier is counter-presuppositional rhetorical questions which may imply not only deontic statement but deontically future directive performatives, depending on whether the lexical verb used is perfective or imperfective respectively. Similarly, the evidential use of oath expressions to modalize a directive performative expressing, for example, commissiveness is yet a further occurrence of S Emphasis in deontic modality.

The lay-out of this chapter runs as follows. Firstly, an exhaustive syntactic analysis of SE in Arabic will be given in order to show whether or not all clause elements that have representational functions in the structure can receive S Focus. Secondly, a semantic account of S Emphasis where the two basic types of restriction underlying the use of SE will receive our full attention is in section two. Thirdly, a
detailed pragmatic account will be allocated to SE in section three where it will be shown how the semantic types of restriction bear out a pragmatic interpretation in contrastive SE only. Fourthly, the structural realizations of SE will be identified and later pragmatically interpreted in section four in accord with our new pragmatic model. Fifthly, a detailed discussion on the congruent as well as the incongruent functions of S Emphasis will be tackled in section five. Finally, an empirical analysis of S Emphasis in argumentative discourse will be provided in section six.

6.1 S EMPHASIS IN SYSTEMIC GRAMMAR

In western linguistics, the it-cleft as a carrier of contrastive Emphasis has almost exclusively been investigated at the expense of other important modals similarly capable of relaying contrastiveness. The crux of such accounts turns around whether or not the function it-cleft produces in a certain context is predicational and/or specificational, and how to specify them. If it is Specificational for these linguists, it is likely to imply exhaustiveness. If, however, it is predicational, it is unlikely to imply exhaustiveness (cf. for example Akmajian, 1970; Gundel, 1977; Prince, 1978 and Declerk, 1983 & 1984). Their other views and conclusions need not concern us here.

Systemically, SE is studied as a predicated Theme that frequently contributes to the thematic organization of the clause. Halliday (1985,59) argues that any element having a representational function in the clause can be marked off by predication in this way (cf. below). The predicated Theme structure is frequently associated with an explicit formulation of contrast: “it was...”.

Like other linguists, Halliday functionally divides Focus into Unmarked and Marked Focus. The overlap of both types of Focus has similarly blurred any possibility of rigorously demarcating the boundary of Emphasis proper. No further
specification has been given in systemic grammar concerning the contexts in which SE may be resorted to.

In addition, Taglicht (1984, 7-8) who attempts to provide a wider view of Focus and Emphasis points out that

the cleft construction has ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings. Ideational meaning is involved because the construction specifies its focus as unique with respect to the content of the residue (i.e. of the relative clause). The interpersonal meaning consists in the selection of the focus as a target of the speaker's communicative intent. And clefting also has textual meaning, because its use, and the selection of its focal item, change the way a sentence coheres with the text of which it forms a part.

Although Taglicht's functional account of S Emphasis is illustratively extensive, it unfortunately offers nothing of considerable merit.

6.2 S EMPHASIS IN ARABIC

In Arabic grammar, a realization of SE has received an extensive grammatical account as one of three sub-types representing a very well-established topic, namely Exception، الإستثناء. The realization expresses SE through the use of the formulation Negation/Focusing، الإستثناء المفرغ (the exception made void of government). It consists of two basic parts, the variable، i.e. an elliptical structure، which would have contained a superordinate term، الإستثنائي منبه (a general term from which the exception is made)، had it been mentioned، and the value، i.e. the excepted، الإستثنائي، as a hyponym realized by the focus constituent and placed immediately following the Focusing modals. To express SE، the structure of such clauses، which must be devoid of the superordinate term، must always be negative and semantically incomplete if the hyponym is dropped. The hyponym always takes whatever case the superordinate would have taken had it been expressed in its original position in the variable structure.
The focusing modals most commonly employed in MSA are, "illaa"; "siwaa" and, "ghayru", (except, but, save for, only, etc.)

By contrast, SE in Arabic rhetoric receives a very extensive, detailed and sensitive pragmatic account under the heading "qasr" or "hasr", (lit. Confinement or Restriction) covering the use of not only the foregoing exceptive modals but different modals that are similarly used to realize SE as well. Lexicographically, both the grammatical and the rhetorical accounts express the process of confinement or restriction while linguistically both denote specifying something, i.e., a Quality or a Bearer, for something else, i.e., a Bearer or a Quality respectively through the use of specificational means. To illustrate how SE is analysed in Arabic rhetoric let us first move on to identify exhaustively the syntactic elements that have representational functions in the clause structure and capable of realizing the focus constituent.

6.2.1 Syntactic Account of SE

Our main concern here is to discuss how SE is realized in clause structure in terms of the modals used and the position, the syntactic function and the sequence of the elements forming the variable and the value. The positions and sequence of the variable and the value in certain realizations of SE are syntactically constrained.

The modals used to realize SE are either a combination of a Focusing modal preceded by any of the negative modals which in turn precedes the variable and thus expresses the rejection of incorrect information, or a Focusing modal without any explicit use of the negative modals to precede the variable. Thus, a clause structure realizing SE in Arabic consists of two basic structural parts, the "maqṣūr", (lit. confined), and the "maqṣūr ‘alayhi”, (lit. to which
something is confined), used to designate respectively the presupposed and focused information of an S emphatic clause.

Parallel to these Arabic terms, most contemporary western linguists (cf. Quirk et al.: 1972 and Declerk: 1983 & 1984 among others), use the terms “variable” and “value” for characterizing respectively what is presupposed and what is focused in cleft sentences. To describe the specificational relationship between the two basic parts of a clause structure they use the descriptive statement “the specification of a value for a variable”. Note that attention must be drawn to the sequence of both parts “the value” and “the variable” in such a statement.

In Arabic, the Focusing modals of SE are disparate and wide-ranging, if we take into account cases of multiple Emphasis as well. The most widely recognized modals are: Negation/Focusing; adversative conjunctions; “innamaa”, (only); Fronting; pseudo-cleft; the pronoun of separation; the definitivization of the G Subject and the predicate, etc. (cf. below). Apart from the first two modals, the remaining ones are understood to express negation implicitly.

In order to provide an exhaustive syntactic account of the elements realizing the value, it is necessary to take into account the two types of clause structure in Arabic, namely the Equational and the Verbal clauses. Almost all the lexical, phrasal and clausal constituents that have ideational functions in the structure of such clauses can realize the value and the variable if the clause is used as a mechanism of S Emphasis. Let us begin first with the Equational.

1. The Equational Clause

The structure of an Equational clause realizes SE as follows:
A. the variable is the G Subject and the value is the predicate:
maa 'l-waladu illaa DHAHIYYU.
not the-boy-nom but clever-nom.
(The boy is only clever.)

B. the variable is the predicate and the value is the G Subject:

maa dhakiyyun illaa 'L-WALADU.
not clever-nom but the-boy-nom.
(No one is clever but the boy.)

2. The Verbal clause

A. the variable is the verb and the value is the L Subject:

laa yafuzu illaa 'L-DHAKIYYU.
not (he)-win-ind but the clever-nom.
(No one wins but the clever.)

B. the variable is the L Subject and the value is the Goal:

maa saa'ada Zaydun illaa AHMADA.
not helped-(he) Zeid-nom but Ahmed-acc
(Zeid did not help but Ahmed.)

C. the variable is the Goal and the value is the L Subject:

maa saa'ada Ahmada illaa ZAYDUN.
not helped-(he) Ahmed-acc but Zeid-nom
(Nobody helped Ahmed but Zeid.)

D. the variable is the indirect object and the value is the direct object:

maa manahtu Zaydan illaa DARRAJATAN.
not rewarded-(I) Zeid-acc but a-bike-acc
(I rewarded Zeid with nothing but a bike.)

E. the variable is the direct object and the value is the indirect object:

maa manahtu darraajatun illaa ZAYDAN.
not rewarded-(I) a-bike-acc but Zeid-acc.
(I rewarded nobody with a bike but Zeid.)

F. the variable is a circumstantial element of manner and the value is the nominal element whose action it modifies:

maa jaa’a maashiyan illaa ZAYDUN.  # ماءِ جاِه مَاشيَان إلَّا زِيد
not came-(he) walking-acc but Zeid-nom.
(No one came on foot but Zeid.)

G. the variable is the nominal element whose action is adverbially modified and the value is the circumstantial adverbial element specificationally modifying the action:

maa jaa’a Zaydun illaa MAASHIYAN.  # ماءِ جاِه زِيد إلَّا مَاشِيَان
not came-(he) Zeid-nom but walking-acc.
(Zeid did not come but on foot.)

H. the variable is the verb and the value is either a temporal element as in:

maa saafara illaa YAWMA ’L-KHAMIISI.  # ماءِ سافَر إلَّا يوْم الْخَمِيس
not travelled-(he) but day-acc the-Thursday-gen.
(He did not travel but on Thursday.)

or spatial element as in:

maa sakana illaa FII BAGHDAADA.  # ماءِ سكنَ إلَّا فِي بَغْدَاد
not lived-(he) but in Baghdad-gen
(He did not live but in Baghdad.)

I. the variable is the verb and the value is a circumstantial element of Purpose:

maa waqaftu illaa IJLAALAN LI’L-AMIIRI.  # ماءِ وقفتُ إلَّا إِجْلا لَلأَمِير
not stood-(I) but honouring-acc for-the-prince.
(I did not stand up but in honour of the prince.)

J. the variable is the verb and the value is a circumstantial element of Cause:
ما هرب زييد إلا خوفا من السجن

maa haraba Zaydun illaa KHAWFAN MINA 'L-SIJNI.

not escaped-(he) Zeid-nom but fearing from the-prison.

(Zeid did not run away but for fear of prison.)

K. the variable is the verb and the value is a circumstantial element realizing a comitative. This is in fact possible only if the S focalizer is “innamaa”, (only). Note that the following and the next two examples, suggested to me by Taariq al-Janaabii, clearly contradict what all rhetoricians have restrictively pointed out in this respect:

innamaa sirtu wa ‘L-SHAARI’A.

only walked-(I) along the street-acc.

(I walked only along the street.)

L. the variable is the verb and the value is the Range element specifying either the quantitative range of the process as in:

maa daqaqtu 'l-baaba illaa DAQQATAYNI.

not knocked-(l) the-door-acc but two-knocks.

(I knocked the door only twice.)

or the qualitative range of the process as in:

maa sirtu illaa SAYRA ‘L-ABTAALJ La

not walked-(l) but walk the-heroes.

(I did not walk but like heroes.)

or

(It was like heroes that I walked)

M. the variable is the verb and the value is an indefinite substantive in the accusative which qualitatively disambiguates تمييز , a preceding constituent, i.e. Subject, object, etc., within the clause:

ما تصاب زييد إلا عرفا

maa tasabbaba Zaydun illaa 'ARQAAN.

not dripped-(he) Zeid-nom but sweat-acc. (Zeid’s sweat)
(Zeid dripped nothing but sweat.)
(Zeid dripped only sweat.)
(It was sweat that Zeid dripped.)

N. the variable is the L Subject and the value is an adjective modifying the L Subject:

\[ \text{maajaa'anii rajulun illaa KARIIMUN.} \]
\[ \text{not came-(he)-to-me a-man-nom but generous-nom.} \]
\[ \text{(The man who came to me is generous.)} \]

O. the variable is an oath structure which is grammatically positive but semantically negative, and the value is a Verbal clause with a perfective indicating future reference, i.e. deontic directive:

\[ \text{naashadtuka Tlaaha illaa SAA'ADTA 'L-FAQIIRA.} \]
\[ \text{ask-I-of-you (by) God but helped-(you) the-poor-acc.} \]
\[ \text{(I ask of you by God but to help the poor.)} \]
\[ \text{or} \]
\[ \text{(I beseech you by God but to help the poor.)} \]

As is clear from this illustrative list, almost all the syntactic elements having basic or non-basic representational functions can have the capacity to represent the focus constituent. However, the only cases which lack this capacity are almost all the realizations of Emphasis proper discussed in the preceding chapter.

6.2.2 Semantic Account of SE

Having discussed the various syntactic constituents eligible for specificational focusing, it is equally necessary to detail the semantic features crucial for any pragmatic interpretation of S Emphasis. The analysis of such features might look, on the face of it, as if we were contradicting our argument concerning the natural linkage between the linguistic form and pragmatic interpretation, which is accounted for in terms of our new pragmatic model. However, the semantic level we are concerned with here is not the truth conditional level, since, for example, we can have
two cognitively identical constatives used to relay two different S emphatic structures differing in terms of the constituent in Focus. Rather, we are concerned with the semantic level, similar to Firbas’s (1983:11) dynamic semantic accounting for the specification of notions such as Bearers and Qualities, etc., and providing an ontological characterization of the intra-sentential relations between the two basic elements: Subject and Predicate. The relevance of the ontological account of such notions to S Emphasis is attributed to the fact that the specification of a Subject for a Predicate or vice versa per predication will relay two different pragmatic interpretations of both types of specification.

Broadly speaking, most philosophers and logicians usually provide an ontological analysis of the two basic elements constituting the predication of a sentence. The analysis centres around the referentiality of Subject-and Predicate-expressions and how to characterize them metaphysically. Strawson (1959), for example, argues that

both expressions are used to introduce entities [referents] into a proposition in the sense that both expressions identify nonlinguistic entities.

To be able to identify both Subject and Predicate, Strawson sets up two criteria, namely the grammatical and category criteria. The former indicates that

Predicate-expression carries, in addition to signifying an entity, the linking symbolism indicating that the Predicate-entity is linked ascriptively to the Subject-entity. The linking symbolism is not present in the case of the Subject-expression. The linking symbolism gives, for instance, the verb the sense of incompleteness by virtue of which it may be said to demand completion into a proposition. Whereas the Subject possesses such completeness that will satisfy the predicate incompleteness. Subject-expression, on the other hand, [indicates that] only Universals, or complexes containing Universals, never Particulars 'simpliciter', can be predicated (186, 179). When both entities despite being
fundamentally distinct are introduced into a proposition they constitute a complete thought (212).

Thus, the essential differences between the two expressions are: the conceptual completeness of the Subject vs the incompleteness of the Predicate; the Particularity of the Subject vs the Universality of the Predicate; the Subject’s lack of a linking symbolism vs the Predicate’s possession of such a linking symbolism, which demands completion, etc. Consider:

* Socrates is wise *

The Subject-expression "Socrates" signifies a specific entity, an individual, a Particular, whereas the Predicate-expression, "is wise" signifies a description, a Universal, and if we utter it alone we would feel it demands completion possessed by the Subject expression.

Furthermore, Searle (1969), who criticizes Strawson’s claim of the referentiality of the Predicate-expression, rightly argues that

the distinction between Subject and Predicate is one of function. The Subject serves to identify an object, the Predicate, if the total illocutionary act is one of describing or characterizing, serves to describe or characterize the object which has been identified (119). Entities such as Universals do not lie in the world, but in our mode of representing the world, in language (115). That is to say, Predicate-expressions do not have entities or referents in the outside world because no contingent fact is necessary to refer to. So what we need is to know the meaning of the Predicate expression only (117).

Searle also explains how it will not do to appeal to the notion of “aboutness”, in

* the thing which is a rose is red *
because for every context in which one would wish to say that this instance is about "redness", one can find an equally plausible context in which one would wish to say that it was about "rosehood" (117).

However, as was argued in chapter 4.2.1, a plausible distinction between the ontological "aboutness" and the contextual "aboutness" has been advocated. In other words, the Strawsonian criteria above do not seem to be plausible enough to characterize Searle's understanding of contextual "aboutness". Accordingly, at the contextual level, either "rosehood" or "is red" can represent the entity talked about, whereas at the ontological level, only "rose" can satisfy the Subjecthood criteria and only "is red" can satisfy the Predicatehood criteria above.

From this it follows that Predicates cannot be treated ontologically i.e. propositionally, as Subjects since they demands completeness. If, however, a Predicate at the ontological level, is used as a Subject, then it must acquire certain potentialities characteristic of Subjecthood. For example, if the Predicate "is wise" of the first example above, is to be made Subject, it must be changed into "the wise", "wisdom", etc., as a concept characterizable by the Strawsonian criteria above. Accordingly, the Subject-expression "the wise" will signify two distinctive concepts, (i) the original Predicate concept, "being wise" conflated with (ii) the individual as a carrier of wisdom in the outside world.

In Arabic, traditional philologists and logicians have conducted a similar analysis to that of Strawson and Frege, focusing on predication,  بالإسناد, and predicational relation, العلاقة بالإسنادية of a given sentence. Predication can be defined as
the application of a predicate to an appropriate number of terms functioning as arguments of that predicate (Dik, 1978: 15).

According to Weiss (1985), those Arab philologists speak of the verb as signifying [within such a predicational relation], in addition to a term [referent], an ascriptive linkage of that term to some other term (613). All verbal sentences express ascriptive linkage involving two types, or categories, of terms called in Arabic Dhat, (self) and Hadath (action) (614).

“Dhaat”, according to Kafawii (1683, 153, vol.i), is

ما يُقطَعُ أن يُعلَم و يُبَنَى عَنْهُ

that which can be known and talked about.

(my translation)

He further adds that “Dhaat” is مستقل بالفهوى (lit. a complete concept), whereas “Hadath” غير مستقل بالفهوى (lit. incomplete concept) (347, vol.i). “Dhaat” is further defined by other Arab philologists, as that which is not “Hadath”, whereas “Hadath” is,

أَلْعَنْى أَلْقَاءَمَ بَالفِيْر

that which exists through something else (cf. Weiss, 1985: 614).

As such, not only do “Dhaat” and “Hadath” correspond to the Strawsonian notions of Particular and Universal respectively but to the Arabic terms: the Bearer, موصوف, and the Quality, صفة, capable of forming a proposition carrying S Emphasis. It follows then that the term “Quality” is to be used here in the widest possible sense embracing not only actions but also properties, qualities, etc., capable of entering a proposition as a basic part assignable to individuals, i.e. Bearers or Particulars, in the process of utterance encoding. The term “Bearer of quality” or simply “Bearer”, on the other hand, is to refer to individuals, persons, objects, etc., that can occupy

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Subject-expression if introduced into a proposition. In Arabic rhetoric, an S emphatic utterance is ontologically composed of a Bearer, and a Quality, which both can be syntactically realized by those ideational functions of a predication specified in our discussion on Given/New in chapter four and given above. Or both can be treated as equivalents to Halliday’s notions of Actor vs Process, Senser vs Phenomenon, Carrier vs Attribute, etc., used to characterize the participants of a clause as representation. The reduction of such notions to only two, namely, Bearer vs Quality is valid at least to avoid complexity.

The relationship the Quality has to its Bearer within a proposition will not be explicable by using descriptive statements such as “is assigned...”, “the assignment of...”, “specifies... for...” etc. as is the case in western linguistics. Rather, the descriptive statement which will be used in the present research to explain the specificational relationship which both the Bearer and the Quality enter into in a given proposition is “the restriction of the variable to the value”. Thus, the kind of specificational relationship between these two concepts underlying all realizations of SE in Arabic and in other languages manifests either, (i) “the restriction of a Quality [the variable or presupposed] to a Bearer [the value or focused]”, or (ii) “the restriction of a Bearer [the presupposed] to a Quality [the focused]”. Notice that attention must be drawn to the positions of the presupposed and focused parts in such a descriptive statement, as these positions differ from their positions in descriptive statements used in contemporary western linguistic counterparts. That is, what is presupposed, which is a Quality or a Bearer, is restricted to what is focused which is a Bearer or a Quality respectively.

Accordingly, any S emphatic constative is interpreted ontologically as either restricting a Quality to a Bearer or a Bearer to a Quality. The specification of both
types of predicational nexus to be pragmatically compared with one another in terms of effectiveness and efficiency and the text producer's attitudinal and intensificational implications, is likely to be indispensable in the pragmatic analysis of S Emphasis. More specifically, the former relationship serves to express the text producer's maximization of the utterance's exclusive application to the constituent focused. The latter relationship, by contrast, serves to express the text producer's attitudinal diminution of the utterance's restrictive application exclusively to the focused constituent. Both types of implications largely depend, particularly in contrastive SE, on the specification of the type of predicational nexus both ontological entities enter into, irrespective of the kind of realizations. This type of semantic analysis does not involve whether or not the proposition in question is true or not. Thus, in this sense, it is not a truth-conditional account.

Furthermore, in order to show how such a semantic analysis which specifies the positions and the relation of Theme and Rheme bears upon FSP, Benes (1968: 271) argues that

the relationship of the rheme to the theme can be regarded as the constituent act of utterance, just as the relationship of subject and predicate as the constituent act of a sentence. The actual communicative aim or sense of the utterance:

_{Prague is the capital of CSSR}_

Theme / Rheme

is the assignment of a particular quality [the rheme] to its bearer [the theme], while the sense of the other utterance (revealing the same grammatical as well as semantic structure, and the identical lexical filling), {namely}

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Theme / Rheme

may be described as the assignment of a bearer [the rheme] to a quality [the theme].
Unfortunately, however, neither Benes nor Danes (1974), who uses Benes's types of assignment, goes further than providing such a bearing upon FSP. It is clear that in most realizations of SE the Theme, i.e. the presupposed, carrying Given information and the Rheme, i.e. the Focus, carrying New information, are syntactically constrained in certain types of realization. What we need to know is what pragmatic interpretation can be induced from this type of semantic analysis and its bearing upon FSP. That is, the connection between FSP and such a semantic abstraction supplies a criterion for a linguistic classification of utterances which contributes further to refine attitudinally the pragmatic interpretation of these utterances, at least within the borderline of SE.

In order to show their pragmatic implications we first need to discuss the implicature of Exhaustiveness normally relayed by SE utterances before illustrating how both types of restriction are interpreted in terms of such an implicatural inference and the text producer's attitude and emotions.

### 6.2.3 Pragmatic Account of S Emphasis

Having identified the necessary semantic distinction of two cognitively similar constatives in terms of restricting a Quality to a Bearer or a Bearer to a Quality, we are now in a position to show how such a distinction bears upon their pragmatic interpretations. The implicature, embodying the intent of the text producer's message in the sense of exclusively singling out a Bearer or Quality to be assigned to a variable, is termed exhaustiveness. For example, most semantic and pragmatic investigations into the use of the contrastive structural formulation "It is \( X \) that/who, etc. ...", which have eventually led to the identification of exhaustiveness, have only reached a single-sided conclusion of the use of SE. Even exhaustiveness, which seems to have been likened to the existential presupposition of proper names and definite noun phrases, namely, the
unique existence of their referents, by some linguists such as Halverson (1978), seems to have received inadequate if not inconclusive analyses. Most linguists have tackled exhaustiveness in relation to Contrast, as was highlighted in chapter four. Singling out a specific candidate from a given presuppositional set normally implies contrasting it, as the only one, with the remaining unchosen candidates. Halverson (1978), Kuno (1972) and Dik (1981) among others, suggest that the exhaustiveness implicature must be understood with respect to a restricted universe of discourse. In effect, the quantification in the exhaustiveness implicature is too restricted to cover cases whereby exhaustiveness does not presuppose contrastiveness. Thus they fell short of recognizing the truth-conditional, i.e. absolute, uniqueness or exhaustiveness that is exactly similar to the presupposition of proper names and definite noun phrases. They argue that the exhaustiveness implicature of a cleft is that the focus constituent is an exhaustive listing of the objects which satisfy the clefted clause. However, this is not to argue that the clausal exhaustiveness is a kind of presupposition similar in terms of contextual intentionality to that of proper names and definite noun groups. On the contrary, clausal exhaustiveness usually represents communicatively intended information in SE, whereas lexical exhaustiveness usually represents unintended or information taken for granted. Exhaustiveness in the present research would also be similar to the uniqueness of a referent recognized not by general knowledge of the world but be logically and grammatically imposed by meaning. Nouns premodified by superlatives, ordinals and similar restrictive items such as ‘sole’, or anaphoric and cataphoric use of ‘the’ will thus be made logically unique. (Greenbaum and Quirk, 1990: 79).

It will be shown that general or specific negation in the variable structure of SE plays a decisive role in determining whether or not the quantification of the objects exhaustive listing is or is not restricted when we consider the typology of SE below.

Exhaustiveness as a conversational implicature, unlike other linguists’ treatments, will be treated as either a generalized implicature if an S emphatic constative
is used in a congruent context, or a particularized implicature if an S emphatic constative is used in an incongruent context. The treatment seems justified and consistent with the theoretical framework postulated for the present research. To prove the sound validity of our definition of exhaustiveness, consider, for example, how inaccurate Horn (1980) is when he treats exhaustiveness as a generalized implicature only. If, for example, an S emphatic constative conveying an analytic proposition, is used in an incongruent context, it would be hardly acceptable to argue that tautologies expressing S Emphasis would produce generalized implicatures. By contrast, in our discussion of, إِنَّمَا، “innamaa”, (only), it will be demonstrated how this modal can be used to introduce an S emphatic utterance conveying an analytic proposition used to relay a particularized implicature, since using tautologies flouts one of the submaxims of Quantity concerned. Even the identification of the type of restriction, particularly restricting a Bearer to a Quality, would sometimes be rendered irrelevant in our pragmatic interpretation of this utterance in a proper context. All these factors will be raised elaborately in our typology, functions and realizations of S emphatic utterances in Arabic rhetoric below.

In order to demonstrate the crucial role of the two types of restriction given above in helping to attain a specific pragmatic interpretation of any given utterance, it is necessary to reach an understanding of what they are meant to be in terms of exhaustiveness and the text producer’s attitude and emotions. In our ontological analysis of SE utterances, two types of restriction are established:

1. The restriction of a Quality [a variable] to a Bearer [a value], قصر على موضوع.

This type of restriction serves to express the text producer’s maximization of the utterance’s restrictive application uniquely to the focused constituent. It indicates his attitude towards the exclusive application of the rest of the utterance to the focused Bearer. Thus, whenever the focused constituent realizes a Bearer, the text producer
maximizes the restrictive application of his utterance uniquely to the focused constituent. Pragmatically, this induces two possible implicatural consequences:

(i) The Quality is true only of the Bearer as the only true candidate

A. within some contextually defined presuppositional set in truth-conditionally contrastive SE, or

B. within a contextually undefined presuppositional set in truth-conditionally exhaustive SE, and

(ii) The Bearer has, possesses, etc., not only the Quality specified, but further unspecified Qualities as well; this is a positive maximization of the Bearer’s extra potentialities as a further pragmatic implication drawn from this type of restriction.

Consider:

\[ \text{maa mudarrisun illaa AHMADU.} \]
\[ \text{not a-teacher-nom. but Ahmed-nom.} \]
\[ \text{(No one is a teacher but Ahmed.)} \]

The example:

(i) exhaustively restricts the Quality of “being a teacher” to the Bearer “Ahmed” as the only true candidate, either

A. within some contextually defined presuppositional set in truth-conditionally contrastive SE, or

B. within a contextually undefined presuppositional set in truth-conditionally exhaustive SE, and,

(ii) the Bearer “Ahmed” has further unspecified Qualities besides “being a teacher”.

2. The restriction of a Bearer [the variable] to a Quality [the value],

This type of restriction serves to convey the text producer’s diminution of the utterance’s restrictive application uniquely to the focused constituent. By restricting the Bearer to a specific Quality, it shows the text producer’s diminishing perspective
towards the exclusive application of the Bearer to the Quality by putting the Quality concerned in focus. The restriction is a way of reducing the Bearer's Qualities and potentialities to only one chosen from among either a contextually defined or undefined presuppositionial set. This pragmatically implies:

(i) The Bearer has the Quality as the only true candidate, either

A. within some contextually defined presuppositional set in a truth-conditionally contrastive SE, or

B. within a contextually undefined presuppositional set in a truth-conditionally exhaustive SE, and,

(ii) the Bearer is not the only one who has the Quality overtly defined; this implication diminishes the Bearer's extra potentialities by being limited to only one Quality as in

\[ \text{not } \text{Ahmed-nom but a-teacher-nom.} \]

(Ahmed is nothing but a teacher.)

The example:

(i) exhaustively restricts the Bearer "Ahmed" to the Quality of "being a teacher" as the only true candidate chosen either from

A. some contextually defined presuppositional set in a truth-conditionally contrastive SE, or

B. within a contextually undefined presuppositional set in a truth-conditionally exhaustive SE, and,

(ii) Ahmed is not the only Bearer of the Quality of "being a teacher".

Although both utterances are lexico-grammatically and truth-conditionally similar and entail the proposition that "Ahmed is a teacher", they differ only in the location of the focus constituent to which the predication residue is exclusively restricted. Difference in focus entity, which is bound to induce different pragmatic interpretations, is further extended to relay the text producer's different attitudinal implications depending on whether the focus constituent realizes a Bearer or a Quality, as is clear by now.
However, the extension of the pragmatic interpretation covering either the text producer’s maximization or diminution of the restrictive applicability of the utterance is observable only in contrastive utterances involving the receiver’s specific pragmatic presupposition. (cf. below). In order to show this extended interpretation of both types of restriction, the question usually asked in Arabic rhetoric is “which of the two foregoing utterances is more effective and efficient in PRAISING Ahmed?” Note that Praising here is intended to communicate the maximization of the Bearer’s potentialities as being specified uniquely, i.e. upgrading. In examining both pragmatic interpretations of each type of restriction we notice that using the former utterance, i.e. the restriction of a Quality to a Bearer, is more effective and efficient if used to praise the Bearer as a distinguished referent to whom/which the Quality is exclusively restricted and who has further Qualities as well. This is clearly a highlight of how the text producer maximizes the truth value of the utterance exclusively restricted to the entity of the focus constituent.

The latter utterance, by contrast, gives the opposite interpretations, hence the text producer’s diminishing tone towards the applicability of the utterance to the Bearer as not the only one in the universe of discourse.

In the case of an undefined presuppositional set, the exhaustive implicature of a truth-conditionally exhaustive SE must be understood with respect to either a limited or unlimited universe of discourse. A limited universe refers to spatio-temporally limited universe, i.e. locally limited, such as this country, in that building, etc., not with respect to the rejected values given in the presuppositional set, since no rejected values can be contextually envisaged. Conversely, an unlimited universe within which the exhaustiveness implicature is envisaged must be understood as the presuppositional set
being globally unlimited or perhaps globally zero. Both kinds of universe should give a clear idea of the type of exhaustive implicature as either limited or unlimited.

As for the contextually defined presuppositional set in a truth-conditionally contrastive SE, the rejected and correct values may be either overtly or covertly defined co-textually and/or contextually. Here too, we are likely to see an exhaustive implicature with respect to the correct value opted for as opposed to those rejected.

However, these two types of S Emphasis are not the only ones; there is a further type which interprets certain exhaustive and contrastive utterances hyperbolically. This and the preceding two essential types of SE will be taken up in detail next.

6.2.4 Typology of S Emphasis

Most studies on cleft sentences in contemporary linguistics centre around the issue of whether a given cleft is predicational and/or specificational, depending on the contexts observed for this reason. (cf. Prince, 1978 and Declerk, 1983 & 1884). The former is communicating New information thus non-contrastive, whereas the latter is Given information thus contrastive. Although the dichotomy of being predicational and contrastive is necessary, it is the type of restriction as a decisive criterion which would help us classify S emphatic utterances in terms of finite or absolute exhaustiveness, and upgrading or downgrading the focally specified candidate. We will be discussing both types of restriction within each type of SE by stating their contextual implications that help typically characterize each of the four types to be provided presently.

In Arabic rhetoric the typology of S emphatic utterances is conducted, as we just saw, on the basis of A. taking into account or not the receiver’s presuppositions and beliefs, B. the truth condition of the proposition emphatically specified, C. total or restricted negation, and D. the hyperbolic or superlative interpretation and whether it is
factual or contrastive. Emphatic utterances are thus initially classified on the basis of the classificatory criterion of the receiver’s presuppositional status into two basic types: **Truth-conditional SE**, and **Contrastive SE** each of which is further sub-categorized into two sub-types on the basis of their expressing either factual or hyperbolic exhaustiveness and/or factual or hyperbolic contrastiveness. We end up, therefore, with two basic sets, each of which subsumes two more specific sub-types. Thus, the first set is

6.2.4.1. Truth-conditionally S Emphasis (TSE) which subsumes

- 6.2.4.1.1 Truth-conditionally Exhaustive SE (TESE)
- 6.2.4.1.2 Hyperbolic Exhaustive SE (HESE)

and the second set is

6.2.4.2 Contrastive SE (CSE)

subsumes

- 6.2.4.2.1 Truth-conditionally Contrastive SE (TCSE)
- 6.2.4.2.2 Hyperbolically Contrastive SE (HCSE)

Let us take up each of these types in detail.

**6.2.4.1 Truth-conditional SE (TSE)**

**6.2.4.1.1 Truth-conditionally Exhaustive SE (TESE)**

TESE usually conveys information which is truth-conditionally true of the focally stressed constituent. In other words, the presupposed information is truth-conditionally exhaustive, unique or exclusive to the Bearer or the Quality representing the focally stressed value. No presuppositional set is available in the context or co-text since the restricted information is truth-conditionally exclusive to the focus constituent. The exhaustiveness implicature is referentially the same as that conveyed by proper
names and definite noun phrases such as "the sun", i.e. there is only one sun in the universe. However, the truth-conditional exhaustiveness of SE is neither an existential presupposition nor a conventional implicature. Rather, it is normally a kind of implicature of an exclusive assignment of a value to a variable. From this characterization of this type it is clear that the propositions specified which convey absolute exhaustiveness seem to be predominantly analytic in the sense of the absolute exhaustiveness of "the sun" as a unique entity. Let us consider both types of restriction and how they are interpreted within this type of TESE.

1. The restriction of a Quality to a Bearer.

Consider the following example which is an analytic proposition expressed specifically and emphatically.

-иннамаа ирвий арда ‘l-raafidayni
only he-irrigate-land-acc Mesopotamia-gen

-DILATA WA ‘L-FURAATA.
Tigris and the Euphrates.
(It is the Tigris and Euphrates that irrigate Mesopotamia.)

Here, the focally stressed element in the structure presented by ‘иннамаа" (only), is believed to be the one at the very end of the structure. Thus the focus constituent is realized by "the Tigris and Euphrates" which represent the Bearers to which the process of irrigation as a Quality is truth conditionally exclusively restricted. The two implicatures derivable from this type of restriction are intended to inform the receiver of what is true in all possible worlds. The first is that there are no rivers other than "the Tigris and Euphrates" which irrigate Mesopotamia; this corresponds truth-conditionally to reality, hence no presuppositional set is possible. The second is that the two rivers may irrigate other than Mesopotamia, e.g. Syria and Turkey. It is crucial that no presupposition set is available which makes this type of SE truth-conditionally exhaustive in the true sense of the word. Since there is no presuppositional set and the
proposition is analytic it will be nonsensical to say that the text producer in this type is
atitudinally maximizing the truth value of the utterance applicable exclusively to both
Bearers. So no upgrading which may underlie this restriction is involved in this class of
utterances.

Generally speaking, TESE does not involve any real contrast owing to the
unlimited nature of the discourse universe in this class. As such, the foregoing example
seems to convey, factual though it is, New information for a receiver who does not
seem to know about it. However, as far as I am aware, only Abuu Muusaa (1979: 44)
states very unequivocally that this type is normally used to inform the receiver of a state
of affairs which the text producer would like to specify emphatically. Although Abuu
Muusaa is apparently right, he and other Arab linguists use Negation/Focusing Formula
to illustrate how the analytic proposition of this type of SE is being specificationally
encoded. In so doing, the illustration is meant to identify the focus constituent as well as
to explain that the negation covering all but the focus constituent and characteristic of
this type of SE is total. In actual communication, only “inammaa” in the example above
is presumably the norm, as will be shown below. The use of S emphatic modals to
communicate information, which is either known or presented as such, may be because
such information is not expected to be known by some people, or the information is not
expected to turn out as such by both interlocutors. Compare this to what Prince (1978:
899) calls “Informative-presupposition it-clefts whose function is to mark a piece of
information as fact”. Consider a similar example which is a Qur’anic verse:

لا حول ولا قوت إلا بالله
no power and no strength but in-God-gen
(There is no power and no strength save in God)
(Wehr, 1976:217)

In our account of demodalized utterances in the previous chapter, we have argued that
sometimes people choose not to modalize emphatically their communicative utterance on
the basis that, from their point of view, their propositions which usually express their ideologies and firm beliefs conform not only to belief but reality as well. So when they express the same propositions through the use of SE formulation, they do that for a very good reason which seems only appropriate with regard to what is being expressed, as in this Quraanic verse. The verse, from the point of view of the Muslims, is Truth-conditionally exhaustive whereby no presuppositional set is envisaged. More specifically, Muslims normally utter this verse and the like when a friend or relative passes away, and when they feel helpless. Thus, it conveys an analytic proposition emphatically specifying the truth-conditional exhaustive reliance of Muslims on God in a context of helplessness and desperation. When a friend or a close relative dies as a result of a divine decision, a Muslim who wholly and fully believes in such decisions may consider in a sense the death of his beloved friend as if counter-presuppositional to his religious beliefs. In other words, a Muslim may deep inside feel or wish that death could have spared him his friend or relative's life because he believes in God and divine decisions, and he would wish the deceased had not died. On realizing deep inside that such a decision is decisive, he recites this verse to express complete reliance on God in such contexts of helplessness. In so doing, he obviously expresses acceptance and thus reasserts his own beliefs in God and in divine decisions. The use of this kind of SE utterance is thus meant to convey the text producer's expressive feelings and emotions which might he dissimilar to what is actually occurring in the outside world. It was mentioned in chapter two that such a use is not directed to any specific receiver in such a specific context. It may well be argued that the verse has become something like a proverbial S emphatic utterance indicating helplessness (cf. the functions of SE below).

However, the verse can further be used as a TCSE realization intended either to replace the receiver's wrong beliefs, restrict the contrastive applicability of the utterance to the focus constituent, or select the focus constituent as the correct value from a presupposed set (cf. below and also Al-Haashimii, 1960: 194 for a detailed account).
Furthermore, consider the following example which does not express an analytic proposition, but a synthetic one conveying a truth-conditional exhaustiveness:

\[
\text{maa mazzaga 'l-kitaaba illaa ZAYDUN. }
\]

not torn-(he) the-book-acc but Zeid-nom.

(Nobody has torn the book but Zeid.)

Here, “tearing the book apart” as a Quality is truth-conditionally exclusive to the value “Zeid”, who, in addition to the other Qualities he may have besides tearing the book apart, is the only person who tore the book apart. Similarly no presuppositional set is apparently available in the context, which indicates that the specific pragmatic presupposition is not involved, and therefore, the Bearer “Zeid” does not stand in contrast with any other possible candidates. The discourse universe is clearly limited as the person who is the culprit would be local, i.e. a relative. So “why do we use the Negation/Focusing formula to encode a synthetic proposition expressible by using the unmarked version?”

Arabic rhetoric does not provide any explanation as to the specific contextual motivation for using such utterances in SE except az-Zamalkaani (1974:184) and Aniis (1975:173) who only discuss examples which are not motivated by a definite pragmatic presupposition. However, the only possible explanation that seems feasible to me is that this utterance can be used when the receiver is classified as counter-presuppositional but who is presuppositionally neither mistaken nor self-assured. He is simply angry at a certain state of affairs and insistently wants to be informed of the value involved. More specifically, when the receiver is confronted with a certain state of affairs which is not only slightly undesirable and should not have happened but is unexpected as well, he would certainly, if he does not know for example the identity of the culprit, question the text producer about it. So his question may represent the specific pragmatic presupposition intended to complete his cognizance of that particular state of affairs.
This example is, therefore, intended to supply New information as to the identity of the value which/who seems to be notorious for bad behaviour in causing damage to others. The text producer, who in this case infers or speculates on the basis of either direct knowledge or past experience, emphasizes that the culprit is no one but X. The receiver’s question which has to signal phonologically or lexico-grammatically his lack of expectation or his lack of desire to see such a state of affairs occur may be "who on earth has torn the book apart?". This type of truth-conditionally exhaustive SE which in this case means that the proposition is true in at least one possible world by being in conformity with reality and belief without having any presuppositional set, can be found in numerous occasions. Consider the following example drawn from (Swan, 1980: 124), and similar to the one above:

A. Who would do a thing like that?  
B. Nobody but her.

A’s question clearly signals the receiver’s disapproval or counter-presupposition to what has already happened. B’s response which, in turn shows the truth-conditional restriction of a Quality to a Bearer, clearly conveys New information intended not to replace wrong belief, restrict, or select, but to fill in an informational gap.

2. The restriction of a Bearer to a Quality. This type of factually exhaustive restriction is problematic for almost all rhetoricians and, thus neglected because the proposition is deemed to be false in all possible worlds. That is, it is factually impossible to restrict a Bearer which must have other numerous Qualities which are not at issue at the moment of speaking, to no other than one single Quality. However, Sulaymaan (quoted in Abuu Muusaa (1979: 80) argues that the following example can be a realization for this type. Consider:

Innamaa nahnu Li’ LLAAHI.  
only we for-God-gen.  
(We are but for God.)
The variable "we" indicates that all human beings, creatures, plants, and everything on earth restrictively belongs to nobody but God. No other candidate in a presuppositional set can be envisaged to be contrasted with the value "for God". It is clear that, from a Muslim's point of view, the proposition here is analytic too, and the negation used which can either be explicit or implicit, must be total or infinite in order to have a truth-conditionally exhaustive SE. By being total, it truth-conditionally precludes the possibility of having an alternative presuppositional candidate(s) as is the case in Truth-conditional Contrastive SE.

6.2.4.1.2 Hyperbolically Exhaustive SE (HESE)

In addition to its basic proposition, this type of utterance emotionally and attitudinally expresses the text producer's point of view hyperbolically, and can thus be regarded as a congruent realization of intensification, namely, "Tabliigh", whose occurrences are characterized as being imaginably and frequently possible (cf. chapter five). The only difference between them is that HESE is not a realization of content incongruence, i.e. metaphorical, etc., and can accordingly be used either in congruent and/or incongruent contexts alike. The important thing to remember is that the hyperbolic use of SE is similar to the use of superlative adjectives and adverbs ascribing the superiority in question to the entity they modify. In other words, the use of SE can be an expression of Boosters, to use Quirk's terminology (1985: 590-597), which is an intensifying subjunct indicating an abstractly conceived intensity scale on which the point indicated is either relatively high or relatively low. A Relatively high point of intensity covers both Boosters and Maximizers. Hyperbolic SE underpins the stress of the text producer's strong emotion by magnifying the importance of the value specified by his utterance. The exhaustiveness implicature must thus be understood in terms of specifying one candidate as superior to the rest in a locally or universally limited but contextually unspecified presuppositional set. The contextually unspecified candidates are treated as non-existent in comparison with the chosen candidate who/which is not
meant to stand in contrast with any other candidates whatsoever. In order to illustrate that, let us take each type of restriction in turn.

1. the restriction of a Quality to a Bearer. Consider the following:

لا كريم في البلد إلا زيد
lā kariimun fī ‘l-baladī illaa ZAYDUN.
not generous-nom in the-country-gen but Zeid-nom.
(No one is generous in the country but Zeid.)

Restricting the Quality of generosity hyperbolically to the Bearer “Zeid”, the restriction first implies that the only generous one in the country is Zeid, and second, Zeid has other Qualities besides being extremely or the most generous. However, if the example is taken literally, it will be truth-conditionally false because there must be other people who are generous too in the same country. But, according to the contextual interpretation of the example above, their generosity is thought of as locally non-existent, unrivalled or unequalled in comparison with Zeid’s generosity. Again neither a specific presuppositional set nor a specific pragmatic presupposition are specifiable from this context since the constative is not intended to be truth-conditionally contrastive. So the function of such a use seems to fill in an informational gap rather than correct the receiver’s wrong beliefs and assumptions.

2. the restriction of a Bearer to a Quality. Consider the following:

ما زيد إلا كريم
maa Zaydun illaa kariimun.
not Zeid-nom but generous-nom.
(Zeid is nothing but generous.)

Here the Bearer “Zeid” is exclusively restricted to the Quality of generosity in comparison with the remaining unspecified Qualities which Zeid has and which are demoted to being non-existent if compared with the specified Quality “being generous”. There are other Bearers who may be generous as well but this is not the issue here because the context is not one of contrastiveness.
6.2.4.2 Contrastive Specificational Emphasis (CSE)

As far as SE is concerned, contrastive SE is believed to be the most important type of SE in Arabic rhetoric. Not only does it involve the receiver's specific pragmatic presuppositions but the specific presuppositional set of the values eligible for being focally stressed if chosen in a given discourse. It is this type of S Emphasis which, if used, implicates the text producer's intentional upgrading or downgrading tone towards his receiver through the proposition contrastively communicated. Let us move on to discuss its basic sub-types in detail.

6.2.4.2.1 Truth-conditionally Contrastive SE (TCSE)

TCSE appears to differ from factually exhaustive SE in terms of information quality, i.e. predominantly synthetic, and in terms of quantification, i.e. by having a presuppositional set. There is a strong semantic and pragmatic resemblance between TCSE and cleft sentences which involves not only specifying a value for a variable but also the retrieval of the receiver's specific assumption or pragmatic presupposition motivating the use of Contrastive Emphasis. The correctly chosen member of TCSE which does indeed represent an exhaustive listing of the members under consideration and can thus satisfy the contrastive clause in question, stands in contrast with the unchosen members of the presuppositional set given contextually and/or co-textually. The contextual functions of TCSE which will be discussed next, is either to select, restrict or replace the receiver's mistaken belief with the correct one. It has been stated above that as far as contrastive SE is concerned, both types of restriction pragmatically impart the text producer's attitudinal view carried by his contrastive proposition towards his receiver. If the restriction is one of a Quality to a Bearer then the contrastive structure is normally meant to upgrade the Bearer in question. If, however, it is one of a Bearer to a Quality, then it is meant to diminish, downgrade, etc. the Bearer concerned. Both interpretations are regarded as necessary criteria on the basis of which two contrastive
structures bearing out different types of restriction are judged in terms of upgrading or
downgrading the entity represented by the focus constituent in a contrastive utterance.
Thus,

1. if the restriction is one of a Quality to a Bearer, then the realizations are
pragmatically used to upgrade the Bearer. Consider:

\[
\text{maa shaa’irun illaa ZAYDUN.} \\
\text{not a-poet-nom but Zeid-nom. (No one is a poet but Zeid.)}
\]

The two pragmatic interpretations of this restriction state that

(i) the Quality of “being a poet” is contrastively restricted to the Bearer Zeid, and
therefore all the unchosen members of the presuppositional set do not share this Quality
with Zeid. Zeid is the exhaustive listing of a set of members or the only member from
among the members of the presuppositional set who is a poet, and
(ii) this restriction implies that Zeid may have other Qualities besides being a poet.

The restriction, from the text producer’s point of view, distinctively praises or upgrades
Zeid positively by maximizing the restrictive application of the utterance uniquely to
Zeid.

2. If the restriction is of a Bearer to a Quality, then the realizations would be
to depraise or downgrade the Bearer’s potentialities. Consider:

\[
\text{maa Zaydun illaa shaa’irun.} \\
\text{not Zeid-nom but a-poet-nom. (Zeid is only a poet.)}
\]

The implicatures of such a restriction are:

(i) Zeid is restricted to only the Quality of “being poetic” selected from among a limited
number of Different Qualities forming the given presuppositional set, and
other unspecified Bearers may share the Quality of being a poet with Zeid. Thus the Bearer "Zeid" is not an exhaustive listing of the members who share the Quality of being a poet, since the utterance clearly depraises or downgrades Zeid by depriving him of the rejected Qualities specified in the preceding pragmatic presupposition. This type of restriction differs sharply from type 1 in terms of the Bearer’s exhaustiveness.

6.2.4.2.2 Hyperbolically Contrastive SE (HCSE)

HCSE is normally used to impart the text producer’s hyperbolic point of view contrastively. It is similar to BESE except HCSE evokes limited members of a presuppositional set which share the same value except for one of them which is singled to represent the focus constituent. Treated as being hyperbolically the only one, the focus constituent can thus be situated either on the higher or lower extreme of the contrastive superlativity scale. Therefore,

(i) if the restriction is of a Quality to a Bearer, then the realizations would certainly be intended to upgrade the Bearer. Consider:

\[
\text{ما شاعر إلا زيّد.} \quad \text{not a-poet-nom but Zeid-nom.} \\
\text{(No one is a poet but Zeid.)}
\]

The implicatures of such a restriction are that from among the members forming the presuppositional set which have the same Quality of being a poet as Zeid, Zeid is specifically chosen as the only one who is the poet, whereas the Quality of being poetic attributable to other members of the presuppositional set as well is treated as if non-existent, unequal to Zeid’s. In addition to his being a poet, Zeid has other unspecified Qualities besides being a poet. Similarly,

(ii) the restriction of a Bearer to a Quality. Consider:

\[
\text{ما زيّد إلا شاعر.} \quad \text{not Zeid-nom but a-poet-nom.} \\
\text{(Zeid is only a poet.)}
\]
The restriction implies that Zeid is hyperbolically restricted to the Quality of being poetic by comparison with other Qualities Zeid possesses and presuppositionally specified in the context. In other words, Zeid's Quality of being poetic is meant to exceed or is treated as unrivalled by his other Qualities such as being a scientist, painter, etc., brought forth in a presuppositional set. The second implicature of this restriction, namely other Bearers may share the Quality of being poetic with Zeid, does not seem to me plausible, since it contradicts the very essence of the hyperbolic use of such a structure. As far as I can see, the second implicature does not seem to arise since this restriction does not truth-conditionally negate Zeid's other Qualities given in a presuppositional set.

So far I have been elucidating how an S emphatic constative is pragmatically analysed, the nature of the implicature derivable from S emphatic structures, types of restriction necessary to identify the text producer's attitudinal aspect towards his receiver, and the propositional types of S emphatic structures. In the next section, a detailed discussion on the congruent and incongruent typologies of the S Emphasis Functions in discourse will be attempted.

6.2.5 Functions of CSE

Having covered some of the basic semantic and pragmatic considerations of SE, our focal issue now is to introduce the discoursal functions relayable by SE in contrastive contexts in which the receiver's specific pragmatic presupposition upon which the encoding of an S emphatic constative depends, is involved

Contextually only a contrastive SE utterance, whether factual or hyperbolic, can produce certain discoursal functions with regard to the receiver's suppositions, beliefs, ideology, etc. Recollect that in our discussion of the parameters of Emphasis, namely, the pragmatic presupposition as a parameter of Emphasis in chapter four, it was argued
that the employment of SE, unlike Dik’s five Focus functions, produces only three primary functions reminiscent of those identified in Arabic rhetoric. These three functions, which are specifiable via pragmatic presupposition, represent the intention of the use of SE in specific contexts involving explicit or implicit rejection of incorrect information. I believe that the reduction of SE functions to three only is called for since, as we saw in our review of literature, most linguists seem to have obscured the area of Emphasis proper by knowingly or unknowingly extending contrastive Emphasis to cover areas of unmarked Focus and vice versa. It is essential to recognize the involvement of an explicit or implicit rejection feature typically characterizing all contrastive utterances of SE. Before discussing the functions of SE in detail it is necessary to recollect the types of receivers provided in chapter two which specifies the congruent and incongruent contexts presupposing the use of contrastive Emphasis.

In compliance with the typologies of constative and receiver, there are eight specific congruent and incongruent contexts in which constatives are either contrastively modalized or de-modalized, depending on the observance or infringement of the submaxims concerned. Thus, firstly, the text producer may produce an emphatically modalized constative to be used in two congruent specific situations, the first when the receiver is both verbally and non-verbally counter-presuppositional, and the second, when something contradicting the text producer’s previous expectation and beliefs occurs. The latter, which may be regarded as a congruent realization, essentially shows the text producer’s expressive use of language without any receiver’s specific contextual participation.

Secondly, the text producer may flout the respective submaxims by demoting his receiver to a different status and consequently use SE to modalize or demodalize his constative in such incongruent contexts. Accordingly, six specific contexts have been identified: these are: (i) the demotion of a counter-presuppositional receiver who is
cognizant of p to someone as if non-cognizant of p requires the use of contrastive modals, (ii) the demotion of a counter-presuppositional receiver who is non-cognizant of p to someone who is as if cognizant of p calls for the use of contrastive modals, (iii) the demotion of a receiver who is presuppositionless to a counter-presuppositional one necessitates the use of contrastive modalization, (iv) the demotion of a reconfirmation-seeking receiver to a counter-presuppositional one induces the need for a contrastive modalization encoding of the message, (v) the demotion of a counter-presuppositional receiver to a reconfirmation seeking one calls for the use of Emphasis proper, and (vi) the demotion of a counter-presuppositional receiver to a presuppositionless one induces the use of de-modalization.

However, it should be pointed out that it is not always possible to restrict TCSE to a specific receiver whose conversational role in eliciting the use of SE in the cases above is contextually identifiable. There are cases where the receiver could be anyone who is expected to counter-presuppose the veracity of the contrastive constative modalized by means of Negation/Focusing formula. (cf. next section). The present research will mainly be concerned with the use of contrastive modalization based on the prior specification of the receiver's contextual statuses.

6.2.5.1 The Congruent Functions of CSE

CSE or contrastive modalization is normally used congruently to produce three primary discoursal functions. These are:

6.2.5.1.1 Restrictive CSE

Restrictive CSE is a function which TCSE relays in order to restrict a previously given presuppositional set to one or more correct values representing either Qualities or Bearers. If the chosen value is a Quality, as is the case in the type of restricting a Bearer to a Quality, then the chosen and rejected values must not be in primary opposition such
as tall vs short, but in secondary opposition to one another, since it is impossible to envisage two primary opposite Qualities such as tall vs short being assigned to a given Bearer simultaneously (cf. Werth, 1984: 131-63, on complementaries, converses, etc. and Taglicht, 1984: for primary and secondary opposites). Further, the two types of restriction used to restrict the values presupposed, clearly involve either an explicit or implicit rejection - depending on the type of realization used - of an incorrect value given as a candidate of the presuppositional set and provision of a correct one. Thus,

1. if the restriction is one of a Bearer to a Quality, the text producer may encode his utterance contrastively in order to restrict the receiver's pragmatic presupposition which would be:

Зайдゥن شاعر و لغوي. 
Zeid-nom a-poet-nom and a-linguist.
(Zeid is a poet and a linguist.)

To restrict the applicability of the utterance to only the correct value he may use an adversative conjunction that shows the rejection will be explicit as in:

Зайдゥن شاعر لا لغوي. 
Zeid-nom a-poet-nom not a-linguist-nom.
(Zeid is a poet, not a linguist.)

or implicit by using “иннамаа”, (only), as in:

иннамаа Зайдゥن شاعر. 
only Zeid-nom a-poet-nom.
(Zeid is only a poet.)

Typologically, in both examples only one Quality is correct, because the rejected value, namely “a linguist” cannot be assigned to the Bearer as it is truth-conditionally false in at least one possible world. If, however, the restriction is hyperbolically contrastive, then both the rejected and the correct values are true of the Bearer but one of
them is comparatively hyperbolically superior to the rejected one. That is, the rejected value can be viewed as if qualitatively non-existent in comparison with the selected one. Accordingly, two pragmatic interpretations are possible for the examples above.

2. If the restriction is one of a quality to a bearer, the pragmatic presupposition would be:

Zayd-nom and Ahmed-nom poets-dual-nom.
(Zeid and Ahmed are poets.)

The rejected value may be explicitly given by using an adversative conjunction as in:

lā shā'irun illā ZayDUN. (No one is a poet but Zeid.)

or implicitly implied as in:

innamaa 'I-shā'ru ZAYDUN. (Only Zeid is the poet.)

Similarly, these two examples can have two pragmatic interpretations on the basis of the typology given above. That is, if the utterance is a TCSE, then the rejected value, "Ahmed" as a poet is truth-conditionally false. If, in contrast, the utterance is a HCSE, then the rejected value, "Ahmed" is a poet too, but his being poetic is inferior, or qualitatively non-existent, if compared with Zeid's.

The scope of SE used for restricting, may be either constituent SE, as in the examples above or predicational SE. The receiver's principles and beliefs may either be mistaken or counter-presuppositional.
6.2.5.1.2 Replacive CSE

Replacive TCSE indicates that a TCSE utterance can be used to remove an incorrect specific value either explicitly or implicitly in the receiver’s previous discourse and to replace it with a correct one. If the correct value represents a Quality, then it may or may not be in primary opposition with the rejected value. Similarly, replacive TCSE involves two distinct procedures: Rejection of the incorrect values and the provision of the correct ones. Dik (1981: 63-5) shows that the logical procedure in replacing the incorrect value by a correct one is first to remove the rejected value and second to substitute it with the correct one. However, the Correction sometimes precedes the Rejection in several contexts. In other contexts, the Rejection may be inferentially derivable from the Correction, which should always be explicitly mentioned, since Correction presupposes Rejection (ibid: 64) but not vice versa.

As for the beliefs and presuppositions of the receiver, they may be either mistaken, الإعتقاد بخلاف، or self-assured, الظن على الخلاف, counter-presuppositional ones. The latter type of beliefs may induce a counter-presuppositional confrontation which would quite likely attract the use of more direct contrastive evidentials in order to prove the truth value of \( p \).

Similarly, both types of restriction are at work here. Thus,

1. if the restriction is of a Bearer to a Quality, the pragmatic presupposition of this function would be:

\[
\text{Zaydun lughawiyyun.} \\
\text{Zeid-nom a-linguist-nom.} \\
(\text{Zeid is a linguist.})
\]

The use of TCSE can either explicitly reject the value “linguist” together with providing the correct value as in:

\[
\text{Zaydun SHA\text{\textsuperscript{a}IRUN laa LUGHAWIYUN.}}
\]
Zeid-nom a-poet-nom not a-linguist-nom.
(Zeid is a poet not a linguist.)

or implicitly reject the incorrect value and provide the correct one by using fronting as in:

SHAA'IRUN Zaydun.  
a-poet-nom Zeid-nom.  
(It is a poet that Zeid is.)

2. if the restriction is one of a Quality to a Bearer, the pragmatic presupposition may be the same as the one above, but the stress this time is on the Bearer, "Zeid" representing a value. So the use of TCSE can either explicitly reject the incorrect value together with stating the correct one as in:

maa shadirun illaa ZAYDUN.  
not a-poet-nom but Zeid-nom.  
(No one is a poet but Zeid.)

or implicitly reject the incorrect value as in:

innamaa’sh-shaa’iru Z4YDUN.  
only the-poet-nom Zeid-nom.  
(Only Zeid is the poet.)

If, however, these utterances are intended to be realizations of HCSE, the interpretation would be that if the values represent Qualities, then it is true that "Zeid" is both a linguist and a poet. But the Quality of being poetic is chosen and restrictively assigned to Zeid to nullify hyperbolically the existence of his other possible Quality of being a linguist. It is a prerequisite that both interlocutors know that it is true that Zeid is a linguist as well as a poet. But the receiver may be treated as somebody who does not know that Zeid's Quality of being poetic is hyperbolically superior to his being a linguist. Therefore, he specifies the Quality of being a poet indicating the superiority of the variable "Zeid". To redress that, the text producer hyperbolically replaces the wrong Quality by specifying the Quality of being poetic as being the one which shows Zeid's superiority over the other Quality specified by the receiver's pragmatic presupposition.
Note that as far as I am aware, all relevant Arabic references cited leave the functions of
the hyperbolic use of CSE and whether such a use is meant to restrict or replace
incorrect information obscure. As we can see, it is possible to use HGSE to yield the
same as the foregoing functions of TCSE.

Similarly, the scope of replacive CSE may be a constituent or predicational
Emphasis if the focus element represents the whole clause requiring to be replaced by
another (cf. in this respect the example of Multiple Emphasis discussed in chapter four).

6.2.5.1.3 Selective CSE قصر تغيير

Selective TCSE involves the selection of a correct value from a given
presuppositional set of possible values expressed disjunctively. The receiver’s
disjunctive pragmatic presupposition must be coupled with decisiveness in order to
indicate affirmatively that the applicability of his utterance’s truth value is either to X
value or to Y value. It must be understood that the disjunctive formulation of the
receiver’s assumption is not encoded interrogatively, i.e. “Is X or Y Q?”, because an
interrogative formulation would not involve Rejection and Correction which are
characteristic of most SE utterances, but a request for New information. So if an SE
utterance is opted for in a certain context, then it should be conveying partial New
information. In fact it is only Abuu Muusaa who rightly disagrees with the rest of
rhetoricians, including as-Sakkaakii, and who advocate using SE if the receiver is
reconfirmation-seeking. Actually, these rhetoricians are possibly right if the implicit
expectations of the receiver’s information-seeking question are likely to contradict those
of the text producer’s (cf. below). We need to remember that Selective TCSE involves
“Contrastiveness” when it explicitly or implicitly excludes the other presupposed values
as the incorrect ones for the variable. Thus,

1. if the restriction is one of a Bearer to a Quality, the pragmatic
presupposition would be:
Zaydun anmaaż shaa’irun aw lughawiyyun. (Zeid is either a poet or a linguist.)

Using TCSE to select the right value may involve an explicit rejection of the incorrect value and stating the correct one as in:

Zaydun SHAA’IRUN laa LUGHAWIYYUN. (Zeid is a poet not a linguist.)

or involve an implicit rejection as in:

innamaa Zaydun SHAA’IRUN. (Zeid is only a poet.)

2. if the restriction is one of a Quality to a Bearer, the pragmatic presupposition would be:

anmaaż Zaydun aw Ahmadu shaa’irun. (Either Zeid or Ahmed is a poet.)

This pragmatic presupposition may motivate the text producer to use TCSE either to reject explicitly the incorrect value and state the correct one as in:

Zaydun SHAA’IRUN laa AHMADU. (Zeid is a poet not Ahmed.)

or implicitly reject the incorrect value by stating only the correct one as in:

innamaa ash-sha’ru Zaydun. (Only Zeid is the poet.)
The question now to be asked is, "is it possible to equally use selective CSE hyperbolically to express the applicability of the utterance force to either of the two or more values encoded disjunctively?" The answer is negative because the selection of the correct value "a poet" from the presuppositional set will not tell the receiver that Zeid is a linguist as well. The receiver’s knowledge that "Zeid is a poet and a linguist" is a prerequisite for hyperbole to work appropriately here. If the receiver’s pragmatic presupposition does not indicate such knowledge, it is impossible to show the receiver how Zeid is hyperbolically superior in terms of the value focused. In using CSE hyperbolically the receiver lacks this knowledge which is clearly encoded in the pragmatic presupposition disjunctively. This is unfortunately also left vague in Arabic rhetoric.

As a consequence of the congruent typology of CSE functions above which represent the norm of dispatching CSE utterances, most rhetoricians conclude that:

\[
\text{قصر التعبين أعظم لأن كون الشيء موصوفاً بـ } \\
\text{أحد أمرين معيدين على الإطلاق لا يتضمن جواز إنصافه بهما معًا ولا إمتثاله.}
\]

Any TCSE utterance usable to restrict and/or to replace is re-usable to select but not vice versa because the values of selective CSE may either be primary opposites, thus similar to the context of CSE used to replace incorrect information, or secondary opposites, thus similar to the context of CSE used to restrict the values simultaneously specified for a variable by the receiver.

(my translation)

Therefore, the exemplifications used for restrictive and replacive CSE are re-usable for selective CSE but not vice versa.
However, according to Abuu Muusaa (1979b: 50), there are cases of replacive CSE which cannot be exemplified for restricting CSE because it is impossible to specify two primary opposites as the possible values for a variable.

6.2.5.2 Incongruent Functions of CSE

TCSE can further be used to relay at least nine discoursal functions if it is used in incongruent contexts depending largely on both interlocutors' misrepresentation of each other's assumptions and beliefs. In other words, these functions are not based on the text producer's certain prior knowledge of the need to replace rather than to restrict the receiver's beliefs. For example, the text producer may pragmatically presuppose that the receiver's assumptions require to be restricted whereas in fact they may require to be replaced. These possibilities may occur in situations whereby the receiver may have been misinformed, or perhaps he does not wish to give the text producer a clear-cut idea of his views or the ideological grounds on which he stands in a confrontational dialogue. The deviance of such cases from the norm specifies nine highly specific situations suitable for the use of CSE. The first six incongruent contexts are:

1. The receiver's presupposition needs to be restricted but the text producer assumes that it needs to be replaced or selected.

2. The receiver's presupposition needs to be replaced but the text producer assumes that it needs to be restricted or selected.

3. The receiver's presupposition needs to be selected but the text producer assumes that it needs to be restricted or replaced.

Moreover, there are further situations whereby the receiver may wrongly believe that the text producer's assumption requires to be either restricted, replaced or selected, whereas in reality the text producer's assumption concerned is similar to the receiver's. The text producer encodes his utterance contrastively to inform the receiver of the
sameness of their assumptions and beliefs. So as a result we may have three more situations that concern the incongruent use of CSE. These are:

1. The function of restricting the applicability of an SE utterance can further, according to al-Qazwiinii (1949: vol. 3, p.14, fn.), be used to correct the receiver's belief who may think that the text producer is the one who incorrectly assigns more than one value to a variable and hence, his belief is required to be correctly restricted. The receiver's belief concerning restricting the correct value is already correct, and the text producer's belief is also correct but he assumes that the receiver perhaps believes otherwise, thus requiring the use of SE not only to inform but correct the receiver's mistaken assumption. The context concerns both truth-conditionally and hyperbolically contrastive types of SE.

2. Replacing TCSE may further (ibid:15) be used in a context where both the text producer's and the receiver's beliefs are identical and thus correct, but the text producer assumes that the receiver may have wrongly assumed that the text producer's belief is incorrect and in need of replacement. To replace this mistaken belief the text producer dispatches a contrastive utterance meant not only to replace such a wrong assumption but also to inform the receiver that his [the text producer's] belief is correct too. Such a use therefore is not meant to remove an incorrect value and eventually provide the correct value. It is, rather, meant only to inform the receiver of the sameness of his own belief to the receiver's. That is, it is meant to correct the receiver's wrong knowledge of p. The motivation for such a correction is based on the text producer's expectations, assumptions, signs or inferences drawn from the receiver's ideological status. The situation thus seems to concern the interlocutors' mutual knowledge of p. (cf. chapter two) rather than p itself.

3. Selective CSE may be used by the text producer in a context whereby the receiver's belief is correct but the receiver wrongly assumes that the text producer's belief, which is actually correct as well, requires to be selectively corrected. The text producer thus uses CSE selectively to inform the receiver of his similar belief. It is not meant to correct
the selective application of the proposition, but rather to correct the receiver's incorrect knowledge of $p$.

To conclude, the present section has been focusing on the congruent and incongruent typologies of TCSE's discoursal functions. The account of such functions, which has illustratively discussed the types of restriction, primary and secondary oppositeness of the values involved, and the scope of TCSE, has led to the identification of at least twelve contexts in which TCSE can be used to operate contrastively. In our empirical account of SE to be conducted below, we will confine our specification to the congruent functions only.

6.2.6 Realizations of S Emphasis

The aim of this section is to provide a detailed account of the various realizations of SE in Arabic. Rhetorically, only four conventional constructions realizing SE are given a very thorough empirical pragmatic account in Arabic rhetoric. However, as-Sayyuṭii (n.d., 49-51, vol.2) provides fourteen purely grammatical realizations including the four conventional ones. Ten of such means seem to me to be conveying real SE. There are also lexical elements which are paraphrases of the preceding realizations such as verbs, nouns, adjectives etc., that can impart SE in similar contexts. The difference between the four conventional ones and the rest is that the latter are restricted to certain clausal structures, whereas the former enjoy the freedom of being used in any clause type. Therefore, we too will be focusing empirically on the four conventional ways of conveying SE although we will be providing a brief discussion on three of the remaining grammatical realizations. The grammatical realizations of SE are twelve. These are:

1. The Reflexives, (cf. chapter 5)
2. Use of “inna” together with /la-/ (cf. chapters 4 & 5)
3. Textual Repetition of Subject. (cf. chapter 5)
4. Multiple Emphasis (cf chapter 4)
5. Pronoun of Separation,
6. Definitivization of Subject & Predicate,
Only the last four will receive a thorough empirical account, whereas the three before, namely 5, 6, and 7, will be discussed briefly below. As for Multiple Emphasis, it was shown in chapter four that clause no. 10 was a very clear realization of CSE where the focus element is the whole proposition, i.e. predicational CSE, intended to replace wrong information in a certain S context. Similarly, the use of oath structures to modalize emphatically a following clause could be used to express predicational Emphasis as well as constituent Emphasis intended to realize Emphasis proper and S Emphasis. Let us first turn our attention to the fifth, sixth and seventh types of realizations then we will be focusing in detail on the last four conventional means of expressing SE.

6.2.6.1 Pronoun of Separation

This is a pronoun which can be used only in Equational clauses by being inserted in between the G Subject and the predicate as a reduplication of the immediately preceding G Subject. The predicate, which may be a substantive, noun, a relative clause, or some other element, must be definite so that this pronoun functions as an emphatic modal in contrastive contexts. The pronoun, whose essential function is to announce that what follows is the predicate, not an adjective which would have rendered the clause incomplete, must agree with the preceding G Subject in person, gender and number. That is to say, without the presence of this pronoun, the predicate can be treated as a definite adjective modifying the preceding G Subject. Thus, without the pronoun of separation, both can represent a noun group functioning as a G Subject for a non-native speaker of Arabic because both can take the indicative case, be definite, agree in gender, person and number with the preceding Subject, hence the confusion. However, in spite of this essential function, it still remains an optional modal the Equational clause can dispense with.
In spoken language, intonation should play an essential role in identifying the definite predicate as such by replacing this pronoun with a pause. The intonational prominence seems to fall either on the G Subject or its reduplication, i.e. the pronoun of separation. In either way the use of the pronoun emphatically specifies the co-referent of the focus constituent as the value, which is always the G Subject, for the variable, i.e. the predicate. In other words, the positions of the value and the variable seem to be grammatically constrained by the use of this pronoun. The type of restriction involved is accordingly always one of a Quality as a variable which is always realized in this case by the predicate, to a Bearer as a value which is always realized by the G Subject. Consider:

ZAYDUN huwa 'l-mudarrisu. (Zeid is the one who is the teacher.)

6.2.6.2 Definitivization of the G Subject and Predicate

The definitivization of G Subject and predicate too is confined to the basic elements of the Equational clause bipartition only. More specifically, when both the G Subject and predicate are definite the clause can relay SE if (i) either the Subject is a substantive, verbal noun etc., definitivized for genericness, or (ii) the predicate is either definitivized for genericness or referentiality, or a relative clause, and the G Subject is definitivized by other than the definite article. Although both processes are used to produce SE in contrastive contexts, they sharply differ in Focus position. According to (i) the value would be the predicate and the variable would be the G Subject. The positions of both the value and the variable seem to be syntactically constrained as well by prefixing the generic definite article to the Subject. Since the G Subject always realizes a Bearer, the type of restriction in (i) is thus always one of a Bearer to a Quality. Consider the following example:
It should be mentioned in passing that, according to Fowler (1986: 131-2), generic sentences such as the preceding one are generalized propositions claiming universal truth and usually cast in a syntax reminiscent of proverbs or scientific laws.

In (ii), on the other hand, the restriction is one of a Quality to a Bearer. The value would be the G Subject and the variable is the Predicate. Consider the following which realizes hyperbolic SE:

**ANTA 'l-kariimu.**
***you the-generous.***
*(YOU are the generous one.)*

Similarly, if the predicate is a relative clause, we may get:

**HUWA 'l-ladhii akhadha 'l-kitaaba.**
***he the-one-who took-(he) the-book-acc.***
*(HE is the one who took the book.)*

The relative clause realizing the Quality is restricted to the G Subject “He”. The utterance is clearly a pseudo-cleft clause which can be reversible as well (cf. next).
Systemically, pseudo-cleft is termed a thematic equative which, in terms of transitivity, is viewed as a grammatical metaphor for its unmarked counterpart. Halliday (1985: 41-3 & 280) points out that in such a clause all the elements are organized into two constituents linked by a relationship of identity through the use of 'be'. Its basic part initiating with a wh-element is a structural feature [which Halliday] calls 'Nominalization' whereby any element or a group of elements takes on the functions of a nominal group in the clause and constitutes a single element in the message structure. The function of Nominalization systems is to distribute the elements of the clause into alternative patterns of Theme and Rheme. The thematic equative realizes two distinct 'semantic' features. (i) On the one hand, it specifies what the Theme is; on the other hand, it identifies it with the Rheme, and (ii) the identification of the Theme with the Rheme adds a 'semantic' component of exclusiveness, i.e. this and this alone.

In Arabic Grammar, al-Ansaarii (n.d., 609-13), argues concerning the steps required to encode a pseudo-cleft clause, that

in order to specify the Rheme, i.e. the identifier, for the Theme, i.e. the identified, by means of using "الدَّي", (the one who), four steps are required:
(i) use a proper relative pronoun co-referential with the identifier, in initial position,
(ii) postpone the identifier to final position,
(iii) nominativize the identifier as it represents the predicate of the pseudo-cleft, and
(iv) place a proper pronoun co-referential with the identifier immediately after the relative pronoun in initial position if the clause is Equational.

(translation)

As a result of such steps we get the following example:

الدَّي هو نائمٌ زيدٌ.
The one who is sleeping is Zeid.

Bearing out New information, the constituent "Zeid" is placed at the end for end-focus.
Al-Anṣāri further argues that the identifier of the clause in question is subject to the following conditions:

1. It can be postponed, thus this excludes wh-elements, conditional devices, etc.,
2. It can be definitivizable, thus this excludes adverbs of manner and the specificational noun، which are both necessarily indefinite,
3. It can implicitly be pronominalized, thus this excludes prepositional phrases having، “hattaa” (to); مد، “mudh” and مني، “mundhu”, (since) as prepositions,
4. It can occur in an affirmative statement, thus this excludes the use of nominal groups such as أه، “ahadun” (anybody) usable in a negative statement,
5. It occurs in a constative utterance only because it is impossible to relativize, for example, the imperative form,
6. It does not occur in either of two independent clauses juxtaposed adjacently.

(my translation)

These are the most distinctive features that characterize the identifier in a pseudo-cleft clause in Arabic.

Functionally, pseudo-cleft has been the subject of controversial views regarding whether it is specificational and/or predicational (cf. Gundel, 1977; Prince, 1978 and Declerck, 1984). The latter is called predicational pseudo-cleft because it wholly conveys New information to be used in contexts where it is believed to fill in a gap. Whereas the former does not wholly convey New information and thus produces contrastiveness. A third type of pseudo-cleft which need not concern us here is called definitional. (cf. Declerck: ibid).

Al-Jurjaanii (140-1), in Arabic rhetoric, argues that “alladhii”, (the one who) is normally resorted to in pseudo-cleft structures to introduce the relative clause part used to specify a definite element realizing the predicate of these structures. The relative clause, i.e. the variable or the identified, carries Given information, whereas the definite element, i.e. the value or the identifier, carries New information. Al-Jurjaanii shows that
these structures are contextually used for التخصيص، takhṣīs, (specification), which is an alternative term for S Emphasis.

Further to their use for S Emphasis which will not be pursued any further, pseudo-clefts can sometimes be used predicationally in certain contexts. In our section on clause typology in chapter two, it has been intuitively demonstrated that if we have a definite Subject bearing New information and an indefinite object bearing Given information retrievable from the preceding discourse, we cannot place the Subject at the end because it is not permitted in Arabic grammar to place an indefinite element before a definite one except in contrastiveness. The FSP principle responsible for placing Given information first is being grammatically disrupted. In order to solve this problem by preserving the end-focus principle, Arabic seems to resort to pseudo-cleft structures if the answer is to be non-elliptical. Consider the same example repeated here for convenience:

\[ \text{man saraqa baytan?} \quad \mid \text{سن سرق بيتا؟} \]
\[ \text{who robbed-(he) a-house-acc?} \quad \mid \text{(Who robbed a house?)} \]

The non-elliptical response would be:

\[ \text{الذي سرق بيتا أحمد.} \quad \mid \text{alladhii saraqa baytan AHMADU} \]
\[ \text{the-one-who robbed-(he) a house AHMED.} \quad \mid \text{(The one who robbed a house is AHMED.)} \]

Of course we can place the definite Subject at the very beginning, in which case we are likely to have an emphatic Nominal clause realizing Emphasis proper at the emphatic instance level. The FSP principle responsible for determining the marked distribution of Given and New elements is the subjective word order principle. Consider:
AHMADU saraqa baytan. 
AHMED-nom robbed-(he) a-house.
(AHMED robbed a house.)

Here, the example, which is not a pseudo-cleft, can further realize SE if there are contextual clues indicating the contrastive reading of such a clause.

From this it follows that the predicational reading of the pseudo-cleft, which is extremely similar to the specificational one in terms of informational structure, does not seem capable of functioning as a discourse-initiating unit. However, that is not to claim that the pseudo-cleft cannot be used discourse-initially in Arabic, since only empirical investigations will determine such a possibility.

What matters as far as this research is concerned is specificational pseudo-cleft which specifies a value for a variable to be used in contrastive contexts. The contrastive reading which modally expresses evidential implications of the truth of the proposition communicated, can contextually be used with a counter-presuppositional receiver when the text producer observes the submaxims of Emphasis and quality concerned. It can also be used with presuppositionless and reconfirmation seeking receivers when the text producer flouts the respective submaxims. As regards the scope of specificational pseudo-cleft, it is evidently constituent Emphasis.

6.2.6.4 Negation/Focusing

It has been stated earlier that in any communicative interaction the text producer can choose to realize explicitly the two steps, i.e. Rejection and Correction, necessary for SE by resorting to the Negation/Focusing formula which divides the clause into two basic parts, the negated part and the positively focused part. The negated part always precedes the asserted one, hence the positions of the variable realized by the negated part
and the value realized by the asserted part are always syntactically constrained. Additionally, it does not seem possible to repeat the negated part immediately following the focus constituent as is the case with "innamaa" (cf below).

In Arabic there are seven negative modals used as negative restrictive subjuncts in S Emphasis to negate the part of the clause that is presupposed. The negative modals which are: "laa", "maa", "laysa", "lma", "lan", "hal", and "in", (no, not), are normally used to add diverse nuances of time reference, modality, etc. to the statement they negate particularly in Negation/Focusing formula. Some of them may precede a Nominal or Equational clause, others may precede a Verbal one. The explicit use of negation covers two types of SE realizations, the Negation/Focusing and Adversative Conjunctions to be discussed next. In Negation/Focusing they must be used in combination with either one of the three Focusing subjuncts, namely "illaa", "ghayr" or "siwaa", (but). Syntactically, the negative modals mark the negated information as variable, while the focusing modals mark what follows as the value. Thus both types of modals are used simultaneously in formulaic expressions solely conveying SE in S contexts. What is noteworthy of the negative modals is their epistemic or deontic sense to modalize the basic proposition communicated in a communicative interplay. In order to show their contributions with respect to SE, it is necessary to discuss them in some detail. To provide a comprehensive picture of negation, negation can be classified into either 1. Explicit Negation and 2. Semantic Negation.

6.2.6.4.1 Explicit Negation

Explicit Negation involves the overt use of a negative subjunct to negate the variable of an SE utterance. Normally the negated part is incomplete and it becomes complete only if the focused part is provided preceded by a focusing subjunct. Earlier we said that a superordinate which is almost always omitted from the presupposed part would have rendered the negated clause complete if mentioned. The quantification to
which the superordinate term refers decides whether the SE is intended to be truth-conditionally exhaustive or contrastive. If the negation covers a total quantification then we have TESE. If, on the other hand, it covers a specific quantification, then we have TCSE. This can be decided partly from the context and partly from the negated part of the clause in question.

All the negative subjuncts in Arabic can be employed to modalize an SE utterance in terms of time, aspect, Emphasis, etc. In order to familiarize ourselves with their signification, it is necessary to take them up in some detail.

(i) Laa. (do not, did not, is not)

"Laa" is used to negate either an imperfective or perfective lexical verb or a noun group, and serves to produce the following modal meanings.

a. Before an imperfective verb expressing deontic negative mand with the imperative form in the jussive:

لا تعودي إلا بعد أن تشبعي.

-laā taʿuḍī illā BAʾDA
not come-back-(you-fem) until after

-AN TASHBAʾII.
that have-enough-(you-fem)
(Do not come back until [only if] you have had enough.) (Cantarino, 1974: vol.I,117)

b. Before an imperfective denoting habitual present and

لا يكتم السر إلا كل ذي شرف.

laā yaktūmuʾ s-sirr ʾillā KULLU DHII SHARAFIN
not (he)-keep the-secret but every-(one) with nobility
(No one (can) keep(s) a secret but a noble one.)
(ii). **Maa**, (did not, does not, is not)

“Maa” is used to precede an imperfective or perfective lexical verb of a Verbal clause and the Subject of an Equational and Nominal. Its scope is a constituent negative modal, thus denying the part placed next to it, be it a verb or a noun group. It is very frequent in the SE formulation “maa...illaa...”. Consider:

ما شهدنا إلا ما علمنا.

\[
\text{maa shahidnaa illaa BIMAA 'ALIMNAA.} \\
\text{not attested-(we) but with-what knew-(we).} \\
\text{(We attested only what we knew.)}
\]

(iii) **Laysa**, (is not)

“Laysa” expresses the negation of general existence by preceding the Equational clause whose G Subject accordingly takes the nominative case and the predicate the accusative even when used in SE. Consider:

ليس القائد إلا منتصر؟

\[
\text{Laysa 'I-gaa' idu illaa MUNTASIRAN.} \\
\text{Is not the-leader-nom but victorious-acc} \\
\text{(The leader is nothing but victorious.)}
\]

(iv) **Lam**, (did not)

“Lam” is usually used to precede the imperfective of a Verbal clause whereby it changes the clause time reference to past. The imperfective takes the jussive mood. The other syntactic uses of “lam” are similar to “laa” above. Consider:

لم يذهب إلا أحمد.

\[
\text{lam yadhhab illaa AHMADU.} \\
\text{not go-jus but Ahmed-nom.} \\
\text{(No one went but Ahmed.)}
\]
(v) Ian, (will never)

"Lan" is always used to precede the imperfective of a Verbal clause in order to negate the future emphatically. The imperfective always takes the subjunctive mood which is frequently used to express deontic SE. Consider:

lan yadhhaba illaa Ahmadu.
will-never (he)-go-sub but Ahmed-nom.
(No one will go but Ahmed.)

(vi) In, (is not, are not)

Although "In" as an independent negative modal is almost obsolescent in MSA, it can be used in combination with a focusing modal to modalize an Equational clause to be used in S contexts, i.e. "In...illaa...". It behaves like "maa" discussed above. Consider:

In anta illaa MUDARRISUN.
not you but a-teacher-nom.
(You are but a teacher.)

(vii) Hal, (is not)

"Hal" as a conventional yes-no interrogative particle, can further be used unconventionally to relay negation in S emphatic contexts in the same way as "maa" if it is used together with a focusing modal to modalize an Equational or a Verbal clause. Consider the following Qur’anic verse (LV, 60):

هل جزاء الإحسان إلا الإحسان.
Is (shall) the recompense-nom

-l-ihsaani illaa 'L-IHSAANU.
the-goodness-gen but goodness-nom?
(Is (Shall) the recompense of goodness (be) other than goodness?)

Here, the translation seems to demonstrate the possible use of rhetorical questions to convey SE. The only difference is that the focusing subjunct "illaa" (but), is used in
order to make the utterance look like an emphatic assertion rather than a rhetorical question. So “hal” (is, shall) is accordingly regarded as a negative restrictive subjunct rather than an interrogative yes/no particle. The example above could thus be translated as an emphatic assertion communicating SE. Consider:

(The recompense for goodness is but goodness.)

6.2.6.4.2 Semantic Negation

Sometimes in SE the negated part is not syntactically explicit but experientially implicit involving the insertion of a special lexical verb implying negation to realize the variable of an SE utterance. The verbs which assume this function are: يأبأى (...refuse...but...), or, (...does not want (or accept)...); يمتنع, “ya’baa” (...refuse...but...), or, (...does not want (or accept)...); يمتنع, “yamtani‘u” (...abstain...but...), and, “yakuffu” (...stop...but...). The superordinate element omitted from the part representing the variable is normally also elliptical in the case of these verbs. The focus constituent is either an infinitive of a lexical verb or a verbal noun as a nominalization of that lexical verb. Consider:

(he)-refuse God-nom but to (he)-complete-sub message-(His)
(God refuses but to complete His message.)

As for the three focusing modals, namely “illaa”, “ghayr” and “siwaa”, (but), they are functionally synonymous as far as SE is concerned except that “illaa’ is a modal particle, whereas the other two are modal nouns. Being modal nouns, both “ghayr” and “siwaa” together with the focus constituent that follows form a genitive relation in which the two focusing modals must always by nominative, accusative, or genitive depending on the ideational function which the focus constituent assumes in the clause structure, i.e. Actor, Goal, etc. Whereas, the focus constituent itself always takes the genitive case in such a genitive relation. If the focus constituent which can only be a single constituent not a clause following both focusing modals, is a pronoun, then it is suffixable to both
modals. However, the focus constituent with “ghayr” can be elliptical if it is retrievable from the context or preceding co-text, whereas the one with “siwa” cannot. Consider:

Zeid is a poet.

There are rare cases whereby an element forming part of the variable is postponed until the very end of the clause without forming any part of the focus constituent. Rather it is mentioned as an afterthought. Consider:

No one learned chemistry but Ahmed.

Here the object “chemistry” is being removed from its original place and placed immediately following the focus constituent.

Functionally, there are a number of contexts whereby the text producer is inclined to choose the negation/Focusing formulation. These include:

1. Negation/Focusing formulation is normally used to convey information which the receiver is likely to repudiate in counter-presuppositional contexts. That is to say, the information communicated by the focus constituent is normally New and contrastive. Consider:

Zeid is only a teacher.

The receiver’s counter-presupposition may express the pragmatic presupposition “Zeid is a principal” if the utterance is to be taken as contrastive intended either to replace, restrict or select the correct value. Noteworthy is the fact that the use of Negation/Focusing formulation is treated in this type of utterances as a less polite way
than the use of لوح, "innamaa" (only), in substituting what is incorrect for what is correct.

2. If, however, the same formulation is used to communicate an analytic proposition, i.e. tautologies, then according to al-Jurjaanii (re-ed. 1983: 235) the proposition is treated by the text producer as if synthetic, thus subject to the receiver's doubts and verification. Recollect the idolaters' use of Negation/Focusing formulation in clause no.7 in chapter four to emphasize an analytic proposition contrastively in order to repudiate the Envoys' claim of being Messengers of God. Consider the clause repeated here for convenience:

\[
\text{in antum illaa basharun mithlunaa. }
\]
\[
\text{not you but mortals like-us}
\]
\[
\text{(You are but mortals like us.)}
\]

The utterance clearly conveys an analytic proposition which tells the receivers, namely "the Envoys" what they already knew. Using a Negation/Focusing formulation to emphasize an analytic proposition contrastively, it flouts the above mentioned conventional use characteristic of this formulation in S contexts. The contrastive use of the proposition indicates that the Envoys' claim of being Messengers of God has motivated the idolaters "the text producer" in this case, to believe that such a claim is only compatible with those who are immortals. Because the Envoys are human beings then they are mortals. And since they are mortals then they are not Messengers of God. Consequently, the proposition above which is originally true in all possible worlds is no longer analytic in this specific situation, hence the issuance of the proposition contrastively. In a word, the idolaters communicate the fact that the Envoys are not Prophets of God since Prophets are expected to be immortals.

However, the interpretation above does not seem to show the whole picture. Obviously, the Envoys not only know but do not counter-presuppose the fact that they
are mortals and human beings. So why do the idolaters use CSE? Evidently, the idolaters have demoted the Envoys from receivers who are cognizant of p to receivers who are not only counter-presuppositional but also non-cognizant of p. The demotion is compatible with the idolaters’ assumption of thinking that the Envoys cannot claim to be Prophets while they are in reality mortals. Pragmatically, the idolaters flout the submaxims of Emphasis concerned by such a demotion in order contrastively to remind the Envoys of their being mortal. In addition, the idolaters seem to have exploited the submaxim of quantity by dispatching known information with which the receiver is already familiar. Thus, the implicature derivable may be that you are not Messengers of God as you are mortals.

The example above which expresses a restriction of a Bearer to a Quality yields two implications, first the Envoys are restricted to only being mortals, and second the Envoys are not the only Bearers who are mortals, i.e. the Bearers are not uniquely or exhaustively restricted to the Quality of being mortal. Obviously, the tone expressed by the idolaters’ utterance is one of degrading or diminution as the Bearers, i.e. the Envoys, are not the only Bearers of being mortal.

However, the use of SE in such examples is sometimes rendered useless in certain contexts. For example, the Envoys, in a second but similar situation between the Envoys and the idolaters, concede that “they are mortals”, in response to the idolaters’ utterance given above. Consider the following Qur’aanic verse (XIV,11) representing the Envoy’s concession in the situation concerned:

\[ \text{\textit{in na}_\text{hnu illaa} BASHARUN} \quad \text{MITHLUKUM, wa laakin...}\]
\[\text{not we but mortals-nom like-you, but ...}\]
\[\text{(We are nothing but mortals, LIKE YOU: but...)}\]
Here the Envoys’ utterance, which represents an exact structural and semantic reiteration of the idolaters’ utterance given in the previous co-text, though contrastively encoded, is not meant to relay CSE since the idolaters who do not deny that, argue likewise. It is equally impossible to argue that the Envoys demote the idolaters from being presuppositionless -as they are not- to being counter-presuppositional in order to justify the use of the Negation/Focusing formulation. Hence the restriction of a Bearer to a Quality is rendered unintended here. It is not even possible to give this example an S emphatic reading because in argumentative discourse, it is the norm to quote your opponent’s exact claim as a thesis to be rebutted, particularly if the claim is partially true. This is not to say that it can accordingly be used as a discourse-initiating unit, although the Envoys’ response can only be used as a discourse-initiating unit if the Negation/Focusing formulation is being replaced by “innarnaa”, and be used in the same way as the use of it-cleft as a discourse-initiating unit if it wholly conveys New information. (cf. below)

3. Negation/Focusing can also be used to communicate information which is quite likely to arouse a counter-presupposition because it counter-presupposes what is generally expected by the majority of people to be true. Since no specific receiver is identifiable, the receiver could thus be anyone anywhere anytime. Assuming sometimes that the information his utterance expresses is quite likely to raise one’s eyebrows, the text producer chooses to dispatch his utterance contrastively embodying a touch of hyperbole as a disproportionate magnification of the less familiar, less accepted and strange proposition. In other words, the utterance in question strictly expresses a personal view unlikely to be generally accepted without raising one’s own eyebrows. Consider:

ما زادني الشيب إلا وقاراً.

maa zaadanii sh-shaybu illaa WIQAARAN.
(not increased-(it)-me the-grey-hairedness-nom but dignity-acc.  
Greyhairedness increased nothing but my dignity.)
Here the text producer imagines that his unspecified receiver would disagree with what the utterance expresses if encoded non-emphatically. He therefore chooses to express the same proposition contrastively in order to counter such an expected disagreement which is likely to be looming in the horizon.

4. Negation/Focusing formulation can further be used in a situation whereby the text producer takes into account his inner feelings, expectations, etc., in processing his own expressive discourse. We have illustrated one specific context in our discussion on TESE above, in which the text producer is likely to react linguistically against an incident that may not be to his liking.

5. The Negation/focusing formulation, namely “ma ... illaa...” seems, az-Zamallakaanii, 1974: 184-9) claims, to be usable in further specific situations not covered above particularly if the Subject is to be the value specified as in:

\[ \text{maajaa'anii illaa ZAYDUN.} \]
\[ \text{not came-(he)-to-me but Zeid-nom.} \]
\[ \text{(No one came to me but ZEID.)} \]

Two pragmatic implications are possible here: 1. to inform the receiver who does not want to know of Zeid’s coming, but to know that if no one else has come, or 2. to replace, select or restrict the receiver’s incorrect pragmatic presupposition given in the preceding discourse. The first interpretation obviously implies the text producer’s dissatisfaction, i.e. counter-presupposition, with a situation which might not have called for such a use of SE had the number of people who were supposed to come to the text producer’s party at his invitation, etc. been larger than what his utterance implies. A similar situation may be when the receiver gives the text producer a Dirham and then asks him:

\[ \text{kam rajulan a'yaaka dirhaman?} \]
\[ \text{how-many man-acc gave-(he)-you a-dirham-acc?} \]
\[ \text{(How many men gave you a Dirham?)} \]
The likely response in this respect is:

ما أعطاني درهما إلا أنت.
maa a'taanii dirhaman illaa ANTA.
(No one gave me a Dirham but YOU.)

To show his dissatisfaction at the fact that no one gave him a Dirham but the receiver, the text producer is quite likely to resort to the use of SE to communicate his message. It does not seem possible to say that the value in this example and the one above is an exhaustive listing of the objects that satisfy the SE structure, since the value represented by the focus constituent “you” is known to the receiver. In effect, what the text producer’s S emphatic utterance conveys is contrary to what both interlocutors seem to have expected by indicating the text producer’s dissatisfaction at what he has already been given by others. The same interpretation seems inducible if the value is the constituent “Dirham” as well.

6.2.6.5 Adversative Conjunctions

There are three adversative conjunctions, namely لکن “laakin”; بال “bal”, (but), and ل “laa”, (not), whose function is to link two contrastive lexical or phrasal elements asyndetically. The first two can convey SE only if the preceding clause is negative, i.e. “...not...but...”. The use of both modals is to express a repudiatory coordination in which the relationship between the clauses is the reverse of those affirmed by the third restrictive subjunct modal, “laa”, (not). Using these conjunctions to express SE necessitates that the constituent immediately following them be singular, i.e. constituent Emphasis. The repudiatory force can also be expressed syndetically in the case of “laakin”.

(i) laakin & bal, (but)

Both modals can be used in S contexts if both are preceded by either a negative statement or negative imperative clause expressing the text producer’s rejection of
incorrect information. The correct information representing the value always occupies the position immediately following both modals. Syntactically the value is realized by a constituent which in the following case is nominatively case-marked as it is a predicate of a coordinated clause whose Subject, which is explicitly mentioned in the variable part, is ellipted. That is, the rejected value takes the accusative case whereas the correct value takes the nominative case, because when negative modals such as “maa” and “laysa” precede the variable part of an SE Equational clause, the G Subject takes the nominative while the predicate the accusative. Consider:

ما أحمدُ تاجرًا لكن مدرسُ.

maa Ahmadyu TAAJIRAN laakin/bal MUDARRISUN.
not Ahmed-nom a-merchant-acc but a-teacher-nom.
(Ahmed is not a MERCHANT, but a TEACHER.)

It is widely agreed that the contextual function of “laakin” in particular is to replace wrong information, as in the preceding example, and occasionally to restrict as well.

(ii) Laa, (not)

“Laa” is normally used to precede a proposition asyndetically coordinated with a preceding affirmative proposition or a mand. The value of this structure comes immediately before “laa” and the variable immediately after it. Consider:

زيد مدرس لا وزير.

Zaydun MUDARRISUN laa WAZIIRUN
Zeid-nom a-teacher-nom not a-minister-nom
(Zeid is a teacher not a minister.)

The clause preceding “laa” can be a mand expressing deontic performative, i.e. obligation. Consider:
Almost all traditional rhetoricians point out that “lāa” can be used to express both TESE and TCSE. The functions its use may relay can be to replace, and to select and it can be used to restrict only if the incorrect and the correct values are not in primary oppositeness.

6.2.6.6 Innamaa (only)

“Innamaa” is a very important focusing subjunct used in Arabic as a restrictive modal whose function is to colour the clause it introduces with S Emphasis. The majority of traditionalists believe that “innamaa” as an S emphasizer is capable of explicitly emphasizing the statement it introduces with a touch of semantic negation of other than what is explicitly stated. Further to its use before Verbal, Nominal and Equational clauses, “innamaa” can occasionally be placed immediately following any nominal constituent whose syntactic function is linguistically signalled by a resumptive pronoun in the predicate of Initial-placement clause. The resumptive pronoun represents the variable of the SE structure “innamaa” precedes. If the nominal constituent preceding “innamaa” functions as the Subject of the clause in question, no resumptive pronoun is necessary.

The clause preceded by “innamaa” may or may not be syndetically linked with the preceding clause by means of the connectors, “wa” or /fa-/. The former connective conjunction “wa” joins equally important sentences, stating their simultaneous validity without any attempt at internal arrangement or logical classification (Cantarino, 1975: 20).

The latter connector, on the other hand,
may unite two sentences that have a causal relationship pointing toward the effect, or fact, and its consequences (ibid:21).

Sometimes “innamaa” in its function as a focusing modal may be replaced by the adversative conjunctions “laakin” or “bal” (but) discussed above.

What is important about “innamaa” as an S emphatic subjunct is the location of the constituents realizing the variable and the value of the structure it precedes. Almost all traditionalists and contemporaries who apparently empirically analysed “innamaa” claim that the focus constituent reflecting the scope of “innamaa”, and realizing most of the independent representational functions, must always fall at the very end of the structure in question. For example, an adjective without the Head it modifies can only be the focus constituent if it functions as a predicate in an Equational. However, a single adjective which modifies its Head within a noun group syntactically functioning as Subject can occasionally be restrictively focused if the Negation/Focusing formulation is used instead (cf. section one of this chapter). Thus, those rhetoricians stipulate that in the structure following “innamaa”, the variable must always precede the value irrespective of marked disposition of word order. Consider the following in which the value “a teacher” is the focus constituent placed at the very end of the structure:

\[ \text{innamaa Ahmedu mudarrisun.} \]
\[ \text{only Ahmed-nom a-teacher-nom.} \]
\[ (\text{Ahmed / is only a TEACHER.}) \]

If the predicate “muddarrisun” precedes the G Subject “Ahmed”, the focus would fall on the very last constituent of the structure, which in this case is “Ahmed”.

Admittedly, the marked word order which sometimes concurs with “innamaa” structure seems problematic; the excruciating question concerning the use of “innamaa” to precede clauses with contrastive word order is whether “innamaa” or the marked
word order of the clause it precedes should be taken to realize S Emphasis. More specifically, most classical linguists ignore the S function of marked word order of the clause “innamaa” precedes, if the clause is an Equational. If, however, the clause “innamaa” precedes is Verbal or Nominal with a contrastive word order, then the S function of “innamaa” is cancelled or reduced to a modal realizing Emphasis proper (cf. Abu Muusaa 1979b: 172-4). In both cases, the cancellation is prompted by the fact that each of such S Emphasis modals locates its own value, which coincides with the variable of the other. In the case of the Equational, the following Qur’aanic verse (XIII, 40) in which the prepositional phrase functioning as a predicate is markedly fronted and placed immediately following “innamaa”, where it coincides with the variable of “innamaa”. Consider:

\[\text{Fanaa 'alayka 'L-BALAAGHU... (it is thine only to DELIVER (the Message)...)}\]

Contextually, the use of fronting whose function as a carrier of S Emphasis in the structure is cancelled or reduced by that of “innamaa”, is intended to facilitate the S Emphasis of “innamaa” to fall on the postponed constituent of the structure concerned. If, however, the object of a Verbal or Nominal clause preceded by “innamaa” is fronted, the S Emphasis would fall on the fronted object rather than the S Emphasis relayed by “innamaa” on the constituent at the very end of the structure (cf. ibid.). Consider the following example:

\[\text{innamaa ZAYDAN akramta (It was only ZEID that I rewarded.)}\]

Contextually, those linguists argue that the element in S focus of this example is the fronted object “Zeid” not the constituent at the end. Hence the function of “innamaa” is either cancelled or reduced to a modal realizing Emphasis proper. Apparently, those linguists would like to avail themselves of the possibility of having a value preceding the
variable in clauses presented by “innamaa” by having recourse to a factor which is
totally ignored if it occurs in the Equational. Such a possibility is unfortunately backed
up by a couple of classical poetic verses that do not seem to be empirically plausible.
However, it may well be argued that the use of either fronting or “innamaa” to modalize
contrastively a single constative in poetry is likely to be a poetic necessity rather than a
pure realization of S Emphasis. It is obvious that their argument, partially true though it
may be, seems to misjudge not only the important contribution of multiple Emphasis to
the veracity of the proposition concerned as we saw in chapter four, but also the
influence exerted by other factors such as intonation, the inflectionality of the Arabic
language, the previous discourse, etc.

In addition, there is a further pragmatic distinction characterizing the
conventional and unconventional use of marked word order and “innamaa”. For
example, the conventional use of “innamaa” is to introduce a proposition known to the
receiver or treated as such, whereas the conventional use of marked word order
communicates a proposition unknown to the receiver (cf. below). In order to understand
the basis on which their justification for stipulating a last position for the value in
“innamaa” structures depends, it is necessary to sketch out that as clearly as possible.

Firstly, “innamaa”, among other plausible possibilities, is traditionally argued to
be formed of the emphatic modal ٌ، “inna”, (assuredly) and the unspecific relative
pronoun،，“maa”, (what). As such, “innamaa” is treated as a pseudo-cleft marker
like “what” introducing a structure whose value comes at the very end. This, of course,
is not wholly true as we saw in the preceding examples.

Secondly, they further argue that if the construction “laa (not) + the rejected
value” is to follow an “innamaa” structure, the correct value of the “innamaa” structure
must always come at the end in order to contrast smoothly with the rejected one.
Consider the following Equational whose G Subject as a value is postponed and thus stands in contrast with the rejected value that immediately follows:

إذاً لك هذا لا ذلك.
in namaa laka HAAADHAA laa DHAAK.
only for-you this not that.
(It is THIS for you not THAT)

Here, the correct and incorrect values are placed immediately before and after the adversative conjunction “laa” (not), respectively. It would not be possible to change the position of the correct value without affecting the location of the S focus “innamaa” produces. However, we have just shown that in a Verbal clause with a fronted object the location of “innamaa’s” S focus can change if “innamaa” as a realization of S Emphasis is contextually cancelled.

Further, if the adversative conjunction “laa” is solely used to relay SE as we saw above, the focus constituent in the structure preceding “laa” may either be placed initially or at the end of the structure. Consider the following cited in as-Sakkaakii (re-ed. 1983: 289) in which the correct value which stands in contrast with the rejected value following “laa” remains initially:

زيد شاعر لا عمرو.
ZAYDUN shaa’irun laa ‘AMRU.
Zeid-nom a-poet-nom not Amro-nom.
(ZEID a poet, not AMRO.)

Thus, it does not seem plausible enough to stipulate the placement of the incorrect values immediately before “laa”.

Similarly, the use of the Verbal and Nominal clauses provides yet further evidence for the possibility of invalidating such a stipulation. Abuu Muusaa (1979b: 20)
argues in this respect that if the focus constituent is the L Subject, only the Nominal clause is possible to realize the structure before “laa”. Consider:

محمد فعل ذلك لا زيد.

MUHAMMADUN fa’ala dhaalika laa ZAYDUN.
Muhammed-nom did-(he) that, not Zeid-nom.
(MUHAMMED did that, not ZEID.)

The example shows that the value “Muhammed” need not be placed immediately before “laa” so that it can contrast with the rejected value unambiguously. It could be argued that fronting the L Subject together with the presence of the adversative conjunction are meant to produce contrastiveness jointly. As a matter of fact, those linguists do not seem to argue that the use of fronting would cancel the S function of “laa” or vice versa. This clearly demonstrates, unlike Abu Muusaa’s claim, that marked word order may jointly re-enforce the function of “innamaa” to relay SE.

Evidence for having two contrastive modals modalizing a single utterance is also cited in English, in which the focus constituent of the it-cleft and that of “only” coincide in the same structure. Consider:

It is only this country that can maintain peace.

Thirdly, being almost unfamiliar with intonation in particular, those linguists do seem to have misjudged whether or not intonation has a role to play in decisively helping to identify the position of the value. Intonation evidently jointly cooperates with other factors such as fronting, etc., to identify the value position in an “innamaa” structure. Accordingly, it seems quite reasonable to counter-argue, unlike those linguists, that the position of the value in an “innamaa” structure may either be placed initially or at the very end of all types of clause structures, i.e. Equational, Verbal, etc. Whether the same value is fronted or postponed, the structure which “innamaa” introduces should produce
the same exhaustive interpretation except bearing in mind the conventional and unconventional use of both S emphasizers in the same structure. If the word order is marked, it will enhance rather than cancel the contrastive force of “innamaa” and vice versa. It is almost inconceivable and incompatible with the inflectionality of Arabic, which enjoys free word order to assign a fixed position for the focused constituent representing the value in an “innamaa” structure. This suggestion can similarly be empirically justified by the following example cited in Cantarino (1975: vol. iii, 204):

\[
\text{لمست أستطيع أن أجيبك وإنما هنالك شخص آخر}
\text{who does not (I) (I)-can to (I)-answer-you! and only (but)}
\]

\[
\text{هومااكا شاهج عن آخر-نون / هو النمو (I) (I)CAN to (I)ANSWER-you! and only (but)}
\]

\[
\text{ياستيجيúه كلحة بـ-الجة مبـ.}
\text{(he)-can this answer-acc. / VARIABLE}
\]

\[
\text{(I can not answer you, but there is someone else who can.)}
\]

The example evidently demonstrates the possibility of having the correct value “there is someone else” in initial position where it stands nicely in contrast with the rejected value “I” in the preceding clause. The structure preceded by “innamaa” is obviously a reversed structure of a pseudo-cleft, which can equally realize S Emphasis. As far as this example is concerned, the only objection to this argument might be that “innamaa” here may be replaceable by the adversative conjunction “laakin”, (but); a fact which is not possible in many other examples of “innamaa”. Note that the positions of the value and the variable are reversible in this particular example as well.
From this we conclude that the value of "innamaa" and "laa" modals could be located anywhere in the structure depending on the contextual interpretation and the importance assigned to the value in the structure.

Before moving on to characterize "innamaa" contextually, there is a very interesting deictic issue equally important to any discussion on "innamaa" and the Negating/Focusing formulation. In Arabic grammar, it is argued that if the pronoun implied in the imperfective alludes to the text producer or the person addressed, it must not be enunciated in unmarked clauses because of being fully intelligible. In S Emphasis, if such pronouns, i.e. "I" or "You", are to represent the focus constituent of "innamaa" structure, they can only be enunciated at the very end of such a structure provided that the imperfective is morphologically conditioned in order to allude implicitly to a third person singular extraneous to both interlocutors. As a result, the imperfective does not agree with the text producer's or the receiver's explicit coreferential pronoun as the real L Subject in gender, number and person. If, however, the imperfective remains without such a morphological conditioning, the elements "I" and "you" would not realize the focus constituent of "innamaa", but a repetitive element emphasizing the pronoun implied in the imperfective. The S focus which would accordingly fall on the element preceding both "I" or "You" in the structure concerned, will induce a different pragmatic interpretation of the constative.

It is therefore a way of referring to two kinds of ego from two different perspectives: to the subjective, experiencing, internal self implied in the imperfective as a third person singular and to the objective, observing, external self realized by "I" or "You" enunciated at the end of the structure. The two egos co-refer with the text producer himself whose constative views the first ego as an experiencer of the action implied in the imperfective as a third person singular, and the second ego as an observer of the same action subjectively narrating the same action.
This interesting phenomenon has been taken up by Lyons (1981) who in turn refers to Kuroda (1973) and endeavours to find out whether or not the grammaticalization of subjectivity of certain utterances in English is possible. That is, for example,

if 'I am hot' is translated into Japanese by means of a verbal form (in what is roughly the equivalent of the English progressive aspect), the effect is that of an utterance which refers simultaneously to two kinds of ego, or self: to the subjective, experiencing, internal self and to the objective, observing, external self (107).

Lyons further adds that combining both kinds of self-reference is normally used in particular styles, notably in free indirect speech to report a mental state or event from two points of view (107-8).

Consider the following instance drawn from Arabic rhetoric:

إِنَّمَا يُدافِعُ عَنْكُمْ أَنَا
innamaa yudaafi‘u ‘ankum ANAA.
only (he)-defend-ind you-all I.
(The one who defends you (all) is I.)

In this utterance, two egos, which co-refer with the text producer himself, are alluded to, the first as a third person singular implied in the imperfective as an experiencer and the second as a first person singular enunciated at the end of the structure as an observer.

Furthermore, we occasionally may have two or more successive SE utterances using either similar or different modals in a given discourse whereby the second utterance is likely to be elliptical. The juxtaposition of both clauses seems on the whole to express the same idea from two angles by means of paraphrasing. Consider the
following Qur’aanic verse (VII, 187) in which two successive clauses express SE via “innamaa” and the Negation/Focusing formulation respectively:

They will question thee concerning the Hour, when it shall berth. Say: “the Knowledge of it is only with my Lord; none shall reveal it at its proper time, but He.”

Contextually, al-Juýaanii, in his outstanding treatise on classical Arabic rhetoric, empirically accounts for “innamaa” by providing very illuminating remarks indeed about its contextual functions in different clause structures. The account includes a contextual comparison between the four types of SE realization based on grammatical, semantic and contextual criteria that helped him identify the specific contexts for such realizations. All his findings, to be attested below, have been reiterated and sometimes slightly modified by his descendants in the same field. Accordingly, the contexts which he specifies for “innamaa” include the following:

1. Al-Jurjaanii was the first to reformulate the “innamaa” structure by means of the Negation/Focusing formulation as a standard against which other types of realization are also attested. The attestation is intended, (i) to identify the value and the variable of such types, and (ii) to highlight the implicit or semantic negation which these types of SE realizations clearly have. This is not to say that the use of “innamaa” and the Negation/Focusing formulation are always interchangeable, because there are certain contexts in which it is by no means possible to replace “innamaa” by a Negation/Focusing formulation and vice versa. For example, the two items, احده , “ahadun”, (anyone, anybody), and، من , “min”, (any) can only be used with explicit negation, i.e. Negation/Focusing formulation. However, both modals can be used interchangeably if the proposition they express is challengeable and the value which, thus, bears out New information is intended to replace incorrect information presupposed from the preceding discourse. The only difference about such an
interchangeability is that “innamaa” would be said to have been used unconventionally, whereas the Negation/Focusing formulation was used conventionally. Consider:

\[
\text{innamaa jaa' anii ZAYDUN (laha 'AMRU)}
\]
\[
\text{only came-(he)-to-me Zeid-nom (not Amro)}
\]
\[
\text{(Only ZEID came to me (not Amro).)}
\]

or

\[
\text{maa jaa'ii illaa ZAYDUN.}
\]
\[
\text{not came-(he)--to-me but Zeid.}
\]
\[
\text{(No one came to me but ZEID.)}
\]

In the first example “innamaa” is meant not only to replace incorrect information presupposed but also to communicate the fact that the proposition it precedes is expected to be unchallengeable or obvious from the context, past experience, etc. (cf. below).

2. A further distinction is that “innamaa” is thought to be used to express a proposition with a touch of polite statement tinged with some blame in a contrastive context. Whereas using the Negation/Focusing formulation seems to communicate less politeness if it is used in the same context as it is a blunt way of rejecting incorrect information and then providing the correct information.

3. Most rhetoricians agree that “innamaa” can be used to produce any one of SE types, i.e. TSE and CSE, in certain contexts. Functionally, “innamaa” is primarily used to replace either a mistaken or a self-assured counter-presupposition. Recalling that only TCSE and HCSE involve the specific pragmatic presupposition of the receiver’s previous discourse, “innamaa” is primarily used to replace incorrect information if the proposition is synthetic and challengeable. As exemplification, the preceding two examples as well as almost all Cantarino’s citations (1975: 202-7) are expressing the text producer’s intentionality to replace incorrect information. However, this does not preclude the possibility of the occasional employment of “innamaa” to restrict two or more undetermined values as well.
4. According to al-Jurjaanii (re-ed.1983: 232), the unmarked use of “innamaa” is to introduce a proposition which is either known to the receiver who would not counter-presuppose it, or a proposition presented as such. Thus it could be said that “innamaa” is normally used to introduce propositions which quite likely express a universal truth, i.e. self-evident or unchallengeable, or propositions treated as such. “Innamaa” here can not possibly be replaced by the Negation/Focusing formulation unless to exploit a submaxim. Its conventional use in this context is slightly similar to what Ball (1977) calls proverbial it-cleft whose that-clause is unlikely to be presupposed as in:

A. It is a wise child that knows its own father.
B. It is a fortunate man that will find the fountain of youth.

Further, the use of “innamaa” in such a context seems to back up the text producer’s views as a summative clause in order to authenticate evidentially the veracity of his proposition used against the opponent’s contrastive view aired at an earlier stage. The contrastive use of “innamaa” is thus aimed to replace wrong information whereby the rejected information may not be directly and specifically inferred from the structure of “innamaa” itself. That is why in such a use no presuppositional set may be inferenced without reference to the argumentative text type and the genre in which “innamaa” is likely to be used repetitively. In other words, this particular use of “innamaa” may be seen to encode a conclusion or a comment which carries a touch of mild blame, tinged with politeness and intended to seal up the text producer’s contrastive point of view with regard to a certain state of affairs. Consider:

أَمَّا يَحْمِلُ الْفَخْدَةَ اللَّيْثِمُ

\textit{innamaa yahmilu 'l-hiqda 'L-LA'IIMU}

\textit{only (he)-harbour-ind the-hatred-acc the-mean-person-nom}

(\textit{It is a MEAN PERSON who harbours hatred.})

Similarly, consider the following which relays a particularized implicature in a certain context:
Being communicatively tautological, the constative above may be used in an incongruent context where the receiver appears to be maltreating his brother. If one knows that brotherhood necessitates or presupposes brotherly treatment, then one should put it into practice. If one did not put it into practice, i.e. maltreatment, one would prompt the text producer to demote one from being cognizant of p to someone as if non-cognizant of p. The demotion is clearly based on the text producer's infringement of the submaxim of being as informative as required by being over-informative. In addition, the use of innamaa to introduce such a proposition as an indicator of contrastiveness reveals that the receiver's maltreatment is characterized as a non-verbal signal of his being counter-presuppositional rather than non-cognizant or presuppositionless of p. So the particularized implicature would be to endeavour to elicit the receiver's sympathy towards his brother by reminding him of the factuality of the proposition conveyed, and to urge him to stop his maltreatment. In other words, it is a polite way of requesting the receiver to stop maltreating his brother by reminding him of what brotherhood necessitates. It is worth noting that the exhaustiveness implicature in this specific context is no longer intended, since restricting the Bearer "he" to the Quality of being "a brother" is not intended to replace incorrect information such as being "a cousin" which would have been pragmatically presupposed.

If, however, the proposition is synthetic, then by using "innamaa" the text producer invites the receiver to accept his proposition as "should be/should have been recognized as true"'. The unconventional use of "innamaa" is also meant to be a linguistic way used to maximize evaluatively the restrictive application of one's synthetic constative to the focus constituent. Thus, the constative concerned can be treated as a realization of truth-conditionally hyperbolic S Emphasis which does not seem to give
rise to any specific and direct counter-presupposition derivable from the preceding context. Consider the following first part of a poetic verse in which the poet praises Mus'ab:

\[
\text{إِنَّمَا مِصَابُ شِهَابٍ من اللَّهِ...}
\]

\[
\text{innamaa Mus'abun SHIHAABUN mina 'llaahi...}
\]

\[
\text{only Mus'ab-nom luminous meteor-nom from God..}
\]

(\text{It is a LUMINOUS METEOR from GOD that Mus'ab is...})

The poet here alleges that his proposition is already true in all possible worlds and known to everybody as factual, and should not be treated as challengeable. By using “innamaa” unconventionally, the text producer seems to demote his receiver from being non-cognizant of \( p \) to someone who is as if cognizant of \( p \). In other words, the text producer treats his synthetic proposition which is in reality unknown as if known. What is interesting concerning the use of “innamaa” here is that although the type of restriction underlying this constative, namely restricting a Bearer to a Quality, is one of diminution, the restriction has to be totally ignored in our pragmatic analysis because the pragmatic force of “innamaa” clearly changes the minimal applicability of the constative to a maximal applicability to the person concerned.

5. In a different context, “innamaa” can further introduce analytic propositions giving rise to an implicature similar to ironies. Consider the following Qur'aanic verse (VI, 36):

\[
\text{إِنَّمَا يُسْتَجِيبُ الَّذِينَ يَسْمَعُونَ.}
\]

\[
\text{Innamaa yastajiibu 'L-LADHIINA YASMA'UUNA.}
\]

\[
\text{Only (he)-answer those (who) (they)-hear.}
\]

\[
\text{(Answer only will THOSE WHO HEAR.)}
\]

Taken without “innamaa”, this verse congruently expresses a factual proposition which is not only true in all possible worlds but also does not seem to have any communicative intent. However, the use of “innamaa” changes the whole picture and consequently the verse becomes as communicatively significant as any other informative constative. Dispatching a communicatively tautological proposition is obviously meant to exploit the
submaxim of being as informative as required by demoting the receiver from being cognizant of p to someone who is not. In addition, the conventional use of an S modal such as “innamaa” indicates that the context is one of contrastiveness, in which the receiver might have thought of the opposite of the implicature derivable from the constative in question. If the text producer would like to inform the receiver of something which is already obvious, he merely dispatches his known proposition without having recourse to S emphasizers. But if he emphasizes what is already obvious, he must have wanted his receiver to infer a specific implicature from what is being actually said. Realizing that emphasizing tautologies may blatantly induce ironies in certain contexts, the receiver is led to think of the negation of what is actually said. The negation involves negating the presupposed information as well as the information focus. Thus, the other submaxim which may be used to account pragmatically for realizing ironies is the one concerning the explicit use of negation in contexts requiring that. It should be pointed out that most linguists use the maxim of quality to account for the induction of ironies whereby the explicature is considered blatantly false. In the example above, it could be argued that both the explicature and the implicature, in which the text producer believes, are true and communicatively significant, hence the negative role playable by the first submaxim of quality to account for the production of ironies in such propositions. Compare in this respect this pragmatic account of the preceding constative to the similar account which might be given to the constative (I was only joking.).

It should also be pointed out that the ironical reading of the example above is termed in Arabic rhetoric as a conventional implicature “لا اقتضاء” derivable from analytic propositions introduced by “innamaa”. However, it is not the intention of the present research to elaborate on such a claim except to take it at face value.

6. A further important context in which “innamaa” is necessary is its use as a discourse-initiating unit, إبتداء أخبار. In this respect “innamaa” is used in the same way as
some it-cleft and pseudo-cleft units used as discourse-initial (cf. Prince, 1978 and Declerk, 1984). Consider the following Qur’aanic verse (XVIII,110), cited by al-Jurjaanii:

قل إنا أنا بشأ ن مثلكم.

Qul innamaa anaa BASHARUN mithlukum. (you)-say only I a-human-being-nom like-you.
(Say, “I only a MORTAL the like of you.”)

The S use of this example to initiate a discourse does not seem to presuppose any wrong belief directly induced from the preceding context. However, the use does intertextually refer to a previous conversational state of affairs relevant to the current one in which the “innamaa” structure is used as a discourse-initiating unit. Similarly, the text type and the genre in which the “innamaa” structure is to be used call for the use of this type of S Emphasis. The proposition relayed by “innamaa” structure as a discourse-initiating unit may be known or presented as such.

So far I have been discussing in some detail the syntactic and pragmatic considerations of “innamaa”. The coverage intended to argue that the position of the focus constituent in the “innamaa” structure should be free although it predominantly falls at the end. The coverage also specified the conventional and unconventional contexts where “innamaa” is likely to be used.

6.2.6.7 Fronting

Fronting is one of the important conventional realizations of S Emphasis in Arabic and possibly in other languages. Traditionally, it has been overtly pointed out by Siibawayhi that

کانهم يقدمون الذي بيانه أهمل.

they are likely to front what is more prominent.

(my translation)
Fronting has been extensively studied at the grammatical and pragmatic levels in Arabic grammar and classical rhetoric respectively. In Arabic grammar, there are a number of cases whereby the disposition of word order is characterized as either obligatory or optional. Obligatory word order results from the impact of Mathesius's (1975: 154) rhythmic principle, which shows how the position of the object depends on whether it is expressed by a [suffixal] pronoun or by a noun. Some of such cases have already been discussed in our FSP functional typology of the clause in Arabic in chapter two. The disposition of word order in other realizations such as Negation/Focusing formulation and structures of “innamaa” is said to be obligatory too. However, we have argued that in certain cases the observations seem to prove otherwise.

Optional fronting, in contrast, covers almost all structural types of clause and their respective constituents discussed in our syntactic account of S Emphasis above. It is empirically argued by almost all classical linguists that fronted elements can either achieve Emphasis proper or more frequently SE. We will be concentrating solely on cases of fronting resulting from the application of Mathesius's emphatic or emotional principle determining the subjective disposition of word order. Optional fronting thus produces examples assignable to the Specificational instance level which forms just one single level of the levels postulated for a clause typology in Arabic in chapter two. A list of possible syntactic candidates liable to be fronted as a result of the emphatic principle will be presently provided.

Functionally, fronting is normally intended to impart SE, and can be employed either to replace wrong belief, to restrict the S applicability of the constative concerned to one correct value, or to select the correct value from among a presupposed set. It is thus used congruently to address a receiver who counter-presupposes the text producer's view in a context whereby the use of fronting is meant to uphold the second submaxim
of quality by observing the third submaxim of Emphasis as a possible way of producing "evidence" authenticating the veracity of the proposition conveyed. Fronting can additionally be used incongruently to address a receiver who is demoted from being counter-presuppositional to someone who is either reconfirmation seeking or presuppositionless in appropriate contexts. In all such cases, fronting seems to involve the implicit negation of the incorrect information and the overt enunciation of the correct information. However, the rejected value preceded by "laa", (not), can be added to the end of the structure in which the fronting occurs.

Propositionally, fronting occurs congruently in synthetic constatives whose types of restriction essentially depend on whether the element fronted, which always represents the value, is a Bearer or a Quality.

In Arabic, fronting structurally occurs in Equational and Verbal clauses representing manifestations assignable to the S instance level designed for S Emphasis realizations. In order to show how fronting occurs in such spoken or written structures let us discuss it in some detail.

1. Equational Clause

Arabic grammar argues that if both the G Subject and the predicate of an Equational clause are definite, then whichever precedes it takes up the function of G Subject. In other cases, the type of definiteness, i.e. generic, and the use of the pronoun of separation, which were both discussed above, put a syntactic constraint on the disposition of the element to be specificationally focused and the element representing the G Subject. Word order under such constraints is thus rendered useless in both cases of SE. In other situations, only context and intonation would be capable of determining whether the clause at issue is S emphatic or not and whether the G Subject or the predicate represents the focus constituent. Apart from such issues, fronting can freely be
resorted to if there are no other obstacles that may render the clause ungrammatical. The following is a list of the elements that can be fronted for S Emphasis and the circumstances required to be available for a successful optional fronting.

a. The G Subject, which may be a proper, common, non-generically definite noun or a pronoun, may intonationally receive extra stress to mark SE:

\[
\text{AHMADU mudannisun.} \\
\text{Ahmed-nom a-teacher-nom.} \\
(\text{AHMED is a teacher.})
\]

b. The indefinite predicate which may be intonationally marked for extra prominence for SE, may precede the G Subject for SE:

\[
\text{MUDARRISUN Ahmadd.} \\
\text{a-teacher-nom Ahmed-nom.} \\
(\text{Ahmed is a TEACHER.})
\]

c. The indefinite G Subject which normally follows the adverbial element, i.e. locative, may be fronted to give rise to genericness or cardinality contrast of the element fronted:

\[
\text{RAJULUN fii 'd-daari.} \\
\text{a-man-nom in the-house-gen.} \\
(\text{A MAN in the house (not a WOMAN, or not TWO MEN})
\]

d. The predicate realized by adverbial groups or prepositional phrases may be fronted for SE if the G Subject is definite:

\[
\text{fii 'D-DAARI Zaydun.} \\
\text{in the-house-gen Zeid-nom.} \\
(Zeid is inside the HOUSE (not inside the CAR).)
\]

2. Verbal Clause

a. The lexical verb may receive extra intonation to mark SE while it remains in its initial position:
Note that the scope of S Emphasis of this example is constituent Emphasis, since the pragmatic presupposition may be "Ahmed is playing", "Ahmed is either studying or playing, etc". If, however, the rejected value represents the negative of "studying", i.e. not studying, then its scope of S Emphasis is predicational.

b. The L Subject, which may be definite or indefinite, may be placed initially and marked with extra intonation for S Emphasis:

\[ \text{ANAA akhadhtu 'l-kitaaba.} \]
\[ I \text{ took-(I) the-book-acc.} \]
\[ (I \text{ took the book (not ZEID))} \]

c. The definite or indefinite object may be placed initially in order to be emphasized prosodically for SE. An indefinite object occasions cardinality and/or genericness contrast if fronted for S Emphasis. Consider the following definite object fronted for S Emphasis:

\[ \text{ZAYDAN akramtu.} \]
\[ \text{ZEID-acc (I)-rewarded} \]
\[ (ZEID I rewarded (not AHMED)) \]

d. Range element whose function is to specify the verb qualitatively and quantitatively, may be fronted:

\[ \text{'ISHRIINA MARRATAN saafartu.} \]
\[ \text{twenty-acc time-acc travelled-(I).} \]
\[ (I \text{ travelled TWENTY TIMES (not THIRTY TIMES).}) \]

e. Circumstantial element of manner realized by quality expressions which characterize the verb, may be fronted for SE:

\[ \text{MAASHIYAN jaa'a Zaydun.} \]
\[ \text{Walking came-(he) Zeid-nom.} \]
\[ (Zeid came on FOOT (not by CAR).) \]
f. Circumstantial element of reason representing the reason for which the process or the verb takes place, may be fronted for SE:

\[ \text{FALABAN Li' L-TIJAARATI saafartu.} \]
\[ \text{for-want-acc of-the-trade-gen travelled-(I)} \]
\[ \text{(FOR WANT OF TRADE I travelled (not FOR WANT OF EDUCATION).)} \]

These are the most common syntactic categories that are frontable for SE in Arabic. Both types of restriction, which are necessary for the calculability of the implicature intended, are at work here as well.

6.3 SUMMARY

To sum up: in the present chapter I have been discussing SE in Arabic in detail. The discussion has covered the syntactic categories that are likely to be representatives for the value in any S emphatic utterance. Examples of such cases provided are almost more comprehensive than any other reference available to me. The elements that are used to relay Emphasis proper cannot be specificationally focused through the use of Negation/Focusing formulation, "innamaa", adversative conjunctions, or fronting except in some cases of demotion. We further discussed the semantic and pragmatic considerations of S emphatic clauses used in congruent and incongruent contexts. That included the identification of the types of restriction and its pragmatic consequences in certain contexts. A third aspect of SE which was also discussed is the discoursal functions that are relayed in congruent and incongruent contexts. It was pointed out that there are three essential congruent functions, namely, replacive, restrictive, and selective CSE, which represent the same functions suggested in Arabic rhetoric as the only functions associating CSE. The discussion also covered extensively the structural realizations of SE in Arabic. A detailed discussion was given to seven of these realizations, whereas the remaining ones were discussed in the preceding chapter. The
remaining section will be allocated to the empirical analysis of SE in an argumentative discourse representing MSA.

6.4 THE ANALYSIS

Having given the theoretical framework within which S Emphasis is to be tackled, we are now in a position to apply it to a corpus selectively chosen. The corpus analysed is a book from a volume of five books entitled “Emile” originally written by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in French in the eighteenth century. Rousseau had to leave France for Switzerland in 1762 after the condemnation of his works “Emile” and “Contrat Social”. Emile is an academic polemic treatise on education which is a semi-fictional autobiography written to be read. “Emile” was translated into Arabic by Nazmii Luuqaa in 1958 whose translation seems free and shows that he is an adept at manipulating grammar and rhetoric. Similarly Emile was translated into English by Barbara Foxley in 1911 and last reprinted in 1986.

The Arabic version of the analysed book is entitled “The Early Childhood and the Care it Requires”. The book is fifty-pages long and divided into seven sections which are entitled respectively: “Nature and Education”; “Allegations”; “Father’s Duty”; “Choice of Tutor and Pupil”; “Nurse Choice”; and “Early Care and Gradual Psychological Education”. The length of each section is several pages. The Arabic version of “Emile” was selected on the basis of Luuqaa’s sophisticated, eloquent style in Arabic which apparently masks a highly admirable mastery of grammar and rhetoric, and a clear ability in rhetoric and effective language manipulation.

“Emile” is a view of ideological commitment to a certain topic of reality embodying a socio-cultural significance and Rousseau’s educational philosophy. Rousseau usually referred to the educational aspect of “Emile” as a work on moral philosophy, based on his belief that man was naturally good. His principle of the
goodness of natural man intended to show that modern man at the time, for all his knowledge and culture, was inferior to the unsophisticated citizens of ancient Rome or Sparta. Any solution to form the ideal social man of Greece and Rome who was as desirable an alternative as natural man, requires the reform of man himself through education. So if man is to be reformed, a choice of a model had surely to be made between natural man who exists for himself and ideal social man who existed only for others, and it is thus appropriate that the discussion of this choice should form the matter of the opening pages of "Emile". Both opposing demands which cause man's unhappiness seem to reflect Rousseau's troubled life as well as writing. If the two-fold aims could be resolved into one by removing man's self-contradiction, one great obstacle to his happiness would be gone. "Emile" will be a natural man whose natural goodness has been protected and allowed to develop uncontaminated by the corrupting influence of society. Yet at the same time he will be a member of a society, able to play in it whatever role his duty as a citizen should require.

"Emile" as a work of educational reform is applicable to every aspect of the raising of children. The normal treatment of babies seems to have been a calamitous mixture of mollycoddling and neglect. The fashionable practice was for them to be looked after by wet-nurses, usually peasants, who often neglected them horribly. Hygiene was virtually non-existent. The babies were tightly bound in swaddling clothes, partly as a convenience, and partly for fear of their coming to harm if left free to move. As they grew older they continued to be protected from such evils as fresh air and exercise, while being beaten for disobedience.

6.4.1 Specificational Emphasis Realizations

"Emile" as an argumentative discourse is rife with almost all the conventional and unconventional realizations of SE discussed above. In fact the unconventional devices exceed the conventional ones. Confining our analysis to the four conventional
means, 96 occurrences of SE have been identified in the discourse analysed, and almost all that has been said about SE above characterizes the 96 occurrences of S Emphasis realizations except one thing: the syntactic categories realizing the focus constituent are predominantly confined to certain categories such as L Subject, object, G Subject, predicate, and circumstantial element of manner. We will be trying to give a brief consideration of the occurrences left out before concentrating on each of the four conventional candidates of S Emphasis chosen for our empirical analysis.

6.4.1.1 Negation/Focusing

In our analysis of the corpus in terms of Negation/Focusing, there are a number of interesting results already discussed in the theoretical framework designed for S Emphasis realizations. The number of occurrences carrying Negation/Focusing, which predominantly express evidential epistemic modality is 59. Only eight express deontic proposition emphatically, and one expresses dynamic modality by using the modal 

All the negative subjunct modals including two occurrences of semantic negation have been employed. The use of لـن, "lan" (will never) to express future evidential promise has been cited in four occurrences. Similarly, the use of the focusing subjunct, غيرـ، "ghayru", (but) as a negative subjunct whose meaning in this case is the same as لـيس "laysa" (is not), has occurred once. Note that the use of "ghayru" as a negative modal was not mentioned in our theoretical account of S Emphasis.

In addition to the predominant use of the focusing subjunct "illaa", the use of بـخـرـغ ـنـ مـحيط، "siwaa", (but) occurred twice. One of these occurrences uses سـوى as a paraphrastic expression equivalent to the common focusing modal “illaa”, (but).
Although most of the occurrences of Negation/focusing express challengeable propositions, there are a few cases where the propositions are proverb-like ones. In order to show the validity of what has been said theoretically about SE, the following is a pragmatic interpretation of two occurrences of Negation/Focusing.

Text 1.2

**French ST**
...it is not even a master that you are giving him, it is a valet.

**Arabic TT**
لعمري ما استأجرت لهم إلا خادماً حين توجهت أنك أتيتهم باستاذ، وليجعلن من تلمنه نظيراً له في شمائل الخدام.

**English TT**
He pays another man to perform those duties which are his alone. Mercenary man! do you expect to purchase a second father for your child? Do not deceive yourself; it is not even a master you have hired for him, it is a flunkey, who will soon train such another as himself.

The preceding context of this utterance is that Rousseau criticizes rich men for hiring valets to do their fatherly duties toward their children. Specifically, the preceding utterance is rhetorically questioning the veracity of such an act whose answer is to use the above contrastive utterance which literally expresses the proposition “you have hired a valet” as specific information partially inferential from the general proposition of the preceding discourse. However, the focus constituent of the constative expressing specific information still bears out New information meant to remove the receiver’s wrong belief. The general proposition of the preceding discourse clearly points towards the inferentiality of the contrastive specific proposition largely through the use of the negation coupled with “even” in the French ST and the English TT. In the Arabic TT, however, the same general proposition is mentioned immediately following the specific contrastive one.
Syntactically, the text producer of the Arabic TT uses the Negation/Focusing formulation “*maa...illaa...*” to communicate his contrastive view, which is further evidentially modalized by means of the oath expression *لى عصري* (upon my life). The focus constituent realizes the Goal element as a value of the Verbal clause used contrastively.

Semantically, the S emphatic constative expresses a synthetic proposition, whose type of restriction is one of a Bearer “the hired man” to a Quality “being a valet”. The type of S Emphasis, which this constative manifests, is a truth-conditionally contrastive S Emphasis. Thus, the restriction implicates that the contrastive application of the constative is exclusively restricted to the correct value “being a valet” by precluding other wrong Qualities given in the presuppositional set. The second implication, which diminishes the exhaustiveness of the Quality restrictively assigned to the Bearer, is that “*the hired man is not the only one who is a valet*” in the universe of discourse. This clearly accounts for the text producer’s negative and possibly sarcastic attitude or tone derivable from “*it is a valet*” which shows unexpected disappointment attributable to the original fathers’ grave mistake.

Pragmatically, the use of Negation/Focusing formulation to express a challengeable proposition contrastively, is conventional and in congruence with the third and second submaxims of Emphasis and quality respectively. The observance of the submaxims is meant to uphold the maxim of form congruence which in turn upholds the principle of appropriateness. The receivers’ belief, i.e. the original fathers, derivable from the preceding discourse reveals their mistaken or self-assured counter-presuppositions. The generalized conversational implicature generated from this constative is that these hired men are merely valets like any other valets who know nothing of taking up others’ fatherly duties, and whatever the original fathers hire can never ever replace their indispensable fatherly duties towards their children.
As regards its discoursal function, the constative is clearly used to replace the rejected value “being a master” by “being a valet”, or to restrict or uncouple the fathers’ belief of coupling the Qualities of “being a master” and “being a valet” with the people they hire. That is, the exhaustive Quality to which the Bearer is restricted is a valet only.

The English TT, on the other hand, uses two clauses asyndetically co-ordinated by the comma as a replacement of the connector “but”. The first clause is a negative it-cleft whose focus constituent is further modified by the focusing subjunct “even” to indicate that

the utterance concerned is additionally true in respect of the part focused (Quirk et al., 1985: 604).

The second clause is an elliptical it-cleft whose presupposed that-clause is retrievable from the first utterance. In fact, the expression “it is a flunkey” is almost redundant as the previous context indicates that what those fathers would hire can neither be a second father nor even a master. The expectations would be “a flunkey”.

The text producer of the French ST uses two structures similar to the English it-cleft structure.

Text 1.2

French ST

..All naughtiness comes from weakness. The child is naughty only because he is weak.

Arabic TT

إن الطفل لا يكون شريرا إلا بسبب ضعفه.

English TT

But when Hobbes calls the wicked a strong child, his statement is contradicted by facts. All wickedness comes from weakness. The child is only naughty because he is weak; make him strong and he will be good.
In this example, the focus constituent is a circumstantial element of Reason realizing the value of an Equational clause. The text producer of the Arabic TT uses the Negation/Focusing formulation to assert contrastively specific information synonymous with the preceding proverbial-like general proposition stating that "All wickedness comes from weakness". This general proposition, which is previously explicitly called a fact by the text producer, is clearly no longer self-evident or presented as such because someone called Hobbes has claimed that the wicked is a strong child.

Semantically, the proposition predicationally restricts a Bearer, i.e. "the wicked child" to a Quality, i.e. "because of being weak". The first implication of such a restriction shows that the Bearer is restricted contrastively to being weak not to being strong. The second implication indicates that other Bearers such as a cowardly child, may share the Quality of being weak with the Bearer.

Pragmatically, the use of the Negation/Focusing formulation to reject an incorrect claim in a contrastive context is clearly conventional. The pragmatic presupposition requiring correction is: "the child is wicked because he is strong". The use of S Emphasis formulation is in compliance with the third submaxim of Emphasis in order to observe the second submaxim of quality "have evidence", which in turn shows form congruence with the receiver's contextual status. The generalized conversational implicature derivable is that the only cause of wickedness is weakness.

Concerning its function, the constative, which realizes TCSE, is obviously used to replace the incorrect value "because of being strong" given previously by Hobbes.

In the case of the French and English texts, the same interpretation can be said about their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects.
6.4.1.2 Adversative Conjunctions

In the part analysed, there are 23 occurrences showing that almost all the negative modal subjuncts have been used immediately before the incorrect value in the first clause and بل، “bal”, (but) before the part with the correct value. Three of these are expressing deontic modality, two by using لن، “lan” (will never) and the other by using ينبغي ، “yanbaghii”, (should). What follows is a pragmatic analysis of three occurrences of adversative conjunctions in terms of the framework discussed in the preceding chapter.

Text 2.1

French ST
(i) It is less a question of preventing him from dying than of making him live. (ii) To live is not to breathe, it is to act; it is to make use of our organs, of our senses, of our faculties, of all the parts of ourselves which give us the feeling of existence. (iii) The man who has lived the longest is not he who has the greatest number of years but he who has most keenly felt his life.

Arabic TT
وعَبِنَا غَيْبًا حَتَّى لا يَحْلِكَ لَهَا مَوْتٍ مَّوْتٌ (1) إِنَّ وَاحِدَكَ أَنْ تَعْلَمْ كَيْفَ يُعْيَشْ لَ كَيْفَ يُحَاشَى الْمَوْتِ. (2) والِهَيْاَةُ لَيْسَ نِسْبًا مَّقَرَّدَ بَلْ هِي نُشَاطٌ، وَأَسْتَخْدَامُ لَلْجَوارِحِ وَالْمُوَسَّاسَةَ والوَظَائفُ الْحِيْوِيَةَ، مَنْ سَائِرُ عَناصرِ كِيانِنا. (3) وَلِيُسْ اعْتَمَرُ النَّاسُ نَصِيبًا مِّنَ الْحَيَاةِ مِنْ سَلْخِ فِيهَا اطْلُولَ، بَلْ مِنْ مَارَسْهَا اَكْثَرُ مِّنْ سَوَاءً. / وَكَمْ مِنْ إِمْرَأٍ أَوْدَعَهُ التَّرَابِ فِي سَنِّ المَائَةِ / وَهَٰوِيَ مِنْذُ مُولُودِهِ.

English TT
In vain you guard him against death; he must need die; and even if you do not kill him with your precautions, they are mistaken. (i) Teach him to live rather than to avoid death: (ii) life is not breath, but action, the use of our senses, our mind, our faculties, every part of ourselves which makes us conscious of our being. (iii) Life consists less in length of days than in the keen sense of living. A man may be buried at a hundred and may never have lived at all...
The Arabic TT shows that there are three successive complex clauses conveying SE through the use of adversative conjunctions. In (i) the two clauses involved in realizing contrastiveness are correlated by the restrictive focusing subjunct “lāa”, (not) positioned immediately before the second clause, which is characteristically elliptical. In this sense, all the SE adversative conjunctions do not normally conjoin two structurally complete clauses, but two smaller constituents representing the rejected and the correct values used within a full complex clause. In addition, both contrastive structures in (i) overtly express a deontic obligation realized by using the noun modal “waajibuka”, (your duty or you must), and placed upon the child’s father.

Semantically, the type of restriction is one of a Bearer “your duty” to a Quality manifested by a circumstantial element “teach him how to live”. The utterance typologically realizes TCSE because the correct and incorrect values forming the presuppositional set are given immediately before and after “lāa”, (not). The implications consequent upon such a restriction are that firstly, the fathers’ sole duty is to teach their children how to live, and secondly, others such as the mothers may share this duty with the fathers as well. The downgrading which the second implication expresses, minimizes the restrictive applicability of the contrastive constative on the Quality focused because the action of teaching how to live suggests ease and straightforwardness.

Contextually, the constative in (i) contrastively addresses a counter-presuppositional receiver by using S Emphasis on the basis of observing the third submaxim of Emphasis. The use of S Emphasis shows the kind of evidential modal the text producer has against the receiver’s mistaken beliefs.

Functionally, the constative is intended to replace the repudiated value of “teaching the child how to avoid death only” by the correct one, “how to live”. It can
also be said to restrict if we think that teaching a child how to live involves teaching him how to avoid death as well.

In (ii), the text producer of the Arabic TT uses the conjunctive formulation 
“...not...but...” to communicate a contrastive proposition expressing a declaration of an unchallengeable proposition. However, the proposition voiced has become challengeable since it clearly contradicts what is upheld as a general belief. More specifically, the text producer realizes that life for those people at the time is to teach their children how to avoid death by restricting their daily action; a fact which to him meant creating living dead. The proposition seems so general that it can be paraphrastically synonymous with the specific one in (i). The type of restriction is one of a Bearer, i.e. “life”, to a Quality, i.e. “is the use of our senses, mind, etc.”. The same implications as well as the discoursal function as those in (i) can be induced from (ii).

In (iii), the adversative conjunction formulation “...is not... but...” is used to express a proverb-like proposition, which is not only similar to but semantically related to the preceding one. Whatever has been said about (i) and (ii) in terms of predicational restriction, discoursal functions, and congruently contrastive contexts is true of (iii) as well.

In the English TT, (i) is a performative utterance expressing a directive deontic S. Emphasis realized by the imperative form “teach”. Its contrastiveness is structurally marked by “rather than” used to reject what follows as incorrect. In (ii), the adversative conjunctive formulation “...not...but...” is used to express SE. In (iii), on the other hand, contrastiveness is reached by using the comparative formulation “...less... than...”, which is synonymous with structures such as the quasi-coordinative used to express the contrast more explicitly. Consider:
(iii) *Life does not consist in length of days but in the keen sense of living*

The same is applicable to (i) in the French ST. Consider:

(i) *It is not a question of preventing him from dying but of making him live.*

### 6.4.1.3 Innamaa

"Innamaa", which has been cited in thirteen contexts, is used in many cases clearly to mark what follows as known. There is one occurrence which supports our claim concerning the possibility of having a value preceding a variable. There is one further occurrence showing how a structure presented by “innamaa” can be used as discourse-initial, as will be explained below. All the occurrences of “innamaa” show that the propositions it precedes are evidentially epistemic. Two occurrences of “innamaa” in different contexts will be pragmatically accounted for.

Text 3.1

**French ST**

*One fashions plants by cultivation and men by education*

**Arabic TT**

إذا يتشكل النبات بالزراعة، ويتشكل البشر بالتربيه.

**English TT**

*Plants are fashioned by cultivation man by education.*

Initially the text producer of the French ST in 3.1 uses a simple present factual statement starting with the indefinite personal pronoun co-referential with everybody including the text producer himself. He simply puts forward factual information which is expected either to be known to the readership or at least treated as such. The statement of the ST implicitly conveys contrast because he could have used the passive to
communicate factual or scientific proposition as is the case in the English version. The ST and the other TT's are paragraph-initiating unit, signalling a slight specific change of topic, although items such as “young tree” and “its fruit” are mentioned only in the beginning of the preceding paragraph by the text producer in order to appeal to a mother as the only person who can take care of her child. Otherwise there is no presuppositional direct link with the immediately preceding clause as is the case with contrastive utterances. So the statement carries New information intended to be used in substantiation of what follows in the paragraph and possibly what precedes.

The text producer of the Arabic TT uses “innamaa” to introduce the first statement of the same paragraph as text-initial with no specific presupposition requiring replacing, restricting or selecting. Thus, “innamaa” clearly serves to communicate what should have been known or treated as such by the readership although not necessarily so in other contexts. Conventionally, “innamaa” is made use of as a proverb- and discourse-initiating modal especially in argumentative contexts. The relative knownness of the information communicated preceded by “innamaa” shows how the text producer attitudinally feels towards his receiver who seems to/should not have forgotten the knownness of the proposition concerned. The proposition as such has apparently become challengeable in the wider context of the discourse in which “innamaa” is used. Its use in other than argumentative contexts particularly in scientific, narrative discourses, etc., must be awkward, hence should be avoided.

The constative in question, whose focus constituents are both “cultivation” and “education”, manifests the restriction of the Quality “plants’ fashioning” to the Bearer “cultivation”, and the Quality “man’s fashioning” to the Bearer “education”. The text producer is clearly communicating TESE because no other specific values are contextually given as possible candidates for the two Bearers “cultivation” and “education” except in a wider context of the whole discourse in which Rousseau
counterargues against many opposite views held by his society. Pragmatically, the restriction explicitly highlights Rousseau’s positive attitude towards the tautological proposition of reforming man by education. At the same time, the proposition, which is expected to induce the receiver’s tacit or explicit agreement, reflects the implicature that man cannot be fashioned without education nor can plants without cultivation, i.e. irony-like implicature. The irony-like implicature differs sharply from those identified in contemporary studies of pragmatics. In our citation, the text producer does believe in the veracity of both the explicature and the particularized implicature, whereas in contemporary linguistic studies, the text producer, according to the cases analysed, does not seem to believe in the veracity of the explicature of his constative.

The text producer of the English TT opts for a passive statement to communicate such factual information. The apparent reason for using the passive is that the passive construction is normally used in scientific discourse, and since the above statement communicates factual or perhaps scientific information, then the passive seems to be more suitable to the text producer than its counterpart. However, the passive according to this explanation is unmarked and therefore does not seem to communicate any signals of argumentation or ironical indication. A possible and perhaps more appropriate structure would have been the it-cleft as in:

*It is (only) by cultivation that plants are fashioned, and education that man is fashioned.*

Text 3.2

French ST

*A citizen of Rome was neither Caius nor Lucius; he was a Roman even he loved the country that was exclusively his.*

Arabic TT

إنَّ المواطنَ الروماني لم يكون فلاَنا من الناس،

وإيَا هو رومانى وكفى. 

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The text producer of the Arabic TT uses "innamaa" to introduce the proposition "he is a Roman", to contrast with the preceding negative clause. As is noticeable, the proposition tells what the preceding one has already stated of the hyperbolic assessment of the citizen of Rome as he is not like any other man. He clearly exploits the submaxim of quantity by communicating redundant information and thus demotes the receiver from being cognizant of p to being non-cognizant of p. He further flouts the submaxim of Emphasis by demoting the receiver from being presuppositionless to someone who is counter-presuppositional by encoding his proposition contrastively: The receiver is not expected to challenge the proposition as the citizen of Rome is a Roman. Encoding it contrastively, the text producer's intention is likely to communicate a particularized conversational implicature by literally restricting the citizen of Rome to the quality of being Roman. We stated earlier that this type of restriction diminishes rather than maximizes the applicability of the utterance's force on the Bearer. But because the contrastive proposition is unchallengeable and truth-conditionally hyperbolic the diminution element is not at work. The text producer is trying to imply a message, which is that a Roman is an ideal man everyone should follow, and any other men are nothing in comparison with a Roman. The type of this utterance is THSE, since the rejected value in the preceding utterance is literally "any body" in the Arabic TT. However, there is one odd thing about the Arabic text: the use of وکني (lit. and no more), which seems to minimize slightly the hyperbolic applicability of the utterance on the focus constituent.

The text producer of the English TT, by contrast, chooses two asyndetically coordinated clauses to express the same proposition. The first clause rejects the incorrect value, while the second asserts the correct value. The comma is used to replace the
contrastive co-ordinator “but”. The interpretation of both the English TT and the French ST can be calculated on the basis of the same account given to their Arabic version.

6.4.1.4 Fronting

Unfortunately, the discourse analysed shows only a single occurrence of SE word order. Actually, there are a few examples which do not seem to convey any SE. The only occurrence is the following.

Text 4.1

**French ST**

*It is therefore to these primitive tendencies that we should bring everything back.*

**Arabic TT**

* إِلَى هَذِهِ الْبَدْنَآئِرِ الأَوَّلَةِ يَدُن نَبِيعُي أَنْ نَرَدْ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ.*

**English TT**

*Everything should therefore be brought into harmony with these natural tendencies, and ...*

The text producer of the Arabic TT opts for marked word order, i.e. fronting, to impart SE. In the French ST, a formulation identical to the English it-cleft is used to relay the SE intended. The focus constituent is “to these primitive tendencies”, which is left in its unmarked position in the English TT.

What is important here is that the utterance is a performative directive expressing a contrastive deontic obligation. The use of the modal يَدُن نَبِيعُي (should), is meant to communicate non-factual information which is yet to occur in the future. By using this deontic modal together with the first person plural pronoun, the implication is that the Subject together with the text producer failed to reach the standards suggested by the utterance. The subjective view offered by the text producer is not strong enough to commit him to the felicity of his utterance because the deontic modal is used in the
presupposed part. However, the use of SE to encode his utterance fully commits him to the felicity of the utterance concerned.

What is unusual about this utterance is that the presupposed part is not directly retrievable from the preceding context by flatly rejecting it. The presupposed part can be inferred from the preceding context in which Rousseau identifies these tendencies with nature before they are hindered and changed by our habits and more or less warped by our prejudices. It follows then that the presupposition would be that everything should be attributed to habits. In this sense the utterance is TCSE. The restriction is one of a Quality, i.e. "returning everything", to a Bearer "to these tendencies". That is, the Bearer, i.e. these primitive tendencies, is the only one to which we should return everything if we are to bring up real men.

To conclude, I have been empirically analysing the conventional means of S Emphasis in Arabic, and almost all that has been said above about the form and function of S Emphasis in Modern Standard Arabic can be traced in the discourse analysed. It has been demonstrated how the use of SE realizations is a crucial communicative mechanism serving to put the text producer's views effectively and efficiently in argumentative discourse.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

In this brief chapter, I would like to summarize the theory proposed in the present work for the pragmatic analysis of Focus, Emphasis proper and S Emphasis as an alternative to the current theoretical models. I began by arguing for an assumption based on the existence of a natural linkage between linguistic structure and pragmatic interpretation involving a huge linguistic lore needing to be unravelled. More specifically, the essential assumption underlying the choice to use Focus, Emphasis proper and/or S Emphasis is that there are pragmatic constraints influencing the choice of those syntactic features realizing Emphasis proper and S Emphasis attributable to conversational implicature. The assumption can clearly cover other syntactic areas such as +Def vs -Def; Repetition vs Ellipsis, etc. as well. In order to demonstrate the possible workability of the assumption above in the case of Focus, Emphasis proper and S Emphasis a new pragmatic model has been proposed, which places the contextual importance of utterance form on equal footing with that of utterance content. It provides a systematic way of accounting for the pragmatic constraints influencing our choices of utterance form and utterance content, both of which are accounted for within the new model by the maxim of form congruence and the maxim of content congruence respectively. In order to specify the kind of form or content congruence or incongruence, each of such basic maxims subsumes as many submaxims as the number of linguistic features whose choices are influenced by pragmatic constraints. Each submaxim accounts for a specific linguistic feature chosen in terms of its congruence and/incongruence with the receiver's immediate and long-term contextual statuses specified by the text producer at the moment of speaking. The observance or flouting of a specific submaxim is meant to uphold the principle of appropriateness which subsumes the two basic maxims and their respective submaxims.

One of the most important consequences of the new model is the drastic
modification of the calculability of Grice’s generalized and particularized implicatures. The former is calculated on the basis of the text producer’s congruent encoding of the utterance concerned to be dispatched in a congruent context. The latter, on the other hand, is calculated on the basis of his incongruent encoding of the utterance concerned to be dispatched in an incongruent context.

The new model, as was demonstrated, is capable of accounting not only for all cases of Focus, Emphasis proper and S Emphasis, which other models have clearly failed to explain illuminatingly and plausibly, but also for a huge area involving other syntactic features responsive to pragmatic constraints in their respective contexts. The plausibility of the new model is much more realistic than those of the present pragmatic models in the field. It has been demonstrated that an utterance expressing unmarked Focus can either be used congruently to address a receiver who is presuppositionless, or incongruently to address a receiver whose current contextual status requires the use of Emphasis proper, i.e. reconfirmation-seeking, or S Emphasis, i.e. counter-presuppositional, and vice versa. Thus in both cases the typological classification of receivers and constatives in terms of informativity, uninformativity and over-informativity is necessary for the plausibility of the new model.

Furthermore, the classificatory scales of receivers and constatives have clearly clarified Lyons (1977) and Halliday’s (1985) highly contentious claims concerning the weakening effect, which the use of emphasizers such as “certainly” and the like cause to the text producer’s commitment towards the proposition of his constative. It was pointed out that their claim is true only if the text producer’s mutual knowledge of p NOT the veracity of p, is contextually challenged by the receiver.

The present work has also shown that for example, a constative which may be encoded congruently, may contain some constituent used incongruently in the same context. In other words, the implicature of a given constative may be primarily
generalized derivable from the constative as a whole, and from some constituent used to introduce a secondary particularized implicature and vice versa. In consequence, implicature calculability should be conducted simultaneously at the constituent level as well as the predication level of a given constative. In other contexts, the conventional use of a certain type of emphasizers such as "innamaa", Negation/Focusing, etc., helps to produce a particularized implicature if used unconventionally.

Intonationally, a new functional clause typology in Arabic has been proposed by taking into account contextual parameters such as presupposition, uninformativity, informativity, etc., and how such parameters are grammatically and contextually signalled. The clauses which have been contextually classified into four groups, are assigned to four specific levels showing how clauses can be least informative moving on to be informative in ad-hoc contexts. The FSP typology has also demonstrated the basicness of the Verbal clause in Arabic.

It has also been proposed that the syntactic features realizing Emphasis proper and S Emphasis are best treated as evidential modals language puts at our disposal to help us commit ourselves to the veracity of the proposition of the utterance communicated. Being evidential modals, the congruent or incongruent use of such modals evinces the natural linkage these modals have with Grice's second submaxim of quality namely, "have evidence". The submaxim, as was shown, accounts pragmatically for the congruent and incongruent use of these evidential modals in contexts doubting or denying the evidentiality of the proposition conveyed. And being modals, the use of emphasizers clearly reflects the text producer's positive or negative attitudinal aspect accompanying his communicative message in the contexts concerned. As such, emphasizers are predominantly used to realize evidential epistemic modality.

It has also been shown how within the Interpersonal component we may have systems similar in one way or another to Halliday's ideational systems. However, the
interpersonal systems are not mutually exclusive, hence the text producer's choices are determined by contextual factors intended to realize maximum appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness in actual communication.

As far as Emphasis proper and S Emphasis are concerned, the present work has attempted to provide the most common realizations of Emphasis in Arabic, which were analysed in terms of our new pragmatic model, particularly those of S Emphasis. The extensive empirical analysis of S Emphasis in chapter six has demonstrated the fact that although S emphasizers have been analysed in classical Arabic linguistic Literature, they are still found in MSA. The pragmatic account of S Emphasis has shown the importance of the submaxims of quality, Emphasis and quantity usable in identifying the text producer's real intentions in actual communication. The account drastically differs from most of the current analyses conducted by prominent linguists such as Grice, Kempson, Sperber and Wilson among others.

Taking the two typologies of receiver and constative into account in our pragmatic model designed for Focus, Emphasis proper and S Emphasis not only provides a plausible systematic perspective of accounting for Focus and Emphasis but also reduces the indeterminacy characteristic of other pragmatic accounts of the same and other linguistic phenomena.

It is hoped that further studies will pursue the pragmatic analysis of other relevant areas along the same vein as the present model.
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الإميل
أو
تربية الطفل من المبتدئ إلى الباج

تأليف
جان ماكسي روسو

النشرة:紧jc: لوقا

تقديم
الراست "محمد زيكر" د. م.

جميع الحقوق محفوظة للناشر
الطبعة الأولى - أغسطس 1958

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كيف تتنغم الطريق المفتوح وتحمي النبأ الباقية من عواطف
البشرية

امرأة تشبه النبتة الصغيرة وتدعها قبل أن تموت. فوؤدنا ستكون
نقاءها قمة على. وبادر إلى الاحترام روح و كذلك بجي منين. أت ن
سناددع يندفع به تختاري ذلك الحمي، ولكن ما من أحد سواك يبكي
اه أن يدك السباح.

أما ينحال النباتات الزراعية، وتشمل البشرين. فمنفدهم
فارها ديرة، إن تدفعه فاموه وفوقته 3 إن 3علم كيف يديك منها. اب
تكون مصدر ضرر له بما نحنما غيره من التفكير في ميد العمون

(1) النبية الأولى هي اختصر مراحل التربية شانا. وهذه التربية
الإلهية الدقيقة للناس، بدوره من بدو أن تختاري فنزة مند كوكبة
للناس للاستر على بين، تائر في مؤلفات التربية لتي كثيرة
العلمه أو النسب، كله نفتيه بها في الرجال، وإننها منهم تأتي
والترنين فيها يعدهم أكثر مما بين الرجال. إن مبعث الإيمان تتحب
أولادنا، الذين لا يجرون من صراعاتهم ليلهم في حسن تربتهم له
أو سوته. ولا كتب الغومن إعث إمالة دون الاختصاص، لاتي
تنسبهن الكفاهة في، فهنا لا تنتمي الامام سلاسة علامة علامة
واواقح الامامات أقثل من واجبات الإام، وأعمالنا ماجد على راحة الإسرة
وهى في عادة السقف بإثباتهن. ولكن بلى إن بعقا بعد titular أجساما،
فإن تمكنت من نسخته حتى عن أعيننا حفلة في طفتهما، ونسجتها من لحبا،
و نبينا التهدي من أورها لرغبته، لكي نعلق أن يمل بحده لا يكمن إهل
لرث الامام. وهو يบาย أن الإمام يسبحه، أهلاً و هم في ذلك علل،
ولكن مليم في ذلك أقل خطأ من مكونه: إسلام ترد لإيمانيا
العدة الصحاة، وإن في ذلك مجهزة وإن احتفلت ولا يخيما
تستعيه بها، إلا أن المسم وضح وحش ونرتعة التغيير المواقع
ما بيعش البالان، وأعمال أو البلادة التي مفهلون، بإلزامهم، لله الفأ
بهم من حنان الإمات الإله، وأعلى كل حال يجي توصيف هذا المني الذي
استعمل به لطع الإيم، وهذا ما سامحة فيما بعد.

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الله لا يتركون لنا شأنه يموت صبرا قبل أن ينقطع إلى حاجاته. فأن من ينفث قشرة الطريقة لا يدرك أن نوع البهر كان حري أن ينكه لو لم يبدوا السائم فلا فتج فنود ضعافا في حاجة إلى القوة. فنود مجري من كل شيء في حاجة إلى الموان. فنود حقيقي في حاجة إلى التميز. وكل ما يعوزنا فيه مولدا، وتغفيره في كبرنا تؤكينا إياه التربية. والتربيات التي تتكون منها الطبية أو من الناس، أو من الأشياء. فنمؤقتها وجوارها الداخلية ذكرا هو تربة الطريقة. وما تأمل من الأفادة، ومن ذلك التنمو، ذكرا هو تربة الناس. وما تكونها في الأشياء التي تتأثر بها، فذكرا هو تربة الأشياء.

كل أمر ما، إذا بدأ أمر تشكيه ثلاثة ضروب من الأسباب: والهجة التي تثار، هزمتهم التباينة وهو تربة عرقة، فإنه يكون على واقع نقصه ما من تواقيف فيه تعالى، فتصبح على أمر واحد، ويسفون أحيان وفهده هو الذي يصل إلى منه، وبعيش في قواع مع نفسه. وهذا هو من طببربته.

وما بين ضروب التربية الثلاثة، نقب تربة الطريقة خارجة عن ادارتنا: وأما تربة الأشياء فلا تدخل تحت سلطاننا البقدر. وما تربة الناس تلك دون سوته مملوء لنا بحق، بيد أننا مسيطرين عليها الا تزغر. أفإن ذاك الذي ينظر في النافذة على أدول كل من ينطلق بالطفل، وآماله؟

وما أعجزت التربية فنا، فتدعوك أن تستعين على النجاح، فأسابيع النجاح المتوبة ليست بيد أحد. وكلما يستطاع بالعيد أن (1) أن يمشيه سواء من الناس في مظهبه، فتوزع الأفاظ، والعباءات التي تدل عليها، فتعجز عن تحفيهم حاجته إلى موئلهم، وطاعر حالي لا يد

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تقرب من غايتي فيها أو كبرتها، ثم يستائر الحظ بتمام الوصول. وما هو هذه الغاية؟ إنها عن غايتها الطبية. فهم سبق البهران على هذا. وله أن تتصف ضروب التربية الثلاثة لا معدة للاكتشاف، فيجبر أن توجه هذه الاضرار الذين لا آهمها، بعض المحتاجين، بمشاهدة القرب الذي لا سلطان لنا عليه.

ولعل لفظ الطبيعة ينطوي بعض المضموم، فالأدهمها إلى ضيته. فقل إن الطبيعة إن هي إلا المادة، فما مما هذا؟ وقلت إذن عادات لا تكون أمرا، ولا تقع على الطبيعة مطلقا، خذ مثل المادة التي تكون عند النبات، حين يحال برنجها وبيئتها الرأس، ولكن حين يترك للثبات مطلق الحرية، يستمر في الاتجاه الذي أظهر عليه، إلا أن كل انتقاد جديد للثبات الأصلي يرد إلى الإنجاء الرأس، وكذلك مبول الناس، فما له المر، على حاله، تحظى بالعديد التي أقترحه على طببه. ولكن وتزالت تلك الحالة انتقدت المادة وارتاد الحلال إلى الطبيعة.

وما التربية بقينا عادة. وكأن من الناس تبقي تربته أو يهددها. وكأن من الناس يصونها. فمن أن جاء هذا الاحترام؟ فهل تصرف لفظ الطبيعة على العادات التي تواقيف الطبيعة، فلا حاجة بها لمزيد من الإفصاح...

فإننا نولد ذوى حق، ونريد مولدا، ونحن نفعل بأخلاقيات البهجة التي تعطي لنا، ونريد تربيتها. فهي نفسها التي حتى تعود، إنه بصفتها عادة، تنهب الحلال إلى الإنتاج المعنيات التي تصرف بها بعض هذه الاتصالات، وإلى المرور عن بعضها الآخر، نحبه ما يطبع لنا، وما نصهرناه، ثم يحبب ما نجد من وقائنا بيننا وبين هذه الإشارات، إثرنا. ثم أخيرا يحبب الفكر إلى بكونه ذنحا من السعادة أو الكمال...
وفقاً لوحدة كبرى، هو بسط مقاومة الوطن، وقوته ليست في ذاته بل تتعلق بالكل وبدينته إلى ذلك الكل الذي هو الهيئة الاجتماعية.

المفاهيم الاجتماعية المصطلح في التي تعني كيف تعني طبقة النسخ، فترمده من وجودها الطبق يذاته، كتي تتم تجاهة نسياً بذك أن في الوحدة العامة، حيث لا يرى الدرو نفسه بعدد شيئاً. دائماً، يجري من الكل، ولا يضاهي الكل.

إن الكل الروماني لم يكن فاقداً من التاس. وانها هو الرومان الوحيد.

بل أن كان يحب وحده دون نفسه. وهذا رجوليانوس حين قب قلبه.

اعتنى نفسه من فرطه، مما غذا من ممتلكاته. وشفت نفسه في الأسر.

أجنياً عن روما، أن يجلس في مقعده، في مجلس الشيوخ الروماني.

لا أن أسره بذلك فرطه. إنه استمر أن ي كرا في عقده.

وكان له ما أراد، وعاد متصرفاً لبيته شعاعاً، أو كل هذا السلك،

وكان كثيراً كثرنا، في أن كل سلك الناس في هذا الزمان.

ووذا، يغلي من كلمة، عندما بينا في أمره.

وهذا يحسن به كلمة بيد أن غير ذال، فعالهم أن يكونناء.

وعدها فيما يعني معهم، وذلك كان السربطون، فأنا كدمهم.

خرج سربطون، بلذ جملة أن. أتى الدوس. لابد فعالهم، من أول صبر لك، الذي يدوم، أو حوره.

والله، إذا انتهى ولا يذاكونه على القيم بها في حديثهم.

فكل ذلك الفيلسوف، يحب النار لذا، لا ياه من حب.

وشاشة:

لا يمكن أن يعيش وحده، فهو الوحدة المقدسة، وهو الكل أيضاً لل коллектив. لا يتلقى وجوده إلا نفسه، ونحوه، للاوانت:

(1) لا يوجد حرب لم تكون في حروب الكريات. ولكن

تتكون حرب الملوتون، فعلاً في حرب الملوتون، من أن يكمن من رعاياهم!
- فقد انتصرنا في النهاية، ولقد أظهرت النتائج تحضيرًا، وهذا يتطلب:

- الوسيلة المعروفة في النظام الاجتماعي: الحلول المحدودة المواجهة مع ذاتي، ومحاولة تجنب الاختلافات بين أفراد ومؤسسات، بدلاً من مواجهة الأزمات، وмыслية عدم التصرف في النطاقات، ما يجعله فلاغًا للطريقة، بوجود كيد، بناء، وحاجة، أو من أبناء الطبقة الوسطى، وما هذا يبني؟

وكلها تكون بالمرتين، سيكون مخلصًا في حالة سلام، واحدة، في سبيل قراءة عمليه، على بيئة ماهي يبني أنه يفعل، ويقوم على عمله في جوهر وانساباته، وراوي ل>iضيع أن آرى هذا النابية كأثر أو آثار أو أم Vulkan، أو كيف يتأتي له أن يكون الرحمن معا، ومن هذه الأشياء التي تمتاز بالضرورة تجنب صورتان متناقضتان من النظام، بانها عامة مشتركة، والبائرة قرينة، وان أردت أن تعرف كيف تكون النزيهة العامة، أقرأ جمهورية أفلاتون، فما هو كتاب في السياسة، كما يوهمه بعض الكتاب، عن طريق، أو هو أصل في النزاهة خروج من يد البشر.

ومع ذلك، لا يمكنني أن أكتب على النظرة، وان يتبين اليهود، الذين يريدون أن يوجد للرب، ليست من الممكن أن يوجد لأبد، لم يعد للعالم وجود، ولا يمكن أن يوجد للمواطن، فيني، أن يرى كلية الوطن والوطن من الفئات الجديدة، و يعني، البديل من الإرياح، ولكن لا يمكن الإدلا، بها، لأنها لا تصل بالوضع الذي نحن بصدده.

وأما في التنبيه تلك المؤسسات المحسنة التي ينتمونها كيانات من الجماهير العامة، وكذلك لا أستحيب النزاهة الدينية بعض الكلمة لأنها تهدد في غاية من المخاوف، فينها، أراها جيما، ولا تفلح إلا في أن تخرج الرواية في الناس، وهم يظهرون دائماً، أمهملون لسواهم، في حين أنهما لا يملكون إلا أنفسهم، ولذلك، فهم مبهمة للجميع، فلا يضمرهما على أحد، وإنما هي جهد ضاعف.

ومن هذا النتائج تولد الصراع الذي نشهده دائما في الغرب، من نجد مستويات في مسيرة مع تعارض يساهم في النزهة، فتنبأنا هذه القوة المثيرة، وتضح من بينها طريقة مخالفة لا يؤديها إلى هذه القوة أو تلك، وهكذا نتأرجح من أجل أمور طيلة حياتنا، إلى أن نخدم تلك الحياة عن الوصول إلى وقفة معذرتنا، وعاجزة عن إصدار الخبر لأناس وللناس على السواء.

أما النزهة المزدوجة أو النزهة الطبيعية، فلذا يكون للناس، ما هو نفسه، فيلا لله، هدد، في غاية واحدة، والفضاء على التنازل في نفس الموصل عدن، ضمان يحمل دون سعادته.

وأما ينبغي أن نستحب للحصول على ذلك الإنسان الطبيعية الثابتة؟

نستطيع الكثير لأن نقول دون عمل شيء في ذلك الصدد، إن الحركة ضد التيار غير، ما علينا إلا الاختيار منا تارة، فهنا، ولكن حين يكون التيار قويًا، وفي مراحله أن تثبت في وضعنا، فلهام، الرأس، والنظر عليه عامان، فينا، كما، ظننا في مراقبة، فتفرق، ن 있지نا، ونأتي لا تتذكر.

فما هو هذا في الحياة الطبيعية سياسته، وهمهم المشتركة أن يكونوا، ورجل... ولنأني ينبغي أن يكون مصدر تمثره الاضطراب إلى الجماع أو الكمية أو الإعتناء بالقانون، فالطبيعة تنهى قي كل شيء للحياة.
الانسان والعالمة هي المهمة التي أريد أن ألقته أباها. في حين يخرج من بين يدينا إن يكون فاضياً أو نسبياً أو قد لا يكون مناسباً في كل شيء، فلا يمكن أن يكونان. لسوي إذا كيف يكون على الوجه الصحيح، ومهما تصرت الأيدي من وضعه، نسيكون دائماً في موضعه الحقيقي.

إن دراستنا الحقة هي دراسة النية الإنسانية. وإذا تكون النية الحرة، فإنها تتبع النية الحرة بالضرورة أكثر مما هي بالتنسيق. فالناس بدأوا التعلم حين بدأوا الحياة. فكريتنا تبدأ معنا ومعلمنا الأول هو научتنا. وكان الأقدر، بعونات التربية المتغيرة، ولكن قالت قانون أن القائمة تخرج الطفل إلى الورق ترضيه الحاضرة ويراده المؤدب ويفقه معنا المدرسة. هذه التفريقية ساء استعماله، لقرر الظل أن يكون فيه مرشد واحد.

هذا يجب أن نوسع أفقتنا، فنستهدف في نابضة الإنسان الجدد، المعنى يجمع عوارض الحياة البشرية. ولن الناس كانوا يلدون مرتبين. أضاه وظفهم، وله أن السنة كلها يستحقها. فعلخدمة، ولن أضاه كراوح من الحياة لا تحترم التبديل مطلقاً. فذات الطريقة السائدة في تربية الأطفال بسبب حال ذويهم طرقاً صالحة من بعض نواحيه. لأن الطفل الذي يربى على أساس وضع معين لا يتزحزح عن ذلك الوضع فلا يعلم لأكثر ووضع ساء لم يلحوظه. الناس لابن عليه حال. وقائنا الحالة ذو روحاً قلقة تكفر التبديل بين جيل وجيل، فمن المحق أن ينبغي لطفل أن ينشأ حالة ثابتة وظروف لا تنحرف. فإذا اختلفت حالة قبلها أو هبط السلم درجة واحدة هناك لا معالاً أو ضل. وليس المراد أن نعلم الإنسان الايام، بل المراد أن نجعله ينجم باحجابات الأيام.

لا يمكن أن نصون طفلاً. وهذا لا يعني بل يمكن أن نجعله كيفويات، والنهم، وكيف يحمي ضربات القهر وكيف يواجه الأيتام والعالمة. وكيف يعيش أن اتقنوا الأسر في الزمرور والقبط.

ويعش نقاط حتى لا يلكف فأنا نمت مفر. إن واجبنا أن نعلمه كيف يعيش لا كيف يتجاهل الموت. الحياة ليست نسماً يردد بل هي نشاط واستخدام للحوار والحواس والوظائف الحيوية، من سائر عناصرنا. وليس أعلم الناس نسماً من الحياة من سلا سناها، حتى ما زال كراه، لأنه يندفع بسائق من العمر، تراباً في سن المائة وهو لا ينام منذ مولدته. وكان يقه لوضعه الفارض رفعة، وقد قبلاً أن نعيش حقا تلك السنوات القليلة.
حتى في مجموعنا مزايا حقيقية، وكل مواضعنا ضروري من الخطوات أو الاستخدام الصحي. فالساند الوصفت bulunmaktadır مستجيب نموه ومادام على وجه الدنيا، فهو مكبل بشري النظم.

وإذا كان القنابل يؤدي، كان ينبغي أن تكون أقلية، ووقتًا نقلًا هذا الكلام كأنما رؤوسنا قد أسس فاطمي للحربة تقوم بها، تنتمى لها التهذيب من خارج على أيدي القنابل، ومن داخل على أيدي الفلاسفة.

أنتفخون أن أول صوت يصدر عن الطفل هو البكاء الآبل عند ف هذا فانكم تكرون على ذلك بما تكلونه من قوقد. وت İzولون به من وذل، فلا يجد شيئا له ما إلا صوتاته. فكيف لا يستخدمه ليجار بالشكو كين يكفي من الأذى الذي تالونه به. ولو أنكم مثبت ذلك لتمكن مره منه إلى البكاء وأروعر.

وإن أدرى من أن يأت هذة الصادرة الخرجة؟ فالبشارات يتكون لواجبوا الأول ويزومن عن حسن أطفالنا فلا يكون مناص من اتخاذ الحواضن الأجرات ليكن أمانت لأطفال غرباء لايع申し込み في طينه بعثا طفلاً نحوهم، ومن هنا في الغالب نشأ فكرة الفصول فالتطور الحريات لرعايا مستمرة، أما الطفل الكاف لا يحتفظ لرعايا ولا ضر على أحد أن يكين كسبب له البكاء؟ هل على الحاضرة من بكائه ش، مادام لأياده له سلات، وليش بعد ذلك علا ما عاش؟ وهذا تتن أسئلة على حساب بينة، وهذا من حيث الحاضرة الأجرات، وفكره من السبب.

ترى هل تعلم الأمهات الليطين الأيدي تختص من أطفالك خصوصا للأطفال الفقراء في المدينة؟ أي مماثلة بلغونا في القرية؟ وهم رفعتهم؟ أن الحاضرة تعليم الطفل أحياناً من مبان، في مسار دون تعويذ بعد ذلك

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أنا أرى أن الحالة المثلثة لا تزال موجودة. لكن...

وهل قراري حادة الطفل إلى أنه أنها تأتي ان امرأة أمها، أو دابة، او نماذج الأطفال التي تتمتع بناءً لإمرأة أمها، التي تجرب من طفلك من مبدأ. كيف يمكن أن تكون مسببًا صادقًا؟

إذا نحن نشأة صادقًا بعمر الوقت، فين تحل المادية في مجال الطبع، وتعيد الطفل ما لم تشكل مرمتهم نحوه إلا الأموات.

وذلك ضرر كبير ينشأ عن هذا المزدهرية. فقد يجد الطفل مرمتهم أكثر مما يجد آمن. ويعني أن ما يبدو لها من حساب منحة لها أعلاها. تغلبه الظلم في تلك التي وجد عنها رعاية الأم، وكم في هذا من فهم الأمهات...

وبحاول وضع حد لهذا الضرر بمساء الامواج، فيصل إلى الحالة المالية. وما إنها سنوات تقل، حتى يكون قد نرى كل ما كان من أمرها.

والأم التي تعلم هذا ترى ابنها على جرعات النمأت، وحائرة من نحجب الحياة يوما ما كلما احترق من أرضها ندتها...

إن هذه المالة أهبة أكثر مما يظن. فإن أردت أن ترمي كل أباؤكم، فإذا نشأة صادقًا بعمر الطفل، فين تحل المادية في مجال الطبع، وتعيد الطفل ما لم تشكل مرمتهم نحوه إلا الأموات.

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ولكن هل ينبغي أن ننظر إلى المالة من جذورها الجسدية فحسب؟
لا يعرفون بعضهم بعضًا لقلة الإقامة في البيت، فحيثما يفتك الناس إلى
البيئة في البورت يذهبون لاتمامها في أمكنة سواها.
أما إذا أقبلت الأمهات على ارضاء الأطفال، فما أحرى الأخلاق ان
تصلح من نابق نفسها وتستبدد المواطنة البيضاء في الفنون: ويريد
السكان في الدولة. فذاذًا الحياة البيضاء هي أفضل رياض للأخلاق
السنية، ونسبي ضجة الأطفال التي يضيق بها البعض من الأثر ويريد
الأباء والأمهات ببناء الريف الريدي بينهم، وتمت ارتداد النساء أمهات
ارتجل الرجال سيرًا، أبأ وأروجًا.

**

وِلاً ام تكّن هناك ألم، فليس هناك طفل، فالواجبات بينهما متبادلة. 
وِحي تكون الآسية من جانب يكون الفنجة من الجانب الآخر. فالطفل
يجب أن يعبُر أمه فبل أن يعلم أن هذا واجب، وأما لا يجد هاء الدم
تأتيه بالندوان والرعاية، بمعن فما يفتك في الانتاوات الأولى، فيبوب
الطف في أن يولد. وهكذا، تجد أمة من أمة، إلى أن يغول، وكدف خرجا
على الطبيعة.

وِهناك أمات تفعل في القيام بواجباتها، فيفجِرُ جمعة الطبيعة، ولكن
من فتاحة الطبيعة للأمهات، فالعلم من هذا الفترات تختُب من طولها
معبرًا في صُدَح، يُعيِّن على نفسه، فينقطع عن تسكينه، إلى الأم، 
وانتظارها من أمات الطبيعة تجب الأم، وهي لا دعوى أنها باتت فشتهة
لبكة الناس، إذ يظل ركيزة ويشبه ضيوفها، يُعَد في إنشاء في الحفاظ
بذلك التديل فيمكنهم في المذاب المستمر حين يواجهون الحياة من
غير جلد على المقاومة.

رونوا الطبيعة وانفروت كيف ينكن السبيل، ثانيا يملع على ترميم
الأطفال بالأهداف والأشياء، وتتعلملهم عند المباداة كيف يكون الأم.

فالآمال لا تنبع لهم إلا بالحياة، فالصين الطويل يكاد يختمه،
والديدان تذدىه، وسأم الطويل قد ينزع عليه ويتعمد في كثير من
الحالة، ويُقع من خطوةً إلى خطوة، وخطوة متصلاً.
ونفس الأطفال الذين يولدون يذكرون قبل السنة الثامنة، ولكن مني
مرت المرة يكون الطفل قد أكمل منها.

هذه هي سنة الطبيعة، فلما أنجَح عليها، فلا ترى أن يأتي دق عقول
في تصريحهم فتوقداً عليها، أن التجريبي قد بل أن الأطفال المهمين
عرضت لذوب أكثر من غيرهم، فرسوا أطفالك باللعب التي سيكون
من الحمية، عليهم احتمالهم وما، وقدوا أجمجم بالطفل، يختلف
الخصول والإجتراء، والآناع والموضوع والنسيب، وتعودوا أن الطفل
أكثر احتجاجات من الرجل، فَناصعه الطفرة، ويُشدد صوته، أما
الرجل فليس كذلك، فمن الممكن أن تكون عليه، من غير أن تسحق
صحته أو جماله للناظر. وحتى انوجد بعض الخطر، فليس من الخير أن
يردنا عليها، لأن لآخر خطر لا متاح ما عناه الإنتابة.

ان الطفل تزداد قيمته يتدقه في السم، إذا تُضيف إلى تخصمه
قيمة الرعاية التي بذلت له، فمن الخبر أن تصلح ضد أُخْلاَثي النباتات التي
تعرض لها، وأحيانًا واجب، يُشجر هذا خطر في نفتها وهو في
ست مثيرة: قضاء حياتها بالآمال، فَتأتى، إن كانت قيامة الحياة تزداد بمثابة
المر عن السنة التي يزداد فيها النعم تأتي حماة في تجذبها بغض الإيمان
في الطبيعة كي يشبعه من الآلام في نفوسه.

لقد كتب على الإنسان أن يذكَب في جميع الأزمان، وسعود من ل
يرف في طوله الآلام الجسد، فما أتبرعه بجاب آلام أخرى، فأملا
الجسد كلما تدفعته للنخفل عن الحياة؟ وناما الذي يندعو إلى اليأس هو
عذاب الروح. فاُفْعَاء الإيمان حقا هو الذي يأتينا من قبل نفسه.
لا تتخذ لنا موقفا وسطا. فهياما أمرا واما مأمور. ودعا تكون أولى الممان في نفسه معي التحكم أو معي الاستعداد. فهو قبل أن يتعلم الكلام بأمر وقبل أن يتعلم العمل يتعليم. وأحياء نعاه قبل أن يعرف فيما أخطأ قبل وقبل أن يخطئ.

ومنذذا نجد في كلما الصغير منذ البداية يذوق التمثيل نملا الدنيا.

**واجه الآيت**

لا يجب أن يتسب هذا الطفل طاغياً وعبدا في قلبه يدروآ على الملك. ومجرد من أهله، واهر بنحو وروح على السواء ومئتي ألف، في خضم الدنيا كنت عنه الصغير علمه وغروه ورذاله. فسوى عنوان مثبت لحقيقة الشرية وسماها. ولكن حاكم لنا هذا هو الشر السوى. إن هذا البشر صينته جهانتنا وما هذا هو البصر.

أفتردو أن يحتفظ الطفل بصورته الفطرية؟ أن فقطوا عليه إذ يد قدوته إلى هذه الدنيا. حتى ولد الإمام أبيه الأم وازدهر أبها الأب ولا تفارقه طولًا غالي أن يستوي رجلاً! وان يكون فلاحًا من هذا الطريق.

وكما تكون الرعب أم الطفل الفطرية، يكون الرعب أم الطفل. فيجب أن يكون نافذ بين قدم الرعب والمؤدب بمثابة سواء في الترتيب أو المهج حين يشوق الطفل من يدها إلى يده. واعتقد أن الطفل تكريس
لاة فإن أبدى اقتراحاتها عن تلك الحلاوة المفقودة. وكيف يغيب الصلة بين هذا وذاك إلا عن وجودان أخريان الأشياء؟

لا يجب أن يبقى علامة على نهاية حياة رجل، وافق عليه ليغفوه فما يقوم بهذا إلا بكل واجهي نحويه. لا فإن من شأنه أن يبقى نحوه رجلاً؛ وإن تقدم ليجعله أعضاء اجتماعيًا في رجل بُنِيَت لدته موانئ، وأيما رجل قادر على الوقوف بهذا الدين الثلاثي وتأتاق عنه أن يكون مذنب ومتصر، ولم أنه لا يكون أمن في التمثيل حيث ينتمي بعضناه دون سائره وأيما رجل عجز عن التهم بأعمال الأدب حتى لا يندفع في ذلك بسدواب ضاحية أو عمل على الوجه يصدق أن نفبه من واجبه اعالة بيئة ونضاؤها نفسه.

قد لا تصدق أيها القارئ، ولكن نذكرين بين يدي ندم شديد لكل من ينتمي إليه ثورة اقتراحاته بها، وقد نظرت عن تربته نفسه عن إرضاع ثورة اقتراحاته. ولكنها صورة أن تقاست منها عصر واحد فقط كلها ولفقها التربويه. ومنى عميقة مرأة بها عن اراضيه، فلا بد أن تكون وراجع الأب دون ندم بإعجاب الرب. وهذا يُبقي الأساتذة بين الراقصة والأدبية أو المدارس، يتسلطون في غي الكنان يصلون الليل إلى الليل والأيام، أيهم، يهددون الأشقاء يشتركون في المان الوقائع. يتأثرون الحوادث أو يترددن بمراتبهم، ولا ينكاه أخلاقهم في خلقإن ينحل بعضهم بعضًا. وهنا لا ينتمي اجتماعيًا ما فتح أن تمتلك بعضهم إلى بعض في تدبير كامل الأئمة في الواقع عبره. يندفع فيهما بينهم.

ومن ضاعت الأشياء بين الواقفين، انتهى على الأمر أنه تنحى الإبادة عذوبة الحياة والوفيات. فلا مناص من أنهما المخزون إلى المبادل

(1) بالله من حكم صماد، ينداد مضمونه إبلاة حين يذكر ما كتبه.

(2) وضعها نفسه في احترام، من ابتداء بذه ملاقاته.
وإذن كتب قد أطلت من الكلام عن إمام فيما سبق من صفحات، فإنا
كان ذلك إلا لإيضاح الأولية عن التربية على منافضتها للمسامد
الاستفادة. يتعلق من قبل البلدين التي تبادر على أي مسلم أن يرفض
السلام بها، ولكننا أوضحنا في الكتابة، سواء أن البلدي الذي
يجب توجيه مخلوقات نورهنا أن ينتظم، ليس طولا عاديا، ولا بد له من نظام
خاص به. وذلك يذكر ظهوره على السرور، ولكن عليه أن ينصح
عنه لكل الناس،....

وسوف لا أجد هنا عن صفات المريء الفاضل، فاستمر في
تفسير جميع تلك حالات من بطاقح هذا الكتاب سيجد أي سخريه على
تفسير هذه المواهب العليا، أما سيء.

وأخيرًا فإن أثير هنا إلى أهم مخالف لم دوج عليه الناس، وهو أن
الرجل الذي يعتمد نوراً يعتقد أن يكون نوراً وثيقاً ما يكون متيل
الحبل، يقال نوراً ذلك أي أريد أن يكون هو نور طيلة أو أن يكون
نوراً، وأن يكون في نفسه لمساجه ثم، وكسب فقهه
بشاركة في لهو ومراسمه، فينبغي أن نفهمه بالنسب الطويلة وسنابهة من صلة
โปรด، فتعمد الأغلب أشياء لذلك إلى المنام، ولكنهم
لا يجدون نفعاً من تلك الكلمة مطالعاً.

وقد يقال أن الرجل ينبغى أن تكون له خبرة سابقة بتربية مرحلة واحدة
على الأقل. وهذا كثير، فتشبه الواحد لا يستطيع أن يكون بتربية
واحدة في جوانب. وإذا قال أنه لا بد لإنجاحه في التربية أن يكون توجه
الربية تاناً، أو لبسانه مرة أخرى على سبيل التمرين، فكيف ينقد
ال הריكية في المرحلة الأولى، ونحن نعلمه أنه لم يصح لها بعد؟
أجل أن الرجل أو الخبرة معروفان على الإتفاق. ولكن ذلك غير مستطاع.

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1. في مذهب أبا بكر، ونخلعهم عن الملاكمة، لا يصح أن يكون سواء من الناس.
لم نكن قادرين على القيام بذلك، ولكن لا نستطيع الذهاب بعيدًا في هذه الخطة. إن القوة الرئاسية لم تكن لها مثيل، إنها كانت تشكل النواة الأولى. إننا نعرف أنها كانت فائقة في النواة الأولى، لكنها لم تكن مكلفة بالعمل، بل كانت تشير إلى القوة الرئاسية.

وأما بالنواة الثانية، فإنها كانت تتضمن العناصر الأساسية للكيفية التي تقوم بها القوة الرئاسية في هذه الخطة. إنها كانت تتضمن العناصر الأساسية للكيفية التي تقوم بها القوة الرئاسية في هذه الخطة.

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وليس الققدر بعاجل إلى التربية، فتشوه، طبقتهما تفرض عليه طريقتها فرضًا. ولهما عدمة له سواها. وعلى المركبة من ذلك، نجد التربية التي تفرضها على الرغم، طبيعة التأنية تثيره: لا تزاله أصلًا، لا من حيث هو فيه ذاته، ولا من حيث مصلحة المجتمع (1).

ومهما يكن من شيء، فإن التربية الطبيعية ينبغي أن تعلم الرجل كي تكون لائقة للحياة في جميع الظروف البشرية. فيما يستحق أن تربى الفقارية من سعيه في الزواج، لا أن تربى شهرية تربية من سعيه في الناقة. ولكن تربية الفقراء لصالح الحياة البشرية قد تكون أحسن تربية للمرأة لاستغلال لحياة القاقة، لأنها إذا نقرنا إلى الإحساس، وجدنا من يثرمن بعد فقر أقل يقرأكم بخير ملسمون بعد غياب، ولهما الدور الفريد، ضعف الوجبة التي تلبس بلطفه من طبقه نفسه، فنن الأوقات أن نختار نادمي من الطلق، نخلق رجلًا وفقه عاة، المربي لا صار ذلك من له نفسه.

ولأي صدى أن يكون ايلًا في نسب وحبيب، فائدة بذلك أكرن جلم أن تằngر إنسان البطلة المريرة، فهذا صرأ من أباؤه وابناءه. ولكن ابنته توشة. أن ليس من يعنى أن يكون له اب وأم، بل إذا سأحلل جميع حقوقهم، يشقلاحنا من اتحاد طباقه، لا يوجد أن يكون ابنهم وأمه، ولهما أن يكون من أباؤه، فألا يوجد من أباؤه. وهكذا هو شرعي الأول لقبول رعاية. أو لعله شرعي الأول.

ويستغي أن ينصب في ذلك سرطن آخر، ليس في الحقيقة إلا نتيجة وتبديلاً للشرط السابق. وهذا الشرط هو ألا يقين بيننا إلا إرضاً، (1) فقد تسخبت فكرة التعليم العام في الدولة الحديثة هذه النظرة الطبيعية التي التربية، وهو شرط جوهري، لأن يحد، أن ينظر كل من المسلم والمدي، الذي الآخر على أنهما لا يقلقوه ولا يتخذهما. أن نعيد، نرمي عمرو، ونظامهما على واحد مترشح بينهما. فإنها متى تتما على بعد، فريقها، أو استناف الوقت الذي يمضي فيه كل منها، خليفة عن صاحبه، فضيء الترابية والإمكان بينهما. والقراءة والتأسيس كلاهما أحسن. ولا صلح الإقامة إلا على يد التحالف. أما إذا دخل القرآن في الحساب، فسيصدق كل منها في وضع خطته الخاصة للمستقبل. سيكون وقت اجتماعهما مما غير كامل الصفاء.

ان التلمذة لا ينظر إلى الأستاذ إلا على أنه أية خاتم تطوله، والاستاذ لا ينظر إلى التلمذة إلا على اعتبار أنه عم، قبل يتحرق شوقًا في الخلاف من. فكان كلامهما يتحل على اللحظة التي يتخلص فيها من صاحب. وما دام الزواج بينهما غير حقيقين، فلابد أن يد، الأستاذ تنصرف في النفس، وأن يأتي التلمذة نفسها، فهل تكون كل مهله، وفي قبة أنهما سيدان عربهما ما، فسيكون من المهم لديهما أن يتجاوزا. وهذا جاء بعد سجع. كافن منهما عزرا على الآخر، ولا يضربن للتمذة خلاصة من الأسئلة في طولته، للصديق الذي سيحتلق به في كره أو بنائه، والمربي سيتمتع التلمذة، ولا يضع بخدمات سوف يجيء هو ثوراتها حين يدرك تمذاته. فكل ما يمنح للتمذة سبباً بذاته مال ي점을ه يعني وجهة وعكالة من غلت في أواخر الأيام أو شيخوخته.

ويفترض هذا الكتاب مهما أن الولد كان سبيلاً، وأن الطفل حسن التكوين سعي ذوي الفروة. فلاوالد لا يملك اختيارًا لهم، وليس له أن يفاصل بين أعضاء الأسرة التي أفاءها اللهم عليه. فأحداث جمعنا سوية لديه، ينبغي أن يمد بينه في الرعاية وفي شؤونه، أو

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بجب أن تكون الجسم قوية كي يحمي طاعة الروح. فذ نخاذم الصالح يجب أن يكون مثنى النبوة، وعلي أعلم أن النطر بجذ الشهدات. وإذنك الجسم على طول المدينة، فإن القسط وفي الصوم يردان إلى التبديل فتتبعه ولكن لا يمكن من القطر المفدى لطريق الشهدات. وكلما كان الجسم ضعيفاً أشدت سببته، وكلما كازخوا عظمت ملاته. والشهوته الحية كثيرة قتاء في أجسام المحنين. ويردودون هياجاً بجهم عن إرضاء تلك الشهوته.

الجسم الصغير يضيع الروح. ومن هنا يأتي سلطان الأطر الذي أراد أن يأخذ الناس من جميع الأعراض التي يرمي شفعاءها. وأنا شخصي لا أعترف من أي ضرر يشتم الأطباء. ولكن أعرف إذا أيهم يصعبنا بأعمال جد وسيلة بين السبائح والنفحة، أو من يمرض فسبحان الأعداء. إذن كلما يضيع الجسم فإن يقلون النجاعة والإدامة. وما في ذلك ليس جثة وحيدة أن نحن جهاز إلى الجيل.

ولن أشجع الأطباء يقول أن نحن كذلك. فهو الحال الأكبر والبهاء الذي لا يمكنه أن يكون نفعاً. والكل سبب إلى الاستحالة لحفظ حياته. لأن جاهزه معوق دائمًا بل وفيك ريبة وراءه، فأنا أعد أن أغض عليه عيني جاهز، الملعح أن أضاع الحضارة التي تتبعنا المجتمع. لأن جاهل ذلك المجتمع يدرس حاجه ولا واجه، تعضع على حياة المبرة، وما هو alma لم يضع على المجتمع جهود. يلقى جاهز في زراء صورة صاعدة فلا ويجتمع الصحراء مع بحيرة?

ولما أنني معتز أن يشكك سوياً بحرية هذا الرجل، لما أعترف له بالحافة. ولكن موصفه أن لم تنتقل تلهد في خدمة من لا يملك بها، فلا أستطيع مطلقاً أن أعلم في الجهلاء، لا يبكر إلا في جنب الموت.
بعتاهي التي يفرضها عليها. ومنهنا من القيام بواجبا علينا بسبب الضرع
الذي يشتهية فينا فلا شيا فيها من الخطر مثل معرفتنا بها. ومن يعتقد
مستعبنا على الجروح ان يدعه شيا. فحينا جعل النهاة أخيلا محسنا ضد الهلاك زرعه كله قمعة وقفل. فكل انسان لو وجد في
مكانه كان أخليا بلزا زيادة ولا تقصان؟
أريد أن نسر على رجال ذوي شجاعة حقية ؟ النسوم إذن في
المواطن التي ليس فيها أبال. حيث يجل الناس عواقب الأراض. وحيث
لا يفرون مطالا في الموت، فالانسان يغر بفطرته كيف يجلد وتباول
بيات وكيف بموت السلام. وانا الأطباء وصفهم، وانفلاجوا
بصياهم، والكمان بمواضعهم، هم الذين يهونون من قلبه ويسدرون
أعجبه الاعلى افلاج الموت.
أطلوني إذ لم تليه حاجة إلى هؤلاء النافر الثلاثة من أطباء
وقلاوة وكبابة وآلا فلا أذر في فيه إفوات أريد أن نفضهم الناس
بفاضة جهودي. بل أريد أني أبعث ايدي لا يكون لي بشان
هذا هو الحكم وكذ، الذي قضى جانا من عرفة في درات الطب،
ورضى بحارة ألا تمنع الأطفال العقال والإ لى سبيل الوقاية ولا عند
شعورهم بوعكات خفية. أما أنا فاني إلى أنمو من ذلك الدوى وأعل
وقف ابتعشت دائما عن استدعى طبيب للعلاج، ان اني استدعيتي نأني أي
طيب لعلاج أمي. الهم إلا اذا باتت حياته في خطر ماحق. ان لا يكون
في وسع الطب عندند ان يؤذيها هو شر من الموت الذي هو مشغ
 عليه !
واني مقدر أن الطب سوف لا يحم عن استدعال هذا الإجراء
فاف مات دخل قال أنا دعوته بعد فوات الأوان. وان نجا ناختير
شنه بفضل الفاتحة. لكن ذلك اذا الأول بطب النصر في تلك
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الحالة! ولكن ينبغي فيما كان من شئ، إلا ما يدعى الطبيب إلى فشل الطبيب إلا في الوقت الأخير! 
وعلى الطبيب إذا لم يعرف كيف ينعف نفسه أن يتعلم كيف يمرض، فقد كان الإفراط عوض صالح عن ذلك! وكثيراً ما يكون أبعد ناجحاً منه. فإن من المرض فقد في الطبيعة! بحيث يمرض الحيوان يتعذب ويتربى في صمت مذهولي إلى العزلة. فلا فريق حولاتهم عليه قد من زالهم على مرير من الرجال.
وكم من الناس تنامل تند رد الفعل والخوف والقلق والقلق والقلق والقلق يغادر! 
وقد قال لي أن الحيوانات تعيش على وي حال مع الطبيعة أكثر من البشر، ولهذا كانت أثر تأثير الأمراض منها! لكي ذلك! هذا الأسلوب من الحياة هو على وجه التحديد ما أدى أن أحل عليه لـ ييدي.
كين يضع منه ما يعض البحوا.
أن الجانب الوحيد المدين من علم الطب هو علم الصحة. يبد أذيلماً الصحة، وفضلة أكثر مما في الطعام والعمل وما الطبيبان والأحجان الفقهيين للإنسان، فعال يشدد شبهه، والاعتدال يясьمه من الأقارات.

وكي نعرف أي الأنظمة أصل للحياة والصحة يجب أن نعرف ما هو النظام الذي ينبع صحتهم بالذات! وأخيراً انعكس أن الطبيبة للبشر قصة لاحل ولا حاجة لعليه! أنت لا تحتاج إلى لترب! بل نحن يجب أن نحن الطبيبة ليس له نفع، بل ترب عليه أن يمارس لأنه يستطيع الوقت والرجال والمواد فيما هو بأطل وحيا.
وقد استعمل الوقت الذي ينفع في محاولة الإبقاء على حياة مضاعفة! إلا بالناجح لا يتضاعف! وأخيراً وذلك الوقت الذي ينفع يمتد! 

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لمحة:

وعندما تبدأ حاسباً تبدأ معها احتياجاتنا. ولذا يجب أن تكون للطفل موضع منذ ولادته. فإن قام أمه بإعدادها كان خياراً، وقد جمعت الاباء تعليمات كتابية على أمل أن تجمعه لأمانة حرماً على مصلحة طفلها واحترازه الشخصي الذي ستعود إليه قريبًا مثل ذلك الكثير من الزمن.

أما إذا لم اختيار موضع غريب، فيجب تجربة معتقلاً، وليس هذا بسيئ. فهناك الأدبيات على الإيدياذية أن تتعلق بالعمل من كل صوب. فالوروده هي التي تفسد الناس. والترامية أو آلة من يشعر بمروة الريف الورودة التي بين أيديهم. فكلما يقدم للأيدياز في أعمال يدخله الشيء، والما يعولونها باسمه وذلك قبل قليل من المدم.

ويست赚钱 على موضع على تليك اختياره للطفل. إذا، بعد ظهر أفضل موضع عندك ستكون أقدر الجمع على دفع أكبر رشوة للطفل. ولم يكن نوعاً سوف لا نستطيع أن نختار موضع لميل مختاره نفسه. وسيكون رادص في ذلك غريباً على الطفل لا طبيعي.

وأولاً ما أفكر في هو عن اللعب نفسه. فأولئك الذين ي抑えون أنهم باماك أن الطبيع تقصّد أن يكون مخالطاً للطفل. وربما رودي تزداد كثافة اللعب. وقد أصاب الطفل أقدر على نفسه، فليس prompt

تغير الطبيعة للبنين في أساتذة الخواتين على حسب عمر الموالد.

ينتظر الموالد أقل من مرض تربية بسبب الأمومة، وتلك صعوبة لا تعتذر تغلب عليها. ويجيب أن تكون المراعي أيضاً جيدة للصحة.

حسن الزواج هائدة. فإن العفو والانتعاشات والكدار كلها تصد اللحن.

وإذا قصرنا اهتمامنا على الجسد، فلأن حقنا ليس هدفاً لمعن. يكون البنين متراً والمفعط مبتها. فين الطبع ضروي حسن

التنور. فإن المرض مطلوبة بأن يبرع الويلين وينيرا كما هي مطلوبة بارضاعه. ولذا لذلك من صبر وأمانة وحاجاً ونقطة، فإن كانت ممولة

سادة حالة الطفل وهو عاجز عن دفع الأذى عن نفسه وعاجز عن

الناكر. والشراب، ولا يصبحون لأسف لمنا كانت الأحوال.

وتزداد أهمية اختيار الموضع من علماً أن الويلين سيكون موكولا

الإبلا لكلة في مدة الرضاعة. كما سيكو إلى المربي كليه بعد ذلك.

وقد كانت هذه عادة الأقدمين وأولئك الذين لم يحفاظوا الكلام كما

تجتمع، ولكنهم كانوا يحسنون العمل كما انتم. وكانت المرض

عندما لم تفاقم رضعتها الفتاة. ولذا نجد في تشبيهاتهم المرض تقوم

دالماً بدور موضع للطفل. والطفل الذي تندلوا أبد كثرة حرى

أن نسو نشاطه.

وبنن فإني أن تحلِّي المرض في معيشته بمزيد من وسائل الراحة، وأن

نتوانى الأيدياز بزيادة من الاحتفالية. ولكن لا يوجد أن نتبرع

حيانا كل التالي. فإن التغيير الكلي الماجزي، ولها ما هو أفضل، ذو

ثر ثפרי الصحة، وما دام أسراب معيشته الأولى كل لها الصحة

والاحتفالية فإن نتبرع إذاً؟

فإن الفلاحات تقلي في طقم للحمام، وتكثر الخضر. على خلاف نساء

المدينة. وربما أن هذا النظام البياني جيد في عيني، على أطفالهم. أو على

الأطفال جدع على أكثر من ضره. وربما تكمل الفلاحات رفعاً من

أهل المدينة، تقدم البنين أطياف اللحم. على اعتقاد أن اللحم يزيد من

عافية. ويبدعون بين غزري. ولست أرى هذا الرأي مطلقاً قبل أن

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أفضل في نظرتي إلا نبير شئاً من الطعام المتعدد المركزي. وكما هناك من كتب وأكثر من ذلك، وأصحتي محبة من نفس نوعه.

فليس الطعام نفسه هو الذي يؤدي إلى سبب نعمة الذي يسوؤ بفضل الأنظمة الطبيعية، أو ينفع مع القليل والتحسي.

ولنا تدوم على النزيف، ولا ملحة ولا أفيان ولا نقص الحمض المطبق، لأن الماء لا يسمح لنا بقهوة الماء، فإن الطعام القليل الذي لا أدمع ولا دهن لا ينفع حرارة الماء، ويجلدنا ببيع وقود الطبيعة. فمن نتناول أن نشأنا أن الطعام الطبيعة أثر في المرض.

ومت أن نتناول نبات مشابه تلك النبات المشابه، فإن نبات النبات لن يكون من عناصر نباته بيئة لطيفة، ولا أن نصاب بهدف أن نأكل النبات، فإن النباتات لن تكون من الدماغ لحم. فلنأخذ أن نأكل نبات نبات لنا، وإذا كنا نأكل نبات لنا، وإذا كنا نأكل نبات لنا، وإذا كنا نأكل نبات لنا.

ولكن الإناث آكلة الأشجار الطفول وأطع ماما من بين الإناث آكلة اللحوم، فإن اللين في هذه الحالة تكون من عناصر نظام طبيعة النبات، سيكون أقل عنين للنفع، وأما من حيث التعليم، فإن النباتات تنتمي من الدماغ لحم، فلنأخذ أن نأكل نبات لنا، وإذا كنا نأكل نبات لنا، وإذا كنا نأكل نبات لنا.

ومن الجدير أن نتذكر أن الأشجار النباتية تدر لنا سرعه إلى النجاح. ونحن بعين كل التعب عن الإعتدال بأن اللين الحاضر ضار بالصحة من حيث أنه نجاح. فهناك شعور كبير لشعور في طعمنا إلا اللين الحاضر، ونحن بعين كل التعب عن الإعتدال بأن اللين الحاضر ضار بالصحة من حيث أنه نجاح. فهناك شعور كبير لشعور في طعمنا إلا اللين الحاضر، ونحن بعين كل التعب عن الإعتدال بأن اللين الحاضر ضار بالصحة من حيث أنه نجاح. فهناك شعور كبير لشعور في طعمنا إلا اللين الحاضر.
ومن وحد الطفل يستحم في ماء دافئ، يضاف إليه شيء من النبيذ، فانتقد أن النبيذ لا زوم له. فالطبيعة لا تنتج مشروبات مضحية، وليس من المنظر أن تكون الحمور ذات قيمة عظيمة لمخلوقاتها.

بل إنى أرى أيضاً أنه لا زوم لتسخين ماء الحمام الأول. فترى من الشعوب تدعى أطفالها بعد الولادة مباشرة إلى ماء الأنهار أو البحر، وأطفالنا نجني عليهم بالرفاهية الشديدة من قبل ولادتهم، بما في حالات من رعاية ونوعة غريبة، وهم ضعف ولهذا لا نحكم بصورة مناحية الظروف الطبيعية التي تكفل بعندهم إلى الصحة. ولكن وبدلاً من رويدي ي ينبغي أن نعود بهم إلى الحالة الطبيعية ونبدأ بالحمام. ويجب أن نذكر أنه لأن فقرة الأطفال التي تكرر كثيراً توجي للجابة إلى ذلك، إذا مسناهم نحن تأتي جئهم، والكلما تقام في عروض قرار محاولة للاء لن يكون استجابة وصيفاً في ماء بارد حتى ولو كان في برودة الليل، وله استناد للتدخين واستخدام مقياس الحارة

للاكيد من الدقة التامة في ذلك.

ومنه تكون عادة الاستحمام، فإنه عند الطفل لا ينبغي العدول عنها بصلة، بل يجب أن يكون لها طول حياته. وأنا لا أهتم بحماس البارد لسببين. تتعلق بالنظافة والصحة العامة، فحسب عليه أن يسود عضلات الجسم المرونة واحتياج الجلد والحرارة والبرودة. وبعد أن يكبر الطفل ساعدتنا على الاستحمام بين البين والعين في ماء ساخن في مختلف درجات الحرارة التي يضيفها، ثم في مختلف درجات البرودة.
وإذما يأخذ الطفل أنفاسه الأولى، لا يتكبّد في الأشعة المحكمة، ولا تضموا على رأسه تلك الطوارئ، بل اجتلو لافتاً وأسلع فضيضاً، بحيث يتحر لطرائفه الجصية، ومن قصص غير تقل حتى لا يعوق حركته. غير حار حتى لا يجبر دون نسائم الهواء، ومن العجب أن تأتي المدينة يبتغون أولاهم بهواء الريفي الجسدي والآردن التضحية. ولتعمان أن الهواء ميداً لا يؤذي الأطفال بل يزيدهم قوة. وأن الهواء الحار يضعهم ويجبر لهم الحش حتى يظلم. وليوضع الطفل في مهد واسع، بحيث يتحرك بسهولة، ولكن له سياج حتي لا يعرأ للخطر عند الحركة، ومنه اشتد عود أثره يدريج في الجرة، ودعوته يوماً وليد أطرافه الصغرى كي تروماً تزداد قوة يوماً بعد يوم. لم يقرن مره بطل بحاجة، من نهاده.ما بين الاطفال من فراق جماع. وإن أضع ما معركة عينة من جب الفرشاة، لأن الطفل الكريم، بال年薪ط ليبهده، كأن الطفل الميل يتحال إلى ملكه كأن تشارف إلهام النار. وقد بادر عوده أثره بالخطر، وعشيرة مهتمة في خدمة الطفل ونظامه، وتشير إلى الامن في هذا. كان في ذلك تسعه الفروع الأولى للزمان على بد حضيرة نفسها، ويجري عليه أن يراه المرضاع استمرار حتى لا يأتي مع الطفل ما ياهر خيار القطرة. عن جهالة أو عن لوم.  

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"وأعود فأقول: إن تربية الرجل تبدأ منذ مولده. فهو يتعلم قبل أن يتكلم وقبل أن يفهم، فالتجربة هي التي تهدأ بالدروس. ومن ثم، نعزج من معرف الرجل مما كان جاهل. لو أنك تتمنى من لحافة ولادته إلى اللحافة إلى وصل إليه. أو أنك تقسم كل ما عرف الإنسان إلى شطر، وجعلنا شطران منهما قسطاً مشاعاً بين جميع الناس، وجعلنا الشطر الآخر خاصاً بالعملاء، لوجدنا هذا الشطر الآخر ضياء جداً بالقياس إلى الشطر الأول. بيد أننا لا ندرك مطلقًا أن الدروس لا تكون من شيء مفهوم، بل وقبل أن نصل إلى الدروس. لأن الدروس لا تزيل قبئتها إلا بإفادة التايم بين دراجاتنا، أننا في ذلك شأن المدارات الجبرية، حيث الكمية المشتقة بين طرفها لا حساب لها.

ويقول الحيوان أنفسها تكتسب معامل كبيراً. فلا حساب لابد أن تعلم كيف تستعملها. وكيف من اليد والاكمان، وكيف أن تعلم كيف تكون. وهذه اليد والاكمان، ولا الصرف من الدراجة، لا تعرف كيف تكون. تبعد عن خطواتها الأولى، أنها تتعاون من الدراجات، بكل شيء بالنسبة للمدارات الجبرية والفلسفة. وله أن العديد كافياً لهذا حركة في المكان، لوجد، إذا أن تكون لها حواس. ومن تكسببها من المدارض، مما ابهر نوعها إلى الانتظار.

وأولى احصاءات الطفل تكون احصاءات امتعالية، فلا شيء عند..."
الطفل يخرج عن محيط الفن المسلمين، والعادة الوحيدة التي يجب أن تدعي الطفل يكون بها لا تكون عادة ثابتة، فلا نجعله على أحد
الذراعين دون الأخرى، ولا نجعله يتجه بسيد دون الأخرى، أو أن
يستعمل إحداهما أكثر من الأخرى، أو أن يأكل أو يبكي أو ينفر في
ساعات معينة لا يبرع عن المكتش فيها ولا تمارها.

أعددوا من بعيد كي تندفع جئاته الحرية والقدرة على استعمال قواه
كلما تاركين لهما المادّة الطبيعية ببيع يكون دائما سيد نفسه،
فأنّا في جميع الأوقات على العمل ببنيته، وعندما يصل له شمسه،
ومن هذا الطفل في التموز بين الأشواذ زمن المثل أن نختار الأشواذ
التي نطلبه عليها، وكل جديد يثير اهتمام الإنسان بالطبع، وهو يشرح
بضعه لدرجة أنه ينى كل ما لا ينيره، فذاكو كوانه عادة مشاهدة
أشياء جديدة من غير أن يتأثر بها، ففيه لديه كل الخدمات.
والأطفال الذين يشاركون في بيوت النشاط أو في بيوت لا يظهر أهلها
أن تعاني العناية بتعليم الطلاب، ويظهر ذلك الخوف في أحيان
كثيرة عندما يكونون، ولم أن في حياتي فلما رجلا كان أو مرأة أو طفل
يخاف العنكبوت.

فلماما إذا أي لم تبدأ نزهة الطفل قبل أن ينام، ولعل أن ينام، مهما دام
مجرد اختيار الأشواذ التي تمارس على أنها لجهازها أو مقدارا؟ فإنه
أريد أن تتعدد الطفل من مهارة أشياء جديدة، بوجود ساقي، مغزية،
غير متوقفة، ولكن في مهارة قلابة، ومعه بعد إلى أن يعنيها. وما
رأى غيره، بل مهما أقدم أخيرا على نفسها نفسه، فذاك يعود الطفل في صغره
ألا ينزع من تفكيره وسرعان البحر وما إلى ذلك، فنحن أن سببه
من غير نزع، حيث أن ذكرى الفن لا يوجد للأشياء المهارة لدى
من يرى صورا، ونابضانها في جميع الأيام.

وجميع الأطفال يخافون الأكثرة، وسأبدأ بأن أطلع المثل على قول
لطيف: الشكل، ثم وضع أحد الناس ذلك القول أمامي على وجه، ثم
أخذه في الصدقة ويشكجنا الحاضرون جميعا، ويشكج الطفل مع
الأطفال، ويشكجنا جميعا، ويشكجنا أطفالنا أطفالنا على طبيعة شيوع
الأطفال، فان كثف أحد الدخول لا يخاف من آخر، إذا جاء
أبنا على ضيافة فيanchor، كما ضحك في نفاذ القول، وبحذا أن أخليت أن
يتفنح أحد الأكثرة.

وأذا أردت تمويده المثل على ضجة الأكثرة النورية، أندفع معه
في سداد الضجة، ومجرد شرائط الإفراز، فينيا لنا أن نستمتع
بذكرى البقية من غير أن ينيره، ثم أعدوا بعد ذلك على طبيعة المائدة،
ونقل لاحظ أن الأطفال لم يضافكون من الرعد، اللهم إن كان
البدو فيما كأنه يسيرا، فجاهم السماء، فيهما عادنا ذلك.
لا يجب أن تفهم هذا الخوف إذا ذكرنا أن الادب البسيط أو ممارسة.
ومن بدأ الدخول يفزعه بصورة، ففيه على أنه أن تجمّل المقدمة
كي تزيل عن ذلك النزهة فيابتذل الباطن، الدقيق يمكن أن ينبع
الرجل أو الطفل يجاوب أي شيء.

وفي طابع الحياة حينما تكون الذكارة والمهارة فطبيعتين لا ينتبه
الطفل، إلا لا يرتفع فعلا في حواسه، فضاهلا، هم الماد الأذل لما له
وتقدم المجوسين إلا نبض آلا، ثمهاشت إعداد الذكارة لاستخدام
ذلك المجدولًا وما يملكه كبارد، أو أدى ذلك، ولكن لما كان
أتباع الطفل في البداية مخصصًا على مجوسين، يكفي جدًا أن نبين
له وضع المكلاة بين هذه المجدولًا وبيت الأشياء، إلى حد ما.
إنه بسيط في كل شيء، وتحريك كل شيء، فلا تعارض هذا الأتاج
مطاقة، فانه يعلم هذه الوسيلة وينبذا، فهو بهذا النمو تميز كيف

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بحسب البحوث والبرمجة والصمت والغموض والشفاهة والشفاهة في الأدب. وإسقح الجوب وسياجها ووصف الأجسام السوهة
بالنظر أو بالمس أو باللمس أو بالناصع والاسماء، ولا سيما بقارية النظر بالنص، حينما يقدر بالعين الإحساس الذي يأتي من أصابعه.
والمشهد هو أنها الإحساسات تأتي على الأداء، ففيما العام الثاني، أو
الثالث لا يلوح أنهم حساسون للرجال الطيبرية أو الكريمة. هم من هذه
النافورة معنويون من الشعورvu الشفاهة من النواحي.
وبالحركة وجدنها نعم الشعور هناك، وجزءه كأسماحها.
وقد ندرك معنى الأغتشاد. وعندما الطفول الحدخ الحديث الولادة لا يوجد
عندن، إذ كان القهرة شؤم يبدأ بأسلوب واحد يده للغيب على شيء في
متناوله، أو شيء على ساحة مادة خروجها منه، ففيك لا أصبره تلك
اشتياقة بصرية أو أمر مبهر يريد إلى اليد، كي يدون منه أو يصبر الإذكاء
كأنه، في المالية، إن كانت، إنها نفتاساً. إنها اغتشاد
وإذن ذلك الانتقاد الذي يستمع أن يتم بذره. ففي ذلك، إذ أنهم
شبههم كبيراً، وتقرن من موضع إلى آخر، كي يستمر تغير المكان،
ينتمي من ذلك تكرار المفاهيم. وينبغي أن ندرك أن نتمنى من ميدان الحواس، لتسير هدف
مجهوداته. وهذا العرض ملحوظ ويدعى إلى شيء من التفسير.
أن الضيف الذي يشعر به طفل سيفتاحة عينه بإثارة،
والذين عندما تكون مشاصات الأشياء ضرورية كي يضق تلك
الاختيارات. ومن هنا دراح الأطفال ويكفؤون ذلك، فإن
لابد منه، ولا يكتون إحساساتهم معنوية. ففيما تكون تلك الإحساسات
مرتاحة لهم تستخدم بها في صمت. وهذه تكهن تلك الإحساسات
مؤنها، يملؤون ذلك بلغتهم الخاصة، طالبهم، يملؤون.
حينما يكونون يرتكن الظاهرة لا يستمنعون الاستمرار في حالة عدم
أكارات عيناتهم أو يمرؤون.
وهمن ذاكتة متبوعة شملة وقذف البأب في هى المطلبة،
عامرة بين جميع الناس، ولا شك في أن هناك لغة بهذا الصفة. وهي لغة
الأطفال التي يتكونون بها قبل أن يطلقوا الكلام. ولن نتفلل تلك اللغة
نظامية، إلا أنها عضوية ومعفومة. واستخدامات اللسان هو الذي جعلها
تلك اللغة المكركة حتى نسياؤها نسياؤها تاماً.
فاندرس الأندلس، وعندما متفرع كيف تتراوح تلك اللغة على أيدهم.
ولا شك أن الحوار والمواجهة هي ابتكارات في تلك اللغة. لأنهم
يسعون وينمو كل يروم له من الرضااء ويعرون، ويعتقدون أنهم
محاربات مفصلة. ومع آنهم ينتقد في تلك المحاربات بكلمات، لا أن
تلك الكلمات عديبة الجدوى تماماً. فالأشكال لا تفهم معنى تلك
الكلمات. بل في نوبة الضوء المصاحبة لها وصلته.
والإجوار لغة الصوت نجد لغة الإشارة، وهي ليست أقل منها
نضجها وتبايرها. ولتلك الإشارة لا تصدر من يد الطفل الصغيرين، بل
ترسم على وجهه. ومن الحبيب، حقاً، ماذا طفول الفرد على النجم
بوهجه الذي تغير ممارته من لحظة إلى أخرى بسرعة قاتلة. فقونه تيلة
الأفراح والرقص والجزء وهي تولد وتثلي، كما ينثقل البرق
وينثرل. حتى تنسى أنك في كل مرة ترى أملك وجه جديداً.
ولا شك أن عواطف ووجوهه أشد لونية ومرؤيا من عواطف وجوهنا.
ولكن في مقابل ذلك لا يغفل غيوههم الجذابة بشيء. فلا بد أن هذا
هو نوع الأعراض الذي يستخدم في سياقاتها الهيا الإحساسات
الجسمية. فالتعبير عن تلك الإحساسات يكون معروف وجه، أما التعبير
عن المعاطف فيكون جيماً بالنظرة.
ومن ذلك البكاء الذي يتوهم البعض أنه يعود بصورة غير مباشرة إلى العلاقة الأولى بين الإنسان وبين كل ما يحيط به. فإنما تنازل الحلقة الأولى من تلك السلسلة الطويلة التي يكون من النشاط الاجتماعي بأسمه.

فلا يمكن النظر في ذلك البكاء في حالة تتطلب في لوحات عصف النص والتنقية. عن تلك الحالة العربية التي نستطيع أن نفهمها عليه. فإن لم نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن نستطيع أن 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نشيهم ما يجد في متناول يده من غير نية خاصة في المدن أو
القرى.

لا يكاد ينتظرون أن يقدم لهم قوى فائقةً من حاجتهم، بل أن قوام
مهمة في لجع مطالب طينتهم. ففجأ أن تركهم حرية استخدام
جميع القوى التي منحتها أبا الطبيعة عانوا أن يستعينوا ما بيد
لهم إذا أخذوا هذه الوعي الأولي.

ويجب أن نساءهم ون يعدهم بما يقصدهم سواء من حيث الذكاء أو
القوة، مما يكمлим احتياجتهم الدلية. وهذه هي الوعي الثانية.

ويجب فيما تقدمه اليوم من مساعدات أن تكون تلك المساعدات في
حدود المنعة العملية فحسب، ولا نساعدهم في أعماقهم تصل رغباتهم
أو نزاوتهم غير المتوقعة. فالزروع ليست ما يرتبط على ارضاهم ألم
أو نذوب لأنها ليست من صنع الطبيعة. وهذه هي الوعي الثالثة.

ويجب أن ندرس لمن يعتبره الدولة واشتراتهم، كي يتمكن في صميم
ال뉴هم التي يمرون فيها من صعوبة. أن تعلق في فريغاتهم ما هو طبيعي وما هو
نوع أو سبل إلى الاستخدام والتحكم. وهذه هي الوعي الرابعة.

وهذه الوعي الربعة المراة لها أطلال مزيج من الحرية الحقيقية
للإنسان مع الأقلام في سيطرتهم وتحكمهم. قان يتعمل المثل بأصله
لا أن يجرؤوا الأخرين على العمل لهم. وهكذا نعود من بدأنا أن
تعود رغباتهم على قدر قواهم ويرعون ضعوراً مباشراً فيه بأن
الرمان ما ليس في متناول اليد أمر طبيعي لا ينتمي بسما الفجوة
والنحر.

ولكن في الوقت نفسه لا أريد أن تكون الخدمات الأولى التي
tقدم للاطفال موضوع ليس أو إهمالاً دائماً لا يجبر الأطفال على البكاء
من خوفهم أو أن يضعهم في الظروف على ما يلزم. ويعملون من
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau

émile

Translated by Barbara Foxley

Introduction by P. D. Jimack
Professor of French, University of Stirling

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Born at Geneva 28 June 1712, the son of a watchmaker. Ran away aged fifteen and became a convert to Catholicism. After a year wandering in Italy, he returned to France and lived with Mme de Warens at Chambéry for ten years. Settled in Paris in 1742, where he formed a liaison with Thérèse Levasseur, whom he married many years later, and by whom he had five children, all put into a foundlings’ home. Left France for Switzerland in 1762 on the condemnation of Émile and the Contrat social, and in 1766 visited England at the invitation of David Hume. Returned to France the following year and to Paris in 1770. Died 2 July 1778, at Ermenonville, near Paris.
BOOK I

God makes all things good; man muddles with them and they become evil. He forces one soil to yield the products of another, one tree to bear another’s fruit. He confuses and confounds time, place, and natural conditions. He mutilates his dog, his horse, and his slave. He destroys and defaces all things; he loves all that is deformed and monstrous; he will have nothing as nature made it, not even man himself, who must learn his places like a saddle-horse, and be shaped to his master’s taste like the trees in his garden.

Yet things would be worse without this education, and mankind cannot be made by halves. Under existing conditions a man left to himself from birth would be more of a monster than the rest. Prejudice, authority, necessity, example, all the social conditions into which we are plunged, would stifle nature in him and put nothing in her place. She would be like a sapling chance sown in the midst of the highway, bent hither and thither and soon crushed by the passers-by.

Tender, anxious mother, I appeal to you. You can remove this young tree from the highway and shield it from the crushing force

1 The earliest education is most important and it undoubtedly is woman’s work. If the author of nature had meant to assign it to men he would have given them milk to feed the child. Address your treatises on education to the women, for not only are they able to watch over it more closely than men, not only is their influence always predominant in education, its success concerns them more nearly, for most widows are at the mercy of their children, who show them very plainly whether their education was good or bad. The laws, always more concerned about property than about people, since their object is not virtue but peace, the laws give too little authority to the mother. Yet her position is more certain than that of the father, her duties are more trying; the right ordering of the family depends more upon her, and she is usually fonder of her children. There are occasions when a son may be excused for lack of respect for his father, but if a child could be so unnatural as to fail in respect for the mother who bore him and nursed him at her breast, who for so many years devoted herself to his care, such a monstrous wretch should be smothered at once as unworthy to live. You say mothers spoil their children, and no doubt that is wrong, but it is worse to deprave them as you do. The mother wants her child to be happy now. She is right, and if her method is wrong, she must be taught a better. Ambition, avarice, tyranny, the mistaken foresight of fathers, their neglect, their harshness, are a hundredfold more harmful to the child than the blind affection of the mother. Moreover, I must explain what I mean by a mother and that explanation follows.

Emile

of social conventions. Tend and water is ere it dies. One day its fruit will reward your care. From the outset raise a wall round your child’s soul; another may sketch the plan, you alone should carry it into execution.

Plants are fashioned by cultivation, man by education. If a man were born tall and strong, his size and strength would be of no good to him till he had learnt to use them; they would even harm him by preventing others from coming to his aid; left to himself he would die of want before he knew his needs. We lament the helplessness of infancy; we fail to perceive that the race would have perished had not man begun by being a child.

We are born weak, we need strength; helpless, we need aid; foolish, we need reason. All that we lack at birth, all that we need when we come to man’s estate, is the gift of education.

This education comes to us from nature, from men, or from things. The inner growth of our organs and faculties is the education of nature, the use we learn to make of this growth is the education of men, what we gain by our experience of our surroundings is the education of things.

Thus we are each taught by three masters. If their teaching conflicts, the scholar is ill-educated and will never be at peace with himself; if their teaching agrees, he goes straight to his goal, he lives at peace with himself, he is well-educated.

Now of these three factors in education nature is wholly beyond our control, things are only partly in our power; the education of men is the only one controlled by us; and even here our power is largely illusory, for who can hope to direct every word and deed of all with whom the child has to do.

Viewed as an art, the success of education is almost impossible, since the essential conditions of success are beyond our control. Our efforts may bring us within sight of the goal, but fortune must favour us if we are to reach it.

What is this goal? As we have just shown, it is the goal of nature. Since all three modes of education must work together, the two that we can control must follow the lead of that which is beyond our control. Perhaps this word Nature has too vague a meaning. Let us try to define it.

Nature, we are told, is merely habit. What does that mean? Are there not habits formed under compulsion, habits which never stifle nature? Such, for example, are the habits of plants trained horizontally. The plant keeps its artificial shape, but the sap has not changed its course, and any new growth the plant may make will be very slight. It is the same with a man’s disposition; while the conditions remain the same, habits, even the least natural of them, hold good; but change the conditions, habits vanish, nature re-emerges.

1 Like them in externals, but without speech and without the ideas which are expressed by speech, he would be unable to make his wants known, while there would be nothing in his appearance to suggest that he needed their help.
Emile

The Spartan Putareetes presented himself for admission to the council of the Three Hundred and was rejected; he went away rejoicing that there were three hundred Spartans better than himself. I suppose he was in earnest; there is no reason to doubt it. That was a citizen.

A Spartan mother had five sons with the army. A Helot arrived; trembling she asked his news. "Your five sons are slain." "Vile slave, was that what I asked thee?" "We have won the victory." She hastened to the temple to render thanks to the gods. That was a citizen.

He who would preserve the supremacy of natural feelings in social life knows not what he asks. Ever at war with himself, hesitating between his wishes and his duties, he will be neither a man nor a citizen. He will be of no use to himself nor to others. He will be a man of our day, a Frenchman, an Englishman, one of the great middle class.

To be something, to be himself, and always at one with himself, a man must act as he speaks, must know what course he ought to take, and must follow that course with vigour and persistence. When I meet this miracle it will be time enough to decide whether he is a man or a citizen, or how he contrives to be both.

Two conflicting types of educational systems spring from these conflicting aims. One is public and common to many, the other private and domestic.

If you wish to know what is meant by public education, read Plato's Republic. Those who merely judge books by their titles take this for a treatise on politics, but it is the finest treatise on education ever written.

In popular estimation the Platonic Institute stands for all that is fanciful and unreal. For my own part I should have thought the system of Lycurgus far more practicable had he merely committed it to writing. Plato only sought to purge man's heart; Lycurgus turned it from its natural course.

The public institute does not and cannot exist, for there is neither country nor patriot. The very words should be struck out of our language. The reason does not concern us at present, so that though I know it I refrain from stating it.

I do not consider our ridiculous colleges as public institutes, nor do I include under this head a fashionable education, for this education facing two ways at once achieves nothing. It is only fit to turn out hypocrites, always professing to live for others, while thinking of themselves alone. Those professions, however, deceive

1 There are teachers dear to me in many schools and especially in the University of Paris, men for whom I have a great respect, men whom I believe to be quite capable of instructing young people, if they were not content to follow the established custom. I exhort one of them to publish the scheme of reform which he has thought out. Perhaps people would at length seek to cure the evil if they realised that there was a remedy.

1 Thus the wars of republics are more cruel than those of monarchies. But if the wars of kings are less cruel, their peace is terrible; better be their foe than their subject.
Emile

no one, for every one has his share in them; they are so much labour wasted.

Our inner conflicts are caused by these contradictions. Drawn this way by nature and that way by man, compelled to yield to both forces, we make a compromise and reach neither goal. We go through life, struggling and hesitating, and die before we have found peace, useless alike to ourselves and to others.

There remains the education of the home or of nature; but how will a man live with others if he is educated by himself alone? If the twofold aims could be resolved into one by removing the man's self-contradictions, one great obstacle to his happiness would be gone. To judge of this you must see the man full-grown; you must have noted his inclinations, watched his progress, followed his steps; in a word you must really know a natural man. When you have read this work, I think you will have made some progress in this inquiry.

What must be done to train this exceptional man? We can do much, but the chief thing is to prevent anything being done. To sail against the wind we merely follow one tack and another; to keep our position in a stormy sea we must cast anchor. Beware, young pilot, lest your boat slip its cable or drag its anchor before you know it.

In the social order where each has his own place a man must be educated for it. If such a one leaves his station, he is fit for nothing else. His education is only useful when fastened to his station; if not, education harms the scholar, if only by the prejudices it has created. In Egypt, where the son was compelled to adopt his father's calling, education had at least a settled aim; where social grades remain fixed, but the men who form them are constantly changing, no one knows whether he is not harming him by educating him for his own class.

In the natural order men are all equal and their common calling is that of manhood, so that a well-educated man cannot fail to do well in that calling and those related to it. It matters little to me whether my pupil is intended for the army, the church, or the law. Before his parents chose a calling for him nature called him to be a man. Life is the trade I would teach him. When he leaves me, I grant you, he will be neither a magistrate, a soldier, nor a priest; he will be a man. All that becomes a man he will learn as quickly as another. In vain will fate change his station, he will always be in his right place. "Ocupavi te, fortuna, atque cepit; omne que aditus tuos interculsi, ut ad me aspirare non posses." The real object of our study is man and his environment. To my mind those of us who can best endure the good and evil of life are the best educated; hence it follows that true education consists less in preparing him in theory than in practice. If our education begins with ourselves, our first teacher is our nurse. The ancients used the word "Education" in a different sense, it meant "Nurture." "Educit obstetrix," says Varro, "Eeducat nutrix, institut peadagogus, docet magister." Thus, education, discipline, and instruction are three things as different in their purpose as the dame, the usher, and the teacher. But these distinctions are undesirable and the child should only follow one guide.

We must therefore look at the general rather than the particular, and consider our scholar as man in the abstract, man exposed to all the changes and chances of mortal life. If men were born attached to the soil of our country, if one season lasted all the year round, if every man's fortune were so firmly grasped that he could never lose it, then the established method of education would have certain advantages; the child brought up to his own calling would never leave it, he could never have to face the difficulties of any other condition. But when we consider the fleeting nature of human affairs, the restless and uneasy spirit of our times, when every generation overturns the work of its predecessor, can we conceive a more senseless plan than to educate a child as if he would never leave his room, as if he would always have his servants about him? If the wretched creature takes a single step up or down he is lost. This is not teaching him to bear pain; it is training him to feel it. People think only of preserving their child's life; this is not enough, he must be taught to preserve his own life when he is a man, to bear the buffets of fortune, to brave wealth and poverty, to live at need among the snows of Iceland or on the scorching rocks of Malta. In vain you guard against death; he must not die, and even if you do not kill him with your precautions, they are mistaken. Teach him to live rather than to avoid death: life is not breath, but action, the use of our senses, our mind, our faculties, every part of ourselves which makes us conscious of our being. Life consists less in length of days than in the keen sense of living. A man may be buried at a hundred and may never have lived at all. He would have fared better had he died young.

Our wisdom is slavish prejudice, our customs consist in control, constraint, compulsion. Civilised man is born and dies a slave. The infant is bound up in swaddling clothes, the corpse is nailed down in his coffin. All his life long man is imprisoned by our institutions.

I am told that many midwives profess to improve the shape of the infant's head by rubbing, and they are allowed to do it. Our heads are not good enough as God made them, they must be moulded outside by the nurse and inside by the philosopher. The Caribes are better off than we are. "The child has hardly left the mother's womb, it has hardly begun to move and stretch its limbs, when it is deprived of its freedom. It is wrapped in swaddling bands, laid down with its head fixed, its legs stretched out, and its arms by its sides; it is wound round with linen and bandages of all sorts so that it cannot move. It is fortunate if it has room to breathe, and if it is laid on its side so that water which should flow from its mouth can escape, for it is not free to turn its head on one side for this purpose."
Emile

The new-born child requires to stir and stretch his limbs to free them from the stiffness resulting from being curled up so long. His limbs are stretched indeed, but he is not allowed to move them. Even the head is confined by a cap. One would think they were afraid the child should look as if it were alive.

Thus the internal impulses which should lead to growth find an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the necessary movements. The child exhausts his strength in vain struggles, or he gains strength very slowly. He was freer and less constrained in the womb; he has gained nothing by birth.

The inaction, the constraint to which the child's limbs are subjected can only check the circulation of the blood and humours; it can only hinder the child's growth in size and strength, and injure its constitution. Where these absurd precautions are absent, all the men are tall, strong, and well-made. Where children are swaddled, the country swarms with the hump-backed, the lame, the bow-legged, the rickety, and every kind of deformity. In our fear lest the body should become deformed by free movement, we hasten to deform it by putting it in a press. We make our children helpless lest they should hurt themselves.

Is not such a cruel bondage certain to affect both health and temper? Their first feeling is one of pain and suffering; they find every necessary movement hampered; more miserable than a galley slave, in vain they struggle, they become angry, they cry. Their first words you say are tears. That is so. From birth you are always checking them, your first gifts are fetters, your first treatment, torture. Their voice alone is free; why should they not raise it in complaint? They cry because you are hurting them; if you were swaddled you would cry louder still.

What is the origin of this senseless and unnatural custom? Since mothers have despised their first duty and refused to nurse their own children, they have had to be entrusted to hired nurses. Finding themselves the mothers of a stranger's children, without the taste of nature, they have merely tried to save themselves trouble. A child swaddled would need constant watching; well swaddled it is cast into a corner and its cries are unheard. So long as the nurse's negligence escapes notice, so long as the nursing does not break its arms or legs, what matter if it dies or becomes a wailing for life. Its limbs are kept safe at the expense of its body, and if anything goes wrong it is not the nurse's fault.

These gentle mothers, having got rid of their babies, devote themselves gaily to the pleasures of the town. Do they know how their children are being treated in the villages? If the nurse is at all busy, the child is hung up on a nail like a bundle of clothes and is left crucified while the nurse goes leisurely about her business. Children have been found in this position purple in the face, their tightly bandaged chest forbade the circulation of the blood, and it went to the head; so the sufferer was considered very quiet because he had not strength to cry. How long a child might survive under such conditions I do not know, but it could not be long. That, I fancy, is one of the chief advantages of swaddling clothes.

It is maintained that unwaddled infants would assume faulty positions and make movements which might injure the proper development of their limbs. That is one of the empty arguments of our false wisdom which has never been confirmed by experience. Out of all the crowds of children who grow up with the full use of their limbs among nations worse than ours, you have not found one who hurts himself or his mother; their movements are too feeble to be dangerous, and when they assume an injurious position, pain warns them to change it.

We have not yet decided to swaddle our kittens and puppies; are they any the worse for this neglect? Children are heavier, I admit, but they are also weaker. They can scarcely move, how could they hurt themselves? If you lay them on their backs, they will lie there till they die, like the turtle, unable to turn itself over.

Not content with having ceased to suckle their children, women no longer wish to do it; with the natural result—motherhood becomes a burden; means are found to avoid it. They will destroy their work to begin it over again, and they thus turn to the injury of the race the charm which was given them for its increase. This practice, with other causes of depopulation, forbodes the coming fate of Europe. Her arts and sciences, her philosophy and morals, will shortly reduce her to a desert. She will be the home of wild beasts and her inhabitants will hardly have changed the wild beasts.

I have sometimes watched the tricks of young wives who pretend that they wish to nurse their own children. They take care to be dissuaded from this whim. They contrive that husbands, doctors, and especially mothers should intervene. If a husband should let his wife nurse her own baby it would be the ruin of him; they would make him out a murderer who wanted to be rid of her. A prudent husband must sacrifice paternal affection to domestic peace. Fortunately for you there are women in the country districts more continent than your wives. You are still more fortunate if the time thus gained is not intended for another than yourself.

There can be no doubt about a wife's duty, but, considering the contempt in which it is held, it is doubtful whether it is not just as good for the child to be suckled by a stranger. This is a question that has never been settled, and in my opinion they have settled it according to the women's wishes.1 And for my own part I think it is better that the child should suck the breast of a healthy nurse rather than of a petted mother, if he has any further evil to fear from her who has given him birth.

Ought the question, however, to be considered only from the

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1 The league between the women and the doctors has always struck me as one of the oddest things in Paris. The doctors' reputation depends on the women, and by means of the doctors the women get their own way. It is easy to see what qualifications a doctor requires in Paris if he is to become celebrated.
Emile

physiological point of view? Does not the child need a mother's care as much as her milk? Other women, or even other animals, may give him the milk she denies him, but there is no substitute for a mother's love.

The woman who nurses another's child in place of her own is a bad mother; how can she be a good nurse? She may become one in time; use will overcome nature, but the child may perish a hundred times before his nurse has developed a mother's affection for him.

And this affection when developed has its drawbacks, which should make any feeling woman afraid to put her child out to nurse. Is she prepared to divide her mother's rights, or rather to abdicate them in favour of a stranger; to see her child loving another more than herself; to feel that the affection he retains for his own mother is a favour, while his love for his foster-mother is a duty; for is not some affection due where there has been a mother's care?

To remove this difficulty, children are taught to look down on their nurses, to treat them as mere servants. When their task is completed the child is withdrawn or the nurse is dismissed. Her visits to her foster-child are discouraged by a cold reception. After a few years the child never sees her again. The mother expects to take her place, and to repair by her cruelty the results of her own neglect. But she is greatly mistaken; she is making an ungrateful foster-child, not an affectionate son; she is teaching him ingratitude, and she is preparing him to despise at a later day the mother who bore him, as he now despises his nurse.

How emphatically would I speak if it were not so hopeless to keep struggling in vain on behalf of a real reform. More depends on this than you realise. Would you restore all men to their prudent duties, begin with the mothers; the result will surprise you. Every evil follows in the train of this first sin; the mother's heart is disturbed, the home becomes gloomy, the spectacle of a young family no longer stirs the husband's love and the stranger's reverence. The mother whose children are out of sight wins scanty esteem; there is no home life, the ties of nature are not strengthened by those of habit; fathers, mothers, children, brothers, and sisters cease to exist. They are almost strangers; how should they love one another? Each thinks of himself first. When the home is a gloomy solitude pleasure will be sought elsewhere.

But when mothers deign to nurse their own children, then will be a reform in morals; natural feeling will revive in every heart; there will be no lack of citizens for the state; this first step by itself will restore mutual affection. The charms of home are the best antidote to the noisy play of children, which were thought trying, becomes a delight; mother and father rely more on each other and grow dearer to one another; the marriage tie is strengthened. In the cheerful home life the mother finds her sweetest duties and the father his pleasantest recreation. Thus the cure of this evil would work a wide-spread reformation; nature would regain her rights. When women become good mothers, men will be good husbands and fathers.

My words are vain! When we are sick of worldly pleasures we do not return to the pleasures of the home. Women have ceased to be mothers, they do not and will not return to their duty. Could they do it if they would? The contrary custom is firmly established; each would have to overcome the opposition of her neighbours, leagued together against the example which some have never given and others do not desire to follow.

Yet there are still a few young women of good natural disposition who refuse to be the slaves of fashion and rebel against the clamour of other women, who fulfil the sweet task imposed on them by nature. Would that the reward in store for them might draw others to follow their example. My conclusion is based upon plain reason, and upon facts I have never seen disputed; and I venture to promise these worthy mothers the firm and steadfast affection of their husbands and the truly filial love of their children and the respect of all the world. Child-birth will be easy and will leave no ill-results, their health will be strong and vigorous, and they will see their daughters follow their example, and find that example quoted as a pattern to others.

No mother, no child; their duties are reciprocal, and when ill done by the one they will be neglected by the other. The child should love his mother before he knows what he owes her. If the voice of instinct is not strengthened by habit it soon dies, the heart is still-born. From the outset we have strayed from the path of nature.

There is another by which which may tempt our feet from the path of nature. The mother may lavish excessive care on her child instead of neglecting him; she may make an idol of him; she may develop and increase his weakness to prevent him feeling it; she wards off every painful experience in the hope of withdrawing him from the power of nature, and fails to realise that for every trialling ill from which she preserves him the future holds in store many accidents and dangers, and that it is a cruel kindness to permit the child's weakness when the grown man must bear fatigue.

Thesis, so the story goes, plunged her son in the waters of Styx to make him invulnerable. The truth of this allegory is apparent. The cruel mothers I speak of do otherwise; they plunge their children into softness, and they are preparing suffering for them, they open the way to every kind of ill, which their children will not fail to experience after they grow up.

Fix your eyes on nature, follow the path traced by her. She keeps children at work, she hardens them by all kinds of difficulties, she soon teaches them the meaning of pain and grief. They cut their teeth and are feverish, sharp colics bring on convulsions, they are choked by fits of coughing and tormented by worms, evil humours corrupt the blood, germs of various kinds ferment in it,
Emile

causing dangerous eruptions. Sickness and danger play the chief part in infancy. One half of the children who are born die before their eighth year. The child who has overcome hardships has gained strength, and as soon as he can use his life he holds it more securely.

This is nature's law; why contradict it? Do you not see that in your efforts to improve upon her handicraft you are destroying it; her cares are wasted? To do from without what she does within is according to you to increase the danger twofold. On the contrary, it is the way to avert it; experience shows that children delicately trained become more likely to die. When nature is not at work, there is less risk in using their strength than in sparing it. Accustom them therefore to the hardships they will have to face; train them to endure extremes of temperature, climate, and condition, hunger, thirst, and weariness. Dip them in the waters of Styx. Before bodily habits become fixed you may teach what habits you will without any risk, but once habits are established any change is fraught with peril. A child will bear changes which a man cannot bear, the muscles of the one are soft and flexible, they take whatever direction you give them without any effort; the muscles of the grown man are harder and they only change their accustomed mode of action when subjected to violence. So we can make a child strong without risking his life or health, and even if there were some risk, it should not be taken into consideration. Since human life is full of danger, can we do better than face them at a time when they can do the least harm?

A child's worth increases with his years. To his personal value must be added the cost of the care bestowed upon him. For himself there is not only loss of life, but the consciousness of death. We must therefore think most of his future in our efforts for his preservation. He must be protected against the ills of youth before he reaches them: for if the value of life increases until the child reaches a certain age when he can be thrown into the arms of death in infancy only to multiply his pain when he reaches the age of reason. Is that what our master teaches us?

Man is born to suffer; pain is the means of his preservation. His childhood is happy, knowing only pain of body. These bodily sufferings are much less cruel, much less painful, than other forms of suffering, and they rarely lead to self-destruction. It is not the wryfolds of grief which make a man kill himself, it is mental suffering that leads to despair. We pity the sufferings of childhood; we should pity ourselves; our worst sufferings are of our own making.

The new-born infant cries, his early days are spent in crying. He is alternately petted and shaken by way of soothing him; sometimes he is threatened, sometimes beaten, to keep him quiet. We do what he wants or we make him do what we want, we submit to his whims, we subject him to our own. There is no middle course: he must rule or obey. Thus his earliest ideas are those of the tyrant or the slave. His commands before he can speak, he obeys before he can act, and sometimes he is punished for faults before he is aware of them, or rather before they are committed. Thus early are the seeds of evil passions sown in his young heart. At a later day they are aggravated by self-control, and when we have taken pains to make him bad we lament his badness.

In this way the child passes six or seven years in the hands of women, the victim of his own caprices or theirs, and after they have taught him all sorts of things, when they have burdened his memory with words he cannot understand, or things which are of no use to him, when nature has been stifled by the passions they have implanted in him. The child then completes the development of the germs of artificiality which he finds already well grown, he teaches him everything except self-knowledge and self-control, the arts of life and happiness. When at length this infant slave and tyrant, crammed with knowledge but empty of sense, feebly alike in mind and body, is flung upon the world, and his helplessness, his pride, and his other vices are displayed, we begin to lament the wretchedness and perversity of mankind. We are wrong, not this is the creature of our fancy; the natural man is cast in another mould.

Would you keep him as nature made him? Watch over him from his birth. Take possession of him as soon as he comes into the world and keep him till he is a man; you will never succeed otherwise. The real nurse is the mother and the real teacher is the father. Let them agree in the ordering of their duties as well as in their method, let the child pass from one to the other. He will be better educated by a sensible though ignorant father than by the cleverest master in the world. For zeal will alone for lack of knowledge, rather than knowledge for lack of zeal. But the duties of public and private business! Duty indeed! Does a father's duty come last? It is not surprising that the man whose wife despises the duty of suckling her child should despise its education. There is no picture than that of family life; but when one feature is wanting the whole is marred. If the mother is too delicate to nurse her child, the father will be too busy to teach him. Their children, scattered about in schools, convents, and colleges, will find the home of their affections elsewhere, or rather they will form the habit of caring for nothing. Brothers and sisters will scarcely know each other; when they are together in company they will behave as strangers. When there is no confidence between

1 When we read in Plutarch that Cato the Censor, who ruled Rome with such glory, brought up his own sons from the cradle, and so carefully that he left everything to be present when their nurse, that is to say their mother, bathed them; when we read in Suetonius that Augustus, the master of the world which he had conquered and which he himself governed, himself taught his grandchildren to write, to swim, to understand the beginnings of science, and that he always had them with him, we cannot help smiling at the little people of those days who amused themselves to understand the great affairs of the great people of our own time.
relations, when the family society ceases to give savour to life, its peace is soon usurped by vice. Is there any man so stupid that he cannot see how all this hangs together?

A father has done a third of his task when he begets children and provides for living for them. He owes men to humanity, citizens to the state. A man who can pay this threefold debt and neglects to do so is guilty, more guilty, perhaps, if he pays it in part than when he neglects it entirely. He has no right to be a father if he cannot fulfil a father's duties. Poverty, pressure of business, mere pecuniary motives, often social prejudices, none of these can excuse a man from his duty, which is to support and educate his own children. If a man of any natural feeling neglects these sacred duties he will repent it with bitter tears and will never be comforted.

But what does this rich man do, this father of a family, compelled, so he says, to neglect his children? He pays another man to perform those duties which are his alone. Mercenary man! do you expect to purchase a second father for your child? Do not deceive yourself; it is not even a master you have hired for him, it is a flunky, who will soon train such another as himself.

There is much discussion as to the characteristics of a good tutor. My first requirement, and it implies a good many more, is that he should not take up his task for reward. There are callings so great that they cannot be undertaken for money without showing our unfitness for them; such callings are those of the soldier and the statesman.

"But who must train my child?" "I have just told you, you should do it yourself." "I cannot." "You cannot! Then find a friend, I see no other course."

A tutor! What a noble soul! Indeed for the training of a man one must either be a father or more than man. It is this duty you would calmly hand over to a hirerling?

The more you think of it the harder you will find it. The tutor must have been trained for his pupil, his servants must have been trained for their master, so that all who come near him may have received the impression which is to be transmitted to him. We must pass from education to education, I know not how far. How can a child be well educated by one who has not been well educated himself?

Can such a one be found? I know not. In this age of degrada-
tion who knows the heights of virtue to which man's soul may attain? But let us assume that this prodigy has been discovered. We shall learn what he should be from the consideration of his duties. I fancy the father who realises the value of a good tutor will contrive to do without one, for it will be harder to find one than to become such a tutor himself; he need search no further, nature herself having done it for him.

Some one whose rank alone is known to me suggested that I should educate his son. He did me a great honour, no doubt, but far from regretting my refusal, he ought to congratulate himself on my prudence. Had the offer been accepted, and had I been mistaken in my method, there would have been an education running a hazard and I suppose things would have been worse—his son would have renounced his title and refused to be a prince.

I feel too deeply the importance of a tutor's duties and my own unfitness, ever to accept such a post, whoever offered it, and even the claims of friendship would be only an additional motive for my refusal. Few, I think, will be tempted to make me such an offer when they have read this book, and I beg any one who would do so to spare his pains. I have had enough experience of the task to convince myself of my own unfitness, and my circumstances would make it impossible, even if my talents were such as to fit me for it.

I have thought it my duty to make this public declaration to those who apparently refuse to do me the honour of believing in the sincerity of my determination. If I am unable to undertake the more useful task, I will at least venture to attempt the easier one; I will follow the example of my predecessors and take up, not the task, but my pen; and instead of doing the right thing I will try to say it.

I know that in such an undertaking the author, who ranges at will among theoretical systems, utters many fine precepts impossible to practise, and even when he says what is practicable it remains undone for want of details and examples as to its application. I have therefore decided to take an imaginary pupil, to bring him on his own part, the age, health, knowledge, and talents required for the work of his education, to guide him from birth to manhood, when he needs no guide but himself. This method seems to me useful for an author who fears lest he may stray from the practical to the visionary; for as soon as he departs from common practice he has only to try his method on his pupil; he will soon know, or the reader will know for him, whether he is following the development of the growth of the human heart.

This is what I have tried to do. Lost my book should be unduly bulky, I have been content to state those principles the truth of which is self-evident. But as to the rules which call for proof, I have applied them to Emile or to others, and I have shown, in very great detail, how my theories may be put into practice. Such at least is my plan; the reader must decide whether I have succeeded.

At first I have said little about Emile, for my earliest maxims of education, though very different from those generally accepted, are so plain that it is hard for a man of sense to refuse to accept them, but as I advance, my scholar, educated after another fashion than yours, is no longer an ordinary child, he needs a special system. Then he appears upon the scene more frequently, and towards the end I never lose sight of him for a moment, until, whatever he may say, he needs me no longer.

I pass over the qualities required in a good tutor; I take them for granted, and assume that I am endowed with them. As you read this book you will see how generous I have been to myself.
Emile

I will only remark that, contrary to the received opinion, a child's tutor should be young, as young indeed as a man may well be who is also wise. Were it possible, he should be a child himself, that he may be the companion of his pupil and win his confidence by sharing his games. Childhood and age have too little in common for the formation of a really firm affection. Children sometimes flatter old men; they never love them.

People seek a tutor who has already educated one pupil. This is a great mistake; one can only educate one pupil. He will not be essential to success, what right would he have to undertake the first? With more experience you may know better what to do, but you are less capable of doing it; once this task has been well done, you will know too much of its difficulties to attempt it a second time—if ill done, the first attempt augurs badly for the second.

It is one thing to follow a young man about for four years, another to be his guide for five-and-twenty. You find a tutor for your son when he is already formed; I want one for him before he is born. Your man may change his pupil every five years; mine will never have but one pupil. You distinguish between the teacher and the tutor. Another piece of folly! Do you make any distinction between the pupil and the scholar? There is only one science for children to learn—the duties of man. This science is one, and, whatever Xenophon may say of the education of the Persians, it is indivisible. Besides, I prefer to call the man who has this knowledge a master rather than teacher, since it is a question of guidance rather than instruction. He must not give precepts, he must let the scholar find them out for himself.

If the master is to be so carefully chosen, he may well choose his pupil, above all when he proposes to set a pattern for others. This choice cannot depend on the child's genius or character, as I adopt him before he is born, and they are only yet to be finished. If I had my choice I would take a child of ordinary mind, such as I assume in my pupil. It is ordinary people who have to be educated, and their education alone can serve as a pattern for the education of their fellows. The others find their way alone.

The birthplace is not a matter of indifference in the education of man; it is only in temperate climes that he comes to his full growth. The disadvantages of extremes are too great. A man is not planted in one place like a tree, to stay there the rest of his life, and to pass from one extreme to another you must travel twice as far as he who starts half-way.

If the inhabitant of a temperate climate passes in turn through both extremes his advantage is plain, for although he may be changed as much as he who goes from one extreme to the other, he only remains half-way from his natural state; a man who lives in New Guinea or in Lapland, but a negro cannot live in Tenera, nor a Samoyed in Benin. It seems also as if the brain were less perfectly organised in the two extremes. Neither the negroes nor the Lapps are as wise as Europeans. So if I want my pupil to be a citizen of the world I will choose him in the temperate zone, in France for example, rather than elsewhere.

Rich as the north with its barren soil men devour much food, in the fertile south they eat little. This produces another difference: the one is industrious, the other contemplative. Society shows us, in one and the same spot, a similar difference between rich and poor. The one dwells in a fertile land, the other in a barren land.

The poor man has no need of education. The education of his own station is in force upon him, he can have no other, the education received by the rich man from his own station is least fitted for himself and for society. Moreover, a natural education should fit a man for any position. Now it is more unreasonable to train a poor man, for wealth, than a rich man for poverty, for in proportion to their numbers more rich men are ruined and fewer poor men become rich. Let us choose our scholar among the rich; we shall, at least, have made another man: the poor may come to manhood without our help.

For the same reason I should not be sorry if Emile came of a good family. He will be another victim snatched from prejudice.

Emile is an orphan. No matter whether he has father or mother, having undertaken their duties I am invested with their rights. He must honour his parents, but he must obey me. That is my first and only condition.

I must add that there is just one other point arising out of this; we must never be separated except by mutual consent. This clause is essential, and I would have tutor and scholar so inseparable that they should regard their fate as one. If once they perceive the time of their separation drawing near, the time which must make them strangers to one another, they become strangers then and there, each makes his own little world, and both of them being busy in thought with the time when they will no longer be together, they resist in vain against their will. The disciple regards his master as the badge and scourge of childhood, the master regards his scholar as a heavy burden which he longs to rid of. Both are looking forward to the time when they will part, and as there is never any real affection between them, there will be scant vigilance on the one hand, and, on the other scant obedience.

But when they consider they must always live together, they must needs love one another, and in this way they really learn to love one another. The pupil is not ashamed to follow as a child the friend who will be with him in manhood; the tutor takes an interest in the efforts whose fruits he will enjoy, and the virtues he is cultivating in his pupil form a store laid up for his old age.

This agreement made beforehand assumes a normal birth, a strong, well-made, but the natural father has no choice, and should have no preference within the limits of the family God has given him; all his children are his alike, the same care and affection is due to all. Crippled or well-made, weak or strong, each of them is a trust for which he is responsible to the Giver, and
Emile

nature is a party to the marriage contract along with husband and wife.

But if you undertake a duty not imposed upon you by nature, you must secure beforehand the means for its fulfillment, unless you would undertake the duties you cannot fulfill. If you take the care of a sickly, unhealthy child, you are a sick nurse, not a tutor. To preserve a useless life you are wasting the time which should be spent in increasing its value, you risk the sight of a despairing mother reproaching you for the death of her child, who ought to have died long ago.

I would not undertake the care of a feeble, sickly child, should he live four score years. I want no pupil who is useless alike to himself and others, one whose sole business is to keep himself alive, one whose body is always a hindrance to the training of his mind. If I vainly lavish my care upon him, what can I do but double the loss to society by robbing it of two men, instead of one? Let another tend this weakling for me; I am quite willing, I approve his charity, but I myself have no gift for such a task; I could never teach the art of living to one who needs all his strength to keep himself alive.

The body must be strong enough to obey the mind; a good servant must be strong. I know that intemperance stimulates the passions; in course of time it also destroys the body; fasting and penance often produce the same results in an opposite way. The weaker the body, the more imperious its demands; the stronger it is, the better it obeys. All sensual passions find their home in effeminate bodies; the less satisfaction they can get the keener their sting.

A feeble body makes a feeble mind. Hence the influence of physic, an art which does more harm to man than all the evils it professes to cure. I do not know what the doctors cure us of, but I know this: they infect us with very deadly diseases, cowardice, timidity, credulity, the fear of death. What matter if they make the dead walk, we have no need of corpses; they fail to give us men, and it is men we need.

Medicine is all the fashion in these days, and very naturally. It is the amusement of the idle and unemployed, who do not know what to do with their time, and so spend it in taking care of themselves. If by ill-luck they had happened to be born immortal, they would have been the most miserable of men; a life they could not lose would be of no value to them. Such men must have doctors to enrich and flatter them, to give them the only pleasure they can enjoy, the pleasure of not being dead.

I will say no more at present as to the uselessness of medicine. My aim is to consider its bearings on morals. Still I cannot refrain from saying that men employ the same sophism about medicine as they do about the search for truth. They assume that the patient is cured, and that the seeker after truth finds it. They fail to see that against one life saved by the doctors you must set a hundred
spared, and time alone have cured. I shall be told that animals
who live according to nature, are less liable to disease than ourselves.
Well, that way of living is just what I mean to teach my pupil; he
should profit by it in the same way.

Hygiene is the only useful part of medicine, and hygiene is rather
a virtue than a science. Temperance and industry are man’s true
remedies; work sharpens his appetite and temperance teaches
him to control it.

To learn what system is most beneficial you have only to study
those races remarkable for health, strength, and length of days. It
common observation shows us that medicine neither increases
health nor prolongs life, it follows that this useless art is worse than
useless, since it wastes time, men, and things on what is pure loss.
Not only must we deduct the time spent, not in using life, but
preserving it, but if this time is spent in tormenting ourselves it is
worse than wasted, it is so much to the bad, and to reckon fairly a
responding share must be deducted from what remains to us.
A man who lives ten years for himself and others without the help
of doctors lives more for himself and others than one who spends
thirty years as their victim. I have tried both, so I think I have a
better right than most to draw my own conclusions.

For these reasons I decline to take any but a strong and healthy
pupil, and these are my principles for keeping him healthy. I
wish not to stop to prove at length the value of usual labour and
bodily exercise for strengthening the health and constitution; no
one denies it. Nearly all the instances of long life are to be found
among the men who have taken most exercise, who have endured
fatigue and labour.1 Neither will I enter into details as to the care
I shall take for this alone. It will be clear that it forms such an
essential part of my practice that it is enough to get hold of the
idea without further explanation.

When our life begins our needs begin too. The newborn infant
must have a nurse. If his mother will do her duty, so much the
better; her instructions will be given her in writing, but this
advantage has its drawbacks, it removes the tutor from his charge.
But it is to be hoped that the child’s own interests, and her respect
for the person to whom she is about to confide so precious a treasure,

1 I cannot help quoting the following passage from an English newspaper,
as it throws much light on my opinions: "A certain Patrick O’Neil, born
in 1647, has just married his seventh wife in 1750. In the seventeenth
year of Charles II. he served in the dragoons and in other regiments up to
1730, when he took his discharge. He served in all the campaigns of
William III. and Marlborough. This man has never drunk anything but
small beer; he has always lived on vegetables, and has never eaten meat
except on few occasions when he made a visit for his relations. He has
always been accustomed to rise with the sun and go to bed at sunset
unless prevented by his military duties. He is now in his 130th year;
he is healthy, his hearing is good, and he walks with the help of a stick.
I.e., at his great age he is never idle, and every Sunday he goes to his
parish church accompanied by his children, grandchildren, and great
grandchildren."
authority over him. If once he thinks there are grown-up people with no more sense than children the authority of age is destroyed and his education is ruined. A child should know no better than its father and mother, or failing them its foster-mother and its tutor, and even if this is one too many, but this division is inevitable, and the best that can be done in the way of remedy is that the man and woman who control him shall be so well agreed with regard to him that they seem like one.

The nurse must live rather more comfortably, she must have rather more substantial food, but her whole way of living must not be altered, for a sudden change, even a change for the better, is dangerous to health, and since her usual way of life has made her become strong, why change it?

Country women eat less meat and more vegetables than towns-women, and this vegetarian diet seems favourable rather than otherwise to themselves and their children. When they take nurseries from the upper classes they eat meat and broth with the idea that they will form better chyle and supply more milk. I do not hold with this at all, and experience is on my side, for we do not find children fed in this way less liable to colic and worms.

That need not surprise us, for decaying animal matter swarms with worms, but this is not the case with vegetable matter. Milk, although manufactured in the body of an animal, is a vegetable substance; this is shown by analysis; it readily turns acid, and far from showing traces of any volatile alkali like animal matter, it gives a neutral salt like plants.

The milk of herbivorous creatures is sweeter and more wholesome than the milk of the carnivorous; formed of a substance similar to its own, it keeps its goodness and becomes less liable to putrefaction. If quantity is considered, it is well known that farinaceous foods produce more blood than meat, so they ought to yield more milk. If a child were not weaned too soon, and if it were fed on vegetable food, and its foster-mother were a vegetarian, I do not think it would be troubled with worms.

Milk derived from vegetable foods may perhaps be more liable to go sour, but I am far from considering sour milk an unwholesome food; whole nations have no other food and are none the worse, and all the array of absorbents seems to me mere humbug. There are constitutions which do not thrive on milk, others can take it without absorbents. People are afraid of the milk separating or curdling; that is absurd, for we know that milk always curdles in the stomach. This is how it becomes sufficiently solid to nourish children and young animals; if it did not curdle it would merely pass away without feeding them.

In vain you dilute milk and use absorbents; whoever swallows milk digests cheese, this rule is without exception; rennet is made from a calf's stomach.

Instead of changing the nurse's usual diet, I think it would be enough to give food in larger quantities and of better kind. It is not the nature of the food that makes a vegetable diet indigestible, but the flavouring that makes it unwholesome. Reform your cheese, use neither butter nor oil for frying. Butter, salt, and oil should never be cooked. Let your vegetables be cooked in water and only seasoned when they come to table. The vegetable diet, far from disturbing the nurse, will give her a plentiful supply of milk. If a vegetable diet is best for the child, how can meat food be best for his nurse? The things are contradictory.

Fresh air affects children's constitutions, particularly in early years. It enters every pore of a soft and tender skin, it has a powerful effect on their young bodies. Its effects can never be destroyed. So I should not agree with those who take a country woman from her village and shut her up in one room in a town and her nursing with her. I would rather send him to breathe the fresh air of the country than the foul air of the town. He will take his new mother's position, will live in her cottage, where his tutor will follow him. The reader will bear in mind that this tutor is not a natural child, but the father's friend. But if this friend cannot be found, if this transfer is not easy, if none of my advice can be followed, you will say to me, "What shall I do instead?" I have told you already—"Do what you are doing;" no advice is needed there.

Men are not made to be crowded together in ant-hills, but scattered over the earth to fill it. The more they are massed together, the more corrupt they become. Disease and vice are the sure results of over-crowded cities. Of all creatures man is least fitted to live in herds. Huddled together like sheep, men would very soon die. Man's breath is fatal to his fellows. This is literally as well as figuratively true.

Men are devoured by our towns. In a few generations the race dies out or becomes degenerate; it needs renewal, and it is always renewed from the country. Send your children to renew themselves, send them to regain in the open fields the strength lost in the foul air of our crowded cities. Women hurry home that their children may be born in the town; they ought to do just the opposite, especially those who mean to nurse their own children. They would lose less than they think, and in more natural surroundings the pleasures associated with nature and maternal duties would soon destroy the taste for other delights.

The new-born infant is first bathed in warm water to which a

1 Women eat bread, vegetables, and dairy produce; female dogs and cats do the same; the she-wolf's eat grass. This supplies vegetable juices to their milk. There are still those species which are unable to eat anything but flesh, if such there are, which I very much doubt.

2 Although the juices which nourish us are liquid, they must be extracted from solids. A hard-working man who ate nothing but soup would soon wear away; he would be far better fed on milk, just because it curdles.

3 Those who wish to study a full account of the advantages and disadvantages of the Pythagorean régime, may consult the works of Dr. Cocchi and his opponent Dr. Bianchi on this important subject.
little wine is usually added. I think the wine might be dispensed with. As nature does not produce fermented liquors, it is not likely that they are of much value to her creatures.

In the same way it is unnecessary to take the precaution of heating the water; in fact among many races the new-born infants are bathed with no more ado in rivers or in the sea. Our children, made tender before birth by the softness of their parents, come into the world with a constitution already enfeebled, which cannot be at once exposed to all the trials required to restore it to health. Little by little they must be restored to their natural vigour. Begin them by following this custom, and leave it off gradually. Wash your children often, their dirty ways show the need of this. If they are only wiped their skin is injured; but as they grow stronger gradually reduce the heat of the water, till at last you bathe them winter and summer in cold, even in ice-cold water. To avoid risk this change must be slow, gradual, and imperceptible, so you may use the thermometer for exact measurements.

This habit of the bath, once established, should never be broken off, it must be kept up all through life. I value it not only on grounds of cleanliness and present health, but also as a wholesome means of making the muscles supple, and accustoming them to bear without risk or effort extremes of heat and cold. As he gets older I would have the child trained to bathe occasionally in hot water of every bearable degree, and often in every degree of cold water. Now water being a denser fluid touches us at more points than air, and, having learnt to bear all the variations of temperature in water, we shall scarcely feel this of the air. When the child draws its first breath do not confine it in tight wrappings. No cap, no bandages, nor swaddling clothes. Loose and flowing flannel wrappers, which leave its limbs free and are not too heavy to check his movements, not too warm to prevent his feeling the air. Put him in a big cradle, well padded, where he can move about freely and safely. As he begins to put on strength, let him crawl about the room; let him develop and stretch his limbs, you will see him gain strength from day to day. Compare him with a well swaddled child of the same age and you will be surprised at their different rates of progress.

1 Children in towns are stifled by being kept indoors and too much wrapped up. Those who control them have still to learn that fresh air, far from doing them harm, will make them stronger, and hot air will make them weak, will give rise to fevers, and will eventually kill them.

2 I say cradle "using the common word for want of a better, though I am convinced that it is never necessary and often harmful to rock children in the cradle.

3 The ancient Peruvians wrapped their children in loose swaddling bands, leaving the arms quite free. Later they placed them unsaddled in a hole in the ground, lined with cloths, so that the lower part of the body was in the hole, and their arms were free and they could move the head and bend the body at will without failing or hurting themselves. When they began to walk they were enticed to come to the hole, and they were often in a position much more difficult for sucking. They clung to the

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Emile

You must expect great opposition from the nurses, who find a half strangled baby needs much less watching. Besides his dirtyness is more perceptible in an open garment; he must be attended to more frequently. Indeed, custom is an unanswerable argument in some lands and among all classes of people.

Do not argue with the nurses; give your orders, see them carried out, and give them no pains to make the attention you prescribe easy in practice. Why not take your share in it? With ordinary nurseries, where the body alone is thought of, nothing matters so long as the child lives and does not actually die, but with us, when education begins with life, the new-born child is already a disciple, not of his tutor, but of nature. The tutor merely studies under this master, and sees that his orders are not evaded. He watches over the infant, he observes it, he looks for the first feeble glimmering of intelligence, as the Moislem looks for the moment of the moon's rising in her first quarter.

We are born capable of learning, but knowing nothing, perceiving nothing. The mind, bound up within imperfect and half grown organs, is not even aware of its own existence. The movements and cries of the new-born child are purely reflex, without knowledge or will.

Suppose a child born with the size and strength of manhood, entering upon life full grown like Pallas from the brain of Jupiter; such a child-man would be a perfect idiot, an automaton, a statue without motion and almost without feeling; he would see and hear nothing, he would recognise no one, he could not turn his eyes towards what he wanted to see; not only would he perceive no external object, he would not even be aware of sensation through the several sense-organs. His eye would not perceive colour, his ear sounds, his body would be unaware of contact with neighbouring bodies, he would not even know he had a body, what his hands handled would be in his brain alone; all his sensations would be united in one place, they would exist only in the common "sensorium," he would have only one idea, that of self, to which he would refer all his sensations; and this idea, or rather this feeling, would be the only thing in which he excelled an ordinary child.

This man, full grown at birth, would also be unable to stand on his feet, he would need a long time to learn how to keep his balance; perhaps he would not even be able to do it, and you would see the big strong body left in one place like a stone, or creeping and crawling like a young puppy.

He would feel the discomfort of bodily needs without knowing mother's hip, and cling so tightly that the mother's arm is often not needed to support them. They clasp the breast with their hand and continue sucking while their mother goes on with her ordinary work. These children should stay at two months, or rather to crawl after them, on their own four feets as much as on their feet. Buffon, M. Buffon might also have quoted the example of England, where the senseless and barbarous swaddling cloths have become almost obsolete. *Cf. Le Longue Voyage de Starem, Le Beau Voyage du Canada*, etc.
Emile

what was the matter and without knowing how to provide for these needs. There is no immediate connection between the muscles of the stomach and those of the arms and legs to make him take a step towards food, or stretch a hand to seize it, even were he surrounded with it; and as his body would be full grown and his limbs well developed he would be without the perpetual restlessness and movement of childhood, so that he might die of hunger without stirring to seek food. However little you may have thought about the order and development of our knowledge, you cannot deny that such a one would be in the state of almost primitive ignorance and stupidity natural to man before he has learnt anything from experience or from his fellows.

We know then, or we may know, the point of departure from which we each start towards the usual level of understanding; but who knows the other extreme? Each progresses more or less according to his genius, his taste, his needs, his talents, his zeal, and his opportunities for using them. No philosopher, so far as I know, has dared to say to man, "Thus far shalt thou go and no further." We know not what nature allows us to be, none of us has measured the possible difference between man and man. Is there a mind so dead that this thought has never kindled it, that has never said in his pride, "How much have I advanced to do, how much more may I achieve? Why should I lag behind my fellows?"

As it is said before, man's education begins at birth; before he can speak or understand he is learning. Experience precedes instruction; when he recognises his nurse he has learnt much. The knowledge of the most ignorant man would surprise us if we had followed his course from birth to the present time. If all human knowledge were divided into two parts, one peculiar to the man, and the other peculiar to the learned, the latter would seem very small compared with the former. But we scarcely heed this general experience, because it is acquired before the age of reason. Moreover, knowledge only attracts attention by its rarity, as in algebraic equations common factors count for nothing. Even animals learn much. They have senses and must learn to use them; they have needs, they must learn to satisfy them; they must learn to eat, walk, fly. Quadrupeds which can stand on their feet from the first cannot walk for all that; from their first attempts it is clear that they lack confidence. Canaries who escape from their cage are unable to fly, having never used their wings. Living and feeling creatures are always learning. If plants could walk they would need senses and knowledge, else their species would die out. The child's first mental experiences are purely affective, he is only aware of pleasure and pain; it takes him a long time to acquire the definite sensations which show him things outside himself, but before these things present and withdraw themselves, so to speak, from his sight, taking size and shape for him, the recurrence of emotional experiences is beginning to subject the child to the rule of habit. You see his eyes constantly follow the light, and if the light comes from the side the eyes turn towards it, so that one must be careful to turn his head towards the light lest he should squint. He must also be accustomed from the first to the dark, or he will cry if he misses the light. Food and sleep, too, exactly measured, become necessary at regular intervals, and soon desire is no longer the effect of need, but of habit, or rather habit adds a fresh need to those of nature. You must be on your guard against this.

The only habit the child should be allowed to contract is that of having no habits; let him be carried on either arm, let him be accustomed to offer either hand, to use one or other indifferently; let him not want to eat, sleep, or do anything at fixed hours, nor be unable to be left alone by day or night. Prepare the way for his control of his liberty and the use of his strength by leaving his body its natural habit, by making him capable of lasting self-control, of doing all that he wills when his will is formed.

As soon as the child begins to take notice, what is shown him must be carefully chosen. The natural man is interested in all new things. He feels so feeble that he fears the unknown: the habit of seeing fresh things without ill effects destroys this fear. Children brought up in clean houses where there are no spiders are afraid of spiders, and this fear often lasts through life. I never saw peasants, mothers, or children, afraid of spiders.

Since the mere choice of things shown him may make the child timid or brave, why should not his education begin before he can speak or understand? I would have him accustomed to see fresh things, ugly, repulsive, and strange beasts, but little by little, and far off till he is used to them, and till having seen others handle them he handles them himself. If in childhood he sees toads, snakes, and crayfish, he will not be afraid of any animal when he is grown up. Those who are continually seeing terrible things think nothing of them.

All children are afraid of masks. I begin by showing Emile a mask with a pleasant face, then some one puts this mask before his face; I begin to laugh, they all laugh too, and the child with them. By degrees I accustom him to less pleasing masks, and at last hideous ones. If I have arranged my stages skillfully, far from being afraid of the last mask, he will laugh at it as he did at the first. After that I am not afraid of people frightening him with masks.

When Hector bids farewell to Andromache, the young Astyanax, startled by the nodding plumes on the helmet, does not know his father; he flings himself weeping upon his nurse's bosom and wins from his mother a smile mingled with tears. What must be done to stay this terror? Just what Hector did; put the helmet on the ground and caress the child. In a calm moment one would do more; one would go up to the helmet, play with the plumes, let the child feel them; at last the nurse would take the helmet and place it laughingly on her own head, if indeed a woman's hand dare touch the armour of Hector.

If Emile must get used to the sound of a gun, I first fire a pistol
Emile

with a small charge. He is delighted with this sudden flash, this sort of lightning; I repeat the process with more powder; gradually I add a small charge without a wad, then a larger; in the end I accustom him to the sound of a gun, to fireworks, cannon, and the most terrible explosions.

I have observed that children are rarely afraid of thunder unless the sound is really terrible and actually hurt the ear; otherwise this fear only comes to them when they know that thunder sometimes hurts or kills. When reason begins to cause fear, let use reassure them. By slow and careful stages man and child learn to fear nothing.

In the dawn of life, when memory and imagination have not begun to function, the child only attends to what affects his senses. His sense experiences are the raw material of thought; they should, therefore, be presented to him in fitting order, so that memory may at a future time present them in the same order to his understanding; but as he only attends to his sensations it is enough, at first, to show him clearly the connection between these sensations and the things which cause them. He wants to touch and handle everything; do not check these movements which teach him invaluable lessons. Thus he learns to perceive the heat, cold, hardness, softness, weight, or lightness of bodies, to judge their size and shape and all their physical properties, by looking, feeling, listening, and, above all, by comparing sight and touch, by judging with the eye what sensation they would cause to his hand.

It is only by movement that we learn the difference between self and not self; it is only by our own movements that we gain the idea of space. The child has not this idea, so he stretches out his hand to retrieve the object within his reach or that which is a hundred paces from him. You take this as a sign of tyranny, an attempt to bid the thing draw near, or to bid you bring it. Nothing of the kind, it is merely that the object first seen in his brain, then before his eyes, now seems close to his arms, and he has no idea of space beyond his reach. Be careful, therefore, to take him about, to move him from place to place, and to let him perceive the change in his surroundings, so as to teach him to judge of distances.

When he begins to perceive distances then you must change your plan, and only carry him when you please, not when he pleases; for as soon as he is no longer deceived by his senses, there is another motive for his effort. This change is remarkable and calls for explanation.

The discomfort caused by real needs is shown by signs, when the help of others is required. Hence the cries of children; they often cry; it must be so. Since they are only conscious of feelings, when those feelings are pleasant they enjoy them in silence; when they are painful they say so in their own way and demand relief. Now when they are awake they can scarcely be in a state of indifference; either they are asleep or else they are feeling something.

All our languages are the result of art. It has long been a subject of inquiry whether there ever was a natural language common to all; no doubt there is, and it is the language of children before they begin to speak. This language is inarticulate, but it has tone, stress, and meaning. The use of our own language has led us to neglect it so far as to forget it altogether. Let us study children and we shall soon learn it afresh from them. Nurses can teach us this language; they understand all their nurseries say to them, they answer them, and keep up long conversations with them; and though they use words, these words are quite useless. It is not the hearing of the word, but its accompanying intonation that is understood.

To the language of intonation is added the no less forcible language of gesture. The child uses, not its weak hands, but its face. The amount of expression in these undeveloped faces is extraordinary; their features change from one moment to another with incredible speed. You see smiles, desires, terror, come and go like lightning; every time the face seems different. The muscles of the face are undoubtedly more mobile than our own. On the other hand the eyes are almost expressionless. Such must be the sort of signs they use at an age when their only needs are those of the body. Grimaces are the sign of sensation, the glance expresses sentiment.

As man's first state is one of want and weakness, his first sounds are cries and tears. The child feels his needs and cannot satisfy them, he begins to help by his cries. Is he hungry or thirsty? There are tears; is he too cold or too hot? more tears; he needs movement and is kept quiet, more tears; he wants to sleep and is disturbed, he weeps. The less comfortable he is, the more he demands change. He has only one language because he has, so to say, only one kind of discomfort. In the imperfect state of his sense organs he does not distinguish their several impressions; all ill produce one feeling of sorrow.

These tears, which you think so little worthy of your attention, give rise to the first relation between man and his environment; here is forged the first link in the long chain of social order.

When the child cries he is uneasy, he feels some need which he cannot satisfy; you watch him, seek this need, find it, and satisfy it. If you can neither find it nor satisfy it, the tears continue and become tiresome. The child is petted to quiet him, he is rocked or sung to sleep; if he is obstinate, the nurse becomes impatient and threatens him; cruel nurses sometimes strike him. What strange lessons for him at his first entrance into life!

I shall never forget seeing one of these troublesome crying children thus beaten by his nurse. He was silent at once. I thought he was frightened, and said to myself, "This will be a service being from whom nothing can be got but by harshness." I was wrong, the poor wretch was choking with rage, he could not breathe, he was black
Emile

In the face. A moment later there were bitter cries, every sign of the anger, rage, and despair of this age was in his tone. I thought he would die. Had I doubted the innate sense of justice and injustice in man’s heart, this one instance would have convinced me.

I am sure that a drop of boiling liquid falling on a man’s hand would have hurt him less than that blow, slight in itself, but clearly given with the intention of hurting him.

This tendency to anger, vexation, and rage needs great care. Boerhaave thinks that most of the diseases of children are of the nature of convulsions, because the head being larger in proportion and the nervous system more extensive than in adults, they are more liable to nervous irritation. Take the greatest care to remove from them any servitors who tease, annoy, or vex them. They are a hundredfold more dangerous and more fatal than fresh air and charming seasons. When children only experience resistance in things and never in the will of man, they do not become rebellious or passionate, and their health is better. This is one reason why the children of the poor, who are freer and more independent, are generally less frail and weakly, more vigorous than those who are supposed to be better brought up by being constantly thwarted; but you must always remember that it is one thing to refrain from thwarting them, but quite another to obey them. The child’s first tears are prayers, beware lest they become commands; he begins by asking for aid, he ends by demanding service. Thus from his own weakness, the source of his first consciousness of dependence, springs the later idea of rule and tyranny; but as this idea is aroused rather from his servitors than from his weakness, you begin to see moral results whose causes are not in nature; thus we see how important it is, even at the earliest age, to discern the secret meaning of the gesture or cry.

When the child tries to seize something without speaking, he thinks he can reach the object, for he does not rightly judge its distance; when his cries and stretches out his hands he no longer misjudges the thing; he bids the object approach, or at least to be brought to him. In the first case bring it to him slowly; in the second do not even seem to hear his cries. The more he cries the less you should heed him. He must learn in good time not to give commands to men, for he is not their master, nor to things, for they cannot hear him. Thus when the child wants something you mean to give him, it is better to carry him to it rather than to bring the thing to him. The child is only naughty because he is weak; make him strong and he will be good; if we could do everything we should never do wrong. Of all the attributes of the Almighty, goodness is that which it would be hardest to dissociate from our conception of Him. All nations who have acknowledged a good and an evil power, have always regarded the evil as inferior to the good; otherwise their opinion would have been absurd. Compare this with the creed of the Savoyard clergyman later on in this book.

Reason alone teaches us to love the one and hate the other, though it is independent of reason, cannot develop without it. Before the age of reason we do good or ill without knowing it, and there is no morality in our actions, although there is sometimes in our feeling with regard to other people’s actions in relation to ourselves. A child would not overthrow everything he sees. He breaks and smashes everything he can reach; he seizes a bird as he seizes a stone, and strips it without knowing what he is about.

Why so? In the first place philosophy will account for this by inbred sin, man’s pride, love of power, selfishness, spite; perhaps it will say in addition to this that the child’s consciousness of his own weakness makes him eager to use his strength, to convince himself of it. But watch that broken down old man reduced in the downward course of life to the weakness of a child; not only is he quiet and peaceful, he would have all about him quiet and peaceful too; the least change disturbs and troubles him, he would like to see universal calm. How is it possible that similar feebleness and similar passions should produce such different effects in age and in infancy, if the original cause were not different? And where can we find this difference in cause except in the bodily condition of the two? The active needs that our services, whatever you do, whatever you say, will destroy in the one and destroy his other; one is moving towards life, the other towards death. The failing activity of the old man is centred in his heart, the child’s overflowing activity spreads abroad. He feels, if we may say so, strong enough to give life to all about him. To make or to destroy, it is all one to him; change is what he seeks, and all change is power. If he seems to enjoy destructive activity it is only that it takes time to make things and very little time to break them, so that the work of destruction accords better with his eagerness.

While the Author of nature has given children this activity, He takes care that it shall do little harm by giving them small power to use it. But as soon as they can think of people as tools to be used, they will carry out their wishes and to supplement their own weakness. This is how they become tiresome, imperious, naughty, and unmanageable; a development which does not spring from a natural love of power, but one which has been taught them, for it does not need much experience to realise how pleasant it is to set others to work and to move the world by a word. As the child grows it gains strength and becomes less restless and unquiet and more independent. Soul and body become better balanced and nature no longer asks for more movement than is
required for self-preservation. But the love of power does not die with the need that aroused it; power arouses and flatters self-love, and habit strengthens it: thus caprice follows upon need, and the first seeds of prejudice and obstinacy are sown.

First Maxim.—Far from being too strong, children are not strong enough for all the claims of nature. Give them full use of such strength as they have; they will not abuse it.

Second Maxim.—Help them and supply the experience and strength they lack whenever the need is of the body.

Third Maxim.—In the help you give them confine yourself to what is really needful, without granting anything to caprice or reason; for they will not be tormented by caprice if you do not call it into existence, seeing it is no part of nature.

Fourth Maxim.—Study carefully their speech and gestures, so that at an age when they are incapable of deceit you may discriminate between those desires which come from nature and those which spring from perversity.

The spirit of these rules is to give children more real liberty and less power, to let them do more for themselves and demand less of others; so that by teaching them from the first to confine their wishes within the limits of their powers they will scarcely feel the want of whatever is not in their power. This is another very important reason for leaving children’s limbs and bodies perfectly free, only taking care that they do not fall, and keeping anything that might hurt them out of their way.

The child whose body and arms are free will certainly cry much less than a child tied up in swaddling clothes. He who knows only bodily needs, only cries when in pain; and this is a great advantage, for then we know exactly what he needs help, and if possible should not delay our help for an instant. But if you cannot relieve his pain, stay where you are and do not flatter him by way of soothing him; your caresses will not cure his colic, but he will remember what he must do to win them; and if he once finds out how to gain your attention at will, he is your master; the whole education is spoilt.

Their movements being less constrained, children will cry less; less worn out with their tears, people will not take so much trouble to check them. With fewer threats and promises, they will be less timid and less obstinate, and will remain more nearly in their natural state. Ruptures are produced less by letting children cry than by the means taken to stop them, and my evidence for this is the fact that the most neglected children are less liable to them than others. I am very far from wishing that this should be neglected; on the contrary, it is of the utmost importance that their wants should be anticipated, so that they need not proclaim their wants by crying. But neither would I have unwise care bestowed on them. Why should they think it wrong to cry when they find they can get so much by it? When they have learned the value of their silence they take good care not to waste it. In the end they will so exaggerate its importance that no one will be able to pay its price; then worn out with crying they become exhausted, and are at length silent.

Prolonged crying on the part of a child neither swaddled nor out of health, a child who lacks nothing, is merely the result of habit or obstinacy. Such tears are no longer the work of nature, but the work of the child’s nurse, who could not resist its importance and so to insist on it, without considering that while she quites the child to say she is teaching him to cry louder tomorrow. Moreover, when caprice or obstinacy is the cause of their tears, there is a sure way of stopping them by distracting their attention by some pleasant or conspicuous object which makes them forget that they want to cry. Most nurses excel in this art, and rightly used it is very useful; but it is of the utmost importance that the child should not perceive that you mean to distract his attention, and that he should be amused without suspecting you are thinking about him; now this is what most nurses cannot do.

Most children are weaned too soon. The time to wean them is when they cut their teeth. This generally causes pain and suffering. At this time the child instinctively carries everything he gets hold of to his mouth to chew it. To help forward this process he is given as a plaything some hard objects such as ivory or a wolf’s tooth. I think this is wrong. Hard bodies applied to the gums do not soften them; far from it, they make the process of cutting the teeth more difficult and painful. Let us always take instinct as our guide; we never see puppies practising their budding teeth on pebbles, iron, or bones, but on wood, leather, rags, soft materials which yield to their jaws, and on which the tooth leaves its mark.

We can do nothing simply, not even for our children. Toys of silver, gold, coral, crystal, rattles of every price and kind; what vain and useless appliances. Away with them all! Let us have no orals or rattles; a small branch of a tree with its leaves and fruit, a stick of liquorice which he may suck and chew, will amuse him as well as these splendid trifles, and they will have this advantage at least, he will not be brought up to luxury from his birth.

It is admitted that pop is not a very wholesome food. Boiled milk and uncooked flour cause gravel and do not suit the somewhat tender teeth. In pop the flour is less thoroughly cooked than in bread and it has not fermented. I think bread and milk or rice-cream are better. If you will have pop, the flour should be lightly cooked beforehand. In my own country they make a very pleasant and wholesome soup from flour thus heated. Meat-broth or soup is not a very suitable food and should be used as little as possible. The child must first get used to chewing his food; this is the right way to bring the teeth through, and when the child begins to swallow, the saliva mixed with the food helps digestion.

I would give them first chew dried fruit or prunes. I should give them as playthings little bits of dry bread or biscuits, like the Piedmont bread, known in the country as "grissins." By dint of softening this bread in the mouth a few of it is eventually swallowed,
the teeth come through of themselves, and the child is weaned almost imperceptibly. Peasants have usually very good digestions, and they are weaned with no more ado.

From the very first children hear spoken language; we speak to them before they can understand or even imitate spoken sounds. The vocal organs are still stiff, and only gradually lend themselves to the reproduction of the sounds heard; it is even doubtful whether these sounds are heard distinctly as we hear them. The nurse may amuse the child with songs and with very merry and varied intonation, but I object to her bewildering the child with a multitude of vain words of which it understands nothing but her tone of voice. I would have the first words he hears few in number, distinctly and often repeated, while the words themselves should be related to things which can first be shown to the child. That fatal facility in the use of words we do not understand begins earlier than we think. In the schoolroom the scholar listens to the verbiage of his master as he listened in the cradle to the babble of his nurse. I think it would be a very useful education to leave him in ignorance of both.

All sorts of ideas crowd in upon us when we try to consider the development of speech and the child’s first words. Whatever we do they all learn to talk in the same way, and all philosophical speculations are utterly useless.

To begin with, they have, so to say, a grammar of their own, whose rules and syntax are more general than our own; if you attend carefully you will be surprised to find how exactly they follow certain analogies, very much mistaken if you like, but very regular; these forms are only objectionable because of their harshness or because they are not recognized by custom. I have myself heard a child severely scolded by his father for saying, “Mon père, irai-je-t-y?” Now we see that this child was following the analogy more closely than our grammarians, for as they say to him, “Vas-y,” why should he not say, “Irai-je-t-y?” Notice too the skillful way in which he avoids the hiatus in irai-je-y or y-irai-je? Is it the poor child’s fault that we have so unskillfully deprived the phrase of this determinative accent y? because we did not know what to do with it? It is an intolerable pedantry and most superfluous attention to detail to make a point of correcting all children’s little sins against the customary expression, for they always cure themselves with time. Always speak correctly before them, let them never be so happy with any one as with you, and be sure that their inestimably modelled upon yours without any correction on your part.

But a much greater evil, and one far less easy to guard against, is that they are urged to speak too much, as if people were afraid they would not learn to talk of themselves. This indirect zeal produces an effect directly opposite to what is meant. They speak later and more confusedly; the extreme attention paid to everything they say makes it unnecessary for them to speak distinctly, and as they will scarcely open their mouths, many of them contract a vicious pronunciation and a confused speech, which last all their life and make them almost unintelligible.

I have lived much among peasants, and I never knew one of them—man, woman, boy or girl. Why is this? Are their speech organs differently made from our own? No, but they are differently used. There is a hillock facing my window on which the children of the place assemble for their games. Although they are far enough away, I can distinguish perfectly what they say, and often get good notes for this book. Every day my ear deceives me as to their age. I hear the voices of children of ten; I look and see the features and height of children of three or four. This experience is not confined to me; the townspeople who come to see me, and whom I consult on this point, all fall into the same mistake.

This results from the fact that, up to five or six, children in town, brought up in a room and under the care of a nursery governess, do not need to speak above a whisper to make themselves heard. As soon as their lips move people take pains to make out what they mean; they are taught words which they repeat inaccurately, and by paying great attention to them the people who are always with them, they guess what they meant to say than what they said.

It is quite a different matter in the country. A peasant woman is not always with her child; he is obliged to learn to say very clearly and loudly what he wants, if he is to make himself understood. Children scattered about the fields at a distance from their fathers, mothers and other children, gain practice in making themselves heard at a distance, and in adapting the loudness of the voice to the distance which separates them from those to whom they want to speak. This manner of speaking is not recognized by custom, nor is it being hammered out a few vowels into the ear of an attentive governess. So when you question a peasant child, he may be too shy to answer, but what he says he says distinctly, while the nurse must serve as interpreter for the town child; without her one can understand nothing of what he is muttering between his teeth. 1

As the grown men, the boys are supposed to be cured of this fault at college, the girls in the convent schools; and indeed both usually speak more clearly than children brought up entirely at home. But they are prevented from acquiring as clear a pronunciation as the peasants in this way—they are required to learn all sorts of things by heart, and to repeat aloud what they have learnt; for when they are studying they get into the way of gabbling and pronouncing their speech will be improved; but their lessons; they cannot find the right words, they drag out their syllables. This is only possible when the memory hesitates, the
tongue does not stammer of itself. Thus they acquire or continue habits of bad pronunciation. Later on you will see that Emile does not acquire such habits or at least not from this cause.

I grant you uneducated people and villagers often fall into the opposite extreme. They almost always speak too loud; their pronunciation is too exact, and leads to rough and coarse articulation; their accent is too pronounced, they choose their expressions badly, etc.

But, to begin with, this extreme strikes me as much less dangerous than the other, for the first law of speech is to make oneself understood, and the chief fault is to fail to be understood. To pride ourselves on having no accent is to pride ourselves on ridding our phrases of strength and elegance. Emphasis is the soul of speech, it gives it its feeling and truth. Emphasis deceives less than words; perhaps that is why well-educated people are so afraid of it. From the custom of saying everything in the same tone has arisen that of poking fun at people without their knowing it. When emphasis is proscribed, its place is taken by all sorts of ridiculous, affected, and ephemeral pronunciations, such as one observes especially among the young people about court. It is this affectation of speech and manner which makes Frenchmen disagreeable and repulsive to other nations on first acquaintance. Emphasis is found, not in the speech, but in their bearing. That is not the way to make themselves attractive.

All these little faults of speech, which you are so afraid the children will acquire, are mere trifles; they may be prevented and corrected with the greatest ease, but the faults which are taught them when you make them speak in a low, indistinct, and timid voice, when you are always criticising their tone and finding fault with their words, are never cured. A man who only learnt to speak in society of fine ladies could not make himself heard at the head of his troops, and would make little impression on the rabble in a riot. First teach the child to speak to men; he will be able to speak to the women when required.

Brought up in all the rustic simplicity of the country, your children will gain a more sonorous voice; they will not acquire the hesitating manner of town children, neither will they acquire the expressions or the tone of the villagers, if or if they do they will easily lose them; their master being with them from their earliest years, and more and more in their society the older they grow, will be able to prevent or efface by speaking correctly himself the impression of the peasants’ talk. Emile will speak the purest French I know, but he will speak it more distinctly and with a better articulation than myself.

The child who is trying to speak should hear nothing but words he can understand, nor should he say words he cannot articulate; his efforts lead him to repeat the same syllable as if he were practising its clear pronunciation. When he begins to stammer, do not try to understand him. To expect to be always listened to is a form of

tyranny which is not good for the child. See carefully to his real needs, and let him try to make you understand the rest. Still less should you hurry him into speech; he will learn to talk when he feels the want of it.

It has indeed been remarked that those who begin to speak very late never speak so distinctly as others; but it is not because they talked late that they are hesitating; on the contrary, they began to talk late because they hesitated; if not, why did they begin to talk so late? Have they less need of speech, have they been less urged to it? On the contrary, the anxiety aroused with the first suspicion of this backwardness leads people to tease them much more to begin to talk than those who articulated earlier; and this mistaken zeal may do much to make their speech confused, when with less haste they might have had time to bring it to greater perfection.

Children who are forced to speak too soon have no time to learn either to pronounce correctly or to understand what they are made to say; while left to themselves they first practise the easiest syllables, and then, adding to them little by little some meaning which their gestures explain, they teach you their own words before they learn yours. By this means they do not acquire your words till they have understood them. Being in no hurry to use them, they begin by carefully observing the sense in which you use them, and when they are sure of them they adopt them.

The precocious use of speech by young children is that we not only fail to understand the first words they use, we misunderstand them without knowing it; so that while they seem to answer us correctly, they fail to understand us and we them. This is the most frequent cause of our surprise at children’s sayings; we attribute to them ideas which they did not attach to their words. This lack of attention on our part to the really strange words and those which are strange to children seems to put to use the earliest of their misconceptions; and these misconceptions, even when corrected, colour their whole course of thought for the rest of their life. I shall have several opportunities of illustrating these by examples later on.

Let the child’s vocabulary, therefore, be limited; it is very undesirable that he should have more words than ideas, that he should be able to say more than he thinks. One of the reasons why peasants are generally shrewder than townsfolk is, I think, that their vocabulary is smaller. They have few ideas, but those few are thoroughly grasped.

The infant is progressing in several ways at once; he is learning to talk, eat, and walk about the same time. This is really the first phase of his life. Up till now, he was little more than he was before birth; he had neither feeling nor thought, he was barely capable of sensation; he was unconscious of his own existence.

"Vivit, et est vitae nescius ipsa sue."—Ovid.